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Abstract
Aircraft Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) is a $76bn industry in which established
service firms such as Lufthansa Technik, Delta Tech Ops, and AFI KLM Engineering & Main-
tenance come under increasing competitive pressure by aircraft, engine, and system manufac-
turers such as Rolls-Royce, Airbus, and Thales. Increasing price pressure on asset sales and the
opportunity to generate profitable service-based revenue streams in the aftermarket makes servi-
tization an imperative for manufacturers, who pursue this type of Business Model Innovation
(BMI) aggressively. Traditional MRO service firms do not only play a vital role for shareholders
and employees but also let airlines benefit from competition in a contracting MRO market that
is in danger of being monopolized. Furthermore, MRO services represent 15-18% of airlines’
direct operating costs (compared to 8% for aircraft financing) and are paramount to ensure safe,
reliable, and punctual airline operations.
This study explores how MROs can successfully innovate their business model when faced with
competition from manufacturers that offer product-service bundles to their customers. While
academia has made significant advancements on how manufacturers can successfully add ser-
vices to their business model, we know very little about how traditional service firms can nav-
igate in such a servitized environment. By conducting three case studies based on 50 in-depth
interviews with MRO and airline managers, I identify a portfolio of four business model con-
figurations that MROs can employ to offer solutions and create value in solution networks.
My findings indicate that MROs can use a contingency-based approach to innovate their busi-
ness model through solution-specific and relational dynamic capabilities. When competing with
manufacturers, MROs can gain a competitive advantage by leveraging the unique elements of
their service-based business model. However, when alliancing is the more promising option,
MROs need to innovate their business model to successfully add and appropriate value in these
complex, coopetitive relationships.
My intention is to make three academic contributions: The principal contribution is clarifying
the role of pure service firms in servitization research and the development of strategic options for
MROs to cope with servitization practices of manufacturers through business model innovation.
Second, this study takes a first step in unveiling the “dark side of servitization”, uncovering the
currently obscure less favorable aspects of this phenomenon. Third, I outline business models
of MRO firms that have been overlooked in the efforts of describing changing airlines’ and
manufacturers’ business models, even though they represent a central link in the supply chain.
This study also claims to make three managerial contributions: first, managers of MROs can
make use of the findings to drive the innovation of their business model and ensure long-term
competitiveness when faced with servitization. Second, the results inform airline managers
about significant environmental changes in the MRO market relevant for technical airline op-
erations, make-or-buy decisions, and MRO procurement. Third, aerospace manufacturers can
benefit from the insights developed in this work to either build a positional advantage against
MROs or rely on these specialized players to complement their service offers.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Motivation: Servitization in the Aerospace Industry
Finding appropriate business models that allow for adapting to dynamic changes in the
competitive landscape has received increasing academic attention (Johnson et al., 2008;
de Reuver et al., 2009; Foss & Saebi, 2017), particularly in the aerospace manufacturing
(Kastalli et al., 2013; Ferreira et al., 2016) and airline industry (Daft & Albers, 2013; Daft,
2015). It has never been so important to examine business model innovation (BMI) as
an enabler of sustained firm performance in dynamic competitive environments due to
the underlying systematic changes in the current airline and manufacturing business
models. This is especially true for traditional service industries, which have received
less academic attention. In particular, the aircraft maintenance, repair, and overhaul
(MRO) sector has come under increasing pressure from aerospace manufacturers that
add services to their business model:
“Aviation’s Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) sector is undergoing a seismic shift as
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) win more and more long-term after care contracts
from airlines. The aggressive strategy is a threat to the bottom lines of global maintenance
providers” (– Ballantyne, 2015, p. 1).
As this quote in an aviation periodical indicates, the entry of the Aerospace manufac-
turers into the service market represents a dramatic increase in competition for estab-
lished MRO firms that has not gone unnoticed, neither in the press nor in the MRO
providers’ balance sheets. The downstream movement of manufacturers into the ser-
vice market is commonly known in the academic community under the term “serviti-
zation” (Oliva & Kallenberg, 2003). Kowalkowski et al. (2017, p. 8) define servitization
as a “transformational processes whereby a company shifts from a product-centric to
a service-centric business model and logic”. In this process, manufacturers offer in-
creasingly complex bundles of products and services to add value to their products
(Vandermerwe & Rada, 1988), which are typically referred to as “solutions” in business
to business industries (Hakanen & Jaakkola, 2012). MROs are pure service firms that
need to compete against this new type of competitor with different business models
including unique resources and capabilities resulting from their manufacturing back-
ground (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011) on a global scale. Increasing competition is generally
welcomed by customers, as it improves their bargaining position (Porter, 1979). How-
ever, airlines increasingly address their concerns regarding possible monopolization of
the MRO market, as manufacturers place rising if not insurmountable barriers to hinder
MROs from competing (Schneider et al., 2013; Hygate, 2013b; IATA, 2015).
Despite servitization being practiced since the early 1960s, the academic conceptual-
ization of the concept started only in the late 80s (Vandermerwe & Rada, 1988), and
only recently have relevant servitization terms been synthesized in a more systematic
manner (Brax & Visintin, 2017). While literature provides evidence regarding barriers
to successful servitization, such as re-centering the company’s culture from products
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to services (Sawhney et al., 2004; Gebauer & Friedli, 2005), research and empirical ev-
idence on competition with pure service firms remain surprisingly thin and mostly
anecdotal. The general implicit assumption is that manufacturers can gain competitive
advantage and improve firm performance by venturing into hybrid product-service
offerings; however, empirical evidence shows mixed results (Neely, 2008; Benedettini
et al., 2015). While most servitization studies explicitly or implicitly focus on compet-
itive advantage gained against other manufacturers, only little (and mostly) anecdotal
evidence about competition with pure service firms exists (e.g., Davies et al., 2007; Finne
et al., 2015). Therefore, established literature cannot fully explain the phenomenon, and
MROs as pure service firms possess no academic guidance of how to cope with the
emerging competition.
Against a common misconception of solution offerings, the asset ownership is not re-
tained with the manufacturer but transferred to the customer or aircraft leasing com-
pany through purchase of the asset (Baines & Lightfoot, 2014). Hence, solution offers in
the aerospace industry are bundles that are comprised mostly of services that support
the product (e.g., maintenance services) or the client (e.g., training services, Math-
ieu, 2001a) which are sold debundled from the product. Debundled pricing enables
pure service firms to continue providing services and solution bundles directly to the
airline customer. Another essential characteristic is that solutions are output-based,
which means that airlines pay a fee based on aircraft usage, not manhours and material
required for repairs, which shifts the risk of exceeding maintenance costs and lower
aircraft utilization partly back to the provider.
The aerospace industry is characterized by mature servitization practices, especially
by engine manufacturers. The “power-by-the-hour” offering by Rolls-Royce, in which
airlines pay a fixed usage-based fee per flight hour for engine maintenance, has even
become one of the most cited examples for servitization (Baines & Lightfoot, 2013). En-
gine manufacturers were the first and the most effective of the aerospace companies to
capture the service market with their solution offerings. While on legacy engines, ma-
nufacturers held around 30% of the service market, they are expected to gain between
65% and over 90% of all maintenance contracts on new engine types (Bourke, 2018).
In response, traditional service providers were forced to established alliances with en-
gine manufacturers to ensure competitive survival in the engine maintenance segment.
Even though these alliances have secured the MROs’ survival, manufacturers can se-
cure much of the profit potential and pin MROs in a dependent position. Currently,
other aerospace manufacturers such as the airframers1 Airbus and Boeing, as well as
system suppliers such as UTAS, Honeywell, and Messier Goodrich, take the engine
OEMs as a boilerplate to drive their own servitization strategies. By adding services to
their business model, manufacturers aim to capture shares of attractive MRO service
market in which firms are able to earn double-digit instead of single-digit profit mar-
1Airframers define the requirements for structure, systems, and cabin of the aircraft and integrate the
mostly subcontracted components groups during aircraft assembly (Krol, 2011).
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gins (Pearce, 2013). Besides revenue and profit growth, servitization allows aerospace
manufacturers to establish closer and longer-lasting ties to their customers, which re-
sults in additional marketing opportunities.
Simultaneously, airlines increase their outsourcing in an industry that is rapidly evolv-
ing and is anything but stable (Hsu & Liou, 2013). Against the background of global-
ization and intensifying competition, many major carriers are going through a process
of de-integration. They now outsource large parts of their business such as catering
and pilot training to networks of suppliers in search of greater efficiency and improved
competitiveness (Rieple & Helm, 2008). The main reasons for this trend towards out-
sourcing include cost savings, a focus on core competencies, and flexibility in manage-
ment (Hsu & Liou, 2013). This also applies to aircraft Maintenance, Repair, and Over-
haul, where many airlines focus on their core business, requiring guaranteed aircraft
availability, maintenance costs, and cost models based on aircraft utilization (Ward &
Graves, 2005; Schneider et al., 2013). Besides, the availability of manufacturers’ com-
plete, integrated, seamless solution packages has increased this demand even further
(Schneider et al., 2013).
This study takes the perspective of MRO service firms that need to seize opportuni-
ties and mitigate threats resulting from the manufacturers’ push into the service mar-
ket, while simultaneously catering to the airlines’ demand of risk-limiting, availability-
based service offers. As of today, academia provides only minimal guidance for MROs
in particular and service firms in general on how to deal with these changes.
The managerial importance of this research gap becomes evident, considering the size
of the affected service firms. Three of the largest MROs are Lufthansa Technik with
annual revenues of $5.6bn, AFI KLM Engineering and Maintenance ($4.6bn), and the
HAECO Group with $1.2bn revenue (Shay, 2017d). Besides, service firms play an essen-
tial role in functional service markets and typically possess substantial market shares.
One example is the German car manufacturing and repair industry, in which 51% of all
car repair shops are traditional, independent service firms, whereas 49% of repair shops
are manufacturer-owned (Boston Consulting Group, 2012). These independent service
firms play a vital role in ensuring competition in the service market and preventing
manufacturers from charging monopoly prices. For these reasons, the European Com-
mission has repeatedly taken mitigation actions to prevent manufacturers from driving
out independent repair shops of the car maintenance market. In particular, “The result-
ing reduction in competition between car repairers could lead to less choice and higher prices for
consumers: independent repairers are often cheaper than authorised outlets, sometimes by over
50%.” (European Commission, 2007, p. 1).
In the aerospace industry, the competitive survival of independent MROs plays a sim-
ilarly important role for airlines and indirectly passengers. The reason is that indepen-
dent service providers prevent monopolization and ensure that airlines have compet-
itive choices in their maintenance decisions. Assuring a competitive MRO market is
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especially vital in this industry in which more than half of lifecycle costs emerge for
MRO during the 25-year lifecycle of aerospace equipment.2 Besides, airlines face sig-
nificant exit barriers, once they have decided which aircraft type to operate.
One example of a solution offer with severe implications on airlines and MROs is the
engine manufacturer Rolls-Royce. Rolls sells its Trent engine exclusively in combi-
nation with a power-by-the-hour agreement, which has gained them a 92% share in
the maintenance market (Hygate, 2013a). For airlines, this contractual arrangement is
highly problematic, as it leaves the airline locked-in with Rolls-Royce during the 25
years operation. Here, the airlines become dependent on this single supplier, which
reduces their bargaining power. The situation is aggravated by the fact that typically
70% of the lifecycle costs of the engine result from operation and maintenance, while
only 30% from the initial purchase of the asset. This position leaves airlines vulnerable
to difficult negotiations with Rolls-Royce, once the initial service contract and warranty
period of the engine has expired.
Unlike in the early times of aviation, the technical operations function of airlines is
not considered as a pure cost factor anymore. Instead, technical operations is a value-
creating core function of airlines that aims to optimize aircraft availability, reliability,
and costs. In this context, the proper management of MRO services is one of the critical
factors in determining the punctuality of airlines. Although technical problems only
account for a small percentage of delays, technical delays have a long duration, a high
impact on punctuality, customer perception, profitability, customer loyalty, and ulti-
mately, airline performance (Knotts, 1999; Niehues et al., 2001; Al-kaabi et al., 2007a;
Rieple & Helm, 2008). The effect of aircraft maintenance, repair, and overhaul services
on airline punctuality stems from the fact that aircraft are maintained overnight and
need to be ready for service in time before the first flight in the morning. This task
involves the management of millions of different parts that need to be maintained in
airworthy conditions or exchanged promptly upon failure to avoid disruptions. Also,
aircraft are regularly maintained during operation in between flights aiming to trou-
bleshoot problems quickly and avoid delays (Kinnison & Siddiqui, 2004).
On the other hand, MRO services also accumulate to the considerable proportion of 15-
18% of airlines’ direct operating cost. This is significantly more than aircraft financing
(depreciation or leasing) that only accounts for 8% of these costs (Berger, 2014). For
commercial engines, even 70% of the lifecycle costs occur in the aftermarket, not the
initial purchase. Tapping into this lucrative aftermarket represents a vital opportunity
for manufacturers to pursue additional Revenue Streams and profitable growth. For
airlines, options for lowering operating expenses besides MRO are limited, since the
primary cost factors fuel, taxes and fees for e.g., landing or air traffic control are mostly
non-negotiable. Thus, airlines consider MRO services as an essential field to achieve a
2As explained further below, MRO costs accrue to 1.5 to 2 times the aircraft financing costs over the
aircraft lifecycle.
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competitive cost-base, whereas Knotts (1999, p. 336) even argues MRO costs to be one
of the two “major yardsticks of airline and civil aircraft performance”.
In summary, servitization and the inherent increase in competition may severely threaten the
competitive survival of independent aerospace MRO service firms with according effects on
employees and shareholders. Besides, the market concentration has the potential to inflict con-
siderable price increases and performance decreases of MRO services with negative implications
on airline performance, and ultimately, passengers. Also, the relevance of this topic will likely
increase in the future in many industries, as servitization is a rising practice amongst a wide
array of capital goods manufacturers (Dachs et al., 2014).
The need to study how MRO service firms can cope with servitization does not only
stem from a managerial but also from an academic interest. As of today, servitization
literature has focused on manufacturers and overlooked the role of pure service firms
and ramifications on service industries almost entirely (Raddats et al., 2019). Thus,
current research possesses only minimal power to explain how service firms can master
the challenges and reap opportunities caused by servitization successfully.
An exception and conceptual basis for this study is an article by Schneider et al. (2013)
who have taken the first step in this field by suggesting two generic BMI paths for
MROs to cope with servitization. One option is to develop outcome-based solutions
to compete with manufacturers in serving airlines that focus on their core business.
The second option is to ally with manufacturers to become part of their solution net-
works. However, these generic BMI paths offer minimal guidance to MROs and other
service firms. For example, academia cannot explain, which type of BMI is the most
appropriate in any given situation. Additionally, we do not know whether both paths
are mutually exclusive or can be implemented simultaneously. Consequently, we lack
knowledge of the types of business models that evolve by implementing these paths.
Another limitation of our current knowledge is that we do not know, how service firms
can adapt their business model to compete and collaborate. How can service firms, for
example, leverage their business model to differentiate their offers against manufac-
turers successfully? Alternatively, what transformations can service firms perform to
ally with manufacturers ensuring their business performance successfully? To narrow
these blind spots, this investigation takes the concept of business models and their in-
novation as a conceptual lens to explore the strategic options that MROs have at their
disposal to cope with servitization.
Business Model Innovation as Conceptual Lens Due to the systemic changes in the
aerospace industry, it is not sufficient for MROs to change single elements of the busi-
ness model such as the Value Proposition. Instead, MROs need to consider the en-
tire business model as the subject of innovation adapt to the multifaceted changes and
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achieve sustainable firm performance.
Business model frameworks are a suitable analytical lens for describing and under-
standing how MROs can cope with servitization. One principal reason is that they use
various strategic management constructs, such as the value chain (Porter, 1985b), strate-
gic positioning (Porter, 1996), the resource-based view (Barney, 1991), strategic network
theory (Jarillo, 1988), cooperative strategies (Dyer & Singh, 1998), boundary decisions,
and transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1981; Barney, 1999) (Morris et al., 2005).
This allows researchers to analyze the core logic of firms, changes in this logic, and
competitive advantage on a strategic (corporate core logic), structural (value chain ac-
tivities), and resource level, through a systemic, multi-level approach (Daft & Albers,
2013). Another reason is that the business model concept is widely used throughout
servitization literature due to its capacity to explain the manufacturers’ shift towards
services (Baines et al., 2017). These studies have unearthed different typologies of so-
lution business models, and the business model innovation process required to add
services to a product-focused business model (Kowalkowski et al., 2017). However, the
process of business model innovation and the resulting business model configurations
of service firms caused by servitization remain close to non-existent.
To avoid ambiguity in the use of the concept, two connotations of business models
need to be discerned. On one hand, the term “business model” describes the inherent
core logic on which a firm operates. On the other hand, the business model concept
is also used as an analytical instrument to dissect and analyze the business models
pursued by companies. To do so, business model frameworks such as the Business Model
Canvas (Osterwalder et al., 2005) are used to abstract the complex reality of firms into
comprehensible models that enable the description and understanding of the firm’s
core logic of creating value (Rentmeister & Klein, 2003; Zott & Amit, 2010).3
To explain the transformation of business models, this study relies on the dynamic ca-
pabilities view (DCV). Dynamic capabilities are the capacity of an organization to pur-
posefully create, extend, or modify the tangible, intangible, and human assets/resources
as well as capabilities, which the company owns, controls, or has access to on a prefer-
ential basis (Helfat et al., 2007, p. 4 and 66). Firms require dynamic capabilities to de-
velop their business model, exploiting chances and avoiding risks posed by dynamic
markets, in order to achieve a competitive advantage over time (Teece, 2007; Demil
& Lecocq, 2010). Furthermore, the DCV has emerged as one of the most influential
strategic management lenses over the last decade (Di Stefano et al., 2014; Schilke, 2014).
For these reasons, the DCV is an appropriate theoretical lens for servitization and the
3The term business model is often used interchangeably to refer to the core logic and the analytical tool.
To avoid ambiguity, I refer to the core logic of value creation by firms with the term “business model”,
e.g., “Ryanair operates a low-cost business model”. In instances in which I use the business model
concept as an analytical tool, I refer to “business model framework”, e.g., “The Business Model Canvas
is a business model framework that describes the core logic of firms operating a specific business model
through nine elements.”
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adaption of business models in its context (Kindstro¨m & Kowalkowski, 2014). The DCV
suggests that manufacturers require a set of service-specific dynamic capabilities to suc-
cessfully add services to their business models (den Hertog et al., 2010; Kindstro¨m et al.,
2013; Gebauer et al., 2013). This is due to intangible and fuzzier nature of service val-
ues (Gro¨nroos, 2007) and the fact that service innovation requires the sensing of local
customer needs and problems (Kowalkowski et al., 2012).
Developing Solutions The first generic BMI path for MROs is to compete with manu-
facturers by developing solutions for their airline customers. To create solutions, pure
service firms need to bundle services (targeting both the asset and the client) to achieve
a competitive position on the market. Because MROs have offered solutions only to
a lesser extent, they need to reconfigure their business model to make new, more en-
compassing, Value Propositions. Recent publications in the sector, such as the Engine
Yearbook 2019, underline the continuous urgency of this need: “it is clear that in order to
survive independent MROs must continue to be highly adaptable and it is this that sets them
apart — their ability to provide tailor-made solutions for the customer and to bend and stretch
with the evolution of the engine market.” (Horwitz, 2019, p. 19).
However, the manufacturer-centric literature is of only little help to MROs. One main
reason is that MROs come from a base in services and that the trajectory towards so-
lutions is different from the product-side of the continuum (Tukker, 2004). As service
providers already possess more service-focused elements in their business model, the
shift is likely to focus on how to reconfigure the existing elements to create outcome-
based offerings.
On the other hand, an absence of manufacturing-related business model elements will
increase challenges associated with the underlying technology in the product. For ex-
ample, assuming the risks inherent in outcome-based products may represent a chal-
lenge. In conclusion, MROs and other pure service firms possess different traditional
business models that need reconfiguring and face different challenges than manufac-
turers. Considering these specific circumstances, previous manufacturer-focused servi-
tization studies have only limited explanatory power.
A second aspect that underlines the need to study pure service firms stems from the fact
that it is unclear whether they can reach a competitive position by developing solutions.
The common assumption is that manufacturers possess product-related strengths that
put them in a more competitive stance compared to pure service competitors (Johnstone
et al., 2009; Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011) and thus, may gain at the expense of intermediaries
(Baines & Lightfoot, 2013). However, it is unclear, to what extent this assumption is true
(Story et al., 2017), as pure service firms may possess other sources of competitive ad-
vantage such as extensive local service infrastructure (Oliva & Kallenberg, 2003). They
may also perform a crucial quasi-purchasing role for their customers, e.g., by providing
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advice in product acquisition and use (Olsson et al., 2013).
Alliancing The alliance option of MROs stems from the phenomenon that servitiza-
tion does not occur in isolation at manufacturers, but instead in the form of solu-
tion networks where traditional service firms play a vital role. As a general agree-
ment, manufacturers face limitations in performing all tasks associated with solution-
provisioning themselves (Baines et al., 2007; Gao et al., 2011), a stand-alone approach
is often less economically viable (Gebauer et al., 2013). Therefore, manufacturers tend
to outsource non-core services to third-party service providers (Cohen et al., 2006; He-
lander & Mo¨ller, 2007), who possess greater experience in service provisioning (Beuren
et al., 2013). As a result, a network with these third-party service providers is formed
by the “solution integrator”, which is usually referred to as service or solution net-
work (e.g., Windahl & Lakemond, 2006; Gebauer et al., 2013; Eloranta & Turunen, 2016).
In the service networks, each actor contributes to the offering (Vargo, 2011), focusing
on their core competence and cooperation with other network actors (Basole & Rouse,
2008). In this context, service firms should reconfigure their business model to become
network partners in these manufacturer-led solution networks. This would change the
existing relationships with manufacturers that enter the service market.
However, academia has traditionally focused on manufacturers and their integrator
role in the field of solution networks. Only recently, scholars have only recently taken
a broader focus on capabilities that other actors, such as customers and intermediaries
require in the context of servitization (Story et al., 2017). Hence, comparatively little
scholarly attention has been paid to the needs of service firms to navigate in a servitized
environment, despite their vital role.
Subsequently, a gap exists in understanding the reconfigurations of business models
that service firms require to become network partners and the dynamic capabilities
needed to do so. This gap is especially critical in the light that the performance of
the solution offer depends on the actors in the network, even to a point where the
brand image of the manufacturer can suffer, if service providers fail to deliver services
adequately (Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013; Nenonen et al., 2014).
Besides, most literature assumes that manufacturers are the central integrating actors
of the solution network, while service firms play only a peripheral partner role (Paiola
et al., 2013; Gebauer et al., 2013). Practice, however, shows that also pure service firms
can integrate manufacturers and other vendors into a seamless solution and even as-
sume responsibility for the manufacturer’s service business. This phenomenon has
only recently emerged under the label de-servitization and is not well understood, es-
pecially in regards to the increasingly blurring and changing responsibilities between
the different actors in solution networks (Kamp & Parry, 2017; Kowalkowski et al.,
2017). Specifically, literature remains unspecific regarding the different types of al-
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liances between manufacturers and pure service firms, the associated benefits and sac-
rifices for service firms, and the factors that influence the alliance decision from a ser-
vice provider side. Consequently, MROs as pure service firms cannot rely on literature
when innovating their business model to cope with servitization.
The networked collaborations formed by manufacturers and service firms require fairly
developed relational operational and dynamic capabilities (Gebauer et al., 2013; Story
et al., 2017). These are, however, particularly challenging to create (Brax & Jonsson,
2009; Gebauer et al., 2012). For example, manufacturers are known to require relational
dynamic capabilities to build, manage, and reconfigure their service networks from a
central integrator position (Kowalkowski et al., 2011b; Salonen & Jaakkola, 2015). Tra-
ditional service firms occupy a decentral network position which requires reconfigur-
ing the business model towards the manufacturer. The reconfiguration can be accom-
plished by developing specific offerings that build on resources and operational capa-
bilities inherent in the service firm’s business model. Hence, the business model inno-
vation process of becoming a network partner differs considerably from the process of
integrating actors in a solutions network. Therefore, the distinct dynamic capabilities
require an empirical investigation to be understood.
In the Aerospace MRO market, alliancing with the manufacturer has been suggested
as the second viable BMI to cope with servitization, mainly due to the manufacturers’
ability to limit the MRO’s access to repair manuals, licenses, and the required tooling
(Schneider et al., 2013). However, there appears to be ambiguity at a strategic level
about decisions on collaborative approaches and on how to actually perform this type
of business model innovation. This is amplified by the fact that in practice different
kinds of alliances exist that differ in the role that manufacturers and service firms take
in the collaboration. Hence, the necessity to perform empirical research on different
approaches for the formation of solution networks stems from both, an academic and
managerial interest.
In summary, academia provides a limited explanation of how traditional service firms can re-
configure their business model to develop solutions and form partnerships with manufacturers.
Additionally, we do not know which different types of alliances exist and the contingencies to
their creation. As both are essential strategic options of pure service firms to cope with serviti-
zation and ensure competitive survival, further investigation in this field is paramount.
To understand the transformations of their business model that MROs should perform,
an understanding of the very object of innovation is required. While business model
innovation of manufacturers and airlines in the commercial aviation value chain has
been or broad academic interest, MRO business models have received considerably less
research. The various innovations that aircraft and engine manufacturers have under-
taken in their business model to gain a competitive edge have been broadly examined.
This includes establishing risk-and-revenue partnerships in the 1990s (MacPherson &
Pritchard, 2007), and servitization since the 2000s (Ng et al., 2013; Batista et al., 2015;
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Ferreira et al., 2016). Similarly, airlines’ business models have been researched exten-
sively. Scholars have laid the focus in this domain on the emergence of low-cost busi-
ness models that continue to challenge traditional network carriers (Bieger & Agosti,
2005; Doganis, 2010), the convergence of these models (Daft & Albers, 2013, 2015), and
performance effects of emerging hybrids between these business models such as the
already dissolved airberlin (Corbo, 2017).
In contrast, the business model of maintenance-, repair, and overhaul firms has at-
tracted considerably less interest. This is despite its relevance for explaining compet-
itive advantage and network formation in the context of servitization, as well as its
high potential for technological and scientific optimization (Uhlmann et al., 2013). In-
stead, different authors have outlined single elements of the MRO business models
(e.g. organizational requirements, Hinsch, 2012), operational efficiency gains through
lean methods (Thomas et al., 2008), and digitization (Sahay, 2012; Kashyap, 2012), or
maintenance management (Tsang, 1998, 2002). As this fundamental underlying ba-
sis is missing, business model innovation of MRO providers, competitive advantage
against manufacturers, and the formation of service networks cannot be explained by
academia. Besides, practitioners cannot rely on a solid academic basis to drive their
business model innovation efforts.
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1.2 Purpose and Contribution
As the main objective of this study is to delineate the MRO firms’ strategic BMI options
to ensure sustainable competitiveness in these circumstances, I formulate the overall
research question of:
“How can Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul service firms retain firm performance through
business model innovation, when faced with servitization practices of aerospace
manufacturers?”
This initial research question has been broken down into the following three sub ques-
tions:
1. What are the elements and characteristics of the business model of Maintenance, Repair,
and Overhaul service firms in the Aerospace Industry prior to servitization?
2. What are adequate strategic options for MRO service firms to cope with servitization?
a) How can competitive advantage between MROs and manufacturers be explained
based on their respective business models?
b) What are adequate configurations of their business model that MROs can develop to
cope with servitization?
c) Which contingency factors influence the decision which configuration should be im-
plemented?
3. How can MRO service firms reconfigure their business model to implement the identified
configurations?
a) What are the specific business model elements that MROs need to develop to imple-
ment these configurations?
b) What are the specific dynamic capabilities and their microfoundations that MROs
require to successfully reconfigure their business model?
By answering these questions, I make three main contributions to servitization research
that has mostly overlooked pure service firms so far.
Strategic Options for Pure Service Firms to Cope With Servitization My first contribu-
tion is to determine viable strategic options for pure service firms to cope with serviti-
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zation through business model innovation. By employing a multiple case study, I build
a two-dimensional framework containing five different archetypes of MRO business
models. The first dimension encompasses the choice of delivering traditional service
or solution offers. The second dimension involves the choice of whether to compete or
collaborate with a manufacturer. Following the identification of the five archetypes, I
outline their adequacy and implementation. This is performed by first discussing how
the generic competitive strategies of differentiation, cost leadership, and focus can be
applied in the MRO market for different types of service offers. Then, I examine how
manufacturers and MRO service firms may leverage their business models to gain a po-
sitional advantage. Based on these findings, I explore the contingency factors that influ-
ence the alliance decision of MROs and hence the adequacy of the different archetypes.
In the last step, I outline the business model reconfigurations involved in implementing
these archetypes and the dynamic capabilities required to do so.
This study is motivated by two prior studies that have considerably advanced our
understanding of competition between pure service firms and servitizing manufac-
turers in general and particularly in the aerospace industry. The first study by Ulaga &
Reinartz (2011) examines how manufacturers can leverage the unique resources from
their manufacturing background to build distinct capabilities that can be applied to
generate a positional advantage against pure service firms. The reason why this con-
tribution is seminal in the context of hybrid offerings is that Ulaga & Reinartz (2011)
are the first and very few authors that examine competition between manufacturers
and pure service firms in hybrid offers. In contrast, prior studies have examined servi-
tization as a strategy to achieve competitive advantage against other manufacturers
(Lightfoot et al., 2013) and have — possibly involuntarily — overlooked competition
with pure service firms almost entirely. Ulaga & Reinartz’ main argument underlining
competitive advantage of manufacturers is their ability to link the product and service
business. According to this argument, manufacturers are in a position to leverage their
unique manufacturing-specific resources to build distinct capabilities that pure service
firms do not possess. By applying these capabilities on different types of industrial
product-service offerings, manufacturers can achieve differentiation or cost advantages
versus service firms that do not possess these unique resources and capabilities.
The main limitation of Ulaga & Reinartz’study is that the authors base their sample
only on manufacturers. Hence, sources of competitive advantage of manufacturers may
underlie a certain bias by interviewees and, more importantly, sources of competitive
advantage of pure service firms cannot be identified. Ulaga & Reinartz (2011, p. 22)
explicitly acknowledge this limitation by stating: “Scholars could also investigate how pure
services firms venture into hybrid offerings and compare their resources and capabilities with our
results.”. However, pure service firms possess unique resources, capabilities, or other
sources of competitive advantage based on their service-oriented business model that
are difficult to imitate for manufacturers. One example are cost advantages through
economies of scale, learning curves, and pooling effects that service firms can realize
by servicing equipment of various manufacturers (Mathieu, 2001b; Cohen et al., 2006).
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In this context, the commercial aerospace industry represents an excellent empirical
field for making a contribution, since traditional MRO service firms continue competing
successfully against manufacturers in this industry.
However, competition is not always the best choice, as the numbers of alliances be-
tween MROs and manufacturers in recent years shows (Spafford & Rose, 2014). In
this context, the second influential article provided by Schneider et al. (2013) comes
into play. These authors provide further insights regarding the development of hybrid
offerings and forming alliances by MRO providers in the aerospace industry, employ-
ing Business Model Innovation as the underlying conceptual lens. Schneider and her
colleagues develop a rudimentary MRO business model and propose developing solu-
tions and forming alliances as appropriate business model innovation paths for MROs
to deal with changes in the aerospace industry.
Even though Schneider’s study forms a solid base to start from, the study has note-
worthy limitations. First, the MRO business model remains generic, being based on
two dimensions only and is therefore very limited in explaining the core logic of MRO
service firms. Second, the study proposes the two generic BMI paths of developing
solutions and alliancing, however, remains unspecific in which cases which BMI path
should be pursued and what configurations emerge, when these paths are executed
simultaneously. Third and most importantly, the study states that alliances with ma-
nufacturers are a necessary but not sustainable approach until the manufacturers have
gained sufficient service capabilities to provide solutions on their own. This statement
poses an intriguing point of departure for my research, as the question arises, whether
options for MROs exist to make this bitter side of servitization sweeter? Could MROs,
for example, forego the creation of unsustainable alliances in some cases or establish
certain types of partnerships that create more value and are more sustainable than oth-
ers?
In conclusion, it remains unclear under which circumstances and how to perform which type of
BMI. Additionally, we have a limited understanding of whether the different BMI paths are pur-
sued in isolation or simultaneously and of the types of business models that evolve in each case.
To give helpful guidance to MRO service firms, we need a much more detailed understanding of
these parameters.
My study not only allows us to understand better how pure service firms can create
solutions but also improves our understanding of the alliance decision of these firms in
solution networks. While academia portrays the decision of manufacturers as a strate-
gic choice that these firms make to either make or buy service capabilities (Paiola et al.,
2013; Salonen & Jaakkola, 2015), our understanding of the respective choice of pure
service firms has remained superficial. However, service firms should take a strategic
approach towards the alliance decision, since it may compromise its established posi-
tion in the service market and eradicate competitive advantage. My research shows
that the alliance decision has more severe antecedents and effects than previously ex-
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pected, directly tying into the competitive positioning between both parties. The quote
“if you can’t compete, you better collaborate” of one of the interviewees serves as vivid
proof of that. Hence, unlike previously assumed, solution networks contain not only
cooperative but also competitive aspects. This study outlines the complicated coopeti-
tive nature of solution networks and the specific dynamic capabilities required by pure
service firms to establish and manage these relationships with manufacturers.
However, the results indicate that not all alliances are created equal; instead, they in-
volve different benefits and trade-offs for the service firm. Through a multiple case
study, I identify three different types of alliances that pure service firms can pursue and
the trade-offs involved in this choice. In contrast to earlier studies, I find that some con-
figurations are a sustainable approach for MROs to develop their business model, while
others are not. These findings contrast previous studies that have portray alliances with
manufacturers as a time-limited and hence not sustainable approach (Schneider et al.,
2013). Additionally, the developed contingency approach enriches our understanding
of how pure service firms cope with servitization through alliances.
In the last part of this study, I outline the business model reconfigurations and spe-
cific dynamic capabilities required to implement each of the archetypes. Implementing
these configurations by the means of the particular capabilities allows MRO service
firms to successfully develop and implement viable strategic options to survive and
thrive when faced with servitization. Overall, the main contribution of this study is
developing a viable approach to business model innovation that MROs can employ to
thrive and survive when faced with servitization. This involves identifying the con-
tingency factors that determine the appropriate configuration and outlining how to
implement it.
Unveiling the “Dark Side” of Servitization The competitive survival of pure service
firms is not only an end in itself but has important implications for functioning service
markets. Current research portrays servitization to be associated with positive effects,
such as competitive differentiation, reduced risk, increased customer value, and the
customer being locked-on, not locked-in (Wise & Baumgartner, 1999; Vandermerwe,
2000; Shankar et al., 2007; Ng et al., 2009). However, the manufacturers’ downstream
movement can have severe effects on customers that are left with reduced or no ser-
vice choices for the lifecycle of their equipment. This is especially severe in industries
such as aerospace that use complex product systems. These industries are characterized
by long product lifecycles, where services such as maintenance constitute a significant
proportion of the total cost of ownership for the customer (Davies & Hobday, 2005). By
identifying the manufacturers’ strategies to erect insurmountable barriers for service
firms or bind them into their service networks, I shed light on the “dark side” of servi-
tization. Explicitly, I identify the specific mechanisms that manufacturers employ to
erect barriers to keep pure service firms from servicing their equipment. These mech-
15
Chapter 1. Introduction
anisms differ considerably from previous assumptions of how manufacturers can gain
a positional advantage versus service firms (i.e., by leveraging distinctive capabilities
based on their unique resources from their manufacturing background).
MRO Business Model Innovation Third, I make a contribution to business model liter-
ature in the commercial aviation industry. So far, research in this area has been limited
to explaining innovative approaches to compete based on business model innovation
of aerospace manufacturers (e.g., Ng et al., 2013; Batista et al., 2015; Ferreira et al., 2016)
and airlines (e.g., Bieger & Agosti, 2005; Doganis, 2010; Daft & Albers, 2013). In this
study, I develop an empirically grounded business model of MRO service firms, clos-
ing the missing link in the business model literature about the aerospace supply chain.
MROs need to understand and adapt the core logic of how they conduct business, as
business models of both their suppliers and customers change dramatically. When do-
ing so, they can leverage unique elements of their business model to create a positional
advantage by achieving strategic fit in times of increased environmental dynamism.
One example is using the well-developed service-related engineering capabilities to
create new digitally-enhanced service offers, which will be decisive for gaining a com-
petitive edge in the commercial aerospace industry within the next years.
Managerial Implications This study also lays claim to make a threefold of managerial
implications: first, managers of maintenance, repair, and overhaul firms within and
outside of aerospace can make use of this study to successfully innovate their busi-
ness model to survive and thrive when faced with servitization. While alliancing is a
promising option, it is not the only choice and managers should carefully select the type
of alliance arrangement depending on the presented contingency factors. When com-
peting, coopeting, or alliancing with manufacturers, MROs should rely on the unique
business model elements identified in this study. These elements can be used for both,
formulating valuable contributions for manufacturers and building a competitive edge
against them.
Second, the findings have implications for airline managers who are responsible for
the development of the technical operations function, the MRO make-or-buy decision,
and procurement of MRO services. Servitization is a severe environmental shift that
presents these managers with opportunities and threats. On one hand, airlines can
improve costs and reduce risks by relying on solution offers; on the other hand, they
need to actively manage increasing long-term dependencies arising in the aerospace
supply chain.
Third, this study has implications for aerospace manufacturers. Managers of these
firms can benefit from the insights developed in this work to design alliances that al-
low MROs to make better value contributions to the partnership and ultimately the
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customer. Focusing on the core manufacturing business and outsourcing most services
to a capable partner is another promising option to benefit from aftermarket revenues
while limiting the risk associated with servitization.
1.3 Structure
The study is structured according to a design that consists of seven chapters, which
aim to answer the research questions in a concise and structured manner. Following
the introduction, the conceptual background is explained in Chapter 2. First, business
models and their innovation are introduced as suitable underlying concepts to guide
and structure this thesis; then servitization is introduced as the main academic research
field to which I plan to contribute.
Section 2.1 outlines the concept of business models and the Business Model Canvas as
an analytical tool to describe these models. Then, I introduce business model innova-
tion and dynamic capabilities as the suitable underlying theoretical lenses that are used
to explain the MROs’ quest for sustainable firm performance. By studying this section,
the reader can gain an understanding of what business models are and how they can be
captured, analyzed, and innovated. In addition, the reader will be informed about the
underlying strategic management constructs that aim to explain competitive advantage
of the firm.
Section 2.3 is dedicated to servitization, the academic research field to which this re-
search aims to make its main contributions. In this chapter, readers are provided with
the required background terms, definitions, and the underlying rationale of servitiza-
tion, to understand the context into which research is embedded. Existing servitization
literature is synthesized into a business model framework, which allows us to compre-
hend solutions and their elements by the terms and logic of the business model lens.
Another primary focus of this chapter is understanding the role of pure service firms in
servitization literature, which is accomplished via a systematic literature review.
The methodology Chapter 3 explains the epistemological positioning and the research
approach of the study. Systematic combining is introduced as the underlying method-
ology that systematically links established theory or concepts with qualitative case
studies in an iterative process to create meaningful findings. Also, the data collection
method, the course of the investigation, including the pilot and the multiple case study
are introduced. Chapter 3 concludes the data coding and analysis process to explicate
how the findings are derived from the data.
Chapter 4 outlines the aerospace industry as the empiric research field, providing the
reader with a profound understanding of this exciting industry that builds the empiri-
cal context of this study. The description incorporates a characterization of the commer-
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cial aviation value chain from aircraft manufacturing over MRO to airlines as central
actors of the value chain, including rules and regulations, as well as trends that are
shaping the industry today.
One focus is the creation of the traditional MRO business model that is outlined in the
Business Model Canvas. The traditional MRO business model allows us to understand
the core logic of how MROs conduct business and compete as well as what is being
innovated to fit with the new market realities induced by servitization. Besides, the tra-
ditional MRO business model forms the basis for understanding sources of competitive
advantage of manufacturers and MROs, as both parties possess unique business model
elements rooted in their traditional manufacturing and service background. A second
focus lies on exploring the business model innovation practices of airlines and manu-
facturers that, being suppliers and customers, have the most substantial influence on
MRO service firms. In conclusion, this chapter contains the traditional MRO business
model and characterizes dynamic environment to which MRO firms have to adapt to
achieve competitive survival and ensure sustainable firm performance.
Chapter 5 is dedicated to the empirical investigation, describing and interpreting the
Engine, Component, and Aircraft Case, which represent the empirical foundation of this
study. For each case, the developments of the respective market segment are analyzed,
including the manufacturers’ incursion into the aftermarket, as well as the focal firm’s
BMI activities to react to this environmental change. In Chapter 6, I outline a strategic
approach for MRO business model innovation to cope with servitization practices of manu-
facturers. To achieve this target, I first define a portfolio of different strategic options for
MROs to develop their business model. This portfolio contains different configurations
of the MROs business model and is based on the two generic BMI paths of developing
solutions and alliancing with manufacturers that have been identified by earlier stud-
ies (e.g., Schneider et al., 2013). In this context, a conceptual approach towards Porter’s
(1980) generic competitive strategies underlines the importance of solution develop-
ment to escape cost-based competition in the MRO market.
Subsequently, competitive advantage of MROs and manufacturing companies is ex-
plained based on the unique elements of the respective business models. Together
with an empirically developed contingency approach, the question of in which cases
MROs should develop stand-alone solutions and in which situations they should ally
with manufacturers is answered. The two core streams of the empirical investigation
build around the questions of how pure service firms can create different types of al-
liances with manufacturers and develop integrated solutions. Following this approach,
the chapter concludes with the exploration of the respective business model innova-
tion paths to reach the different configurations and an analysis of the required dynamic
capabilities and their microfoundations.
In the final chapter, Chapter 7, the findings of the study are discussed, which involves
the implications for academia and practice. Here, I reflect upon how the results of this study
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inform and contribute to servitization research, MRO business models and competitive
advantage between manufacturers and service firms in hybrid offerings. Besides, I
reflect upon the partly paradoxical implications of the findings for managers of pure
service firms, manufacturers, and airlines. In a last and final section, interesting alleys
for future research and limitations of the study are outlined.
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2.1 Business Models
2.1.1 Introduction
The concept of business models (e.g., Magretta, 2002; Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2013;
Wirtz, 2011) is chosen as the conceptual framework to structure my research into dis-
tinct questions and guide the generation of findings. Business model frameworks are
especially suitable for this task: they allow abstracting the complex reality of firms into
comprehensible models that enable the description and understanding of the firm’s
core logic of value creation (Rentmeister & Klein, 2003; Zott & Amit, 2010).
According to Morris et al. (2005), the business model concept is based on various strate-
gic management constructs, such as the value chain (Porter, 1985b), strategic position-
ing (Porter, 1996), the resource-based view (Barney, 1991), strategic network theory
(Jarillo, 1988), cooperative strategies (Dyer & Singh, 1998), boundary decisions, and
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1981; Barney, 1999). Firms are analyzed on
strategic (corporate core logic), structural (value chain activities), and resource level,
following a systemic, multi-level approach (Daft & Albers, 2013). These properties al-
low the researcher to emphasize certain areas of interest without jeopardizing the com-
prehensiveness of the model.
Besides their strong link to strategic management approaches, business models are
nowadays amongst the most widely used concept in strategic planning as stated by
Baden-Fuller & Morgan (2010, p. 156) “when people are asked ’what is strategy’? most give
an answer that includes the words business model”. Originating from e-business, business
models have extended their application to other areas, such as low-cost and networks
(Daft & Albers, 2015), McDonald’s franchising system (Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010),
and Apple’s iPod (Johnson et al., 2008).
However, the business model concept has not remained free from critique, especially in
its early days, when contributions criticized it of being unclearly defined. For example,
Porter (2001, p. 13), notes that “the definition of a business model is murky at best”. Other
authors such as Magretta (2002) disapprove of the sloppy definition of the term and
the overlap with the concept of strategy. Contemporary business model literature has,
however, overcome these initial hurdles and provides a more harmonized understand-
ing and definition of the business model concept (Zott et al., 2011; Daft, 2015).
Servitization literature has broadly embraced the business model concept since the be-
ginning, however with little rigor especially in earlier papers that refer mostly to the
Value Proposition and types of services provided (Baines et al., 2017). In contrast, only
few servitization studies that employ the business model concept offer a holistic ap-
proach to implementing hybrid business models. Instead, studies are mostly concerned
with either establishing business model typologies or with the business model innova-
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tion process required for successful service infusion (Kowalkowski et al., 2017). How-
ever, the concept is well-suited to investigate servitization, as firms need to focus on
innovating all areas of their business models in a holistic fashion, and not just change
isolated elements to successfully convert to a service-based business model (Kindstro¨m,
2010; Kindstro¨m & Kowalkowski, 2014; Adrodegari et al., 2015; Forkmann et al., 2017a).
As this shift is a dynamic process affecting many business model elements simultane-
ously (Ferreira et al., 2013), business model frameworks are of high utility for compa-
nies that aspire to master this change successfully (Barquet et al., 2013; Weeks & Benade,
2015).
In the Aerospace industry, the business model concept has been widely accepted to ex-
plain how firms compete with each other through different business logics. Especially
business models of airlines have been extensively researched, as traditional network
carriers were challenged by low-cost carriers such as Southwest or Ryanair (Doganis,
2010; Gillen & Morrison, 2003; Bieger & Agosti, 2005; Daft & Albers, 2013). Also, the
aircraft manufacturers’ innovation of their business models from the traditional build-
to-print setup, via risk-and-revenue partnerships in the 1990s towards solution provi-
sioning since the 2000s has received considerable research (Esposito, 2004; Pritchard,
2002; Baines et al., 2007; Esposito & Raffa, 2007; MacPherson & Pritchard, 2007).
As manufacturers compete with new, service-infused business models against mainte-
nance, repair, and overhaul firms, business model innovation is a well-suited concept
for MROs to react to this competitive threat. The reason is that business model in-
novation goes beyond pure differentiation and cost leadership strategies. Instead, it
reconfigures the core logic of the enterprise, aiming to mitigate threats, seize opportu-
nities, and ensure competitiveness (Teece et al., 1997). Schneider et al. (2013, p. 288)
explicitly support this approach by stating that “[t]o ensure survival, firms such as the
MRO providers are not only required to consider and drive the commercialization of isolated
product or service innovations but also to question their underlying core business logic”.
In conclusion, the business model concept offers a strong foundation on which the MROs need
for offering solutions and alliancing with manufacturers can be conceptualized from a single,
holistic perspective.
2.1.2 Business Models, Business Model Innovation, and Sustainable
Competitive Advantage
A firm’s business model determines how the elements of the business fit together in
a unique combination that results in superior value creation and thus can partly ex-
plain how competitive advantage is created (Morris et al., 2005). Thus, the general
assumption is that business models can create competitive advantage by two mecha-
nisms: first, unique, valuable elements can be leveraged into a positional advantage, or
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second, the unique combination of business model elements that is difficult to imitate
can create a positional advantage (Teece, 2010). Business model literature draws on var-
ious strategic management constructs to explain competitive advantage based on single
elements of the business model (Morris et al., 2005). Amongst the most popular theory
are the resource-based view (RBV) (Barney, 1991) and its extension the resource advan-
tage (RA) theory (Hunt & Morgan, 1995). Both concepts view the firm as a bundle of
resources and capabilities that have the potential to create competitive advantage over
competitors. While the RBV posits that the sheer possession of valuable, rare, inim-
itable, and not substitutable resources and capabilities explain performance differences
(Barney, 1991), RA theory accounts for the market position of the firm (Hunt & Mor-
gan, 1995).1 According to RA theory, resources do not lead to a competitive advantage
per se; rather they have the potential for rent generation (Morgan, 2012). I.e., Superior
performance is achieved, as superior resource endowments allow firms to achieve a
better relative cost position or superior value creation for certain customer segments
(see Figure 2.1). As resources and capabilities form part of the internal value creation
logic of business models (Wirtz, 2011), these theoretical concepts are commonly used to
explain competitive advantage based on elements inherent in the business model.
Relative Resource-produced Value
Lower Parity Superior
Lower ? CompetitiveAdvantage
Competitive
Advantage
Relative 
Resource Costs Parity
Competitive
Disadvantage Parity
Competitive
Advantage
Higher CompetitiveDisadvantage
Competitive
Disadvantage ?
Figure 2.1: Competitive Position Matrix (adapted from Hunt & Morgan, 1995, p. 7)
Strategic networks are ”stable interorganizational ties which are strategically important to
participating firms. They may take the form of strategic alliances, joint ventures, long-term
buyer-supplier partnerships, and other ties” (Zaheer et al., 2000, p. 203). As business model
frameworks explicitly take value creation with partners into account, strategic network
theory can be used to answer some of the main questions associated with joint value
creation, such as ”how is value created in strategic networks?” and ”how do firms positions
1For simplification purposes, resources, and capabilities that fulfill the criteria of being rare, inimitable,
and non-substitutable are referred to as being unique.
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and relationships in networks affect their performance?” (Zott et al., 2011). In the context
of alliances, also the relational view is a relevant theory, as it seeks to explain compet-
itive advantage through inter-organizational arrangements such as (a) relation-specific
assets, (b) knowledge-sharing routines, (c) complementary resources and capabilities,
and (d) effective governance mechanisms (Dyer & Singh, 1998).
The second mechanism by which business models can create a positional advantage is
by creating a unique combination of a business model’s elements that is difficult to imi-
tate.2 As such, competitive advantage can emerge from the superior coordination of the
firm’s activities, its internal value chain or the excellent management of the interfaces
with others in the value network (Morris et al., 2005).
However, firms do not only compete in the present but also need to be concerned about
a favorable competitive position in the future, a concept known as ambidexterity of the
firm (O’Reilly 3rd & Tushman, 2004). In other words, firms need to formulate ways in
which they can achieve sustainable competitive advantage through current and future
business logics, which has traditionally been at the field of strategy research (Porter,
1996). Business model innovation is a way for firms to sustainably create and appropri-
ate value, especially in times of economic change (Zott & Amit, 2010). This is achieved
by creating new business logics which are well adapted to a changing environment.
Hence, strategy and business model innovation are two concepts that are inevitably tied
to one another. For example, Teece (2007, p. 1325) notes: “the essence of strategy involves
selecting and developing technologies and business models that build competitive advantage
through assembling and orchestrating difficult-to-replicate assets, thereby shaping competition
itself.”. However, the relationship between strategy and BMI remain ambiguous, and
business model innovation has not been anchored in any particular strategic manage-
ment field (Foss & Saebi, 2017). To avoid ambiguity and inconsistencies, I rely on the
business model innovation terminology throughout this study.
Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu (2013, p. 464) provide a definition of business model in-
novation that is particularly well suited in the context of this study: “At root, business
model innovation refers to the search for new logics of the firm and new ways to create and cap-
ture value for its stakeholders; it focuses primarily on finding new ways to generate revenues and
define value propositions for customers, suppliers, and partners.”. Maintenance, Repair, and
Overhaul firms face changing market logics, existing stakeholder with evolving roles,
and customers that require more encompassing types of Value Propositions. Hence,
BMI is a suitable concept to examine the different strategic options in which MROs can
aim for sustainable performance.
In conclusion, the business model concept provides a large variety of possibilities to explain
competitive advantage especially in a dynamic environment based on well-established strate-
gic management concepts. It has even been argued that in certain markets no single strate-
2Matzen (2009) and (Storbacka et al., 2013) refer to the proprietary level of the business model.
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gic management construct can fully explain competitive advantage by itself, while the business
model concept provides the required integration of the distinct perspectives (Amit & Zott, 2001).
Hence, scholars should draw on a variety of concepts that are most relevant for the idiosyncratic
case to explain competitive advantage better. The dynamic environment in the aerospace indus-
try forces MRO firms to find new core logics of how to compete, which makes business model
innovation a well-suited concept for examination.
2.1.3 The Business Model Canvas
Academia has generated an abundance of business model frameworks (e.g., Oster-
walder et al., 2005; Wirtz, 2011; Gassmann et al., 2013; Daft, 2015) from which a re-
searcher can choose to structure their research. To choose an appropriate framework,
considerations regarding the content and logic of each attempt as well as practical con-
siderations need to be made.
Considerations regarding content and logic require business model frameworks to “be
reasonably simple, logical, measurable, comprehensive, and operationally meaningful” (Morris
et al., 2005, p. 729). Also, the framework needs to define how the contained elements
relate to and influence each other (Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010). The Value Proposi-
tion should be defined as the central component around which activities are designed
to deliver value to the customer (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2013; Gassmann et al., 2013;
Schallmo, 2013). The framework should consider financial aspects such as cost struc-
ture and the generation of revenues, as these allow making considerations regarding
profitability (Schallmo, 2013). Zott & Amit (2010) suggest the support of an activity
system, which can be designed or modified to generate value from internal or external
resources and capabilities. Finally, business model frameworks should visualize infor-
mation to facilitate the understanding of complex information by its users (Osterwalder
et al., 2005).
Additional requirements for the business model framework arise from practical con-
siderations. In the aerospace industry in general and in solution provisioning in partic-
ular, service networks are used to co-create value for the customer (Gebauer et al., 2013;
Paiola et al., 2013). Therefore, value creation through alliances or in networks should
be included as one of the framework’s elements. Furthermore, the business model
framework should facilitate communication in designing, innovating or refining busi-
ness models. Hence, selecting a business model framework that is well-established in
practice is advantageous, as practitioners do not have to familiarize themselves with
the peculiarities of the concept.
The Business Model Canvas (BMC) is a business model ontology that has been initially
developed by Alexander Osterwalder in his doctoral thesis (Osterwalder, 2004) based
on structured review of current business model literature at that time. Since its creation,
25
Chapter 2. Conceptual Background
it has quickly disseminated in research and practice (Gu¨nzel & Holm, 2013), i.a. in the
focal company, and was refined in various publications (e.g., Osterwalder et al., 2005;
Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2013). Due to its conceptual maturity and acceptance in re-
search and practice, the Business Model Canvas is selected as the analytical framework
for this publication.
Its nine elements structured around the Value Proposition allow for clear visualization
and are structured clearly in a value creation part on the left and customer-oriented
part on the right side. Financial aspects are included through the two elements Cost
Structure and Revenue Streams. Also, Key Partners are explicitly considered as an
element of the value creation part.3
Value Proposition The Value Proposition describes the “bundle of products and services
that create value for a specific Customer Segment” (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2013, p. 22).
It can be decomposed into a set of offerings that can be managed individually, allow-
ing for differentiation from competition, thus achieving a competitive position. Value
is created for each Customer Segment through a mix of distinctive elements, such as
newness, increased performance, “getting the job done”, price-, cost-, or risk reduction.
A Value Proposition should be evaluated over its entire life cycle from value creation,
over the purchase, in use, renewal, and transfer at the end of the life cycle (Ander-
son & Narus, 1998). This aspect is especially relevant in the context of servitization,
as manufacturers extend their responsibilities for value creation from manufacturing
downstream towards the full life cycle (Mont, 2002).
Customer Segments Customer Segments are the “different groups of people or organi-
zations an enterprise aims to reach and serve” (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2013, p. 21). Cus-
tomers can be segmented according to distinctive offers required, distribution Chan-
nels used, desired Relationships, their profitability, or according to their willingness
to pay for certain aspects of the offer. Segmentation allows the firm to identify and
focus on attractive customer groups, as well as formulating the right ways on how to
address them, such as Channels and desired Relationship (Osterwalder, 2004; Grant,
2010; Scheuffelen, 2017).
Channels This element describes “how a company communicates with and reaches its Cus-
tomer Segments to deliver a Value Proposition” (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2013, p. 26). The
Channel element can be decomposed into different links with the customer that can
3To avoid ambiguity, reference is made to each of the elements throughout this thesis by capitalizing the
first letter of each word, e.g., Value Proposition.
4Source: https://strategyzer.com/canvas/business-model-canvas.
26
Chapter 2. Conceptual Background
Figure 2.2: The Business Model Canvas4
be employed simultaneously, such as the company’s website and retail stores. A com-
pany’s interface with the customer comprises three types of Channels: communica-
tion, distribution and sales channels. The choice of Channels is crucial for delivering
the Value Proposition and influences the Relationship with the customer: firms have
the choice to either use their own channels such as the firm’s sales force, web sales or
owned stores or partner channels such as wholesale stores or online platforms to ad-
vertise, sell and deliver the firm’s offerings. While owned channels provide a firm with
higher opportunities for margins and closer customer contact, they may be costly to
establish and operate. Partner channels, on the other hand, offer the benefit of a wider
reach and utilization of the partner’s strengths, may however lead to lower margins
(Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2013).
Customer Relationships The element Customer Relationships describes “the types of
relationships a company establishes with specific Customer Segments” (Osterwalder & Pigneur,
2013, p. 28). Osterwalder describes various relationships from automated processes
that recognize particular customers, over personal assistance (e.g., a customer represen-
tative) up to user-communities or value co-creation between customer and supplier.
One of the most crucial factors determining buyer-supplier relationships is interdepen-
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dence and power (Wilson, 1995), discussed in the Resource-Dependence Theory (Pfef-
fer & Salancik, 1978; Anderson & Narus, 1984, 1990; Dwyer et al., 1987; Heide & John,
1988).5 The power of a firm A over a firm B comes from control of resources6 that are
valuable for B and not available elsewhere. Thus, power and dependence are inverted:
B is dependent on A to the extent that A has power over B. Furthermore, power is not a
zero-sum game: mutual interdependence occurs, when A and B have power over each
other (Davis & Cobb, 2010). The dependence on a trade partner depends on the extent
to which he provides critical resources for which there are few alternative sources of
supply (Buchanan, 1992). A lock-in is a type of pronounced dependence in which the
dependent firm is confined to an exchange relationship. Causes of this confinement can
be i.a., the lack of alternative options, high switching costs, or even of cognitive nature
(Harrison et al., 2012).
Key Activities The element Key Activities includes “the most important things a company
must do to make its business model work.” (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2013, p. 37). Key Activ-
ities involve the firm’s operating routines, as these secure the operational functioning
of the company. Operating routines involve the routines along a company’s value chain
by which a company usually earns profits (e.g., purchasing of raw materials, research
and development, production, and selling of goods, Wilhelm et al., 2015).
Porter (1996) highlights the importance of Key Activities for competitive advantage, by
claiming that firms must either deliberately choose a specific set of activities that differ-
entiate them from their competitors or perform them differently. Hence, Key Activities
must be tailored to the individual business model to make it work and enable effective
strategic positioning of the firm.
Key Resources The element Key Resources includes “the most important assets required
to make a business model work.” (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2013, p. 34), including both
material and immaterial resources. This element is rooted in the resource-based view
of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993), arguing that (a) companies
need resources to create value and (b) may achieve a sustainable competitive advantage
through the deployment of unique resources and capabilities. In line with the relational
view (Dyer & Singh, 1998), the Business Model Canvas argues that resources and capa-
bilities do not have to be developed internally but can also be provided by other firms
through Key Partnerships.
5For a list of theoretically and empirically supported variables describing buyer-supplier-relationships,
refer to (Teece et al., 1997, p. 4)
6Besides control of resources, other sources of dependence exist. For example, idiosyncratic investments
made for a relationship that have little value outside of the relationship can be antecedents to depen-
dence (Bensaou, 1999).
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Resources per se do not enable a competitive advantage but need to be transformed
through capabilities to do so (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002). A capability is “a firm’s capac-
ity to deploy Resources [. . . ] to a desired end” (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993, p. 35) through
the Key Activities of the firm.7 Capabilities are information-based, firm-specific and are
developed over time through complex interactions among the firm’s resources (Amit &
Schoemaker, 1993). Hence, Key Capabilities are both, created by the interaction or us-
age of resources, and required for transferring resources into Value Propositions. In the
Business Model Canvas, Key Capabilities are included in the Key Resources element
(Osterwalder, 2004).
Dynamic capabilities can be discerned from operational capabilities as being higher-
order versus zero level capabilities. Sydney Winter illustrates the difference, by defin-
ing DCs as “capabilities that would change the product, the production process, the scale, or
the customers (markets) served” (Winter, 2003, p. 992), while operational capabilities are
“how we earn a living now capabilities”. As dynamic capabilities are required for innovat-
ing and not sustaining the business model (Fowler & Reisenwitz, 2013), I have chosen
to place them in a separate section.
Key Partners The element Key Partners describes “the network of cooperative agreements
with other companies necessary to efficiently offer and commercialize value.” (Osterwalder
et al., 2005, p. 10). Multiple theories offer various motivations for firms to enter al-
liances:8 Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1985) take an efficiency perspec-
tive, arguing that alliances can provide cost advantages compared to the internalization
of production processes or purchasing of goods on the market (Dussauge & Garrette,
1999). According to the resource-based and the complementary relational view (Dyer
& Singh, 1998; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Lavie, 2006) firms can create value from re-
sources, capabilities, and knowledge that are not fully owned by a single organization
but a network of partners. In this view, alliances can create a competitive advantage
based on complementary capabilities, relationship-specific assets, effective governance,
and interfirm knowledge-sharing routines (Dyer & Singh, 1998). The institutional view
(DiMaggio, 1988) argues that organizations are motivated to seek legitimacy or ap-
proval through social constituents such as shareholders, customers, and suppliers. An-
other benefit of alliance formation is the reduction of risks and uncertainties, which can
be reduced by partnering even with competitors (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996).
Cost Structure The element Cost Structure contains the most important costs of a
business model (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2013). Companies choosing a cost leadership
7Amit & Schoemaker (1993) refer to processes instead of Key Activities.
8Typically, an alliance is formed with the Key Partners, an alliance being defined as “Institutionalized,
voluntary cooperation between two or more firms toward a common goal” (Albers, 2010, p. 205). For
an extensive review of antecedents to alliances, see Beuren et al. (2013).
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strategy (Porter, 1985a) need to put a higher emphasis on this element than companies
choosing a differentiation strategy. To reduce a business model’s Costs Structure, lever-
aging economies of scale or scope can be viable tactics (Grant, 2010). The Cost Structure
is determined by analyzing all elements of the business model that may incur substan-
tial costs, such as Key Resources, Key Activities, Channels, Customer Relationships, or
Key Partnerships.
Revenue Streams The element Revenue Streams describes the incoming cash flows
from each Customer Segment. Furthermore, it delineates the mechanisms, which are
used to determine the pricing of the value proposition (Osterwalder, 2004; Osterwalder
& Pigneur, 2013). In the context of solutions, pricing is an essential element, as it
changes from an input- towards an output-based logic (Tukker, 2004). By jointly ana-
lyzing a firm’s Revenue Streams and Cost Structure, the financial viability of a business
model can be described.
2.2 Business Model Innovation
The difficulty of continuing with traditional business logic has become a common phe-
nomenon for firms operating in various industries. Previously successful business
models come increasingly under pressure from shifting competitors, technologies and
blurring industry boundaries (Helfat et al., 2007; Teece, 2007). The airline and retail in-
dustry are two examples in which new competitors have revolutionized the way to do
business and put enormous competitive pressure on market incumbents that needed to
innovate their deteriorating business models (Johnson et al., 2008).
In consequence, business model innovation, taking the whole business model instead
of products, services, or management processes as the locus of change has received
increasing managerial and scientific attention (Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010; Ches-
brough, 2010; Zott & Amit, 2010). Zott & Amit (2010, p. 217) provide a popular def-
inition, defining business model innovation as: “the bundle of specific activities that are
conducted to satisfy the perceived needs of the market, including the specification of the parties
that conduct these activities (i.e., the focal firm and/or its partners), and how these activities
are linked to each other.” This definition is suitable for this thesis, as it deliberately rec-
ognizes the fact that partners play a significant role in value creation, and that BMI
involves value creation for all involved parties (i.e., customers, partners, and the firm),
not merely value attribution.
BMI can be applied both to companies that aim to make small but meaningful changes
in their business model and to entrepreneurs or companies that aim at designing en-
tirely new business models (Zott & Amit, 2010). In markets that are characterized by
low levels of dynamism, scaling and stretching of the business model to better exploit
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given business opportunities may be the most viable option for BMI (Winter & Szu-
lanski, 2001). In cases in which firms are confronted with significant levels of envi-
ronmental dynamism, a mere fine-tuning of business models is not sufficient. Instead,
firms will require more substantial reconfigurations to remain competitive (Helfat et al.,
2007; Teece, 2007).
2.2.1 A Portfolio Approach for Business Model Innovation
Portfolio Approaches in Strategic Management
Portfolio approaches to develop the business model or to improve the strategic posi-
tioning of the firm’s offering are common practice. One example is Hertz & Alfredsson
(2003), who examine third-party logistics providers’ strategic options and the underly-
ing capabilities for providing advanced services and logistics solution offers for their
customers. Another well-known example from corporate strategy is BCG’s growth-
share matrix that uses industry attractiveness and competitive position to compare
the strategic positioning of different businesses and steer their development (Grant,
2010).
The popularity of portfolio approaches for strategic management can be partly ex-
plained by strategic uncertainty that firms face when committing to a specific plan and
the tradeoffs involved in that decision. In this context, firms must transform their busi-
ness model to fit this plan (Zott & Amit, 2008) and make sustainable long-term com-
mitments to preempt imitation and ensure sustainable performance (Raynor, 2007). Si-
multaneously, strategic uncertainty and environmental dynamism lead to situations in
which firms make in hindsight wrong long-term strategic decisions and subsequent re-
source commitments (the development of Sony’s Minidisc Player is an example of this
feat, where a chosen strategy was meticulously planned and executed, however the de-
velopment of MP3 technology rendered the Minidisc player uncompetitive). In these
situations, a portfolio approach that entails various strategic options, helps firms to bet-
ter cope with the tension that arises between adaptability and commitment caused by
environmental dynamism and strategic uncertainty (Raynor, 2007).
On the other hand, committing to a specific configuration of a business model entails
certain tradeoffs. The underlying reason for these tradeoffs are the distinct Key Activi-
ties, Resources, and Capabilities that firms must excel at to make unique Value Propo-
sitions to their customers and achieve competitive advantage. For example, Hertz &
Alfredsson (2003) show how logistic service providers need to balance between general
problem-solving capabilities and specific customer-adaption capabilities when provid-
ing different types of logistics solutions to their customers. Also, business models em-
ploy distinct value creation logics, including creating value by transferring standard-
ized inputs into products or services or finding solutions to unique customer problems.
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A third option is to create value by integrating resources, capabilities, and linking ac-
tors in a networked approach (Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998).9 Firms need to deliberately
choose a configuration and execute the associated Key Activities based on unique Key
Resources and Capabilities, as trying to be everything at once involves tradeoffs, di-
lutes the business model, and erodes competitive advantage (Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998;
Porter, 1996).
Finally, firms need to build specific dynamic capabilities that enable them to reconfigure
their business model into the desired configuration (Teece, 2007; Ludwig & Pemberton,
2011). As these are costly to develop and maintain (Zollo & Winter, 2002), firms should
focus on building the dynamic capabilities that are required to reach the desired con-
figuration, not all types of possible configurations. Providing solutions, for example,
requires more advanced service-related customer need sensing capabilities than tradi-
tional product offers (Kindstro¨m et al., 2013). The specificity of dynamic capabilities is
the reason why manufacturers that wish to add services to their business model need to
concentrate more on building these capabilities than manufacturers that follow a pure
product differentiation strategy.
Pure service firms face the dilemma of increased environmental dynamism and strate-
gic uncertainty caused by servitization efforts of manufacturers with the simultaneous
need to commit to a particular configuration of their business model on which they plan
to compete. Besides, they face tradeoffs when developing their business model along
different dimensions. For example, it is difficult to simultaneously build the required
dynamic capabilities to understand the manufacturer and adapt the business model
to cater to the manufacturer’s needs, while simultaneously undertaking all needed ef-
forts to develop solutions for end customers. Hence, the portfolio is a useful strategic
approach to guide pure service firms in general and MROs in particular in creating
their business model innovation plans. Therefore, the portfolio approach allows ser-
vice firms to reach an ideal fit with changes in the external environment caused by
servitization.
Configurations
I use a configurational approach (Miller & Friesen, 1984) paired with the Business
Model Canvas as the underlying framework that describes the individual configura-
tions of MRO business models. The described configurations are an abstraction of real
MRO business models into ideal types or archetypes (Miller & Friesen, 1984), in which
complex situations are parametrized by a limited set of mutually supportive parame-
ters (i.e., the business model elements) that form a cohesive system (Miller, 1986).
9These three business model configurations have been labeled by Stabell & Fjeldstad (1998) as Value
Chain, Value Shop, and Value Network.
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This abstraction is useful, as “Configurations allow people to order and make sense out of
their worlds by sorting things into discrete and relatively homogeneous groups.” (Meyer et al.,
1993, p. 1197), which can be better analyzed and understood than the complex real-
ity of single instances. The configurations that are presented here are in line with the
common assumption of having a close fit between external situational factors and the
internal design parameters (Mintzberg, 1979). Working with configurations allows me
to identify the contingency factors that determine which ideal type firms should choose
from the portfolio.
However, I depart from the equifinality assumption, which states that the configura-
tions are equally effective as they are a harmonic combination of context and structure
(Meyer et al., 1993). The reason is that some of the identified business model types have
the potential for a higher firm performance of the MRO service firm than others. Even
though I was not able to collect figures to support this claim, interviewees clearly stated
which configuration is preferential for which reasons.
According to configurational theory, a firm must seek to align strategy, organizational
arrangements, and conditions of the external environment. In order to do so, the firm
will choose different organizational arrangements depending on internal (i.e. firm- and
offering-specific) and external (i.e. market-specific) contingency factors (Mintzberg,
1979; Gresov, 1989; Donaldson, 2001). This logic is reflected in business model liter-
ature which highlights that a fit between the business model itself, the environment,
and the firm’s strategy needs to be achieved (Osterwalder, 2004; Zott & Amit, 2008;
Demil & Lecocq, 2010). Hence, there is no single, best way to organize a firm; instead
business model innovation should seek to develop a business model that is best suited
to the particular circumstances (Davies & Brady, 2000).
Contingency Factors can take a variety of forms and can be present externally of the
firm (e.g., as market-specific factors) or reside internally (e.g., a change of strategy may
trigger adaptions in the business model, Kowalkowski et al., 2011b). A well-known
market-specific factor is the level of environmental dynamism, as the type of dynamic
capabilities required for business model innovation and the effectiveness of dynamic
capabilities on firm performance is contingent on the level of environmental dynamism
(Zollo & Winter, 2002; Winter, 2003; Schilke, 2014). At the same time, the presence of
dynamic capabilities represents an internal contingency factor for BMI (Foss & Saebi,
2017). The reason is that dynamic capabilities are required to perform specific BMI
paths (Teece, 2007) but are not readily present. Instead, they need to be built and sus-
tained, which requires time and effort (Zollo & Winter, 2002).
A firm’s dependence on resources controlled by external actors is another contingency
factor for organizational arrangements, which has been broadly explored by scholars
employing the Resource Dependence Theory (RDT, Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). RDT char-
acterizes the firm as an open system that is dependent on the contingencies of the exter-
nal environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Central to the RDT is the concept of power,
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which is derived from the control of critical resources (Ulrich & Barney, 1984).
According to RDT, firms attempt to limit the power others have over them, while often
trying to increase their control over others (Hillman et al., 2009). These actions may lead
to power imbalance and mutual interdependence between firms (Casciaro & Piskorski,
2005). Firms can develop their business model in various ways to limit dependence,
e.g., by adding partners in the form of strategic alliances or joint ventures and adding
activities such as political actions to their business model (Hillman et al., 2009).
Resource dependence and the enactment of power over other actors are of particular
relevance in the context of servitization. The reasonx is that interdependence is present
in service networks that manufacturers employ to provide their hybrid offerings. While
on one hand manufacturers try to gain a central network position that can be used to
obtain power and exert it over the suppliers in the network (Corsaro et al., 2012; Salo-
nen & Jaakkola, 2015), they also depend on their partners due to relationship-specific
investments and adverse image effects of their partners’ unsuccessful service offerings,
which leads to mutual interdependence (Kindstro¨m, 2010; Salonen & Jaakkola, 2015).
As dependence on the manufacturer has emerged as a pivotal theme in the pilot study,
RDT is expected to have high explanatory power for MRO competitiveness and alliance
formation in the aerospace industry.
2.2.2 Dynamic Capabilities: Enablers of Business Model Innovation
The Nature of Dynamic Capabilities
The Dynamic Capability View (DCV) of the firm arose approximately two decades ago,
aiming to identify “the sources of enterprise-level competitive advantage over time” (Teece,
2007, p. 1320). The DCV attempts to explain why some firms thrive and survive in
turbulent environments and aims to identify the underlying drivers of long-term firm
survival and success (Wilden et al., 2016). The DCV resulted out of the critique on
the resource-based view, being too static and not taking the possibly disruptive effects
of changing environments into account (Helfat et al., 2007). Over the last decade, the
DCV has emerged as one of the most influential lenses of strategic management, with
a steady and strong incline in research activity (Di Stefano et al., 2014; Schilke, 2014).
Helfat et al. (2007, p.4) provide a widely-accepted understanding of a dynamic capabil-
ity being: “the capacity of an organization to purposefully create, extend, or modify the tan-
gible, intangible, and human assets/resources as well as capabilities, which the company owns,
controls, or has access to on a preferential basis”. As such, dynamic capabilities are the in-
ternal enablers of business model innovation (Foss & Saebi, 2017). Dynamic capabilities
can be distinguished from operational capabilities by the fact that they are required to
innovate not operate the business model (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003).
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Microfoundations of Dynamic Capabilities
Dynamic capabilities are often disaggregated into the three categories of sensing, seiz-
ing, and reconfiguring according to the framework developed by Teece (2007). Sensing
refers principally to the perception of opportunities and threats by gathering and as-
sessing business intelligence. This category may include the sensing of customer pref-
erences, the emergence of new technologies, developments of local and global markets
but also new competitors (Helfat et al., 2007; Teece, 2007).
Once firms perceive opportunities, they need to seize them to leverage them into com-
petitive advantage. Seizing almost always requires an investment, for example into an
R&D project. Also, structures must be in place to decide which of the multiple, often
competing, opportunities to pursue. During this process, the firm may create or select a
particular business model that supports the commercialization strategy and investment
priorities (Teece, 2007). However, a pure investment in technological competency and
complementary assets is not sufficient. Instead, the firm must run a business model that
is flexible enough to sustain and exploit new opportunities as they present themselves
(Chesbrough, 2010; Teece, 2010).
A key to successful and sustainable growth is the capability to reconfigure the business
model of the firm, adapting it for example to changing markets or technologies (Teece,
2007, 2012). Successful firms often become complacent and rigid over time, frequently
rather fine-tuning their business model and focusing on exploitation instead of explo-
ration. This fine-tuning may be sufficient in cases of minor environmental dynamism;
however, firms will require more substantial reconfigurations when faced with higher
environmental dynamism or even disruptive change (Helfat et al., 2007; Teece, 2007).
The three categories of sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring can be further disaggre-
gated in their microfoundations, which are the “organizational and managerial processes,
procedures, systems, and structures that undergird each class of capability” (Teece, 2007, p.
1321).
In conclusion, dynamic capabilities enable organizations to purposefully innovate or reconfigure
all elements of their business model, be it their own or partners’ resources and capabilities, their
Key Activities, Customer Relationships or the very core logic of how value is created.
The Context-specificity of Dynamic Capabilities
Dynamic capabilities are not universal but depend on the specific industry and con-
text (Ludwig & Pemberton, 2011). While early studies exhibit a bias towards products
and technological innovation (Kindstro¨m et al., 2013), only little progress in the ser-
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vice domain have been made. For example, scholars have undertaken conceptual and
empirical studies of the dynamic capabilities required for service innovation in general
(den Hertog et al., 2010; Wilden et al., 2018), in service networks (Agarwal & Selen,
2009) and specifically in the context of servitization (Kindstro¨m et al., 2013).
Dynamic Capabilities and Environmental Dynamism The nature of dynamic capabili-
ties and the effect that DCs have on performance varies with the level of environmental
dynamism that is present in a market. While markets with low dynamism are charac-
terized by infrequent changes that can be mostly anticipated (Schilke, 2014), highly dy-
namic environments are “ones in which market boundaries are blurred, successful business
models are unclear, and market players (i.e., buyers, suppliers, competitors, complementers)
are ambiguous and shifting.” (Eisenhardt et al., 2010, p. 1111). For low levels of envi-
ronmental dynamism, dynamic capabilities only have a limited effect on performance,
since dynamic capabilities are both costly to build and sustain (Zollo & Winter, 2002;
Winter, 2003) while these type of markets do not provide ample opportunities for re-
source reconfiguration. Instead, markets with low levels of environmental dynamism
rather foster exploitation of the existing resource base (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Teece,
2007). Hence, service firms need to develop specific dynamic capabilities, depending
on whether they aim to drive market change, or quickly react to a changed environment
in dynamic markets (Wilden et al., 2018).
In highly dynamic market environments, routine-based dynamic capabilities are not an
adequate means for change, due to their path dependency and organizational inertia
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Schreyo¨gg & Kliesch-Eberl, 2007). Here, competitive ad-
vantage is quickly eroded, which leads to the necessity of establishing simpler, more
experimental, and iterative routines. Consequently, DCs “consist mostly of simple rules
and real-time knowledge creation, [however] they may have detailed routines to deal with aspects
of the process where prior knowledge and/or codification are particularly useful” (Eisenhardt &
Martin, 2000, p. 1113).
Thus, dynamic capabilities have the strongest effect in intermediate levels of environ-
mental dynamism, where on the one side opportunities for reconfiguration are present,
while on the other side routine-based dynamic capabilities are suited to seize them
(Schilke, 2014). In these markets, DCs are “complicated, predictable, analytic processes
that rely extensively on existing knowledge, linear execution and slow evolution over time”
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000, p. 1113). In contrast, they are not “simple rules” (Eisen-
hardt et al., 2010) and ad-hoc problem solving activities, some type of innate talent, or
one-time idiosyncratic resource-reconfigurations or best practices (Winter, 2003; Helfat
et al., 2007).
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Environmental Dynamism in the Aerospace Industry The aerospace industry tradi-
tionally displays low environmental dynamism and is characterized by long product
lifecycles, few market entries or exits, and high safety regulations, slowing down tech-
nological innovation (Fan & Zhang, 2010). The principal aircraft manufacturers Airbus
and Boeing are stable competitors whose duopoly has been strengthened even further
by the integration of Bombardier and Embraer, respectively. Meanwhile, new competi-
tion from Asia is only slowly emerging through COMAC and Mitsubishi, while Russian
aircraft manufacturing does not represent any credible threat to the Western supremacy
in this industry. Also, MROs have been competing for decades in a relatively stable en-
vironment with other third party and independent MRO providers.
Servitization represents a considerable increase of environmental dynamism for MRO
firms, as they are forced to compete with manufacturers that go downstream (Wise
& Baumgartner, 1999) and compete with different resources and capabilities based on
their manufacturing-led business model (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). The simultaneous
trends of an increasing amount of airlines that focus on their core business and demand
of solution offerings (Ward & Graves, 2005; Schneider et al., 2013) further adds to these
dynamics and creates the need to develop the MROs’ business model to fit with the new
market realities. Hence, dynamic capabilities are crucial for MROs to innovate their
business model, which allows them to mitigate risks and benefit from opportunities
that servitization provides.
Dynamic Capabilities for Solution Provisioning Servitization is a research field that
is increasingly linked to the Dynamic Capabilities View (Kindstro¨m & Kowalkowski,
2014). There appears to be consensus on that manufacturers require dynamic capabili-
ties to guide them towards a successful service-oriented business model earning the ex-
pected revenues and profits (Fischer et al., 2010; Kohtama¨ki & Helo, 2015). This service
innovation process is based on a deliberate, evolutionary process of sensing, seizing,
and reconfiguring routines, which are facilitated through the management innovation
(Gebauer, 2011).
As these are context-specific to the servitization phenomenon and thus represent a good
indication of dynamic capabilities that may be required by MROs aiming to develop
Solutions, I analyze articles that explicitly specify the dynamic capabilities that manu-
facturers need to provide hybrid offerings in Chapter 2.3.
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2.3 Servitization
2.3.1 Introduction
Innovative manufacturing firms increasingly compete strategically through service pro-
visioning (Spring & Araujo, 2009). Particularly in manufacturing sectors with a high in-
stalled product base, integrated product-service offerings can be used to defend a com-
petitive advantage versus lower cost economies (Wise & Baumgartner, 1999). Conse-
quently, there is a growing amount of research concerned with the phenomenon known
as servitization of manufacturing (Vandermerwe & Rada, 1988). A commonly cited ex-
ample is Xerox that instead of selling printers are selling document management so-
lutions. In this offering, the customer does not acquire the printer but pays a fee for
each page printed, while Xerox is responsible for installation and all maintenance tasks
(Baines et al., 2007).
While the origins of servitization in strategic management literature are commonly
traced back to the early 1990s, Davies et al. (2007) point out that the industrial mar-
keting literature suggests origins in the 1960s with the introduction of ’systems sell-
ing’ strategies. Since then, many manufacturing companies have moved dramatically
into services blurred the boundaries between product and service industries. Servitiza-
tion is a common and rising practice in many industries, predominantly of investment
goods such as medical equipment, automotive or train manufacturing, where manufac-
turers are achieving an increasing portion of their revenue with services. As depicted
in Figure 2.3, about 80% of the European manufacturers were offering services while
earning 10-15% with service revenues in 2014.
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Figure 2.3: Relevance of Product-related Services in Manufacturing (Dachs et al., 2014)
Due to the rising importance of servitization in practice, many research communities
have adopted the concept for their work (Mu¨ller & Sakao, 2010), leading to an increas-
ing number of publications (see Figure 2.4) and importance of servitization as a research
38
Chapter 2. Conceptual Background
topic (Kowalkowski et al., 2015).
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Figure 2.4: Number of Publications in Servitization research (adapted from Lightfoot et al., 2013)
2.3.2 Related Terms and Concepts
According to Baines et al. (2009), the term “servitization” was coined by Vandermerwe
& Rada (1988, p. 314), who stated that servitization is: “the increased offering of fuller
market packages or ‘bundles’ of customer-focused combinations of goods, services, support, self-
service and knowledge in order to add value to core product offerings”. Subsequently, re-
search has been launched under different terminologies and headlines (Wang et al.,
2011). Moreover, a clear ontology is missing (Vasantha et al., 2012; Sakao et al., 2009;
Mu¨ller & Sakao, 2010). Some terms are used synonymously although they are not the
same (Beuren et al., 2013) and different terms have been used to describe the same phe-
nomena (Pawar et al., 2009). Some authors have even come to the conclusion that a
“jungle of terms” (Park & Lee, 2009, p.1) exists. These terms include e.g. “servicisation”
(Quinn et al., 1989), “service infusion” (e.g., Eloranta & Turunen, 2015), “development of
product-service systems” (Baines et al., 2009), “through-life management” (Ward & Graves,
2005), “going downstream” (Wise & Baumgartner, 1999), “integrated solutions” (Davies,
2004), and “new manufacturing” (Marceau et al., 2002). Not until very recently, has this
“jungle of terms” received a major step in clarification, although earlier attempts10 have
helped to systematize the research field. However, the servitization research commu-
nity still lacks a common lexicon to structure the scientific and practical debate but
10The systemization of the research field has been an effort of various authors: Baines and his colleagues
conducted two literature reviews regarding servitization (Baines et al., 2009) and PSS (Baines et al.,
2007) clarifying both concepts. Reim et al. (2015) identify and define further concepts related with
PSS, whereas Park & Lee (2009) provide a literature review to create a common terminology and unify
the different terms under the umbrella term “Integrated Product-Services” (IPS). Velamuri et al. (2011)
provide a literature review including German publications with the aim to concise a set of current
definitions and categorize the work on hybrid value creation.
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Authors Definition of Servitization
Kindström (2010), p. 481 Companies need to adopt a more holistic, business model-like, approach in order to besuccessful in developing new services and moving to [a] service-based business model.
Adrodegari et al. (2016), p. 519 In order to successfully move “from products to solutions”, companies need to redesigntheir business model.
Forkmann et al. (2017), p. 151
This study conceptualizes service infusion as a business model reconfiguration by using
a process perspective. Service infusion is therefore understoodas a process affecting the
business model dimensions of transaction content, structure, and governance.
Table 2.1: Selected Definitions of Servitization
continues relying on various terms and concepts (Kowalkowski et al., 2017). However,
the research field is becoming more structured with literature reviews that aim to inte-
grate and cluster the different research streams (Brax & Visintin, 2017; Raddats et al.,
2019). In the following sections the related concepts are introduced, delimited, and a
leading ontology for this thesis is defined.
Servitization
Literature related to servitization refers with different terms to either the process of a
manufacturer transitioning towards services, the product-service offerings, or practices
undertaken in the process. Servitization is a term that commonly refers to the process
of leading a service-led growth strategy (Kowalkowski et al., 2017). It has received
synonyms such as “service infusion” (Brax, 2005; Kowalkowski et al., 2012), and “ser-
vice transition” (Oliva & Kallenberg, 2003; Fang et al., 2008), which are interchangeably
used in literature. The different synonyms employed are due to the different geograph-
ical and research interest of the several research communities11 which investigate the
phenomenon (Lightfoot et al., 2013). Servitization literature has recently employed the
business model concept in the definition of servitization. The common denominator
is that servitization is interpreted as a change from a pure product-centric towards a
service-centric business model (see Table 2.1).
As business model innovation is one of the central concepts of this study, I define
servitization in line with Kowalkowski et al. (2017, p. 8) as “the transformational pro-
cess whereby a company shifts from a product-centric to a service-centric business model and
logic”.
Tukker (2004) and Clayton et al. (2012) conceptualize a continuum between products
11According to Lightfoot et al. (2013), the following distinct research communities are concerned with the
phenomenon of servitization from a range of different perspectives: Marketing, Service Management,
Operations Management, Service Science. For an overview of each community and their main research
concerns, please refer to Lightfoot et al. (2013, p. 1428).
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and services on which firms can position themselves defining their product-service mix
(see Figure 2.5). Manufacturers that venture from the product-side of the continuum
towards an increasing focus on services are engaged in servitization.
Recently, literature has identified the deservitization as the reverse process to servitiza-
tion, in which manufacturers return to a focus on their core competence manufacturing,
either outsourcing services to specialized service firms or spinning-off their service di-
visions (Kowalkowski et al., 2017; Valtakoski, 2017). Deservitization can be explained
by different factors such a lack of profitability and shareholder value generated by the
service offering (Gebauer et al., 2005; Johnstone et al., 2009) or the fact that the customer
or specialized service provider is better able to provide services than the manufacturer
due to tacit knowledge required for the operation of the equipment (Valtakoski, 2017).
Hence, cases may exist in which it is more advantageous for the manufacturer to offer
less rather than more services and focus on the core business.
Above, we have clarified the terms used to describe how manufacturers reconfigure
their business model to include more services or focus on products. However, what
about pure service firms that compete with manufacturers either with pure services of-
fers or integrated bundles of services and products? While extensive guidance has been
given for firms undertaking servitization, both advice and empirical evidence for pro-
ductization remains scarce. In contrary, servitization literature has not yet established
a clear terminology regarding this type of business model innovation.
The few empirical studies concerned with the business model innovation of pure ser-
vice firms towards providing a combination of products and services refer to this change
of business model as “moving upstream” (Davies, 2004, p. 728), or “becoming [. . . ] inte-
grated solution providers” (Brady et al., 2005, p.364). Baines et al. (2007) and Clayton
et al. (2012) propose “productization” as a term for pure service firms that start to add
products to their service offerings, to enter the product-service continuum from the
right (service) side. However, productization has already been established as a term
referring to a process aiming at “making services more tangible, product-like and repeatable”
(Harkonen et al., 2015, p. 70). Practitioners have developed a similar understanding of
Product content
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Service content
(intangible)
Product + Service Product & Service Service + Product
Deservitization Servitization
Pure
Service 
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Figure 2.5: Product-Service Continuum (adapted from Tukker, 2004; Clayton et al., 2012)
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productization as being a practice involving (a) specifying and standardizing the ser-
vice offering, (b) concretizing the service offering and making it more tangible, and (c)
systemizing and standardizing processes and methods (Jaakkola, 2011). Hence, pro-
ductization is not a suitable term for the innovation of a service firm’s business model
towards providing hybrid product-service offerings.
Very recently, literature has coined the term “reverse servitization” referring to “a strat-
egy in which a service firm builds technology innovation competencies and delivers advanced
services” (Baines et al., 2017, p. 269). As reverse servitization includes building manu-
facturing capabilities, I do not regard it as a suitable term in the context of this study,
since service providers may also compete with pure service solutions or solutions based
on the equipment of various manufacturers (Hobday et al., 2005). In conclusion, the
business model innovation process of pure service firms competing with bundles of
services and products against manufacturers is labeled in congruence with Brady et al.
(2005) as “becoming a solution provider”.
Types of Product-Service Systems
A Product-Service System (PSS) is commonly defined “an integrated product and ser-
vice offering that delivers value in use” (Baines et al., 2007, p. 3). Multiple other terms
describe the combination of products and services, such as “industrial product-service
systems” (IPS2, Meier et al., 2010), “functional product” (Markeset & Kumar, 2005), and
the marketing-led concept of “hybrid offerings” (Beuren et al., 2013; Kowalkowski et al.,
2017). PSS has evolved beyond its original usage in the context of engineering, opera-
tions management, and ecology (Lightfoot et al., 2013), as it has been widely adopted by
a stream of literature that interprets servitization as an innovation of a firm’s business
model (e.g., Reim et al., 2015; Adrodegari et al., 2016).
In the attempt to classify different types of PSS, servitization literature has produced a
massive number of typologies12, aiming at both classifying types of PSS business mod-
els and describing the degree of servitization of a manufacturer on the product-service
continuum. Interestingly, however, the papers do not employ any of the established
business model frameworks to describe the different types. Instead, the description
is mostly limited to either the payment model or the Value Proposition. The proba-
bly most cited classification is provided by Tukker (2004), who categorizes PSS into
product-oriented, use-oriented and result-oriented offerings (see Figure 2.6). Each of
these categories is composed of further subcategories, comprising a total of eight PSS
offerings. As pointed out earlier, also Tukker refers to these types of offerings as busi-
ness models, although the description is limited to the offering and revenue structure
while omitting changes in all other dimensions of a business model.
12For a review please refer to Oinonen & Jalkala (2013) or to Wallin (2013a).
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Figure 2.6: Product-, Use-, and Result-oriented PSS Offerings (adapted from Tukker, 2004)
In product-oriented offerings, the product is sold in a traditional manner together with
services that ensure the utility such as after-sales services, repair, and maintenance.
Since the value lies mainly in the product content, customers perceive services often as
mandatory and compulsory, which goes along with a low willingness to pay. Accord-
ingly, manufacturers may be obliged to either offer them for free or include them free
of charge in comprehensive packages (Lele, 1997). In use-oriented Value Propositions,
the customer pays based on the usage of the product, such as in car-sharing models. In
result-oriented offerings, the customer pays for the achievement of the agreed results.
This may be achieved through process outsourcing such as office cleaning, pay per ser-
vice unit or the agreement on a functional result (Tukker, 2004). An illustrative example
for pay per service unit are Xerox document management solutions, in which the cus-
tomer does not pay for printers or their maintenance but each page printed (Xerox,
2015).
While this typology is useful for the classification of the revenue streams that underly
the solution offer, it does not reflect the change of perspective required by manufac-
turers, who traditionally focus on product instead of service aspects and is therefore of
limited value for the the required business model innovation (Lightfoot et al., 2013). In
her early work, Mathieu (2001a) problematizes this change, clustering services accord-
ing to their recipient: services supporting the product (e.g., maintenance services) and
services supporting the client (e.g., consulting services). She finds that manufacturers
need to overcome barriers to successfully offer services supporting the client, which
are characterized as a closer customer relationship, a higher degree of customization,
innovation potential and opportunities for differentiation (Mathieu, 2001a).
Ulaga & Reinartz (2011) define a typology of PPS offers building on Mathieu (2001a),
who clusters service offers according to their recipient (services supporting the prod-
uct and services supporting the client) and Tukker (2004), who distinguishes between
input- and output- (i.e., availability and performance-based) based offerings. Combin-
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ing these two approaches, the authors define a theoretically and empirically-founded
service typology (Figure 2.7) that clusters services along the two dimensions “Nature
of the Value Proposition” (i.e., input- or output-based) and “Service Recipient” (i.e.,
product or customer’s process).
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Figure 2.7: Typology of Industrial Services for Hybrid Offerings (adapted from Ulaga & Reinartz,
2011)
This framework is especially valuable for a strategic portfolio-based analysis since the
Key Capabilities and Resources required for each type of service, and the underly-
ing logic for competitive differentiation differ fundamentally in each of the quadrants
(Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). Thus, the framework is suitable for analyzing competitive
advantage between pure service providers and manufacturers in different types of PSS
offers.
Product Life Cycle Services Product life cycle services (PLS) refer to “the range of ser-
vices that facilitate the customer’s access to the manufacturer’s good and ensure its proper func-
tioning during all stages of its life cycle, whether before, during, or after its sale”, such as
installation and maintenance (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011, p. 15). PLS are promises to per-
form a deed, directed towards the manufacturer’s good (e.g., exchange of a toner car-
tridge when empty). Since PLS are core services required for the functioning, such as
maintenance services, manufacturers may be faced with the necessity to provide these
services to sell their goods. Since these kinds of services are considered a “must-have”
by the customer, a minimal opportunity for competitive differentiation and low will-
ingness to pay may be present. Consequently, a cost leadership strategy may be the
most appropriate, which requires vendors to provide these services in a cost-efficient
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way.
Asset Efficiency Services Asset efficiency services (AES) are “the range of services sup-
pliers provide to achieve productivity gains from assets invested by customers” (Ulaga & Rein-
artz, 2011, p. 17), such as condition monitoring or reliability management. Just like
product lifecycle services, AES are geared towards the manufacturer’s good, however,
aim at improving performance (e.g., the guaranteed 98% availability of inflight enter-
tainment screen). Customers do not consider AES as part of the core offering, and
therefore AES provide a basis for competitive differentiation and profit potential.
Process Consulting Services Process consulting services13 (PCS) are “the range of ser-
vices a manufacturer provides to assist customers in improving their own business processes”
(Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011, p. 18), such as audits and consulting services. These services
promise to perform a deed (e.g., a consulting project with the aim to define a main-
tenance schedule for the customer), without assuming responsibility for performance
outcomes and are geared towards the customer’s processes (e.g., the usage of the prod-
uct). This type of service is based on the competence regarding the operation of an
asset and can be provided independently of the sale of the asset, or even for the assets
of a competitor. Since these services are tailored to the individual customer needs and
are based on intimate knowledge in the operation of the asset, the customers’ willing-
ness to pay tends to be high. Consequently, these types of services are often priced like
professional services according to the time and resources needed (Ulaga & Reinartz,
2011).
Solutions Finally, solutions14 (SOL) are “comprehensive bundle of products and services
tailored to the individual customer’s need that involve assuming the responsibility for the oper-
ation and performance of customer’s processes” (Hakanen & Jaakkola, 2012, p. 594), such as
tire management for a fleet of a trucking company. The customer typically outsources
parts of the operation of the asset to the service supplier, who assumes responsibility
for the performance of the customer’s process. Solutions are typically a complex, inte-
grated bundle of products and services, customized to the individual customer’s needs
that require some form of customer involvement and risk-transfer to the supplier (Hax
& Wilde II, 2001; Stremersch et al., 2001; Galbraith, 2002).15 Solution offers are posi-
tioned on the right (service) side of the product-service continuum, due to their focus
on services and their outcome-based nature of the Value Proposition.
13Ulaga & Reinartz (2011) name this service category Process Support Services (PSS). Since the acronym
of this term is easily confounded with Product-Service-Systems (PSS), I have decided to rename this
service category.
14Ulaga & Reinartz (2011) name this service category Process Delegation Services (PDS). Since the services
described in this category are commonly referred to as solutions, this more common term is used.
15For an extensive review about the characteristics of solutions, please refer to Oinonen & Jalkala (2013).
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2.3.3 Servitization as a Competitive Strategy
Literature commonly identifies three drivers of servitization: financial, marketing, and
strategic (i.e., aiming to achieve a competitive advantage) (Baines et al., 2009): Financial
drivers include a higher profit margin and stability of income, especially in the capital
goods industries, where manufacturers possess an installed base of products (Wise &
Baumgartner, 1999). In these industries, the ratio between units in operation and an-
nual sales varies in between 13:1 for the U.S. automotive industry, 22:1 for train manu-
facturers and 15:1 for the civil aerospace industry (Wise & Baumgartner, 1999). Rev-
enues created with services on the installed base can be one or two magnitudes larger
than revenues from the initial product sales, especially in industries with complex prod-
ucts of long life-cycles in which the potential for revenue generation shifts downstream
to the after-sales service period (Wise & Baumgartner, 1999; Ward & Graves, 2005).
Services are known to influence the purchasing decision and create marketing oppor-
tunities, resulting in increased product sales. This is especially true for B2B markets
where higher technical complexity and pressures to outsource as well as increased cus-
tomer contact through service provisioning lead to more differentiated products and
higher customer loyalty (Baines et al., 2009). In solution provisioning, services occur
before, during, and after a product is delivered to the customer (Davies, 2004) resulting
in lengthened customer relationships, and future sales opportunities (Malleret, 2006).
During these lengthened relationships, social capital is developed between manufac-
turer and customer by relational processes providing further options for differentiation
(Tuli et al., 2007) against competing manufacturers.16 The result is an added customer
value which may offer more profit potential than pure product innovation (Pawar et al.,
2009; Gebauer et al., 2005).
Servitization is also commonly observed as a strategy aiming to increase competitive
differentiation as a reaction to the commoditization of product markets in mature in-
dustries (Lightfoot et al., 2013). Authors have used different strategic management
approaches such as Porter’s market power and competition paradigm (Porter, 1998),
the resource-based view (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991), and the relational view (Dyer
& Singh, 1998) to explain a competitive advantage gained by manufacturers adding
services (Eloranta & Turunen, 2015). Most studies explicitly or implicitly focus on ex-
plaining competitive advantage against other (e.g. low-cost) manufacturers (e.g., Wise
& Baumgartner, 1999; Oliva & Kallenberg, 2003; Gao et al., 2011), however not against
incumbent service firms. More recently, an increasing number of studies employ the
dynamic capabilities view (Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 2003) to understand how manu-
facturers can add services to their business model to achieve competitive advantage
over time.
Studies following the market forces paradigm argue that servitization is not only a re-
16Competition between manufacturers and service firms is reviewed in Section 2.3.7.
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action to changing customer demands but also commonly seen as an optimal way to
address Porter’s market forces, actively shaping the market (Neely, 2008; Gebauer et al.,
2011). According to this view, firms need to consider the strategic fit between the ex-
ternal environment and the organization to achieve their desired competitive market
position with their servitization strategy, based on either differentiation or cost lead-
ership (Gebauer, 2008). Often, servitization is seen as a way to escape price-based
competition by building competition barriers and achieving a differentiation advan-
tage (Gebauer et al., 2010a; Nordin & Kowalkowski, 2010). However, the popularity of
the market forces approach has diminished nowadays and is used mostly in combina-
tion with more modern strategic management theories such as the dynamic capabilities
view (Eloranta & Turunen, 2015).
Because resources needed for production and service provision differ (Bharadwaj et al.,
1993), the RBV is the most popular perspective on servitization (Eloranta & Turunen,
2015). Studies taking the RBV argue that manufacturers can build a sustainable com-
petitive advantage by building valuable, rare, and inimitable service-specific resources
(Barney, 1991). Manufacturers possess unique resources, including an installed base
(Wise & Baumgartner, 1999; Oliva & Kallenberg, 2003; Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011), unique
and complex offerings, (Gremyr et al., 2010; Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011) and service-en-
hanced relationships (Davies et al., 2007; Nordin & Kowalkowski, 2010). However,
servitization is a challenging task, as manufacturers need first to develop a bundle of
service-specific operational resources and capabilities to successfully transition towards
PSS business models (Matthyssens et al., 2009) such as a service culture (Gebauer et al.,
2010a) and integration capabilities (Davies & Hobday, 2005). To develop these oper-
ational capabilities and reconfigure their business model from a product- to a service-
focus, manufacturers require solution-specific dynamic capabilities (Gebauer et al., 2012;
Kindstro¨m et al., 2013).
Servitization studies that follow the relational view argue that relationships in solution
networks are sources of competitive advantage. Both suppliers and customers form
an ecosystem in which value is created. Specific capabilities are required to initiate,
maintain and profit from relationships and value constellations in the ecosystem that
supports the PSS offering (Eloranta & Turunen, 2015).
Servitization literature has broadly embraced the business model concept since the begin-
ning; however, only few of these studies are concerned with the competitive advantage
of manufacturers. Instead, papers either (a) establish different typologies of PSS busi-
ness models (e.g., Benedetti et al., 2015; Ferreira et al., 2016), or (b) target the business
model reconfiguration process from goods to hybrid value provisioning (e.g., Kind-
stro¨m, 2010; Kindstro¨m & Kowalkowski, 2014; Adrodegari et al., 2015; Forkmann et al.,
2017b).
Studies that take the business model lens to explain differences in firm performance
highlight that adding services to the manufacturer’s business model is an important
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method to employ a differentiation strategy against low-cost producers (Gao et al.,
2011). To generate significant financial value, manufacturers need to undergo a com-
prehensive business model transformation. In contrast, merely adding services to the
product portfolio can lead to negative financial performance (Parida et al., 2014a,b).
Negative financial performance may also result since a critical percentage of service
revenues needs to be achieved to overcompensate initial investments required for pur-
suing a servitization strategy (Kastalli et al., 2013).
In conclusion, most studies focus on single aspects of competitive advantage in hybrid value
provisioning (e.g., either resources and capabilities or the network) and do not make use of the
holistic perspective that the business model concept has to offer to explain competitive advantage.
In turn, studies that employ the business model concept mostly limit themselves to exploring ty-
pologies and business model transformation paths instead of using the opportunities this holistic
concept provides for explaining competitive advantage through servitization. In addition, the
usage of established business model frameworks that allow us to understand the many facets
of solution provisioning remains scarce. Hence, we need to understand better how competitive
advantage between manufacturers and pure service firms in solutions can be explained through
the business model approach.
2.3.4 Servitization Challenges
Although financial, marketing and strategic drivers offer opportunities for improving
firm performance, servitization poses many challenges for manufacturers that have re-
ceived broad academic attention (Zhang & Banerji, 2017). Empirical studies show that
in practice servitization is not always successful, but shows rather mixed results: In the
growth phase, firms may experience the service paradox, a situation in which manufac-
turers are not able to reap the expected benefits from their initial investments to move
towards services (Gebauer et al., 2005; Brax, 2005). After an initial profitability increase
with simple add-on services, manufacturers often face a decline in profitability. Only
after their investments are translated into economies of scale, manufacturers then can
regain profitable growth (Kastalli et al., 2013). Typically, positive effects on firm value
only become pronounced when a critical mass of 20-30% of services in total firms sales
is reached (Fang et al., 2008).
In a 2004 study, the consulting firm Bain & Co found that only 21% of companies suc-
ceed with their service strategies and only some firms outperform their goods-offering
competitors in terms of revenue growth, margins or return on equity (Baveja et al.,
2004). According to Hancock et al. (2005) half of all solution providers realize only
modest benefits, while 25% realize losses. Also, Neely et al. (2011) report that there
is no statistically significant correlation between service maneuvers and profitability
of manufacturing firms. However, newer research by Eggert et al. (2015) points out
that hybrid innovations, referring to the simultaneous development of new products
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and services, improve firm performance above pure product innovations. This effect
is especially prominent in competitive markets with a highly concentrated customer
base.
While both above and below average performance may be caused by a properly or
poorly executed servitization strategy, some firms turn away from in-house service
provisioning altogether, effectively deservitizing (Finne & Holmstro¨m, 2013; Kowal-
kowski et al., 2017). This underpins the importance of the question of which are the
specific challenges that need to be overcome by manufacturers to add service to their
product portfolio successfully.
Zhang & Banerji (2017) divide the challenges that manufacturers face into five types:
(a) the organizational structure, (b) the business model, (c) the development process,
(d) customer management, and (e) risk management. The organizational challenge arises
from the need to change internal product-based structures and culture to support ser-
vice provisioning (Fang et al., 2008; Kindstro¨m et al., 2015). This is because value cre-
ation involves services, which are fuzzier, intangible, (Gro¨nroos, 2007) and bundled
with the products. Hence, manufacturers cannot merely add services on top of their
transaction-based product business but need to employ a radical approach (Brax, 2005).
Organizational arrangements may include the formation of a separate service division
or establishing a network of service providers to support service provisioning (Salonen,
2011; Gebauer et al., 2013; Paiola et al., 2013).
The changes that manufacturers have to make to their business model have received
much academic attention, especially in the last years (Zhang & Banerji, 2017). The holis-
tic business model concept is especially suitable to investigate challenges that manufac-
turers face for successful servitization, as they can be disaggregated into the different
dimensions of business model frameworks. This sheds light on the many facets of
change that servitization requires and the interdependencies between business model
elements. Hence, I develop a PSS Business Model Canvas in the next section in which
the differences in each dimension of the business model are discussed in more detail.
As service development differs considerably from product development, manufacturers
cannot rely on their established product development process but need to make the es-
tablishment of a service development process a top priority (Baines et al., 2009; Kindstro¨m
et al., 2015). To do so, manufacturers need to develop new tools and techniques (Baines
et al., 2007) and build relational processes with the customer (Tuli et al., 2007). One
reason is that services are intangible which makes it more challenging to receive instant
feedback in the development process and requires testing at the customer (Demeter &
Sza´sz, 2013).
In contrast to pure product offerings, value is co-created in-use with the customer when
providing PSS (Vargo & Lusch, 2004; Hakanen & Jaakkola, 2012). This causes challenges
regarding customer management, as the value intended by the supplier is not always the
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value perceived by the customer (Hakanen & Jaakkola, 2012). For example, some cus-
tomers may not be motivated by the concept of ownerless consumption (Baines et al.,
2007), or share their operational data with the supplier (Matthyssens & Vandenbempt,
2008). In cases in which solution providers operate their customers’ equipment, in-
creased attention may be required for the management of third-party customer rela-
tionships. As the manufacturer operates the customer’s equipment, the customer’s
competitors may perceive the manufacturer now as a competitor, not anymore as a
mere supplier of hardware or systems (Helander & Mo¨ller, 2007). This, in turn, may
have implications for future business prospects with these potential customers, or may
even damage existing buyer-supplier relationships with these firms.
Servitization entails a variety of risks, e.g., increased financial requirements (Neely,
2008), the risk for the customers’ operations in result-based offerings (Ulaga & Reinartz,
2011), or even an increased risk of bankruptcy (Benedetti et al., 2015). In solution
offerings in which manufacturers take over the responsibility for maintenance of the
complete system, often components or software of competitors or third parties can be
present that increase the difficulty and risk of ensuring the performance of the sys-
tem (Helander & Mo¨ller, 2007). Hence, manufacturers need to build the capabilities to
recognize and mitigate these risks if they want to introduce services to their business
model (Benedetti et al., 2015) successfully.
In conclusion, servitization is no easy endeavor for manufacturers. Instead, it should be seen
as a strategic move with the potential to increase revenues and profits that comes at the risk of
performance or even bankruptcy, if challenges are not adequately tackled and associated risks
mitigated. Besides, successful servitization requires the reconfiguration of large areas of the
business model as well as the management of interdependencies of these areas.
2.3.5 Literature Review: a Canvas for PSS Business Models
Since the Business Model Canvas is used throughout this study as an analytical in-
strument to describe business models and their innovation in the aerospace industry, I
have decided to perform a systematic literature review17 that outlines the core logic of
solution-based business models with the Business Model Canvas. The literature review
contained 72 papers that were analyzed regarding the conceptualization of servitization
as business model innovation and the distinct elements. It shows that servitization has
been conceptualized as the innovation of manufacturers’ business models from prod-
ucts towards a greater service content (Forkmann et al., 2017a). However, the terminol-
ogy is used rather loosely, and especially early papers use the term business model but
refer mostly to the Value Proposition, revenue model, or the different types of services
provided (Baines et al., 2017).
17The method is explained in Section 3.4 in the Methodology section.
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Furthermore, studies that take the business model lens on servitization were not able
to give a complete picture of the different dimensions of PSS business models. Instead,
servitization literature that employs the business model concept can be discerned in
two sets of studies (Kowalkowski et al., 2017): The first set is concerned with establish-
ing generic (e.g., Tukker, 2004) or industry-specific typologies of PSS business models,
for example in energy services or aerospace (Benedettini et al., 2015; Ferreira et al.,
2016). Other studies in this set employ a configurational approach, highlighting that
different equifinal (i.e., equally effective) configurations of business models can be used
for successful hybrid value provisioning (Forkmann et al., 2017a). The configurational
approach argues that success of the hybrid offering does not depend on the chosen
configuration per se, but on the strategic fit between the organizational-, and PSS con-
figuration, as well as the selected service strategy (Aurich et al., 2009; Gebauer et al.,
2010b).
The second set of studies interprets servitization as the reconfiguration or innovation
process of the manufacturer’s business model. The authors that adhere to this set stress
that manufacturers need to focus on all areas of their business model in a holistic fash-
ion and not just change isolated elements, to successfully convert to a service-based
business model (Kindstro¨m, 2010; Kindstro¨m & Kowalkowski, 2014; Adrodegari et al.,
2015; Forkmann et al., 2017b). As this shift is a dynamic process affecting many busi-
ness model elements simultaneously (Ferreira et al., 2013), the business model concept
shows a high utility for companies that aspire to master this change successfully (Bar-
quet et al., 2013; Weeks & Benade, 2015). However, the use of established business
model frameworks to delineate the different configurations remains very limited, with
Barquet et al. (2013) being one of the few exceptions.
The fact that only few servitization studies take the holistic business model perspec-
tive, although servitization requires reconfiguring multiple elements and their interde-
pendencies of the established business model (Forkmann et al., 2017b), underpins the
need to develop a holistic PSS business model. This PSS business model would then
allow abstracting the complex reality of providing solutions into a comprehensive sys-
tem, thus enabling us to understand the changing core logic of firms that transition
from their legacy business focus towards solution provisioning (Rentmeister & Klein,
2003). Furthermore, understanding the manufacturers’ business model innovation pro-
cess from products to service provisioning provides only limited guidance for pure ser-
vice firms that wish to provide solutions. As a consequence, we must first establish
an understanding of solution business models as a general end state of business model
innovation, to then understand how pure service firms can transition towards this end
state from a base in services.
The Solution Business Model Canvas proposed here (Figure 2.8) represents a synthesis
of the papers identified in the literature review, focusing on the elements relevant in the
context of solution provisioning in the aerospace industry and pure service providers.
It builds on earlier work by Barquet et al. (2013) that was enriched with newer litera-
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ture as well as previous relevant papers that contribute to the understanding of hybrid
business models. While the Solution Business Model Canvas of Barquet et al. (2013,
p. 698) was a valuable basis that provides an overview on solution-based business
models, it suffers from some limitations that the present literature review intents to
overcome. One limitation was the lack of transparency, as Barquet and colleagues did
neither disclose search terms, time frame, databases or inclusion criteria that were used
to conduct the literature review, which significantly hampered the reproducibility of
their findings. A second limitation was the fact that the paper was published in 2013,
which is especially relevant considering the novelty and increasing importance of the
business model concept in general and in servitization research in particular in recent
years.
Cost Structure
• Increased employee, working capital and net asset base costs
Initiatives to positively influence cost structure:
• Modularization of product/service units 
• Productization of services
• Outsourcing of services to specialized service providers
• Risk-sharing and mitigation through formalized contracts with 
customers and service providers
Key Activities
• Design & manufacturing, 
intertwined with services
• Integration (incl. 
customization, 
standardization, 
modularization)
• Operational services & 
problem-solving
• Final service provision
Value Proposition
• Provide asset and ensure 
proper functioning during 
its lifecycle through basic 
and advanced services 
• Reduction of operating 
costs
• Asset performance 
improvement
• Getting-the-job-done: 
Asset performance, 
availability and reliability
• Risk transfer
• Enable customer to focus 
on core competencies
• Financing of asset
• Customization
Customer Segments
• Segmentation according 
to preferences about 
ownership, 
responsibilities, 
availability and costs.
• Customer portfolio 
management balancing 
different customer groups
Channels
• Channel control required 
• Customer-facing unit 
and/or KAM to manage 
customer Channel
• Dedicated personal 
assistance predominant
• Diverse direct and 
indirect channel 
configurations in solution 
networks
Customer Relationship
• Close, long-term 
relationship consisting of 
relational processes
• Increased 
interdependency but also 
incentive alignment
Revenue Streams
• One-off, deed-based payment for product/services
• Use-based payment for product/service
• Performance-based payment for product/service
• Option: bundling/unbundling of revenue streams
Key Partners
• Network of service 
partners to complement 
internal capabilities 
• Types: Banks, consulting 
firms, specialized service 
firms (e.g. maintenance, 
logistics, IT)
• Extent of network usage 
explained by various 
theories (RV, TCE, …)
Key Capabilities
• Operational Capabilities
• Relational Capabilities
• Integration and Multi-
vendor Capability
• Risk Management
• Data Processing and 
Interpretation Capability
• Design To Service 
Capability
Key Resources
• Installed base (data)
• R&D, manuf. assets
• Service sales force and 
distribution network
• Field service organization
• Service Culture
Figure 2.8: PSS Business Model Canvas
Value Proposition
PSS business models entail a wide range of Value Propositions that range from the
product plus simple add-on services such as installation and maintenance up to pro-
viding integrated turnkey solutions (Stremersch et al., 2001). Depending on a firm’s
position on the product-service continuum, the customer value can be created mainly
through the product or the service components of the PSS offering (Tukker, 2004). In
Section 2.3.2, I have introduced a service typology for PSS business models, ranging
from product-lifecycle services, via process consulting services, asset efficiency services
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up to solutions. Here, we explore the underlying Value Propositions that can be made
in these different types of PSS.
In product-lifecycle services, the product is sold in a traditional manner together with
services that ensure the utility such as after-sales services, repair, and maintenance
(Tukker, 2004; Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). Basic services (e.g., documentation, repair,
spare parts, basic training) and advanced services (e.g., advanced training, remote mon-
itoring and remote product diagnosis, product upgrade/retrofit, warranty extension,
and maintenance contracts) fall into this category (Adrodegari et al., 2015). The central
Value Proposition of these type of industrial services is to ensure proper functioning of
the good during all stages of its lifecycle, e.g., pilot and crew training enables airlines to
train sufficient staff to operate the aircrafts (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). Hence, the main
focus of the Value Proposition of the manufacturer’s PSS is inherent in the product and
its proper functioning and to a lesser extent in the services provided. Nonetheless, out-
sourcing basic and advanced services can also result in lower asset operating costs for
the client, if the manufacturer can provide these services more cost-efficiently than the
customer or a specialized service firm.
Asset efficiency services include services such as condition monitoring or preventive main-
tenance that aim at increasing the performance of the asset. Hence, the central Value
Proposition of these services is not to perform a deed but to achieve an output that
can be summarized as “asset performance improvement”. Process consulting services
aim at using the manufacturer’s knowledge of the asset to improve the customer’s pro-
cesses related to its operation (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). This indirectly supports both
of the previous Value Propositions, as better operations enable the customer to reap
more benefits of the asset or lower its costs. For example, manufacturers can suggest
maintenance schedules that optimize the energy efficiency of machinery.
Finally, “Getting the job done” (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2013, p. 25), is one of the main
Value Proposition of solutions (Davies et al., 2003; Oliva & Kallenberg, 2003; Brady et al.,
2005; Johnson et al., 2008). As Davies and his colleagues put it: “customers are not pay-
ing for an integrated package of products and service. They are buying guaranteed solutions
for trouble-free operations. The onus is on the providers of integrated solutions to identify and
solve each customer’s business problem by providing services to design, integrate, operate and
finance a product or system during its life cycle.” (Davies et al., 2006, p. 40). Thus, solu-
tions incorporate result-oriented Value Propositions, in which the customer pays for
the achievement of the agreed results. In this type of agreements, the supplier assumes
the responsibility for the risk associated with performance outcomes previously carried
by the customer. The risk transfer is one of the main motivations for customers to enter
into this type of complex agreement; however, this typically requires the payment of a
risk premium to the supplier (Tukker, 2004; Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011).
Another motive of customers to enter into solution agreements is to focus on their core
competencies (Hamel & Prahalad, 1990), which is an aspect that has been reported for
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many industries, i.a., defense, passenger transport, and automotive (Cousins & Crone,
2003; Johnstone et al., 2008; Nair et al., 2013; Schneider et al., 2013; Smith, 2013). While
result-oriented performance indicators can take a variety of forms, the system’s avail-
ability over a certain period (e.g., 95% availability) and reliability are the predominant
indicators (Ng et al., 2009; Lightfoot et al., 2013). Servitization literature argues along
the service-dominant-logic that value is co-created between supplier and customer in-
use (Vargo & Lusch, 2004; Baines et al., 2007; Toossi et al., 2013). As solutions are of-
ten complex and need to be tailored to the individual customer needs, (Davies & Hobday,
2005), customization of the solution represents another Value Proposition (Tukker &
Tischner, 2006; Toossi et al., 2013). PSS can also incorporate use-oriented Value Propo-
sitions, in which the customer pays based on the usage of the product in either a lease-,
rental/sharing, or pooling agreement (Tukker, 2004). Here, the customer benefits from
ownerless consumption (Mont, 2002), which effectively represents financing the PSS
during its lifecycle (Davies et al., 2006).
Key Resources and Capabilities
The further manufacturers venture towards services, providing solutions and other ad-
vanced or customized services, the higher is the value potential but also the risk, com-
plexity and amount of resources and capabilities that must be developed and coordi-
nated (Kindstro¨m & Kowalkowski, 2014).
Key Resources Manufacturers that wish to deliver solutions successfully need to de-
velop new Key Resources and reconfigure the existing resource base (den Hertog et al.,
2010). The “installed base” represents the number of assets currently in use in a given
capital goods industry, such as machines, cars, or airplanes. It is a Key Resource since
capital goods require services throughout their lifecycle and present manufacturers
with service- or solution-provisioning opportunities (Oliva & Kallenberg, 2003). Fur-
thermore, tThe installed base generates product and usage data that can be used for the
development of services directly tied to the product (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). Besides,
increasing data-availability of the installed base has the potential to lower maintenance
costs, enabling a cost leadership strategy (Baines et al., 2007).
Product development and manufacturing assets comprise both tangible and intangible re-
sources such as R&D and production facilities, tools, intellectual property, patents, and
licenses. These assets are required for the development and production of the physical
goods and provide spill-over effects that can be used in service provisioning (Ulaga
& Reinartz, 2011). The extent to which a solution provider possesses these assets de-
pends on its in/outsourcing configuration for production: the “system seller” refers
to a configuration that relies on internal production, requiring proprietary, in-house
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technology, while the “system integrator” relies on systems and technologies of multi-
ple external vendors (Davies et al., 2007). However, the system integrator can acquire
access to intellectual property even if for example a complete subsystem has been out-
sourced (Baines et al., 2011). Thus, product development and manufacturing assets are
a Key Resource, which is either present internally or attained through partners.
The product sales force and distribution network provide the manufacturer with close ties
and privileged access to the customer which can be used to sell services to the customer
(Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). However, the product sales force is not effective in selling
services per se. Instead, it needs to acquire additional knowledge, capabilities or even
require reorganization. The reason is that sales managers have to transform from a
passive recipient of a predefined offer into more active participants in a value-creating
relationship typical for services (Kowalkowski et al., 2015). It has even been argued
that firms need to create a separate service organization with a dedicated sales force
and build a service culture to successfully provide solutions (Gebauer & Friedli, 2005).
While manufacturers can add some level of services to their business model based on
their internal resource-base, they need to build additional resources and capabilities for
advanced service offers and solutions (Matthyssens et al., 2009). One valuable resource
is a field service organization that performs services on the asset, especially if the asset
cannot be moved easily to the manufacturer’s premises. Manufacturers are faced with
the challenge to recruit highly qualified staff that possesses the required capabilities
(Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011; Kindstro¨m & Kowalkowski, 2014), or rely on a network of
third-party service providers, who have a greater experience providing these types of
service (Cohen et al., 2006; Helander & Mo¨ller, 2007; Beuren et al., 2013).
Last but not least, the typical manufacturing culture often focuses on efficiency, econo-
mies of scale, and the idea that variety and flexibility are costly. In contrast, service-
orientation centers on innovation, customization, and flexibility. Manufacturers that
are becoming solution providers hence need to build a service culture and balance both
product and service culture to achieve a symbiotic relationship (Gebauer et al., 2005).
Key Capabilities Service infusion creates a need to develop new capabilities to manage
a service-oriented business, including operational capabilities such as maintaining, oper-
ating, or renovating a product throughout its operational life cycle (Brady et al., 2005;
Kowalkowski et al., 2013). However, such product- and service-based operational capa-
bilities cannot achieve the expected level of service profits and revenues alone but need
to be accompanied by a set of PSS-specific capabilities (Kindstro¨m & Kowalkowski,
2014). Since Servitization literature has identified an enormous variety of capabilities18,
a not comprehensive selection of Key Capabilities is provided. I have based the decision
18Kindstro¨m & Kowalkowski (2014) alone name 24.
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of whether or not to include a Key Capability on whether it has been named repeatedly
throughout literature and whether it is applicable beyond the particular context.
Solution providers require a set of relational capabilities to interact with customers and
the Key Partner network (Windahl & Lakemond, 2006; Kindstro¨m & Kowalkowski,
2009; Forkmann et al., 2017b), because the development of new services often involves
mutual investments and co-specialization among suppliers, the customers, and other
actors in the business network (Mo¨ller & To¨rro¨nen, 2003).
The integration capability refers to the organization’s capacity to integrate both inter-
nal and external activities, skills and knowledge from other organizations to produce
more complex products and services (Hobday et al., 2005). Due to the ever-increasing
complexity of high-technological products such as aircraft and the reliance on network
partners in solution provisioning (Gebauer et al., 2013), solution providers require the
integration capability as one of their Key Capabilities. Companies aiming to provide
solutions for equipment of competing manufacturers require a multi-vendor capability
(Raddats & Easingwood, 2010), which is an advanced form of the integration capabil-
ity. Supporting the competitors’ products if it is in the customer’s best interest has been
described as the “acid-test” (Foote et al., 2001; Davies et al., 2006) since it competes
with the own product business and requires a credible consultancy approach (Raddats
& Easingwood, 2010).
As advanced consulting services, performance-based contracts, and especially solution
offers involve assuming the performance risk of the customers’ operations, developing
the capability to assume, manage and mitigate risks thus becomes a central issue for solu-
tion providers (Tukker, 2004; Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011; Zhang & Banerji, 2017). PSS that
incorporate asset efficiency services require special data processing and interpretation ca-
pabilities to improve the asset’s performance during operation (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011).
These capabilities include the capacity to capture, adequately exploit, and convert this
data into actionable knowledge (Kamp et al., 2017). The importance of this type of ca-
pabilities may well increase due to the increasing availability of big data as industry 4.0
gains a foothold in industry and also in literature under the label of smart servitization
(Kamp et al., 2017).
Finally, a specific capability that manufacturers can develop when providing PSS is the
design-to-service capability. This capability enables manufacturers to build and offer PSS
so that “its tangible and intangible elements interact synergistically to tap its full differentia-
tion and/or cost reduction potential” (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011, p. 13). The authors highlight
the importance of manufacturers to “think service from the beginning” already in the pro-
duction design process as, for example, including hardware and software that enable
remote monitoring and first level support of the asset may improve both cost-efficiency
and asset performance.
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Key Partners
While the great majority of early servitization literature has focused on the internal
development of capabilities in single organizations, servitization research has moved
towards the analysis of solutions provisioning in networks (Eloranta & Turunen, 2015).
In this stream of literature, most studies analyze the manufacturer as the focal point of
the network and provider of the solution to the customer, while pure service providers
become network partners providing certain services to or on behalf of the manufac-
turer.
As stated earlier, manufacturers often outsource non-core services to third-party service
providers with service-specific resources and service experience (Cohen et al., 2006; He-
lander & Mo¨ller, 2007; Beuren et al., 2013). As a result, a network with these third-party
service providers is formed by the solution provider, which is usually referred to as
service or solution network (Windahl & Lakemond, 2006; Beuren et al., 2013; Gebauer
et al., 2013; Eloranta & Turunen, 2016). In the service networks, each actor contributes
to the offering (Vargo, 2011), focusing on their core competence and cooperation with
other network actors (Basole & Rouse, 2008). Relationships differ in the networks from
equity alliances, as Joint Ventures, via strategic partnerships, down to cooperative rela-
tionships that are formalized by contractual agreements (Lockett et al., 2011; Turunen
& Toivonen, 2011; Forkmann et al., 2017b).
Outsourcing in PSS Business Models A central theme of servitization research is the
outsourcing decision, i.e., the decision about whether resources and capabilities should
be developed internally, externally, or in a hybrid manner.19 Researchers have devel-
oped various strategic outsourcing approaches (see Table 2.2) to explain the configura-
tion that manufacturers that wish to provide solutions choose.20
Cohen et al. (2006) noted early that some cases exist, in which the outsourcing deci-
sion is not a choice, but that contextual factors exist that make outsourcing a necessity.
Pure service providers may be equipped with opportunities for generating synergies,
reduced pooling risks, and economies of scale that enable them to gain a competitive
advantage, for which reasons manufacturers may be obliged to outsource. Later works
do not pick up these findings but portray outsourcing as a deliberate decision taken by
the manufacturer according to different sets of contingency factors.
19Different terms have been established for this decision, such as make or buy decision (Paiola et al.,
2013), internalization/externalization (Kowalkowski et al., 2011b), servitization strategy (Bustinza
et al., 2015), or firm boundary decision (Salonen & Jaakkola, 2015).
20Many studies explicitly or implicitly assume that the solution provider is a manufacturer that develops
solutions. Studies as (Davies et al., 2007) that expressly acknowledge that service providers can become
solution providers are an exception.
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Approach Description Authors
Business Model • System Seller: primarily internal service provisioning
• System Integrator: primarily external service provisioning
Davies et al. (2007)
Configurational 
Approach
• Internal, external, or hybrid configurations
• Contingency factors: market strategy, customer 
relationships, product-service linkages, internal 
competences and market channel characteristics
Kowalkowski et al. (2011) 
Competitive
Strategy
• Outsourcing of non-core activities enables cost- and 
differentiation leadership
Gao et al. (2011)
Competitive
Strategy
• Outsourcing decision contingent on differentiation versus 
customer satisfaction strategy
Bustinza et al. (2015)
Strategic 
outsourcing 
approach
• The strategic approach for delivering solutions determines 
the outsourcing decision:
• Seller of after-sales services:mostly internal
• Integrator of after-sales solutions: mostly external
• Seller of life-cycle solutions: mostly internal 
• Orchestrator of total solutions: mostly external
Paiola et al (2013)
Firm boundary 
conceptions
• Identity: manufacturer versus service provider
• Competence: close versus distant knowledge fields
• Efficiency: minimize transaction / governance costs
• Power: strategic control of network
Salonen & Jaakkola (2015)
Table 2.2: Solution Providers’ Outsourcing Approaches (own illustration)
The system seller versus system integrator approach of Davies et al. (2007) represents
an early study of two possible configurations for building service capabilities. While
the system seller aspires to develop most resources and capabilities required for service
provisioning internally, the system integrator relies on external partners to provide ser-
vices and concentrates on the core competence of integration. Newer empirical studies
(Kowalkowski et al., 2011b; Paiola et al., 2013) find that firms choose between three
different configurations of value creation: internal, external, and hybrid. While the in-
ternal and external setups are very similar to the abovementioned system seller and
integrator approaches, Kowalkowski et al. (2011b) find however that the most common
setup is, in fact, the hybrid arrangement, in which the solution provider outsources a
varying extent of services to external service providers.
Firms that choose their desired configuration, rely on a set of firm-, offering-, and
market-specific contingency factors such as risk aversion, service orientation, strategic
priorities (Kowalkowski et al., 2011b). As these factors can contrast each other, a com-
pany needs to balance opposing forces when planning their configuration. In broad
lines, Kowalkowski and colleagues argue that services that are core to the manufac-
turer and its customer or provide additional value are to be retained in-house, while
services that are either regionally distant, non-core or demand an entirely different re-
source base, should be performed by external service providers.
Gao et al. (2011) and Bustinza et al. (2015) interpret the firm’s competitive strategy as
the dominant contingency factor for the outsourcing decision. According to Gao et al.
(2011) firms should outsource all non-core activities to the service network, as this al-
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lows each actor to concentrate on its core business and add value to the system. Gao
and colleagues argue that this way cost leadership and differentiation leadership could
be achieved at the same time through the network of actors. On a similar note, Bustinza
et al. (2015) find that the outsourcing decision is contingent on the competitive advan-
tage the firm pursues either through differentiation or customer satisfaction. Firms
aiming at achieving a differentiation advantage should make use of an external partner
or a separated internal unit. Firms aiming for competitive advantage through customer
satisfaction, should, in turn, rely on developing the required capabilities in-house.
Paiola et al. (2013) identify four strategic approaches for delivering solutions that deter-
mine the outsourcing decision: (a) seller of after-sales services, (b) integrator of after-
sales solutions, (c) seller of life-cycle solutions, and (d) orchestrator of total solutions.
While the first two mostly rely on internal capability development to develop solutions,
the latter two base their competitive advantage on the integration of external service
providers. The authors base the outsourcing decision on the theoretical lenses of trans-
action cost economics, the resource-based view of the firm, and the core competence
approach.
Salonen & Jaakkola (2015) investigate the outsourcing decision using the four firm
boundary conceptions identity, competence, efficiency, and power.21 According to the
identity view, firms try to maintain coherence between their identity as a manufacturer
and the transfer to solutions. Accordingly, firms that aim to preserve their manufactur-
ing identity choose external partners for service provisioning, while firms that intend
to change their identity develop service capabilities internally. According to the com-
petence view, companies seek to maximize the value of resources required for solution
provisioning. Resources closely related to current fields of knowledge should be de-
veloped internally, while distant fields of expertise are to be integrated from external
partners. The efficiency view argues that governance and transaction costs for the man-
agement of interdependencies of solutions elements should be minimized. This means
that only systems that can be modularized should be integrated externally, others need
to be integrated internally. Last but not least, the power lens is concerned with reach-
ing strategic control and a central network position. According to this lens, solution
providers should select partners that accept them as an attractive customer channel.
Conclusion: The outsourcing decision of manufacturers has evolved from anecdotal evidence to
strategic, theoretically founded approaches that manufacturers can use to make their outsourcing
decision deliberately. These approaches result in configurations of solution networks on which
manufacturers base their competitive advantage. However, outsourcing requires two partners:
one company that outsources and one that delivers. In comparison, the delivery side has received
surprisingly little research. As traditional service providers need to take an informed decision of
21The boundary conceptions of the firm are based on the seminal article by Santos & Eisenhardt (2005) that
draw on established management theories such as i.a. the resource-based view of the firm, transaction
cost economics, managerial cognition, and resource-dependence theory.
59
Chapter 2. Conceptual Background
whether to ally with a manufacturer, the literature review has uncovered the need for research
regarding this type of business model innovation.
Revenue Streams
The transformation of Revenue Streams from deed-, and thus often cost-based, (Adrode-
gari et al., 2016) towards use- or performance-based payments is one of the major
shifts discussed in solution business model literature. In use-based contracts, revenue
streams are generated through the usage of the product in either a lease, rental/sharing,
or pooling agreement (Tukker, 2004). The automotive industry is an industry that has
widely embraced this business model through car leasing, rental or sharing concepts
(Vezzoli & Ceschin, 2008). Through this type of contract, companies have the opportu-
nity to secure long-term revenue streams, which may come however at the cost of the
initial one-off sale of the asset (Mont, 2002).
In performance-based contracts, different mechanisms such as KPIs that measure the
asset’s performance as well as pain/gain-sharing models need to be established (Ulaga
& Reinartz, 2011). Depending on the individual contract, revenue streams can be de-
termined to a significant proportion on the performance achieved by the provider, as
hefty penalties for asset outage may occur.
A common misconception of both use- and result-oriented Value Propositions lies in
the issue of ownership of the asset: while most literature states that the manufacturer
retains the ownership of the asset, in most cases it is transferred to the customer or
a financial third party (Baines & Lightfoot, 2014). For example, a farming company
will still own or lease the farming equipment that they operate. However, unklike
in traditional product sales, they can rely on a 24h trouble-shooting and maintenance
support (Claas, 2019).
Manufacturers have the choice to either bundle or unbundle their product-service sys-
tems: in bundled offerings, the asset and subsequent services are sold together, while
in unbundled offerings, the asset is sold and billed separately from the services. Sim-
ilar, service offers can be sold bundled or unbundled as well: In a bundled offering,
the solution provider offers an “all-inclusive” service package, while in an unbundled
offering, services such as maintenance, training, and consulting are priced individually.
Finally, a mixed bundling strategy can be employed in which products and services are
offered in a both bundled and unbundled manner (Stremersch et al., 2001). For exam-
ple, certain services such as installation and maintenance may be bundled and priced
together, while others, such as consulting services, are priced separately (Forkmann
et al., 2017a). Steiner et al. (2016) find that customers have on average a 5% lower will-
ingness to pay for bundled offers, and hence unbundling has the potential to enhance
firm profitability considerably.
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In summary, the PSS provider can incur one-off, use-based, and performance-based revenue
streams for both asset and services and has the opportunity to employ different bundling strate-
gies. Against a common misconception, the ownership of the asset is often transferred to the
user or a financial third party and does not remain with the provider.
Cost Structure
On average, servitizing firms incur additional costs compared to their pure manufac-
turing counterparts in the areas of employee costs, working capital, and net asset base
(Neely, 2008). Staff cost increase can be explained by the fact that staff that is able to
offer consultancy services and design complex systems and solutions are likely to be
more expensive than staff with a narrower skill set working in a manufacturing plant.
Besides, additional assets, stocks and hence working capital is likely to be required for
the offering of additional services which leads to a cost increase in these fields (Neely,
2008; Baines et al., 2011). Finally, when performance rather than ownership is sold, cost
structures should be adapted to support the increased demand for cash-flow (Adrode-
gari et al., 2016). Thus, cost structure management is one of the main challenges for
successful PSS provisioning (Sundin et al., 2009).
Companies employ a variety of tactics to lower their cost structure and increase prof-
itability. Modularization of product and service units has been proposed as a way to
achieve cost savings and improve reliability. In this approach, solution providers and
their partners jointly develop modular units that are consistent, easy to understand
and assemble into a customized solution package (Davies et al., 2006, 2007). A second
approach is the productization of service components, which aims at standardizing so-
lutions to achieve lower costs by reaping economies of scale and in-house knowledge
and resources (Kowalkowski et al., 2015). In this approach, companies aim at improv-
ing their replication capabilities through formalizing, specifying and standardizing ser-
vices to take advantage of what Davies & Brady (2000) call economies of repetition.
These activities include concretizing professional expertise and systemizing processes
and methods (Jaakkola, 2011). Since this strategy requires long-term service experi-
ence, profound knowledge of customers, product and process data, feedback loops and
modularization capabilities, few manufacturers are successful in its implementation
(Kowalkowski et al., 2015).
A third approach is to outsource services to specialized service providers that enjoy cost
advantages against manufacturers entering the service domain through economies of
scale and learning (Mathieu, 2001b). Economies of scale result from servicing the equip-
ment of multiple manufacturers, while the manufacturer usually does not start with
multi-vendor service offers. Learning advantages result on the service provider’s focus
on services (such as maintenance), while the manufacturer needs to build and maintain
competencies in both the service and manufacturing domain (Mathieu, 2001b). Thus,
61
Chapter 2. Conceptual Background
choosing to outsource service provisioning to specialized service firms may lower the
manufacturers cost structure for service provisioning if these firms can realize syner-
gies, pooling risks, or economies of scale (Cohen et al., 2006).
Providers of usage-based agreements are exposed to the risk of higher maintenance
costs, as the effort required for maintenance may considerably exceed previous expec-
tations. One tactic to limit risks and resulting costs is to establish risk-sharing agree-
ments with the service partners, making them less pronounced for the manufacturer
(Lockett et al., 2011; Reim et al., 2015). However, customers may also show adverse
behavior resulting in exceeding costs for the PSS provider, as they do not carry the risk.
Companies have the option to mitigate these risks by establishing contractual terms
that include a limitation or loss of warranty in cases in which the customer displays
these types of adverse behavior (Azarenko et al., 2009).
Customer Segments
Different Customer Segments may display distinct preferences about product own-
ership, which are caused by factors such as consumer habits, behaviors, and values
(Manzini & Vezzoli, 2003; Barquet et al., 2013). Manufacturers often segment their cus-
tomer base according to different types of user behavior, since PSS involves changes in
ownership, responsibilities, availability and costs (Matzen, 2009; Barquet et al., 2013).
For example, some customers groups may not be enthusiastic about ownerless con-
sumption, while others may even prefer this type of PSS (Baines et al., 2007).
To define specific Value Propositions for each segment, the PSS provider has to establish
an excellent understanding of customers, as well as their operations and business, as
PSS are often more customized that pure product offers (Kindstro¨m, 2010; Reim et al.,
2015). Kindstro¨m & Kowalkowski (2014) highlight the importance of customer portfo-
lio management, aiming at assessing the profitability of the accounts and understand-
ing the overall return of relationships. In this regard, companies should maintain close
ties with established customers but not at the expense of building relationships with
new ones. Also, a dynamic portfolio of large customers with a more significant buy-
ing power and smaller customers with a lower buying power should be established,
to balance the varying profitability of product and service contracts between those seg-
ments.
Customer Relationship
Customer Relationships play an important role in the context of PSS in general and
in particular in solution provisioning because suppliers become part of customer’s on-
62
Chapter 2. Conceptual Background
going operation (Windahl & Lakemond, 2006). Designing effective solutions requires
strong customer interaction since they rely on understanding both the customer and
its needs, business goals, practice, and culture. Thus, knowing the customers’ business
contexts and operational conditions is fundamental (Oliva & Kallenberg, 2003; Windahl
et al., 2004; Brax, 2005; Windahl & Lakemond, 2006). Accordingly, the general assump-
tion in servitization is the notion that firms should increase their relational orientation
and develop long-term and close relationships with customers (Oliva & Kallenberg,
2003; Penttinen & Palmer, 2007).
In PSS, services are delivered before, during and after product delivery to the customer
(Davies, 2004) resulting in lengthened customer relationships and future sales oppor-
tunities compared to traditional product sales (Malleret, 2006). The intensivied set of
ties consists of relational processes, which are established for effective PSS provision-
ing, resulting in social capital and opportunities for competitive differentiation (Gao
et al., 2011). These processes include (1) definition of customer requirements, (2) cus-
tomization and integration of goods and services and (3) solution deployment, (4) post-
deployment customer support (Tuli et al., 2007).
Vandermerwe (2000) argues that through solution provisioning, customers can become
“locked-on” (p. 29), a situation in which they freely decide to continue business with
the solution provider, due to the superiority of the product-service bundle and not
due to a lack of alternatives or change barriers.22 However, switching barriers for cus-
tomers increase due to co-specialization with the provider’s processes, which result in
an adaption of the internal processes and are possibly supported by relation-specific
assets such as IT-systems (Bharadwaj et al., 1993). Consequently, the joint interdepen-
dence between customer and supplier increases from pure product-over use-based up
to performance-based agreements (Windahl & Lakemond, 2010). By outsourcing (core)
processes to the supplier, the customer becomes more dependent on the supplier and
its performance, especially when core processes are affected. At the same time, the
customer loses internal process knowledge and thus depends more strongly on the
supplier’s expertise. Giving up ownership of the equipment increases supplier depen-
dency even further, since insourcing operations or shifting it to a different supplier is
further complicated (Windahl & Lakemond, 2010). Hence, it is highly questionable,
whether customers indeed become locked-on instead of locked-in, when they rely on
comprehensive solutions.
On the other hand, the supplier also becomes more dependent on the customer and
its performance through the sales of integrated solutions. While the sales of equip-
ment represents a one-off sale, customer revenues depend on the usage of the solution
(Windahl & Lakemond, 2010). Successful customers will generate a higher output than
22A lock-on then is an especially pronounced type of differentiation advantage, which is not to be con-
founded with a lock-in, which is a buyer-supplier relationship in which one party is heavily dependent
on the other (Narasimhan et al., 2009).
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unsuccessful ones and hence generate more stable revenues for the manufacturer. To
balance the increased reciprocal interdependencies, firms typically align interests be-
tween buyer and supplier through performance guarantees, long-term contracts, and
pain/gain-sharing models (Penttinen & Palmer, 2007; Windahl & Lakemond, 2010; Ko-
walkowski et al., 2015).
In conclusion, providing solutions leads to customer relationships characterized by longer dura-
tions and increased reciprocal interdependency, especially if core processes are outsourced to the
solution provider. The customer’s dependence on the supplier is typically balanced by employ-
ing pain/gain-sharing mechanisms. However, it is questionable if these can offset the increased
supplier-dependence due to the loss of the customer’s internal capabilities required for insourc-
ing the respective services or changing the supplier.
Channels
Manufacturers that wish to penetrate the service market can use their established cus-
tomer Channels to promote their service or solution offers (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). In
some cases, however, distributors or traditional service firms may occupy the service
sales channel to the customer, which presents a barrier that first needs to be overcome.
One often-cited example is the simulator manufacturer Thales, whose early attempts
to provide pilot training solutions have been thwarted by established flight training
schools (Davies et al., 2006).
Once solutions enter into the operational phase, a close relationship with customers can
be achieved by establishing a set of Channels including operational links, information
exchange, legal ties, and cooperative rules (Matthyssens & Vandenbempt, 2010). These
channels are then used by manufacturers to decrease their reliance on distributors and
strengthen their direct customer relationships (Schmenner, 2009). Manufacturers re-
quire some organizational adaptions to build adequate channels for solution provi-
sioning. One element is the establishment of a central customer-facing unit responsible
for the management of Customer Channels, strategic engagements, the definition of
the Value Proposition, system integration and the provisioning of operational services
(Davies et al., 2006). The maintenance of the system is predominantly conducted by
dedicated personnel, representing the main operational channel to the customer (Haka-
nen & Jaakkola, 2012; Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013; Hakanen, 2014). In this context, the
installation of a dedicated Key Account Manager (KAM) as knowledge integrator has
been proposed as a critical Channel element (Hakanen, 2014).
If service provisioning is outsourced to a third-party (e.g., a maintenance specialist), a
triad evolves, whose channel configurations depend on the type of solution offering
and can change over time (Ferreira et al., 2016; Forkmann et al., 2017a). One option is
to establish a direct channel link to the customer (e.g., via IT or representatives), while
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another approach is to let the service provider handle everyday interactions with the
customer (Forkmann et al., 2017a). However, for the solution provider, the latter option
runs the risk of the establishment of a profitable intermediary that controls the daily
customer interface (Kowalkowski et al., 2011b).
Key Activities
The Key Activities element encompasses the most important activities required to oper-
ate the PSS, linking the other business model elements together (Osterwalder & Pigneur,
2013). In general, providers of PSS must extend their focus of activities from pure manu-
facturing towards services. This extension establishes a higher level of interdependency
between the seller’s activities and the buyer’s operations (Barquet et al., 2013). PSS
providers perform Key Activities before, during and after the product’s usage phase
(Cook et al., 2006) that can be clustered into four phases from manufacturing to final
service provisioning (see Figure 2.9).
Earlier Stages Design & Manufacturing Integration
Operational 
Services
Final Service 
Provision
Final 
Customer
Manufacturing Services
Vertical Movesupstream downstream
Figure 2.9: Value Stream (adapted from Hobday et al., 2005, p. 1134)
In design and manufacturing, solution providers should expand and modify the new-
product-development (NPD) process to create a new-service-development (NSD) pro-
cess to develop the service concept and ensure its rollout (Kindstro¨m & Kowalkowski,
2009). In the NPD process, particular emphasis needs to be placed on designing phys-
ical product characteristics synergistically with service components to enable cost sav-
ings and enable new revenue potential (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). Also, superior product
properties such as the ability to be maintained, upgraded, and reused easily, should be
identified and implemented to increase the value creation of the new business model
(Adrodegari et al., 2016). To improve future generations of equipment, the manufac-
turer should implement dynamic feedback loops with the final user or maintainer of
the system (Davies, 2004; Kindstro¨m et al., 2013; Schuh et al., 2015).
In the final manufacturing activity of this phase, the solution provider transfers raw
materials and sub-assemblies or -systems into the asset. The extent to which the pro-
duction of subsystems is outsourced depends on the solution providers’ upstream in-
tegration (Hobday et al., 2005). Integration is at the heart of solution provisioning, since
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solutions involve the integration of horizontal or vertical products and services (Gal-
braith, 2002; Davies, 2004). System integration is defined by Hobday et al. (2005) as
an activity adding value through the design and combination of physical components,
subsystems, software, and services. Integration involves, however, a broader scope:
organizational units and activities inside the firm, Key Partners, and customers need to
be deliberately integrated as well. Inside the firm, the integration of operations and ac-
tions must be managed intentionally on tactical and strategic levels, since business pro-
cesses require a new orientation to support PSS (Meier & Massberg, 2004). Examples
of this decision are whether or not to integrate product and service sales organizations
(Gebauer et al., 2005) or NPD and NSD organizations (Isaksson et al., 2009).
Customization is a commonly named element of solution provisioning, as solutions are
co-developed with the customer and customized according to his needs (Stremersch
et al., 2001; Galbraith, 2002). Customization serves as an antecedent to a closer buyer-
supplier relationship which is a prerequisite for providing high-value services and
thus allows for competitive differentiation and increased profitability (Mathieu, 2001a).
However, customization is a two-sided medal, since it also decreases standardization at
the expense of increased costs (Kowalkowski et al., 2015). Thus, customization needs to
be balanced with standardization and modularization to be able to deliver customized
solutions cost-efficiently (Davies et al., 2006; Kowalkowski et al., 2015).
Delivering operational services includes the support and maintenance of the system re-
quired to provide services (e.g., the flight simulator, Hobday et al., 2005). The delivery
of operational services needs to be planned to take place at a specific location and time
to provide value to the customer. To provide services efficiently, the service provider
needs to assign resources such as service technicians, tools and spare parts efficiently
to service tasks and deliver the services as planned (Meier et al., 2013). Another op-
tion to improve maintenance efficiency is the use of monitoring and preventive main-
tenance activities (Azarenko et al., 2009). Also, the adaption of the problem-solving
attitude and activities are crucial, since its characteristics change severely from manu-
facturing to solution provisioning (Adrodegari et al., 2016). Unlike in production, the
solution provider has to provide quick responses at minimum costs to repair failures of
the equipment (such as a train failure) to avoid penalties (Baines et al., 2011).
Final service provision includes activities such as providing the final consumer with the
service (e.g., telecom or air transport), as well as engaging in brand, marketing, sales,
distribution, and customer care activities (Hobday et al., 2005). Only in a few cases, so-
lution providers take over customer’s operation, providing the final customer directly
with the service. Instead, customers such as train companies typically continue to op-
erate their fleet of trains.23 The efforts required in changing the sales approach and
23The predominant alternative approach is to entirely integrate downstream to become the competitor of
the customer. One example are car manufacturers that offer mobility services which compete directly
with the traditional customer segments of Taxi firms and rental companies.
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activities to lower the cost structure are included in this phase, have however already
been discussed extensively in the respective sections.
In conclusion, manufacturers add activities beyond production to their business model, when
undertaking servitization. These activities start already in the design and manufacturing phase
(e.g., the NSD process) and extend to the final customer beyond the point of sale of the asset
(e.g., by providing maintenance services in operation). Hence, providing solutions requires an
extension of the scope and number of Key Activities in the manufacturer’s business model.
2.3.6 Dynamic Capabilities for Developing Solutions
bThere appears to be a consensus about that manufacturers require dynamic capabil-
ities to guide them towards the development of successful service-oriented business
models that successfully generate revenues and profits (Cohen et al., 2006; den Hertog
et al., 2010; Fischer et al., 2010; Kohtama¨ki & Helo, 2015). This service innovation pro-
cess is based on a deliberate, evolutionary process of sensing, seizing, and reconfigur-
ing routines, which are facilitated by management innovation (Gebauer et al., 2011). To
synthesize relevant servitization literature on dynamic capabilities, I identify and ana-
lyze articles that explicitly specify the dynamic capabilities and their microfoundations
that manufacturers require to provide hybrid offerings. The insights of this systematic
review are presented in the table below.
The findings suggest that several studies have ventured independently from each other
to identify the dynamic capabilities required by manufacturers to pursue servitization
successfully and hence show considerable overlaps. Even though the studies position
themselves in applying the DCV to the phenomenon of servitization, they sometimes
remain blurry regarding their definitions. Especially distinguishing dynamic from op-
erational capabilities and dynamic capabilities from their microfoundations are the
main issues. One example are Kindstro¨m et al. (2013, p. 1078), who define the micro-
foundation of reconfiguring ”Orchestrating the service system: Managing and transforming
the service system, especially managing external actors central to performance of the service.”.
While the transformation of the service network to co-create solutions is undoubtedly
dynamic, the management of the service system is operational. In consequence, I have
re-named some of the identified microfoundations to highlight the dynamic aspect and
improve conceptual clarity.
Sensing Manufacturers develop capabilities to sense market and user needs, tech-
nological developments, and opportunities within the firm and their service network.
Since the value of new services and underlying customer needs may differ between
product and service provisioning (Ulaga & Eggert, 2006), and service-oriented values
are more difficult to measure (Gro¨nroos, 2007), manufacturers need to develop new
67
Chapter 2. Conceptual Background
Dynamic Capability Microfoundations Illustrative Quote
Sensing
Customer need sensing • Identification of service opportunities through observation of customer needs, their perceived risks, and competitors (Fischer et al. 2010)
Technology sensing • Signaling technological options: capability to see promising technological options for newservice configuration (den Hertog et al. 2010)
Service System Sensing • Building up an understanding of the entire service system, including links to partners andsuppliers, and creating network skills (Kindström et al. 2013)
Internal Service Sensing • Building up internal sensing: e.g. opportunities related to the integration of products andservices and the detection of decentralized initiatives (Kindström et al. 2013)
Seizing
Conceptualization and co-
creating
• Conceptualizing, designing, prototyping or testing more fuzzy types of service innovations 
(den Hertog et al. 2010)
Structuring the service 
development process
• Routines of quick and timely decisions to create a dominant design of the total offering. 
• Formulate "planned strategies" for service business development including rigid scenario 
planning. (Fischer et al. 2010)
Restructuring the service 
delivery process
• Having the ability to restructure internal and external resources swiftly, for the delivery of new 
or improved services, including roles dedicated to services at both operational and strategic 
levels (Kindström et al. 2013)
Bundling and unbundling
• Creating smart service combinations with a customized “one stop shopping” character
• Unbundling services and stripping these down to their bare essentials creates highly 
specialized services that are very similar and can therefore be standardized to a certain 
extent (den Hertog et al. 2010)
Reconfiguring
Orchestrating the 
transformation of the 
service network
• Managing the transformation of the service system, especially integrating external actors 
central to performance of the service. Extend the resource base into new markets and 
services and incorporate complementary resources and co-specialization. (den Hertog et al. 
2010)
Scaling and Stretching • Scaling and stretching of service innovation so that services can be provided in a uniform way on a large scale (den Hertog et al. 2010)
Learning and adapting a 
service-oriented mental 
model
• Creating service-oriented mental model: Often referred to as a service logic; implies a 
learning dimension (Kindström et al. 2013)
Balancing product and 
service-innovation related 
assets
• Capacity to overcome internal resistance and conflicts
• Capacity and resources to set up a separate strategic business unit for services with own 
profit-and-loss (Fischer et al. 2010)
Protection of spare parts 
business
• Routines to reconfigure assets and resources to protect the spare parts business from 
imitation (Fischer et al. 2010)
Table 2.3: Dynamic Capabilities of Manufacturers Required for Solution Development
customer-linked sensing capabilities (Kindstro¨m et al., 2013). In doing so, they should use
empathetic capabilities to sense unmet user needs and intensely interact with lead users
and potential clients (den Hertog et al., 2010). These sensing activities can also include
competitors and their competitive moves (Fischer et al., 2010).
Manufacturers need to sense the latest technological innovations that are directly re-
lated to the services business, to identify promising options for new service configura-
tions (den Hertog et al., 2010). Technology sensing for service innovation differs from tra-
ditional product research in that it aims at tapping into possibilities that technological
innovation offers not for product development but for service innovation (Kindstro¨m
et al., 2013).
Internal service sensing relates to the capability of the manufacturer to identify the op-
portunities associated with the integration of products and services to differentiate the
total offering (Fischer et al., 2010). Internal service sensing is especially challenging
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for firms, since service innovation may be little structured and transparent (Gebauer &
Friedli, 2005) compared to product innovation but nonetheless critical as it may have a
direct influence on turnover, profitability, and sales (Kindstro¨m et al., 2013).
Service network sensing refers to sensing service innovation opportunities, not from the
customer, but other actors in the service network. This sensing capability is especially
relevant in solution provisioning since it commonly involves other actors, such as third-
party service providers or system partners that are organized in such a network (Kind-
stro¨m et al., 2013).
Seizing To seize opportunities from service innovation, the more intangible and fuzzy
combinations of existing ideas compared to product innovation need to be conceptual-
ized. Conceptualizing includes designing, prototyping or testing these fuzzy innova-
tions types as a service-innovation-specific capability that is expected to be less tangible
and codified (den Hertog et al., 2010). Firms that co-create advanced services through
repeated cycles of interactive co-creation with their customers can create and seize op-
portunities for innovation and competitive advantage (Kindstro¨m et al., 2013). This
service design process needs to be structured: since service development involves more
disciplines than product development, firms need to organize senior management sup-
port (den Hertog et al., 2010; Kindstro¨m et al., 2013). These authors highlight that firms
should separate service from product development to mitigate unplanned and ad-hoc
service development due to lower prioritization. The separation ensures quick and
timely decisions to create a dominant design of the total offering (Fischer et al., 2010).
Firms that add advanced services to their portfolio require the capacity to restructure
internal and external resources swiftly, for the delivery of new or improved services,
which is a capability that I call ”restructuring the service delivery process” (Kindstro¨m
et al., 2013).24 This capability includes striking a balance between service quality and
cost efficiency (Gro¨nroos & Ojasalo, 2004) and a continuous balancing of the compar-
ative strengths and weaknesses of their internal service functions and their external
service partners. This balancing act includes determining where in-house service units
are located (typically at headquarters versus locally) and which services should be out-
sourced to external parties (Kowalkowski et al., 2011b).
Bundling also known as integration capabilities enable manufacturers to create seamless
but customizable combinations of products and services with a “one-stop-shop” char-
acter. De-bundling capabilities, on the other hand, allow for standardization of services
by stripping them down to their bare essentials (den Hertog et al., 2010). The latter
capacity enables the manufacturer to achieve minimum operational costs and achieve
24Kindstro¨m et al. (2013, p. 1068) call this capability ”managing the service delivery process”. Since this
name resembles somewhat an operational capability, I have decided for to re-label it.
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service profits (Fischer et al., 2010).25 De-bundling, closely resembles the operational
concept of optimizing service productivity (Gro¨nroos & Ojasalo, 2004). As both the in-
tegration capability and product optimization rather represent operational capabilities,
they are treated as such and not conceptualized as a dynamic capability of pure service
providers.
Manufacturers that aim at providing output-based Value Propositions often struggle
with developing the appropriate revenue mechanisms (Kindstro¨m et al., 2013). When
the value is determined in-use by the customer (Vargo & Lusch, 2004), revenue streams
are defined through gain-sharing mechanisms and service outcomes, such as availabil-
ity and performance. Thus, the capacity to develop and adopt new revenue mechanisms
needs to be developed by the manufacturers. This also includes charging the customer
for services that were formerly offered for free or were incorporated in the product
price (Fischer et al., 2010).
Reconfiguring Short-term competitive advantage can often be reached by focusing
on sensing and seizing of opportunities. Efforts to reconfigure the resource base are
required, however, to convert this short-term advantage into a sustainable one (Zahra
et al., 2006; Helfat et al., 2007).
Cooperating across firm boundaries and managing and engaging in networks is a cru-
cial dynamic capability for being able to provide solutions (den Hertog et al., 2010;
Gebauer et al., 2013). The reason is that many value propositions are combinations of
product and service elements of different providers that fulfill a service need together
(Ramirez, 1999). Solution providers need to orchestrate the service system, actively man-
aging the external actors that are central to the performance of the service system. To
effectively do so, solution providers have to develop a common language with suppli-
ers and customers (Gebauer et al., 2013). This reconfiguration capability also included
the extension of the resource base into new markets and shifting roles, resources and
the locus of control in the service system (Kindstro¨m et al., 2013).
The capacity to protect the spare parts business is vital for manufacturers using the ex-
ploitation servitization strategy. Spare parts are an essential foundation for the devel-
opment of the service business because they remain relatively free from imitation and
hamper independent service providers that wish to provide services for the installed
base. Tactics for protecting spare parts include maximizing the ratio between man-
ufactured and purchased parts, controlling the parts supply chains, optimizing parts
25Bundling and de-bundling of product and service elements has been discussed as both a dynamic and
operational capability, the latter mostly under the term integration capability (den Hertog et al., 2010;
Wilson, 1995) as a dynamic capability. In my conceptualization, the dynamic capability of bundling
aims at the reconfiguration from previously separated to jointly sold and priced offerings. The opera-
tional integration capability refers to the actual practices that firms perform to integrate product and
service components during daily operations, e.g., through a Key Account Manager.
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logistics and the use of condition monitoring to detect non-authorized service activities
or the use of alternative parts (Fischer et al., 2010).
Scaling and stretching service innovation is a critical dynamic capability to provide ser-
vices in a uniform way on a large scale (den Hertog et al., 2010). The authors base the
dynamic capability on the replication strategy, which is sometimes called the “McDon-
alds approach” and was first described extensively by Winter & Szulanski (2001). Scal-
ing and stretching is especially important in service markets since communication and
branding are essential for creating a recognizable service offering (Krishnan & Hart-
line, 2001). As such, building a valuable service brand requires serious investment and
a consistent strategy (den Hertog et al., 2010).
Learning and adapting is defined as “capability to deliberately learn from the way service
innovation is managed currently and subsequently adapt the overall service innovation
process” (den Hertog et al., 2010, p. 504). This involves creating a service-oriented
mental model, which is one of the most time-consuming and challenging elements of
reconfiguration for manufacturers. Learning and adapting also implies unlearning and
objecting obsolete routines, which should then lead to the adoption of more effective
behaviors (Sinkula, 2002; Matthyssens et al., 2006). Deliberate learning and adapting is
vital for long-term success and continuous service innovation (Gebauer & Friedli, 2005;
den Hertog et al., 2010).
Firms coming from a base in manufacturing need to balance product and service-innovation
related assets. This includes overcoming the frequent tensions between product and
service units and creating of roles across all organizational levels (Gebauer & Friedli,
2005; Kindstro¨m et al., 2013). Often, profit and loss accountability for services is built
by establishing a separate services business unit to overcome tensions and improve the
profitability of the service business (Fischer et al., 2010).
In conclusion, servitization literature has identified a well-defined set of dynamic capabilities
that manufacturers require to move downstream into hybrid value provisioning. Approxi-
mately two-thirds of the identified dynamic capabilities have been described in more than one
article. While this improves the empirical underpinning of manufacturers DCs to guide them to
product-service business models, it also shows the isolation and overlaps of still present in the
servitization research field. In contrast, the specific dynamic capabilities and their microfoun-
dations required by pure service firms to venture into the hybrid offering space from a base into
services have not been researched.
Pure service firms’ dynamic capabilities differ from manufacturers’ DCs, for both solu-
tion development and alliancing due to a variety of reasons: First, pure service firms
come from a base in services and commonly have already established dynamic and op-
erational routines that enable successful service provisioning. For example, routines
should be set that allow sensing customer needs in the more intangible and value-
oriented (Gro¨nroos, 2007) service domain. Hence, most of the service-specific DCs that
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manufacturers have to develop are not new to pure service firms.
Second, pure service firms lack the internal competencies of the product-manufacturing
business, as they do not possess any significant product-related production units. In ef-
fect, they are likely to require specific technology-sensing capabilities that enable them
to provide services on the manufacturer’s equipment. These capabilities will need to
be even more pronounced if solution offers require pure service providers to assume
responsibility for performance outcomes of a bundle of the manufacturer’s equipment
and the internal services.
Third, manufacturers develop dynamic relational capabilities to build, manage, and
reconfigure their service networks from a central integrator position (Gebauer et al.,
2013; Salonen & Jaakkola, 2015). The dynamic relational capabilities required by pure
service are likely to differ from manufacturers for two reasons. First, they occupy a
decentral network position, which requires different dynamic capabilities, which have
been mostly overlooked by extant literature (Story et al., 2017).
Fourth, manufacturers are known to require dynamic relational capabilities to form
and manage their solution network (Gebauer et al., 2013). These considerably differ,
however, from the relational capacities required by pure service providers, as manu-
facturers merely search for providers to complement their resources and capabilities
to provide solutions, whereas manufacturers represent an entrant competitor to estab-
lished pure service providers. Hence, a specific set of relational capabilities, supporting
both cooperative and competitive aspects of the evolving relationship will be required.
In this study, I take this service firm perspective, i.e., the perspective of service firms that
use BMI to seize opportunities and mitigate threats resulting from the manufacturers’
hybrid value creation efforts. Further research in this field is required due to the limited
explanatory power of manufacturer-specific dynamic capabilities for explaining both,
solution provisioning of pure service firms, and becoming a partner in OEM solution
networks.
2.3.7 Literature Review: the Role of Pure Service Firms in Servitization
Research
Due to the peripheral role that pure service firms have played in servitization research
so far, I have decided to conduct a systematic literature review26 to synthesize the dis-
persed knowledge stocks available regarding this topic. The literature review process
entails analysis of 37 publications containing information about pure service firms in
servitization research from 1990 until 2017. Considering the development of servitiza-
tion research to up to 100 yearly publications (Lightfoot et al., 2013), the lack of research
26The method is further explained in Section 3.4 in the Methodology chapter.
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on traditional service providers is notable. This finding is reinforced by recent litera-
ture suggesting that most servitization studies focus on manufacturers, while the role
of service firms remains under-explored (Martı´n-Pen˜a & Ziaee Bigdeli, 2016; Mountney
et al., 2016).
Topics like competition with solutions (e.g., Mathieu, 2001b; Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011;
Finne et al., 2015) or solution networks (e.g., Gebauer et al., 2013; Paiola et al., 2013)
have been discussed mainly out of a manufacturer’s perspective. In consequence, liter-
ature provides almost no guidance regarding the competitive positioning of traditional
service firms and their business model innovation paths.
However, in contrast to this general finding, two studies have exceptionally advanced
our understanding of competition between pure service firms and servitizing manufac-
turers in general and particularly in the aerospace industry. Hence, these two studies
are portrayed in more detail.
The first study “Hybrid Offerings: How Manufacturing Firms Combine Goods and Services
Successfully” has been conducted by Wolfgang Ulaga and Werner Reinartz in 2011. The
authors examine how manufacturers can leverage the unique resources from their ma-
nufacturing background to build distinct capabilities that can be applied to generate a
positional advantage against pure service firms. This is achieved via a theory-in-use
approach (Deshpande´, 1983), gathering empirical data from two pilot studies and 22
interviews with senior executives from various manufacturing backgrounds. The rea-
son why this contribution is seminal in the context of hybrid offerings, is that Ulaga &
Reinartz (2011) are the first and very few authors that examine competition between
manufacturers and pure service firms in hybrid offers. In contrast, prior studies have
examined servitization as a strategy to achieve competitive advantage against other
manufacturers (Lightfoot et al., 2013) and have overlooked competition with pure ser-
vice firms almost entirely.
Ulaga & Reinartz’ main argument underlining competitive advantage of manufacturers
is their ability to link the product and service business. According to this argument, ma-
nufacturers are in a position to leverage their unique manufacturing-specific resources
to build distinct capabilities that pure service firms do not possess. By applying these
capabilities on different types of industrial product-service offerings, manufacturers
can achieve differentiation or cost advantages (see Figure 2.10). One example is the
manufacturer’s sales force and distribution network that possess in-depth knowledge
regarding the product and privileged access to the customer. This existing sales force
can be trained to acquire the new skills required to master the more complex sales pro-
cess which is required to sell hybrid offerings. Once a product-service sales force has
been trained to understand specific customer problems and is able to master the mental
switch from selling products to selling value while intertwining product with service
features, the manufacturer possesses the unique hybrid offering sales capability that it
can leverage to gain a positional advantage (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011).
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Figure 2.10: Manufacturer-specific Resources and Capabilities for Successful Hybrid Offerings
(adapted from Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011, p. 10)
In spite of the seminal character, Ulaga & Reinartz’ study also has its limitations: As
the sample only includes manufacturers, the authors had to rely on the perception of
their interviewees regarding the unique nature and value of the resources and capabil-
ities of manufacturers. One example is the manufacturer’s field service organization
that many manufacturers employ to deliver services to their installed base of goods.
Based on the field service organization, manufacturers can leverage the hybrid offering
deployment capability, which is “[t]he manufacturer’s capacity to rely on flexible platforms
that allow for standardizing production and delivery processes while safeguarding its ability to
adapt to individual customers’ needs.” (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011, p. 16). This hybrid of-
fering deployment capability in turn, supposedly allows manufacturers to achieve cost
advantages against pure service firms.
These assumptions do however not hold in the aerospace industry. Here, the largest
field service organizations are employed by airlines and their maintenance arms, not
the manufacturers. For example, Lufthansa Technik employed in 2017 on an annual av-
erage approximately 21,000 employees (Lufthansa Technik AG, 2018), AFI KLM Engi-
neering & Maintenance more than 14,000 (AFI KLM E&M, 2018). In contrast, the largest
civil aerospace manufacturers Airbus and Boeing first needed to build their service or-
ganizations, which perform tasks like engineering, customer support, and integration
of different product and service units into a service bundle. For manual maintenance
work (the “dirty fingerprints”) the airframers rely on a network of external MRO ser-
vice partners that provide Line, Base, and Component Maintenance services to their
customers (Pozzi, 2017c). Hence, these organizations are not able to leverage the inter-
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nal service organizations into the proposed cost advantage.
Second, exploring manufacturers’ unique sources of competitive advantage is only one
side of the medal. Also service firms may use the unique resources and capabilities
inherent in their service-based business model to create competitive advantage. One
example are cost advantages through economies of scale, learning curves, and pooling
effects that service firms are able to realize by servicing multiple equipment of vari-
ous manufacturers (Mathieu, 2001b; Cohen et al., 2006). Also, pure service firms may
gain a differentiation advantage through policy choices and timing: by defining service
as their core business and an established service culture, pure service providers can
supposedly provide more flexible, rapid, and professional services than manufacturers
(Mathieu, 2001b). In addition, recent research has found that the service knowledge of
pure service firms enables them to better customize services for customers than manu-
facturers, which may enable them to gain a competitive advantage (Story et al., 2017).
This is also true in the aerospace industry, in which manufacturers typically perform
poorly in customer satisfaction surveys (AeroDynamic Advisory, 2018).
In commercial aviation, service providers continue competing against manufacturers
based on resources and capabilities rooted in their service business. Resources and
capabilities that stem from a base in services are likely to not be available to manufac-
turers and hence have the potential for achieving competitive advantage. Consequen-
tially, the aerospace industry represents a good opportunity to find a response to the
unanswered call for research by Ulaga & Reinartz (2011, p. 22) who explicitly acknowl-
edge this limitation of their study: “Scholars could also investigate how pure services firms
venture into hybrid offerings and compare their resources and capabilities with our results.”.
By examining the sources of competitive advantage of pure service firms I contribute
to the understanding of positional advantage in hybrid offerings from both firms based
in manufacturing and service businesses.
The second seminal article is Schneider et al. (2013) who make a contribution to busi-
ness model innovation literature by examining servitization in the aerospace industry
as a context that makes BMI inevitable for traditional MRO service firms. Explicitly, the
authors aim to shed further light on possible drivers, elements, and formats of business
model innovation within a B2B context. As part of an inductive, theory-building re-
search design, Schneider and her colleagues base their findings on 12 interviews with
managers from a range of smaller private and larger commercial MROs. In context of
this study, the work of Schneider et al. (2013) is seminal as their framework for business
model innovation in the MRO context (Figure 2.11) contains much of the groundwork
onto which this study is built.
Schneider and her colleagues identify two types of antecedents as drivers of BMI of
MRO service firms. The first driver is servitization (expansion of MRO offerings through
OEMs), which is caused i.a. through increasing product-lifecycles and pricing pressure
at the point of aircraft sales. As a second driver Schneider et al. (2013) outline how
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Figure 2.11: Framework of Business Model Innovation in the MRO Context (adapted from
Schneider et al., 2013, p. 295)
airlines focus on their core business flight operations due to a high level of competition
within the industry.
As a response to these drivers, Schneider et al. (2013, p. 288) suggest business model in-
novation as a possibility to realize opportunities and cope with challenges: “[t]o ensure
survival, firms such as the MRO providers are not only required to consider and drive the com-
mercialisation of isolated product or service innovations, but also to question their underlying
core business logic.”. The authors construct the MRO business model framework along
two dimensions: MRO customer value proposition and MRO internal value generation.
Schneider and colleagues propose that increased innovation is required along both di-
mensions of the business model framework: value co-creation-oriented business model
innovation for the internal value generation dimension and customer benefit-oriented
BMI along the MRO customer Value Proposition dimension. One option is to develop
outcome-based solutions to compete with manufacturers in serving airlines that focus
on their core business. This requires innovation of both the internal value generation
dimension (increased collaborations with airlines) and customer value proposition (de-
velop solutions). The second option is to form an alliance with manufacturers to be-
come part of their solution networks. As a third option, Schneider et al. (2013) propose
to form alliances with other MRO providers.
Even though Schneider’s study considerably advances our understanding, the study
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has considerable limitations. First, the MRO business model remains generic, being
based on a framework that contains only two dimensions, and is therefore very lim-
ited in explaining the core logic of MRO service firms. Second, Schneider et al. (2013)
propose developing solutions and three types of alliances as a response to servitiza-
tion and changing customer demand. However, it remains unclear in which case a fit
with the competitive environment can be reached by pursuing these paths. For exam-
ple, three major groups of manufacturers exist, namely airframe, engine, and system
manufacturers. It remains unclear with which type of manufacturer, alliances should
be formed. In this decision, competition for profitability across different levels of the
supply chain and resulting tensions (Michaels, 2017d) need to be taken into account.
On the offering side, different types of solutions exist in the aerospace industry, with
Component Solutions, Engine Solutions, and Aircraft Solutions being the most com-
mon ones. Schneider et al. (2013) do not discern between these types of solutions but
generically propose solution development as a viable BMI path to cope with the emerg-
ing challenges. However, some types of solutions are already common practice, while
others are more difficult to develop due to the inherent risk. In this regard, an identi-
fication of the operational and dynamic capabilities required by MROs to successfully
deliver solutions would greatly improve our understanding of how and under which
circumstances pure service firms can deliver this type of product-service offers.
Third, and most importantly, Schneider and her colleagues raise criticism regarding
the development of OEM alliances, do however not offer any solutions to the MROs’
dilemma. Critique is raised especially regarding the lack of added customer value and
the fact that the alliances are perceived by 82% of their sample as a time-limited ap-
proach until the manufacturers have gained sufficient service capabilities to provide
solutions on their own. This raises the question whether MROs could establish certain
types of alliances that create more value and are more sustainable than others? Fourth,
the study does not address, how the proposed business model paths can be pursued.
As creating solutions and alliancing in solution networks requires fairly developed rela-
tional, operational and dynamic capabilities (Gebauer et al., 2013; Story et al., 2017) we
however need to create a better understanding of how the proposed business models
can be implemented. In conclusion, the specifics and different options of MRO business
model innovation still remain unclear to academia and practice.
In conclusion servitization literature reports mostly anecdotally two distinct paths that
pure service firms chose as a reaction to servitization of manufacturing: (a) developing
solutions themselves and (b) alliancing with manufacturers.
The set of studies supporting the former BMI path acknowledges that also pure service
firms such as WS Atkins plc, an engineering and consulting firm, or Cable & Wireless,
a telecommunications provider can innovate their business model to offer integrated
solutions to their customers (Brady et al., 2005; Davies et al., 2007). This BMI is not nec-
essarily a reaction to servitization of manufacturing but can also be seen as a manner to
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differentiate the firm’s offering by better fulfilling customer needs (Baines et al., 2009).
However, developing solutions may be required to fulfill changing customer demand
once they have become the norm in the market (Oliva & Kallenberg, 2003).
Alliancing with manufacturers is in fact a common theme in solutions literature that
focuses on networks (e.g., Paiola et al., 2013; Gebauer et al., 2013) and business models
(e.g., Storbacka et al., 2013; Adrodegari et al., 2016). In this field, many studies con-
centrate on the collaborative aspect of co-creating solutions. In contrast, only very few
studies note that pure service firms may not have another choice but to cooperate with
manufacturers to gain access to the manufacturers’ resources such as repair manuals.
One of the few exceptions are Schneider et al. (2013, p. 301) who underline the neces-
sity of OEM-MRO alliances by citing a CEO of an MRO firm: “joint ventures with OEM’s
are only a timely limited approach, but we need to collaborate to gain access to the technical
manuals”.
In summary, MROs need to perform BMI to cope with servitization. Developing stand-alone so-
lution offers and forming alliances with manufacturers are deemed the two most sensible tactics.
The two BMI paths either increase the competitiveness against the fuller packages of manufac-
turers’ service bundles (Vandermerwe & Rada, 1988) or choose the collaborative option aiming
to co-create solutions and gain access to the manufacturer’s resources.
A Phase Model of Servitization
To understand and visualize the impact of servitization on established service indus-
tries and traditional service firms, I develop a three-phase servitization model, depicted
in Figure 2.12.
Pre-Servitization Servitization Post-Servitization
• Low density of manufacturers
• Services are considered as necessary 
evil
• Service provisioning internally by 
customers or specialized service 
organizations
• Buyer-supplier-relationships and clear 
role division between manufacturers, 
customers, and service firms 
• Manufacturers add services to their 
products
• Increased competition, possibly price 
wars with established service firms
• Departure from clear division of roles 
and pure buyer-supplier–relationship 
between manufacturer and service 
provider
• Pure service firms innovate their 
business model, providing solutions 
and alliancing with manufacturers
• Established competition between pure 
service firms and manufacturers in 
pure service offerings and solutions
• Established alliances between 
manufacturers and pure service firms 
to jointly provide PSS 
• Fine-tuning of business models
Figure 2.12: Servitization Phase Model
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Pre-Servitization Phase In the pre-servitization phase, manufacturers often perceive
services as “necessary evil” and are reluctant to grant them, as they are sometimes
required to provide them for free as an add-on to the product, resulting in low prof-
itability (Lele, 1997; Neely, 2008).
Consequently, auxiliary services are conducted mainly by customers themselves or spe-
cialized service organizations that offer these services to third parties. Examples from
the airline industry include catering (e.g., the independents Gate Gourmet and DO &
CO, as well as Lufthansa’s LSG Skychefs), pilot and crew training (e.g., Emirate’s Flight
Training Academy and Lufthansa Aviation Training), and IT (e.g., Lufthansa Systems).
The size of these service organizations varies from single mom and pop shops to na-
tional or even global players. In the automotive industry, for example, the car garage
A.T.U has established more than 600 locations in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland
(A.T.U Auto-Teile-Unger GmbH & Co. KG, 2017).
In this phase, manufacturers, customers and service firms create a buyer-supplier re-
lationship with a clear division of roles between the three parties. The manufacturer
is responsible for the design and production of equipment, the customer for operation
and the service provider for maintenance.
Servitization Phase When transitioning from a pre-servitization phase towards servi-
tization, the density27 of manufacturers in an industry is still low. Consequently, the
first OEMs moving downstream into services need to change the existing industry cul-
ture to reach legitimization in service provisioning (Turunen & Finne, 2014).
In cases in which the established service providers form part of a customer organiza-
tion, the market entry becomes especially problematic, since manufacturers moving
downstream become suppliers and competitors at the same time (Kowalkowski et al.,
2011a). If they then move into their customer’s domain without prior agreement or
too assertively, they may encounter competition or even conflict with their customers
(Davies et al., 2006). In this case, traditional service providers may make use of their
established position in the service industry to hamper OEMs’ entry into the service
market. The probably most cited example comes from the airline industry. Here, es-
tablished flight training schools have thwarted the market entry of the flight simulator
manufacturer Thales, who tried to add pilot training and the management of simula-
tor training facilities to their product portfolio (Davies et al., 2006). A common tactic
to mitigate this problem and gain channel control is to merge or form an alliance with
pure service firms (Davies et al., 2006; Turunen, 2011).
Traditional service firms perceive an increased level of competition compared to the
27Density refers in this context to the number of organizations (manufacturers) in a population (total
number of firms offering services for equipment, Hannan & Freeman, 1989)
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pre-servitization phase, as not only the traditional service firms but also the new en-
trants compete in the service market. While the resulting level of competition will
depend on the specific market structure (Porter, 1998), manufacturers often employ
aggressive pricing strategies to establish their service offers, resulting in price wars
with traditional service firms (Schneider et al., 2013). Also, external factors such as
political intervention may affect competition. One example is the the automotive in-
dustry, where antitrust acts of the European Commission have fostered the competi-
tion between manufacturers and pure service providers for car maintenance. Various
interventions in between 2003 and 2011 have ensured a more level playing field by
providing independent repair shops with reasonably priced access to technical infor-
mation, data, tools, equipment, and training required to perform repairs (European
Commission, 2007, 2010; Boston Consulting Group, 2012). On the other hand, legisla-
tion also limits competition, especially in safety-relevant industries, such as elevators
and aerospace. In these industries, laws require manufacturers to ensure the safety
of their equipment, however often at the expense of competition (Turunen & Finne,
2014).
Last but not least, not only manufacturers but also the limited tangible and intangible
resources required for service provisioning may limit competition. Especially skilled
human resources such as sufficiently skilled maintenance mechanics may be scarce (Tu-
runen & Finne, 2014) and thus affect market entry and competitive tactics.
Post-Servitization Phase In the post-servitization phase, some manufacturers have
successfully established themselves as service providers in their respective aftersales
service market. Their counterparts with less success of their service-led business model
may deservitize completely or outsource increasing parts of their service business to
their partners (Forkmann et al., 2017b). In this phase, alliancing and competitive activ-
ity will continue between the two parties, albeit on a less dynamic level. Hence, service
firms will rather need to fine-tune instead of radically change their already reconfigured
business model to increase the fit with the changing environment (Teece, 2007).
Competition may also move towards the left in the product-service continuum if cus-
tomers or pure service firms start backward integration towards manufacturing (Hob-
day et al., 2005). One example of this rather infrequent business model innovation is
the Hong Kong-based MRO provider HAECO that has launched a large scale produc-
tion of PMA parts especially for aircraft cabin interiors (Derber, 2014) to compete with
the manufacturers’ spare parts business. Manufacturers may be able to prevent these
ventures by providing high-quality products at a price that makes backward integra-
tion unprofitable to the customer (Hobday et al., 2005), which would, however, come
at the trade-off of sacrificing some of the profitability of the typically highly profitable
spare parts business.
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Competing by Developing Solutions
Most servitization literature explicitly or implicitly assumes that the shift towards in-
tegrated solutions is a downstream movement from manufacturing to services (e.g.,
Wise & Baumgartner, 1999; Oliva & Kallenberg, 2003), and only some limited cross-
sectoral research (see Table 2.4) shows that solutions can also be provided by firms that
stem from a base in services. Since solutions are complex bundles of products and ser-
vices which involve assuming the responsibility of parts of the customer’s processes
and their performance outcomes, they require the development of specific capabilities
(Hakanen & Jaakkola, 2012; Paiola et al., 2013).
Characteristics of Solution-oriented Business Model Innovation Comparing the litera-
ture available regarding pure service firms venturing into solutions, some conclusions
can be drawn, as many of the analyzed cases have some common characteristics. First,
the prominent and possibly only approach to provide solutions available to pure ser-
vice firms is becoming a solution integrator (Hobday et al., 2005; Davies et al., 2007). In
this approach, resources and capabilities that stem from inside and outside the firm are
integrated into a seamless offering (Hobday et al., 2005). Due to the complex nature of
solutions, companies often do so by forming partnerships with these other organiza-
tions to access their complementary resources, services or products (Foote et al., 2001;
Windahl & Lakemond, 2006). In this context, the capability to integrate internal and ex-
ternal activities, skills and knowledge from other organizations to produce more com-
plex products and services is required both by manufacturers and pure service firms
(Hobday et al., 2005; Davies et al., 2007). To provide integrated solutions, firms need
to form collaborations with customers, OEMs, and possibly competitors. Partnerships
with customers enable customer-benefit orientation and value co-creation, while collab-
orations with OEMs allow access to the required resources such as maintenance manu-
als and intellectual property rights (Schneider et al., 2013).
System seller approaches, in which manufacturers develop most resources and capa-
bilities required for solution provisioning internally (Davies et al., 2007), are not com-
monly pursued by pure service firms. The reasons for not choosing this approach is that
pure service firms would have to integrate backward, becoming producers of goods.
The system seller approach would require considerable investments in research and
development as well as production assets, with very questionable results regarding
the competitiveness versus the products of the established manufacturers. By selecting
the system integrator approach, pure service firms can choose between equipment of
leading manufacturers to provide an integrated solution, instead. This provides ser-
vice firms with a flexibility advantage, as they do not possess any in-house production
capabilities (Davies et al., 2006).
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Firm Traditional Service Offers Solution Offer Business Model Innovation Authors
Cable & Wireless 
Global Markets
• Network design
• Supplying telecom 
infrastructure and applications
• Operation and management of 
corporate networks
• Global outsourcing solutions for 
corporate telecom networks 
including design, ownership, 
management, operation incl. 
service level agreements 
• Building integration capability
• Establishment of three-part
organizational structure 
(strategic center, customer 
front-end, product- and service 
back ends)
• After failure in communication 
crisis: channel partnership with 
global consulting firms
Davies (2004); 
Brady et al 
(2005); Davies & 
Hobday (2005); 
Hobday et al. 
(2005); Davies et 
al. (2006; 2007)
WS Atkins plc • Consulting and engineering 
services, project management 
and technical services for 
infrastructure projects
• Integrated multi-OEM solution 
financed, operated and 
maintained for customers 
defense health care and other 
sectors (e.g. railway or 
baggage handling systems)
• Building integration capability
• Establishment of three-part
organizational structure 
(strategic center, customer 
front-end, product- and service 
back ends)
Davies (2004); 
Brady et al 
(2005); Davies & 
Hobday (2005); 
Hobday et al. 
(2005); Davies et 
al. (2006; 2007)
Aerospace MRO 
firms
• Aircraft MRO services (Line, 
Base, Engine, Components 
Maintenance)
• Tailored solutions: increasing 
focus on customer benefits and 
value co-creation, contents
not further defined
• Innovation of offerings and 
value creation, increased 
customer benefit- and value co-
creation orientation
• Collaboration with customers,
OEMs and other MROs 
(limited)
Schneider et al. 
(2013)
Machine Retailer • Retail of machines and robots • Integrated industrial solution 
comprising of machines, 
maintenance software and 
aftersales (e.g. maintenance 
services)
• Integration of products and 
services of other actors
• Development of network with 
clear roles and stable positions
Hakanen & 
Jaakkola (2013)
Professional 
Marketing Service 
Firms
• Distinct service offers of each 
firm: Marketing, Advertising, 
Media Planning
• Integrated marketing, 
communication and 
consultancy service solution
• Creation of a solution network
with three integrating actors, as 
solution cannot be provided 
alone
• Development of complex value 
co-creation activities
Jaakkola & 
Hakanen (2013)
Distributor of 
automated
warehouse 
systems
(not focal 
company of 
study)
• Distribution of warehouse 
system 
• Integrated warehouse solutions 
comprising of planning, 
installing, integrating, 
optimizing and servicing the 
system
• Taking over responsibility from 
manufacturer of warehouse 
system, development of 
required activities (e.g. 
customization)
• Development of dynamic 
capabilities to innovate and 
operational capabilities to 
sustain business model
• Intensification of relationships 
with manufacturer and 
customer
Forkmann et al. 
(2016)
Information 
technology 
software 
enterprise 
• providing maintenance planning 
and energy consumption 
software as well as training and 
consultancy services
• Energy solution consisting of 
monitoring & control services, 
energy meters and software
• Identification of increased 
customer needs
• Definition of solutions delivery 
process
• Partnerships: consideration but 
unclear whether developed and 
to what aim
Benedetti et al. 
(2016)
Table 2.4: Examples of Solution Providers from a Base in Services
Capability Development Second, pure service firms need to develop specific capabili-
ties to provide solutions. One example is the integration capability, which is required
to integrate the manufacturers’ products as well as internal and external service com-
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ponents. However, the capabilities needed and their development differ from manu-
facturers, due to the base in services (Kindstro¨m et al., 2013). Another aspect is the
in-depth knowledge regarding product components that only manufacturers can lever-
age to build competitive solution offers (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). As product com-
ponents form an integral part of the solution, service providers will have to develop
product-specific capabilities to provide competitive solutions. Also, the development
of service-specific capabilities is likely to differ, as pure service firms already possess
service-infused relationships and relational processes required to provide services (Tuli
et al., 2007).
Competitive Advantage The competitive positioning of pure service firms and ma-
nufacturers has, somewhat surprisingly, received only minimal attention. The main
exception are Ulaga & Reinartz (2011) that explicitly examine the competitive advan-
tage that manufacturers can gain against pure service firms in hybrid offerings.28 All
studies that touch upon the topic use mainly the resource-based view as a strategic lens,
arguing that either party possesses unique, valuable resources and capabilities.
The main argument underlining the competitive advantage of manufacturers is their
ability to link product and service business. Manufacturers may transfer unique product-
related resources and capabilities that pure service firms do not posses onto their PSS
offers (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). Also, they may benefit from positive spill-over effects if
they transfer their product brand name on their service offers (Mathieu, 2001b), which
is a common tactic with car manufacturers. Ulaga & Reinartz (2011) argue that manu-
facturers are in the unique position to leverage their manufacturing-specific unique re-
sources and build distinct capabilities that pure service firms do not possess and hence
achieve a positional advantage (see Figure 2.10). One example is the manufacturer’s
sales force and distribution network that possess in-depth knowledge regarding the
product and privileged access to the customer. This existing sales force can be trained
to acquire the new skills required to master the more complex sales process which is
needed to sell hybrid offerings. Once a product-service sales force has been trained to
understand specific customer problems and can perform the mental switch from selling
products to selling value while intertwining product with service features, the manu-
facturer possesses the unique hybrid offering sales capability that it can leverage to gain
a positional advantage (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011).
Service providers have not received the same level of academic attention as manufac-
turers, may however also use the resources and capabilities inherent in their service-
based business model to create competitive advantage. One example are cost advan-
tages through economies of scale, learning curves, and pooling effects that they were
able to gather by servicing multiple types of equipment of various manufacturers (Math-
ieu, 2001b; Cohen et al., 2006). Also, pure service firms may gain a differentiation ad-
28As introduced in Section 2.3.7.
83
Chapter 2. Conceptual Background
vantage through policy choices and timing: by defining service as their core business
and their traditional service culture, pure service providers can provide more flexible,
rapid, and professional services than manufacturers (Mathieu, 2001b). Besides, recent
research has found that the service knowledge of pure service firms enables them to
better customize services for customers than manufacturers, which may allow them to
gain a competitive advantage (Story et al., 2017).
Even though these limited advancements regarding the competitive positioning of pure
service firms have been made, our understanding of competitive advantage still suffers
from major limitations. First, the empirical underpinning of competitive advantage
remains limited. As Ulaga & Reinartz (2011) base their empirical study only on manu-
facturers that were successful in hybrid value provisioning, the authors were not able
to assess the availability of the identified resources and capabilities at traditional ser-
vice providers. This gap is somewhat problematic, as RBV states that a firm can gain
a sustained competitive advantage based on its unique resources being simultaneously
valuable, rare, inimitable, and organized (Barney & Hesterley, 2012), which is however
difficult to assess if the type of firms compared to are not present in the sample. The au-
thors explicitly acknowledge this limitation of their study by stating “Scholars could also
investigate how pure services firms venture into hybrid offerings and compare their resources
and capabilities with our results.” (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011, p. 22).
Other authors remain purely conceptual and do not provide any empirical underpin-
nings for their arguments. Furthermore, the identified studies containing service firms
in their sample did not evaluate competitive advantage but only collaborative options
for solution provisioning. Consequently, empirical foundations for sources of competi-
tive advantage of pure service firms remain close to non-existent.
Second, some of the manufacturer’s sources of competitive advantage require further
examination. For example, increasing data-availability of the installed base has the po-
tential to lower maintenance costs (Baines et al., 2007) through predictive maintenance
methods, which may result in a competitive advantage for whoever has access to the
data and the required data processing and interpretation capabilities. This is, however,
not necessarily only the manufacturer. Instead, customers argue that the data generated
by their equipment is their property and that they can provide this data to whomever
they prefer, including traditional service firms (Valeika, 2015).
In summary, some first steps have been undertaken to outline the competitive field between ma-
nufacturers that go downstream and established traditional service firms, with a focus on the
resource-based competitive advantage that manufacturers might enjoy. To better understand
competition between both parties and implications for pure service firms to cope with servitiza-
tion, sources of competitive advantage of pure service firms should be identified and compared to
manufacturers.
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Becoming an OEM Network Partner
As discussed in the Key Partners section of the PSS Business Model Canvas, manufac-
turers rely on different types of partners to provide PSS, as these complement the ma-
nufacturers’ resources and capabilities. While the alliance decision of manufacturers
has evolved from anecdotal evidence to developing strategic, theoretically founded ap-
proaches, academia remains mostly anecdotal regarding the alliance decision of service
firms (i.e., whether to become the OEM’s network partner) with only recent progress
(e.g., Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013).
Service suppliers should not blindly join every service network offered by manufac-
turers. Instead, strategic implications need to be taken into account, as service firms
may possess an established position in the service market (Turunen & Finne, 2014) or
operate in a market in which they may have unique sources of competitive advantage
at their disposal. In these cases, joining the manufacturer’s network would strengthen
the OEM’s market position, eradicating the own positional advantage. In other cases,
manufacturers may possess a competitive advantage that may make competing a prob-
lematic or even unfeasible option for traditional service providers. Hence, traditional
service providers require strategic (e.g., contingency-based) approaches towards de-
ciding whether to compete with their own stand-alone solutions or whether to join the
manufacturer’s service network.
For this reason, it is crucial from an academic standpoint to investigate the alliance
decision of pure service firms to improve our understanding of the formation of solu-
tion networks. Also, alliance arrangements between manufacturers and pure service
firms may significantly differ in scope, Key Activities performed by either party, Chan-
nel access to the final customer, and other properties, which has direct implications on
the advantageousness of these arrangements for service firms. In consequence, under-
standing alliances with manufacturers, the different options, and their implications is
also of paramount managerial importance.
However, as of today, servitization literature lacks such a strategic approach for ser-
vice providers and remains limited to some empirical evidence regarding benefits and
sacrifices experienced when joining the manufacturers’ service networks. Besides, the
knowledge stocks regarding changes in the business model of pure service firms re-
quired to become a service partner are still scattered as of today. Hence, I summarize
these knowledge stocks in the following two sections.
Benefits and Sacrifices of Network Partners Marketing literature commonly defines
value as being “derived from the benefits and sacrifices perceived by the actor in the offering
and the related exchange” (Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013, p. 48). While benefits for the cus-
tomer concern the increased utility of the offering, benefits between firms in the service
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network can result from the relationships and interaction between the parties. Sacri-
fices, on the other hand, include monetary and non-monetary costs, such as risks or
invested time and effort resulting from joining the service network (Jaakkola & Haka-
nen, 2013). Table 2.5 summarizes the identified benefits and sacrifices that service firms
potentially perceive by joining the manufacturers’ solution networks.
Benefits Sacrifices
Growth
• Increase in revenue
• Access to new Customer Segments
• Extension of the service offering
Investment and Sales
• High upfront investments
• Delay of profits
• Limited potential to affect solution contents, sales targets and efforts
• Decrease of revenues
Cost/Effort Reduction
• Increased learning and economies of scale
• Reduced effort for sales activities
Access to Knowledge Resources
• Lack of information sharing by solution provider
• Lack of access to intellectual property
Access to Knowledge Resources
• Input in R&D from other Customer Segments
• Increased product knowledge
Culture and Governance
• Professional’s reluctance to act as mere resource providers
• Lack of trust in each other’s competences
• Lack of incentive alignment between partners
Improvement of Company Image
• Credibility for being partner of a known OEM network
• Access to bigger customers that can be used as reference
Co-opetition
• Strengthening a competitor’s service offering
Table 2.5: Benefits and Sacrifices of Service Firms in Solution Networks
Benefits Service firms that become network partners can benefit from potential growth
of their service business by service revenues with the solution provider and access to its
Customer Segments, which enables an extension of the service offering (Lockett et al.,
2011; Turunen, 2011; Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013). In turn, increasing size and stability
of revenues, allows service providers to reap economies of scale or decrease service
turn-around times (Lockett et al., 2011). Service firms can gain a significant learning
advantage by specializing in one type of service, as e.g., the maintenance of complex
technical equipment in a center of excellence concept (Gebauer et al., 2013). The result-
ing learning curves may improve the service provider’s cost leadership advantage even
over other service offers provided outside the solution network. Besides, service firms
require lower customer acquisition costs, since they provide services for the solution
provider’s customers (Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013).
Alliances with manufactures and access to its service network provide service firms
with the possibility to access additional knowledge resources. For example, manufac-
turers can share valuable product know-how, which enables them to solve more ad-
vanced customer problems (Turunen, 2011). Increasing contact with possibly different
customers also allows service providers to gain useful knowledge to support their ser-
vice innovation activities (Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013). Last but not least, service firms
can improve their company image by becoming partners within the manufacturer’s ser-
vice network. An improved brand image may especially benefit smaller firms, which
have not yet gained a firm market reputation, as they can refer to larger customers
being served (Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013).
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Sacrifices To make an informed alliance decision, not only the abovementioned bene-
fits but also potential sacrifices have to be taken into account. The first type of sacrifices
concerns the investment that is required to enter the network and consequences for the
service firm’s cash flow. Lockett et al. (2011) report that service firms may need to make
considerable upfront investments for building a pool of spare parts or for procuring
repair equipment. Further investments may be necessary to stem other upfront R&D
activities; furthermore a healthy cash flow may be required, as profits may be delayed
due to the outcome-based pricing mechanisms (Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013). To make
matters worse, service firms often have limited opportunities to influence the contents
of the solution, the sales targets, and sales efforts, as these activities are predominantly
performed by the solution integrator (Lockett et al., 2011; Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013).
Besides lower sales volume, this may result in other sacrifices such as wasted R&D
efforts or an inferior market position.
The second type of sacrifices relates to a lack of access to knowledge resources. Al-
though manufacturers may provide service firms with valuable product know-how
(Turunen, 2011), they are often reluctant to do so, as they fear the loss of intellectual
property and its dissemination along the supply chain to potential competitors (Lock-
ett et al., 2011). In cases in which solution providers assume most communication with
the customer, touch points enabling service innovation of the service firm may be sig-
nificantly limited. This problem is particularly severe if the solution provider is reluc-
tant to share the customer insights or blocks the communication channel (Jaakkola &
Hakanen, 2013).
The third sacrifice and possible barrier to becoming a network partner becomes appar-
ent considering the cultural change that is required to collaborate with a manufacturer
or solution integrator effectively. Jaakkola & Hakanen (2013) and Lockett et al. (2011)
identify three culture- and governance-related barriers that are (a) the reluctance to act
as a mere resource provider not servicing the end customer, (b) the lack of trust in each
other’s competencies, and (c) a lack of incentive alignment between the two partners.
The latter can be especially pronounced between manufacturers and service providers
due to their naturally opposing targets of a profitable spare parts business versus max-
imizing parts repair. Incentive alignment can be facilitated by usage and performance-
based pricing models with the end customer (Baines et al., 2007) and taking decisions
based on life-cycle costing (Lockett et al., 2011).
As noted earlier, alliance arrangements between manufacturers and service firms differ
considerably, which is why a service firm is unlikely to experience all of the identified
benefits or suffer from all of the identified sacrifices. Instead, service firms should aim
at creating beneficial configurations of alliances with manufacturers that allow them to
reap most of the benefits while mitigating the sacrifices to a maximum.
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The Network Partner Business Model While most solution network studies focus on
the manufacturer, little to no literature is available that focuses deliberately on the firms
that become network partners (Story et al., 2017). Hence, the business model reconfig-
uration required to form solution networks remains incomplete and concentrates only
on the manufacturers’ perspective. This section consolidates the mostly anecdotal in-
formation on the aspired business model and its reconfiguration that pure service firms
need to undertake to become an OEM network partner (see Figure 2.13). This Business
Model Canvas is generic, which means that not all presented elements are present in
all types of alliances and applicable to all kinds of service firms.
Key Activities
• Provide contracted 
services
• Develop and deliver 
modular service portfolio
• Conduct Dynamic 
Feedback Loops with 
OEM
• Service-focused 
innovation
Key Resources & 
Capabilities
• Service-specific local 
resources and 
capabilities (e.g. staff, 
facilities)
• Access to OEM’s 
knowledge resources
Value Proposition
• Specialized services 
required for solution
• Risk-sharing
• Providing local services, 
allowing manufacturer to 
increase global reach
• Allow OEM to 
concentrate on services 
that are difficult to 
standardize and require 
specialized expertise
• Support of 
manufacturers’ growth, 
cost-leadership, or 
differentiation strategy
Customer Segments
• OEM: direct customer of 
service
• Access to new (OEM‘s) 
customer segments
Channels
• Channel Configurations 
to end customer:
• through OEM
• direct access
Customer Relationship
• Relationship with final 
customer depends on 
network configuration 
(direct/indirect)
• OEM: more complex, 
multifaceted relationship
Revenue Streams
• Additional service revenues from OEM and its customers
• Possibility to cross-sell services to new customer segments
Cost Structure
• Learning and advantages through focus on one type of equipment
• High upfront investments may be required to join network
• Reduced effort for sales activities
Key Partners
• Manufacturers, possibly 
other actors in the 
manufacturer’s service 
network
Figure 2.13: Network Partner Business Model of Pure Service Firms
Maintenance firms can make Value Propositions to add value to the manufacturer’s so-
lution through access to complementary resources and capabilities that are transferred
through different types of services to the manufacturer’s solution (Mathieu, 2001b; He-
lander & Mo¨ller, 2007; Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013). These services may include but are
not limited to basic or local support services, system maintenance, and labor-intensive
maintenance operations. Choosing local service providers allows the manufacturer to
serve global markets, building a flexible platform that meets the local demands (He-
lander & Mo¨ller, 2007). This platform can also serve for risk-sharing, as e.g., seasonal
risks of capacity utilization can be shared among the partners (Mathieu, 2001b). If the
manufacturer chooses to outsource basic services, it can concentrate on activities which
are both difficult to standardize and require highly specialized expertise (e.g., consult-
ing, Helander & Mo¨ller, 2007).
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Image risks are one particular type of risk that manufacturers encounter by choosing
third-party maintenance providers. These are relevant in the context of servitization as
manufacturers are worried about undermining their product company image with ser-
vice offerings. This risk is particularly significant at the beginning of the transition into
the service business where service quality may negatively impact customer valuation
in both product and service offerings (Kindstro¨m, 2010). When choosing third-party
maintenance providers, manufacturers trade the image risks of internal service provi-
sioning against image risks resulting from relying on external suppliers. These risks
emerge for two reasons: first, the service provider acts directly at the customer inter-
face, thus serving as a representative of the solution provider. Second, the customer
attributes the service provider’s performance direct to the solution provider and his
company image, irrespective of who actually performs the service (Jaakkola & Haka-
nen, 2013; Nenonen et al., 2014). Hence, service providers should aim at providing con-
sistent, high-quality services to minimize image risks. As many of these services are
better provided by an external specialist than an internal unit, network partners sup-
port the manufacturer in achieving a differentiation advantage (Bustinza et al., 2015).
Service firms can also support manufacturers in reaching a cost leadership advantage
by providing services more cost-efficient than an internal unit. Cost-efficiency gains
are caused by significant learning advantage that service providers can gain by spe-
cializing on one specific type of service, as, e.g., the maintenance of complex technical
equipment (Gebauer et al., 2013). Hence, relying on a single maintenance specialist
for the sub-components of various OEMs is likely to be more cost-effective than each
OEM specializing on the repair of their own equipment, as coordination costs in the
service network are minimized. In summary, pure service firms aim at providing the
“best” (Story et al., 2017, p. 62) service offers to the manufacturer, referring to service
offers that are superior to services that either manufacturer or other service firms could
provide.
The main Key Activity of network partners consists of delivering the above mentioned
services that have been contracted by the manufacturer. In the case of maintenance
firms, these consist of local and global maintenance services, operations of the system,
or specialized repair services (Helander & Mo¨ller, 2007). Also, advanced maintenance
management services such as data administration, calibration of equipment, inventory
management, warranty tracking, and repair management (Toossi et al., 2013) can be
developed and provided to manufacturers.
According to Davies et al. (2006), solution providers configure each solution individ-
ually to the customer needs, ideally from modular service components. Hence, net-
work partners should aim at developing and delivering a portfolio of service compo-
nents that are easily assembled into a seamless offering. This approach should also
increase the network partner’s ability to provide further advanced services to the ma-
nufacturer’s portfolio or possibly increase its responsibilities in the total offer, e.g., if
the manufacturer wishes to partly deservitize (Forkmann et al., 2017b).
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To improve current and future generations of the PSS, the manufacturer should imple-
ment dynamic feedback loops with both the final user and maintainer of the system
(Hobday et al., 2005). These feedback loops offer unique ways of gaining knowledge
about the PSS in operation and benefit all parties, the feedback takers and feedback
givers (Schuh et al., 2015). Hence, network partners should establish gathering, pro-
cessing, sharing, and interpreting data with the manufacturer as one of their Key Ac-
tivities.
Story et al. (2017) report that service firms undertake some limited innovation activities
that aim towards the optimization of the joint product-service offerings. These activities
focus mostly on innovating the service components of the total offering, not the product
component (e.g., monitoring of tires).
The Key Resources and Capabilities required by pure service firms in general and mainte-
nance firms in particular to become solution network partners have received very little
attention in servitization research. However, it is evident that maintenance firms must
possess the Key Resources and Capabilities required to provide local maintenance, re-
pair and overhaul services, such as trained mechanics, engineers, and facilities and
specialist skills, expertise and knowledge (Turunen & Finne, 2014; Story et al., 2017).
An important point that has been mentioned in the previous benefits and sacrifices
section is that network partners regularly gain access to unique knowledge resources
of the manufacturer such as maintenance manuals and product know-how which can
improve their service offering (Lockett et al., 2011). At the same time, the authors high-
light that manufacturers are reluctant to share these resources as they fear knowledge
dissipation and future competition through the service provider.
Also, service firms may require increased financial resources to meet the considerable
upfront investments that they may have to make to become part of the manufacturer’s
service network (Lockett et al., 2011) to finance the change from input- to output-based
pricing mechanisms (Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013).
Becoming a Network Partner affects the service firm’s Relationships and Channels to its
Customer Segments. By alliancing, pure service firms can benefit from gaining access
to the manufacturer’s customers, adding new Customer Segments, which may allow
extension of their service offering, growth, and stable revenues (Lockett et al., 2011; Tu-
runen, 2011; Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013). Solution provisioning generally requires very
close ties to the customer that can be gained both by the solution provider and its net-
work partners (Story et al., 2017). The customer relationships that network partners can
develop, depend on the configuration of the service network, as service firms may or
may not enjoy direct channel access (Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013). In case that no direct
channel to the end customer is established, the manufacturer evolves as a new customer
segment, as services are provided directly for him and not the final customer.
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Relationships between the different actors of a solution network play a vital role as the
strength of the connection between the various actors involved, the solution providers’
position in the network, and the impact on the customer’s core processes may both
enable and obstruct the development of solutions (Windahl & Lakemond, 2006). The
relationship between a service firm and the solution integrator is likely to become more
complex, as it incorporates both cooperative and competitive elements and firms oc-
cupy multiple roles in the network (Lockett et al., 2011).29 This is aggravated by the fact
that incentive alignment and higher level of information-sharing are required to effec-
tively provide solutions, which is however not always the case (Lockett et al., 2011).30
These Relationships may, however, become less complicated over time, once they are
more formalized or if the manufacturer deservitizes, handing over all service responsi-
bilities to the service firm (Forkmann et al., 2017b).
Becoming a partner in the manufacturer’s service networks represents a profound change
in the business model with effects on both, Cost and Revenue Structure. Additional
revenues may be gained by accessing the manufacturer’s customer segments, either
through the offerings inherent in the PSS, or the possibility to cross-sell further own
service offerings to these customers. Also, the manufacturer may represent a steady
source of revenues, especially if no direct access to the end customer is established, but
services are conducted directly for the OEM (Lockett et al., 2011; Jaakkola & Hakanen,
2013). These positive effects may be offset however by the high upfront investment that
is sometimes required to join the network, e.g., to finance the manufacturer’s switch
from input- to output-based offers and the associated delay of cash flows (Lockett et al.,
2011).
The Cost Structure of the service provider’s business model may be lowered through
profiting from significant learning curves that service firms can gain from servicing
complex technical equipment, which can be transferred even outside of the scope of
the service network (Gebauer et al., 2013). Also, access to the manufacturer’s knowl-
edge resources is likely to decrease the Cost Structure of the service firm, as these may
be used to lower the costs for the services provided. A possibly minor point is that
network partners require less customer acquisition costs, as the manufacturer assumes
the responsibility for this task (Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013).31
29If manufacturer and service firm have similar service offers established targeting the same Customer
Segments.
30As noted earlier, aims of OEMs and network partners are initially not aligned due to the contrary in-
centives regarding the manufacturer’s spare parts business. Here, the manufacturer is inclined to max-
imize the profit with spare parts, whereas the maintenance firm aims at increasing the number of
repaired components.
31This is only the case if the service provider does not simultaneously compete with the manufacturer for
identical service offers, as then acquisition costs still apply.
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2.4 Interim Conclusions
In this chapter, I have laid the conceptual background of this study. Business models and their
innovation serve as a theoretical lens that I use to examine how MROs can cope with the ma-
nufacturers’ aftermarket incursion and changing customer needs. Servitization has been intro-
duced as both, the phenomenon that is one major antecedent to MRO business model innovation
practices and the academic field to which I wish to make the main contribution.
I have introduced the concept of business models and their innovation in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
Business model frameworks abstract the complex reality into comprehensible models that allow
us to understand the core logic of firms’ value creation and the underlying mechanisms better.
The concept of business models builds on a variety of strategic management constructs such as
the resource-based and relational view. By employing these different views, we can explain sus-
tainable competitive advantage through a variety of angles. Hence, the business model concept
is especially suitable for this study as, both, suppliers and customers of MROs are in the process
of changing the way in which they conduct business. This, in turn, makes reconfigurations
of multiple dimensions of the business model of MRO service firms one of the most promising
options to sustain firm performance.
In Section 2.3, I have introduced the manufacturers’ strategy of offering hybrid bundles of prod-
ucts and services, which is a phenomenon commonly known as servitization. Benefits to servi-
tization include the ability to earn revenues over the entire life cycle of the asset, increasing
customer contact, and even dependency, as well as escaping price-based competition on pure
product offers but instead pursuing competitive differentiation through a range of basic and ad-
vanced service offers that support the asset or the client. I have defined solutions as advanced
offers in which the provider assumes the responsibility for parts of the customer’s operation,
which typically involve usage-based pricing components (e.g., a fee per hour of equipment us-
age) and performance-based pricing components (e.g., a bonus-malus clause).
However, servitization is not without challenges and manufacturers have to overcome specific
barriers to add services to their business model successfully. In essence, delineating viable hy-
brid business models, building the required capabilities to design and deliver services, adapting
organizational structures, dealing with tensions between product and service business, and as-
suming the risk of performance-based offers is far from straight-forward. In effect, many ma-
nufacturers suffer from the service paradox, which is a phenomenon in which additional service
revenues do not result in the expected benefits. As only very few and limited knowledge stocks
regarding pure service firms in the context of hybrid product-service business models exist, a
systematic literature review was performed to understand this phenomenon better. The results
show that pure service firms can employ the two generic BMI paths of (a) developing solution
offers of their own, and (b) forming alliances with manufacturers to adjust their business model
to the dramatic change in their environment caused by servitization. However, the specifics of
both generic BMI paths remain elusive of today, which leaves both scholars and managers with
little understanding and guidance regarding the decision and implementation of these strategic
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options.32
To improve our understanding the impact of servitization on pure service firms over time, a phase
model was developed that explains the different phases of servitization and their effects on an in-
dustry. In the pre-servitization phase, manufacturers often perceive services as a necessary evil,
which results in customers providing maintenance services themselves and the growth of profes-
sional service organizations for Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul. In the servitization phase,
customers profit from increased high-value solution offers and possibly price-based competition
with traditional service firms. In this phase, Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul firms need to
innovate their business model due to (a) increasing competitive pressure by manufacturers, (b)
the emergence of high-value solution offerings, and (c) the manufacturers’ need for partners to
provide solutions in service networks. Simultaneously, however, manufacturers may limit com-
petition with traditional service firms by restricting access to repair manuals, equipment, and
spare parts, which may lead to reduced instead of increased competition in the service market and
result in increased customer prices. In the post-servitization phase, manufacturers have formed
alliances with service firms. Competition outside of these alliances is expected to continue, al-
beit on a less dynamic level. In industries in which rivalry remains, customers will have the
choice of a broader portfolio of suppliers with their individual strengths and weaknesses, while
alliances between both parties may potentially provide superior joint solution offers. However,
in industries where competitors have successfully been locked-out by manufacturers, customers
may become locked into long-lasting solution contracts and suffer from a substantial one-sided
dependency on the manufacturer once the product-service bundle has been procured.
Current literature remains anecdotal regarding competition between pure service firms and ma-
nufacturers, although a major step in understanding positional advantage from a manufac-
turer’s perspective has been made. However, advancements on competitive advantage between
both players is mostly focused on resources and capabilities and still lacks the empirical un-
derpinnings from a service provider side almost entirely. Hence, current servitization literature
has only limited explanatory power regarding the competitive advantage between manufacturers
and pure service firms. Analyzing competition from both sides between these players by iden-
tifying unique resources, capabilities, and other business model elements of pure service firms
was found to represent a valuable contribution to servitization research (Ulaga & Reinartz,
2011).
While previous literature has acknowledged that pure service firms can offer solutions, the busi-
ness model innovation path required to do so has hardly been explored. Since these firms enter
the product-service continuum from the service-, not the product-side, the needed resources and
capabilities, the business model reconfigurations and the underlying dynamic capabilities are
expected to differ considerably from those required by manufacturers, which makes them in-
teresting to study (Kindstro¨m, 2010; Kindstro¨m et al., 2013). Additionally, factors that may
32These findings have been confirmed by a recent literature review by Raddats et al. (2019), who propose
research on ramifications of servitization on service firms and on an industry level as critical research
priority.
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determine whether pure service firms can develop solutions or need to compete with traditional
service offers, have not received any scientific attention as of today. In conclusion, servitization
literate cannot explain, when and how pure service firms develop integrated solutions, although
this type of business model innovation is commonly employed to ensure firm performance when
faced with servitization. To increase our understanding of how pure service firms can adapt their
business model to offer solutions, I have synthesized the available literature in a Business Model
Canvas, which delineates the target state into which these firms need to transform the different
dimensions of their business model. In addition, I have identified the specific dynamic capabili-
ties that manufacturers require to change their business model from a product to a service focus,
which builds a basis for understanding the dynamic capabilities that are necessary to venture
into the space of hybrid offers from a base in services instead of products.
Studies that are concerned with solution provisioning in service networks mostly take the manu-
facturer’s perspective, while only recent progress has been made in widening the research focus
to include other actors in the service network (e.g., Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013; Forkmann et al.,
2017b). Consequently, we have little knowledge regarding the reconfigurations that pure service
firms must make in the business model to become the manufacturer’s network partner and the
underlying (dynamic) capabilities that are required (Gebauer et al., 2013).
While a plethora of strategic approaches regarding the outsourcing decision has been developed
for manufacturers, no attempts have been made that explain the alliance decision of pure service
firms but is instead limited to benefits and sacrifices that service firms may experience when
joining a manufacturer’s network. However, alliance arrangements between manufacturers and
service firms differ considerably, which is why a service firm is unlikely to experience all of the
identified benefits or sacrifices. Hence, service firms need a strategic approach to the alliance
decision that allows them to create beneficial configurations of alliances with manufacturers.
This decision is complicated by the fact that servitization and service networks result in com-
plex, multilateral relationships in the supply chain, as the manufacturer can simultaneously
be the supplier, customer, partner and competitor of the maintenance firm and vice versa. The
importance of this issue is aggravated in industries with an oligopolistic market structure, regu-
lations, and high-technology proprietary equipment that increase the dependence of service firms
on manufacturers considerably. Hence, developing the required capabilities to decide upon and
implement both generic BMI paths successfully needs to be considered as critical.
In summary, servitization is becoming a more mature research field, which has however pro-
duced very few knowledge stocks regarding pure service firms. To better understand how these
firms employ BMI to offer solutions of their own or form alliances with manufacturers, research
that focuses primarily on these firms is paramount.
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3.1 Methodology
As only limited knowledge about business model innovation of pure service firms in
the context of servitization is present, this study aims at extending our knowledge by
explaining the underlying reconfigurations and contingencies of MRO business model
innovation.
I chose the research methodology1 of systematic combining (Figure 3.1), since it is par-
ticularly useful for the development of new theory and concepts (Dubois & Gadde,
2002). Systematic combining is an abductive approach in which the theoretical frame-
work, empirical fieldwork, and case analysis evolve simultaneously. When applying
systematic combining, the researcher iterates back and forth between these steps, which
allows the expansion of her understanding of both theory and phenomenon, and to
direct and redirect the research efforts. For example, case sampling or interview pro-
tocols can be adjusted according to the requirements of the research topic (Dubois &
Gadde, 2002). Hence, systematic combining allows the researcher to conduct case stud-
ies which are better informed by and intertwined with established theoretical concepts
and thus have higher explanatory power than purely inductive approaches (Dubois &
Gadde, 2002).
Framework
The Case
Theory Empirical World
Matching, 
direction, re-
direction
Figure 3.1: Systematic Combining Dubois & Gadde (adapted from 2002, p. 555)
1Research methodology is defined by Crotty (1998, p. 3) as: “The strategy, plan of action, process or
design lying behind the choice and use of particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods
to the desired outcomes.”
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3.2 An Industrial PhD Project
The study is placed as an industrial Ph.D. project in a single focal company, which is
one of the leading aircraft maintenance, repair, and overhaul providers worldwide, pro-
viding a broad scale of MRO services and solution offers to customers on a global scale.
At the time of writing, the company possesses 14 years of experience with the entry of
manufacturers into the market and has innovated its business model as early as in the
year 2003 by the formation of a joint venture for engine overhaul. While other ways of
reconfiguring the business model exist, the focal company’s path can be characterized
as successful, since it is one of the few MRO service firms that have the capability to
offer maintenance services for both the latest aircraft types (A350 and B787) and most
of the latest engine types (GE-nx2B, LEAP-1A, and the PW1000G). The focal company
is affiliated with a major European airline, which is an important prerequisite for both
types of business model innovation. Overall, it is safe to assume that the company is
a sensible choice for investigating business model innovation of MRO providers in the
context of servitization.
The fact that the focal company is both the object under study and has been my em-
ployer during a significant time period of the study has some implications, which
should be clearly indicated (Pratt, 2009). Being part of the organization allowed me
to have invaluable access to key informants and rich empirical information that would
be very hard, if not impossible, to access for an outside researcher. At the same time, my
working background at the company for 2.5 years before starting with the Ph.D. project
allowed me to gain a sound knowledge of the specific characteristics of the aerospace
industry and their implications for the firms operating in this industry, at least com-
pared to an outside researcher. This background allowed me to use the same language
as the interviewees and to understand their lived experience better, and thus conduct
“get in there and get your hands dirty” research — as called by Gioia et al. (2012, p. 5).
Studying your own organization also involves challenges and risks that need to be mit-
igated. The proximity to the empirical field allowed me to continuously communicate
with colleagues regarding the research topic, which may lead to a biased view of the
phenomena. I have tried to minimize the bias by attempting to take an outside-in per-
spective, searching for contrary opinions and evidence. Discussions with colleagues
from university have helped me to distance myself from the particular views of the
company and assume a more neutral, scientific position. Also, an extended absence
from the workplace during data analysis helped me to distance myself from the com-
pany and intertwine empirical data with literature. I am very grateful that no attempts
were made by the focal company or any other companies to influence the results of the
study or draw preliminary conclusions, although the project was supported by some
funding. Last but not least, I changed my occupation twice during the time of the PhD
and started working within the airline part of the aviation group. This change helped
me to mitigate much of the bias that would have resulted from being employed solely
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at the focal company.
Additional interviews with experts from seven other MROs and eleven airlines were
conducted to triangulate the findings and limit the bias that a single company may
demonstrate. Considering the size of the aerospace industry and the limited amount of
MRO service firms, possessing empirical data of eight MROs and twelve airlines can be
regarded as a broad empirical base.
As the focal company has not been the initiator of the project, neither its identity nor
the identity of its employees is revealed. However, references to the position of the
informants are made to allow the reader to judge better the background from which
individual statements are made. In no instance however do those statements represent
an official view of the company but they are always interpretations of individuals and
are somewhat removed from the original context in which they were made.
3.3 Pilot Study and Research Model
I decided to conduct a pilot study, as research questions based on fieldwork are known
to generate findings with a high relevance from a practical perspective (Yin, 2011).
Specifically, the aim of this study was to gain insights into servitization practices in
the aerospace industry, their significance for MRO firms, and strategic BMI options that
MRO firms would employ to cope with these changes in their environment. Hence, I
started the pilot study with an initial, rather open research question:
”How can Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul service firms retain firm performance through
business model innovation, when faced with servitization practices of aerospace manufacturers?”
Pilot Study The pilot study consisted of a total of seven interviews with managers of
the focal company and two of the affiliated airlines and allowed me to refine the initial
research question, research protocol, and interview guideline (Yin, 2011). One of the
emerging topics was the widespread knowledge and usage of the business model con-
cept by managers of the MRO firm. For example, managers of both airline and MRO
provider repeatedly referred to the change in the OEMs’ business model, while one of
the MRO’s managers even used the Business Model Canvas as a tool for strategic plan-
ning and business model development. The subsequent selection of the Business Model
Canvas as guiding analytical framework of analysis represents one of the strengths of
systematic combining, as this approach allows to adjust the conceptual framework to
improve fit with the empirical case (Dubois & Gadde, 2002).
In the pilot study, it became clear that the focal company has innovated its business
model into different configurations entailing both solution offers and various types of
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alliances with manufacturers. These two types of business model innovation are under-
pinned by earlier findings by Schneider et al. (2013) that have identified them as viable
generic BMI paths of Aerospace MRO firms to cope with servitization.
However, Schneider and her colleagues raise criticism regarding the lack of added cus-
tomer value and the fact that the alliances are perceived as a time-limited approach
until the manufacturers have gained sufficient service capabilities to provide solutions
on their own. This particular statement is intriguing as the question arises, whether op-
tions for MROs exist to make this bitter side of servitization sweeter? In other words,
can MROs establish specific configurations of alliances that create more value and are
more sustainable than others? This question was taken into the pilot study, which con-
firmed that alliances with manufacturers were seen as increasingly important to gain
access to intellectual property rights. Interviewees repeatedly highlighted that the de-
pendence on the manufacturer was an increasing issue both as a driver of but also
within alliances.
To make matters worse, this issue was aggravated by the fact that through servitiza-
tion manufacturers have evolved from being suppliers towards becoming competitors.
However, not all alliances were perceived as equally effective for achieving sustain-
able business success. Instead, the identified alliances could be understood as different
configurations that can be more or less advantageous for the MRO service firm.
In addition, the pilot study showed that cases existed in which the focal company delib-
erately did not form alliances with OEMs but continued servicing the manufacturer’s
equipment or even develop stand-alone solutions without a manufacturing alliance
partner. Consequently, forming a partnership is not necessarily the best way to in-
novate an MRO’s business model in any given situation, especially considering the
aforementioned adverse side effects. Instead, MROs should possess sources of compet-
itive advantage inherent in their business model that allow them to sustain competition
against manufacturers in some instances. Moreover, contingency factors should exist
that determine whether allying is the best response for the given situation (Mintzberg,
1979). From this insight, a research model was developed to break the research down
into a coherent structure.
Research Model To answer the research questions, a suitable overarching research
model (Figure 3.2) was determined. This conceptual framework organizes the research
questions and supports explaining the key factors, constructs, variables, and their pre-
sumed relationships (Miles & Huberman, 1984; Voss et al., 2002). In line with case
study literature (Eisenhardt, 1989; McCutcheon & Meredith, 1993) and the systematic
combining methodology (Dubois & Gadde, 2002), the framework was used to guide
and structure but not determine data collection and analysis. The guiding nature of
the framework has been considered by taking only the reaction of pure service firms to
99
Chapter 3. Methodology and Research Approach
servitization as a concept into the pilot study and letting both business model innova-
tion paths and the further research questions emerge during the systematic combining
process.
2) What are adequate strategic options for MRO service 
firms to cope with servitization?
a) What are possible configurations of the MRO business 
model that MRO service firms can develop to cope with 
servitization?
b) How can competitive advantage between MROs and 
manufacturers be explained based on their respective 
business models?
c) Which contingency factors determine whether MROs 
should form an alliance with manufacturers?
3) How can MRO service firms implement the identified 
configurations? 
• What are the specific business model elements that MROs 
need to develop to implement these configurations?
• What are the microfoundations of dynamic capabilities that 
MROs require to develop solutions, given their traditional 
service background?
• What are the microfoundations of dynamic capabilities that 
MROs requires to form alliances with manufacturers in 
solution networks?
1) What are elements and characteristics of the business 
model of Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul service firms 
in the Aerospace Industry prior to servitization?Servitization
• Servitization by aerospace 
manufacturers
• Increased solution demand by 
airlines
Figure 3.2: Overarching Research Model
The research model consists of three distinct parts that I perform consecutively. First,
the traditional MRO business model before servitization as the subject of business model
innovation is explored (Section 4.3.4). The reason is that we need to understand what
is being innovated before being able to understand how we can develop this subject of
innovation. The traditional MRO business model aims at explaining the core logic of
how MROs conduct business and, simultaneously, builds the basis for understanding
competitive advantage against manufacturers.
After outlining the multiple case study (Chapter 5), I explore the different strategic op-
tions that MROs can employ to cope with servitization in Chapter 6. To do so, I first
define a portfolio of different configurations of their business model that MROs can de-
velop to deal with servitization based on the two generic BMI paths of developing solu-
tions and alliancing with manufacturers. To improve our understanding of the strategic
options and their viability, I then examine how firms can compete in this industry, us-
ing Porter’s (1980) generic competitive strategies as a conceptual lens. As a next step, I
explore how competitive advantage between manufacturers and pure service firms can
be explained by the respective business models. Understanding competitive advantage
between both parties is essential for identifying the contingency factors that determine
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in which cases MROs cannot sustain competition but instead should choose to inno-
vate their business model forming a type of OEM alliance. In the final part (Section
6.4), I explore the dynamic capabilities that MROs need to develop solutions and form
alliances with manufacturers.
3.4 Literature Reviews
Theory building research via case studies starts with an exploration phase, to map
and assess the existing body of knowledge (Dul & Hak, 2008). Two distinct system-
atic literature reviews (Tranfield et al., 2003) were conducted to determine the available
knowledge stocks regarding solution-based business models and the role of pure ser-
vice providers in servitization research.
The first systematic literature review (Section 2.3.5) aimed to synthesize the knowledge
available on solution offerings into the Business Model Canvas. To identify the newest
contributions of the business model perspective on hybrid value provisioning, a liter-
ature search was conducted in the ScienceDirect and EbscoHost database for the time
frame 2013 until April 2016. Search terms included synonyms for “servitization”2 and
the term “business model” in title, abstract and keywords. The search resulted in 22
specific papers that were reviewed individually. Then, relevant, previously read stud-
ies were added from the author’s database on solution provisioning, resulting in a total
of 72 papers that were reviewed for the individual business model elements using an
excel file. These elements were synthesized into the Business Model Canvas as an ana-
lytical tool, resulting in the Solution Business Model Canvas (Figure 2.8).
The fact that 50 papers were added to the literature that did not result from the initial
search hints at a possible limitation inherent in the literature review that needs to be
explained: Due to the lack of maturity of the topic, only a few publications explicitly
make use of business models as conceptual foundation and hence include it in either
title, keywords, or abstract. Thus, solely relying on these publications would give an
incomplete picture of PSS business models, for which reason additional papers were
included that did not match the initial search criteria. Due to the diversity of the topic,
no specific inclusion criteria were used. Instead, papers were added if they helped
to explain particular business model elements. The papers resulting from the initial
search were however used to determine the maturity of servitization business model
research.
The second systematic literature review in Section 2.3.7 aimed at consolidating the
available knowledge regarding the role of pure service firms in the context of servi-
2Synonyms for servitization: service infusion; service-driven manufacturing; service addition; service
transition; integrated solutions; high-value manufacturing; customer solutions; total solutions; busi-
ness solutions; service orientation; service addition; service-driven.
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tization. As servitization research has focused mostly on manufacturers, knowledge
about traditional service providers in this context was scattered. To systematically and
transparently aggregate these knowledge stocks, a systematic literature review (Tran-
field et al., 2003) was conducted, with a focus on the following questions:
• How does servitization literature portray competition between manufacturers that enter
the service domain and pure service providers?
• Which distinctive sources of competitive advantage does each party possess?
• How do pure service firms innovate their business model in the context of servitization?
Research was conducted on the databases ScienceDirect and EbscoHost searching for
articles containing “servitization” and its synonyms3 as well as and “traditional service
providers” and its synonyms4 in title, abstract and keywords from 1990 until August
2016. Since the search on ScienceDirect yielded no results with these parameters, syn-
onyms for “traditional service providers” were allowed for in the whole document.
A notification function, automatically informing about new publications matching the
search terms was set up in both databases, which remained active until December
2017.
The synonyms for servitization are expected to be robust, since they are used in other
servitization literature reviews (Baines & Lightfoot, 2013; Lightfoot et al., 2013; Reim
et al., 2015). The synonyms for traditional service providers have been iteratively im-
proved to achieve higher validity by adding synonyms used in identified papers to im-
prove the search results. Exclusion of results due to synonyms for the term “provider”
was avoided by excluding it and its synonyms from the search altogether. The search
was not limited to scientific papers; however, all non-scientific papers were eliminated
in the reduction phase. The initial search yielded 76 results, which were reduced to 22
after reviewing type, title, and abstract. An additional 15 papers were identified from
prior research activity and during the revision process and then added to the sample,
resulting in a total of 37 articles and conference proceedings, containing specific infor-
mation on the topic. During the review process, these papers were analyzed in an excel
spreadsheet to synthesize the available data. The comparatively high amount of papers
added to the sample can be explained by the fact that only very few articles exist that
explicitly target pure service firms in the context of servitization research. Except for
their role as an alliance partner, the role of pure service firms is discussed mostly as a
side-note and hence not included into title, abstract, or keywords of most articles.
3The same synonyms were used as in the first literature review.
4Synonyms for traditional service providers: incumbent service*; pure service*; traditional service*;
third-party service*.
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3.5 Multiple Case Study
A multiple case study was employed, as various cases typically provide a stronger ba-
sis for developing theories and concepts that are better grounded, more generalizable
and more accurate (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009). Hence, they are espe-
cially suitable when little prior knowledge about the phenomenon under investigation
is available (Miles & Huberman, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2011). As a multiple case
study allows the researcher to perform in-case and cross-case analysis, this method en-
ables abstraction from the idiosyncrasies of a single case, identifying common themes of
business model innovation of pure service firms in the context of servitization (Miles &
Huberman, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989). Even more importantly, the identification of con-
tingency factors with a single case study seems inappropriate, since these factors are
either present or not present in a single case. Instead, factors influencing MRO busi-
ness model innovation can only be identified by comparing differences and similarities
between contrasting cases (Miles & Huberman, 1984).
Purposeful or theoretical sampling is the deliberate selection of cases and is preferred
against random sampling in multiple case studies, as it allows for choosing replicating
cases to strengthen the hypotheses and polar cases to generate a deeper level of theory
(Miles & Huberman, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Three cases
were chosen that differ in the critical aspects of (a) the underlying solution offer, (b) the
perceived competitive advantage of MRO providers, and (c) the alliance configuration
and the resulting configuration of the MRO business model (see Table 3.1).
Properties Engine Case Components Case Aircraft Case
Solution offer Engine Solutions: guaranteed 
availability of aircraft engines to a fixed 
price per flight hour.
Component Solutions: guaranteed 
availability of aircraft components at a 
fixed price per flight hour.
Aircraft Solutions: bundle of 
engineering and maintenance services 
to guarantee aircraft availability and 
reliability for a fixed price per flight 
hour.
Main OEM Competitor Engine OEM Aircraft OEM Aircraft OEM
Perceived competitive 
positioning of MRO
• Entry barrier
• Cost Disadvantage
• Cost Parity
• Differentiation Advantage
• Cost Advantage
• Differentiation Advantage
Alliance Strategy Two types of alliances with Engine 
OEMs to ensure competitive survival 
on respective technology.
Alliance with Component OES to the 
improve competitive position against 
the airframer and avoid competing with 
the OES. 
Deliberate decision to not form an 
alliance with the Aircraft OEM to not 
strengthen its solution offer but instead 
to compete with own solution offer
Business Model 
Innovation and resulting 
configurations
• Traditional MRO Business Model
▼
• OEM Workbench
• Coopetitive Solutions
• Stand-alone Solution
▼
• Two-sided Solution
• Traditional MRO Business Model
▼
• Stand-alone Solution
Table 3.1: Case Comparison
The crucial first aspect is the type of solution offer: Engine-, Components-, and Aircraft
Solutions represent the three main types of solution offers in the commercial aerospace
industry. The offers differ considerably regarding the market structure, the nature of
products and services inherent in the solution offer and the conducted business model
innovation, ensuring a maximum of generalizability of findings beyond this industry.
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The second key aspect is the perceived competitive advantage against the manufac-
turer. In the Engine Case, the MRO sees itself as being at a competitive disadvantage,
and only able to ensure competitive survival by forming a sustainable alliance with
the manufacturer. In the Component Case, the MRO successfully competes with its
solution offer against the rival aircraft manufacturer, has however allied with a com-
ponent manufacturer to strengthen its competitive position. Hence, this case provides
an interesting duality in the alliance decision that allows for in-depth analysis and in-
terpretation. In the Aircraft Case, the MRO provider perceives being at an advantage
against the aircraft manufacturer, and its solution offers from both, a cost and differen-
tiation perspective. This competitive advantage may, however, not be sustainable since
the airframer erects entry barriers on new aircraft types.
The third key aspect is the underlying alliance configuration and the resulting configu-
rations of the focal company’s business model. These configurations are the empirical
underpinning of the MRO business model portfolio (Figure 6.3) that is developed in
Section 6.1. In the Engine Case, the MRO forms two distinct types of alliances with
OEMs. In the first “OEM workbench” configuration, the MRO provides maintenance
services directly to the manufacturer, while in the second “coopetitive solution” config-
uration, the MRO forms part of the manufacturer’s service network and is capable of
providing Engine Solutions directly to airline customers.
In the Component Case, the MRO also becomes network partner of the OEM, how-
ever in a third, “two-sided solution” configuration. In this case, the focal company
takes over responsibility for the manufacturer’s service business and simultaneously
provides Component Solutions directly to the end customer, regularly without any in-
volvement of the OEM. The term two-sided solution is derived from the fact that for the
manufacturer, an aftermarket solution is provided as, as it can concentrate on its core
business manufacturing, while simultaneously airlines can rely on the Components So-
lutions offering of the focal company.
In the Aircraft Case, the focal company deliberately decides not to form an OEM work-
bench type alliance with a competing aircraft manufacturer to provide solution offers,
but to compete individually with its stand-alone solution offering. The three cases are
described individually in more detail in Chapter 5. Each case description contains both,
the changes in the respective MRO market segment induced by servitization, as well as
the focal company’s business model innovation efforts to react to these changes.
3.6 Data Collection
I employed mainly in-depth interviews for data collection, which were supported by
the collection of company presentations, industry-specific periodicals, and the analysis
of web pages. The sampling of interviewees was intentional and purposeful, which
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allowed me to identify further interview needs and suitable respondents to clarify as-
pects of business model innovation of MRO providers as part of data collection and
analysis. This reflects the iterative process between data collection, analysis and theory
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Dubois & Gadde, 2002).
The 41 in-depth interviews of the main study were held with interviewees from eight
MRO firms, and eleven airlines from Europe, North America, Middle East, and Asia
with a focus on the focal company. Airline 1 and MRO 1 were focal firms to which the
author had privileged access, while the other airlines and MROs were mainly used for
triangulation purposes and to improve the validity of the findings, widening the scope
beyond the perception of these two firms. Interviewees were included from a variety
of functions and management levels to ensure the generation of rich data from multi-
ple perspectives. All interviewees were very knowledgeable and eager to contribute
to the topic that was considered as of high interest. For 16 interviews, the researchers
relied on the support of a specialized marketing firm that conducted the interviews via
telephone. Companies and positions interviewed are summarized in Table 3.2. Addi-
tionally, I had the opportunity to participate in various strategy workshops with the
focal MRO firm for the duration of half a year in 2016. This opportunity gave me a
valuable insight into the servitization phenomenon in its real setting and the business
model innovation process at first hand.
Company Type
No. of 
Interviews Positions Interviewed
Airline 1 6 SVP Aircraft Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul, Director Corporate Sourcing, Director Aircraft 
Procurement, Manager Aircraft Procurement, Manager Engine Procurement, Lawyer
Airline 2-11 10
Senior VP Technical Operations, Head of Fleet Technical Management & Deputy Technical Director , 
Director Supply Chain and Logistics Operations, Director Aircraft Engineering, Senior Aircraft Maintenance 
Planning Engineer, Head of Engineering Projects, Transport Manager, Technical Operations and 
Maintenance Instructor, Maintenance Quality Manager, Engineer
MRO 1 26
CEO, SVP Business Unit 1, SVP Business Unit 3, SVP Alliance Function, VP Sales, VP Purchasing, 
Commercial Director Business Unit 1, Head of Corporate Strategy, Director Sales, Team Lead Aircraft 
Engineering, Managers and Senior Managers Alliance Function, Managers Business Development and 
Strategy, Managers Product Management, Managers Market Research, Manager Aircraft Lifecycle 
Management, Managers Procurement, Manager Repair Services
MRO 2-8 7
CEO, VP and General Manager, Executive VP, Director Finance, Director Sales, Product Sales and Key 
Account Management, Managers Business Development
University/Cargo Airline 1 Professor for Business Administration, Logistics and Aviation (former COO of a cargo airline)
Total 50
Table 3.2: List of Interviewees
Subsequently, I structured my interview protocol (Yin, 2011) according to elements of
the Business Model Canvas, Teece’ (2007) dynamic capabilities framework, and con-
siderations regarding competitive advantage as well as contingency factors for alliance
development. In accordance with the systematic combining methodology (Dubois &
Gadde, 2002), the interview protocol which included a priori frameworks were used
to merely guide and structure but not determine the collection of data. The interview
protocol is depicted in Table 3 in the Annex.
The semi-structured in-depth interviews had a duration between 48 and 95 minutes,
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were audio recorded, and transcribed partially by the researcher, partially by a profes-
sional transcription service provider. Secondary data was collected for triangulation
(Yin, 2011), including both literature from aerospace periodicals, such as AviationWeek
or MRO network as well as industry consultant reports aiming at completing the pic-
ture and validating the data.
Two follow-up interviews were conducted with exceptionally knowledgeable respon-
dents to ensure the validity of the findings and clarify remaining questions. At this
point, theoretical saturation was reached, as no more meaningful data was found that
would add to the explanation of the phenomena (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).
After completing data analysis, a presentation of the initial findings was held at the
focal company, giving the opportunity for further validation. In the workshop, the con-
ceptualization and interpretation of the results, including competitive advantage, busi-
ness model innovation paths, and the specific dynamic capabilities were covered, and
the managerial implications for that particular company discussed. Additionally, one
specifically knowledgeable senior manager provided helpful feedback after reviewing
large parts of the manuscript which helped me to refine the findings further.
3.7 Data Analysis
Coding is an analytical process in which textual data is categorized into patterns and
themes to facilitate in-depth analysis (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). A combination of
analytical coding (interpreting and reflecting on the meaning of the data) as well as
topic coding (some codes are pre-defined based on concept definitions) was carried
out (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). For topic coding, the Business Model Canvas by Oster-
walder & Pigneur (2013) and the sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring framework by
Teece (2007) were used as a draft template. Hence, the data analysis was guided by es-
tablished theory, ensuring construct validity and providing valuable insights relevant
to the phenomenon of interest (Eisenhardt, 1989; Dubois & Gibbert, 2010). I found both
a priori frameworks sufficiently specific to be helpful for the initial sorting of codes
but sufficiently generic not to limit the creative coding process. Further open codes
were applied to the text, including the MRO market segments, servitization practices
of manufacturers, and codes for performance outcomes. To enable cross-case analysis,
(Miles & Huberman, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989), which was especially helpful to identify
contingency factors, case affiliation was additionally coded to each citation.
Analytical and topic coding was performed with the Atlas.tiTM software, applying de-
scriptive codes. During the coding of the individual documents, the contents and mean-
ing of each code were refined in the commentary section of the program. I decided to
include codes in the analytical process according to criteria similar to the ones used
by Tuli et al. (2007), i.e. (a) applicability beyond the particular context, (b) mentioning
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by multiple participants, and (c) going beyond the obvious, providing interesting and
useful conclusions. For example, the Key Resource “financial strength” met these crite-
ria: While financial resources are obviously of use for most companies operating what-
ever commercial business model, an increase in financial requirements was detected
in the aerospace industry beyond one specific case by multiple interviewees. Hence,
it is reasonable to assume that increased financial resources are required by most ser-
vice providers operating in industries with complex and evolving technology. In a sec-
ond coding step similar to what Corbin & Strauss (1990) call axial coding, codes were
summarized in partly pre-defined sub-categories, which were related to one another,
guided by existing theoretical concepts. For example, dynamic capability codes were
sorted into the predefined categories of sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring of the dy-
namic capabilities framework developed by Teece (2007). I found that this framework
was sufficiently specific to be helpful for the initial sorting of codes but sufficiently
generic not to limit the creative coding process. For example, the second coding step
involved splitting the sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring categories into microfounda-
tions of solution- and alliance-specific dynamic capabilities.
To explain competitive advantage between manufacturers and service firms, as well as
contingencies of alliancing, I employed a final coding step similar to what Corbin &
Strauss (1990) call selective coding. In this step, I integrated and related the previously
defined (sub)categories into theoretically saturated frameworks. Contingency factors
relevant to the business model innovation process of becoming an OEM network part-
ner, I relied on systematic cross-case analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1984; Eisenhardt,
1989). As part of the analysis, I qualified the specific manifestation of each contingency
factor in two ordinal scales (“low”, “medium”, “high” and “present”, “not present”) to
qualify the effect on the alliance decision (Table 6.2). For qualification, I relied as much
as possible on quantitative indicators to increase the validity of findings but had to
make use of personal interpretation in many areas, which is common practice in qual-
itative research approaches (Miles & Huberman, 1984). Some of the identified factors
were identified as being important by the interviewees but did, however, not differ in
their manifestation in the respective case. These factors were included as contingency
factors nonetheless, relying on the expertise of the interviewees. Factors were then ag-
gregated into second level categories and third level dimensions following what Corbin
& Strauss (1990) refer to as axial coding.
Overall, the systematic combining methodology, well-established coding process, and the am-
ple empirical evidence consisting of 50 interviewees, a validation cycle and triangulation with
industry-specific literature give me the confidence to derive reliable findings and conclusions
about the business model innovation of MRO firms.
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The commercial aviation value chain can be structured from manufacturers to the pas-
senger as the final customer into eight stages (Wittmer et al., 2011; Pearce, 2013).
• Manufacturers and their suppliers, which produce aircraft and their components
• Lessors which buy aircraft and lease them to the airlines
• Airports that deliver the infrastructure for air traffic
• Service providers, such as airport ground service providers, catering firms, bag-
gage handlers, air navigation service providers (ANSPs), etc.
• Aircraft Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul providers (MROs), which provide
diverse maintenance services to ensure the airworthiness of aircraft
• Airlines, the central actor of the value chain, providing the flight services to cus-
tomers
• Computer reservation systems which organize large parts of the distribution within
the industry
• Travel agents or online platforms representing the face of the aviation industry to
the customers
The actors of the value chain, their share (measured by turnover) and profitability are
illustrated in Figure 4.1:
10% 10%
7% 8% 8% 7% 9%
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11% 11%
9%
4%
20%
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30.0%
Manufacturers Lessors Airports Diverse
Services
Maintenance,
Repair Overhaul
ANSPs Airlines CRS
WACC ROIC Turnover Share of Value Chain
7% 30% 26% 6% 6% 6% 15% 3%
Figure 4.1: Actors and Their Profitability in the Commercial Aviation Value Chain1
Airlines are the central actor of this value chain, providing air travel services to the
customers, however, they are also the least profitable, as they are regularly not able to
1Author’s illustration based on Wittmer et al. (2011); Pearce (2013). WACC: Weighted average costs of
capital, ROIC: return on invested capital, timeframe 2004 to 2011. Average WACC and ROIC figures
for Airport Ground Service Providers and MRO.
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earn their cost of capital. The chapter is structured as follows: First, the aerospace value
chain and industry structure are introduced. Then, past and current business model
innovation practices of airlines and manufacturers are summarized, as the drivers for
MRO business model innovation.
4.1 Passenger and Cargo Transport
Air travel is one of the most important means of transportation today. Four billion
passengers and 58 million tons of air freight travel per year with more than 37 million
flights. Per minute, more than 100 flights take off and land around the globe, and up to
18,000 aircraft are simultaneously in the air.2 Air travel allows us to reach any point on
earth in less than 48h, it is the blood in the veins of our modern, globalized society.
Passengers profit from steadily decreasing costs for air travel, as prices have more than
halved in the last 20 years, while the connected city pairs have more than doubled3
(IATA, 2017a). As a result, passengers are expected to spend 1% of the global GDP in
2017 on air travel, making commercial aviation an essential global industry that pro-
vides 69 million jobs in its supply chain and $124bn of tax income for governments
(IATA, 2017a).
Airline Profitability Airlines are the central actors of this value chain, operating the air-
planes that make flying not a dream but reality. However, the airline industry is among
the least profitable sectors that has hardly been able to earn their cost of capital, hence
destroying value for investors and equity owners. Between 1965 and 2007, airlines have
on average achieved a return on invested capital (ROIC)4 of around 5%, which is 3%
under their weighted average cost of capital (WACC)5 and even slightly lower than
low-risk government bonds. Leading industries in the same period were the pharma-
ceutical industry with an average of 25% ROIC and the software industry with around
20% (Pearce, 2013). This low profitability is critical, as airlines are expected to have dif-
ficulties in attracting sufficient capital to finance the 41,000 new aircraft deliveries with
a market value of $6.1 trillion in the next 20 years (Boeing, 2017c). Recently, airlines
have been able to increase their profitability, earning their capital costs in the period
2Based on IATA (2017b) and data from flightradar24.com.
3The average return fare is expected to be $353 in 2017, which is 64% lower than in 1996, adjusted for
inflation. Connected city pairs is an indicator for the global connectivity, which is expected to reach
19,000 in 2017, doubling compared to 1996.
4For airlines the ROIC is the after-tax operating profit, adjusted for operating leases, expressed as a per-
centage of invested capital. It is the payment investors receive for providing debt and equity investors
receive for bearing the risk (Pearce, 2013).
5Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) is a weighted aggregation on the expected returns on equity
and debt. The WACC is regularly determined by considering the opportunity cost, i.e., the estimated
return on an investment with similar risks in the same country (Pearce, 2013).
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from 2014 to 2017 with an ROIC between 8% and 10% (IATA, 2017a). Whether this is
an upward trend that is there to stay, remains however to be seen.
Airline Industry Structure So, why is airline profitability so low? In its early times af-
ter the second world war, commercial air traffic was heavily regulated by governmental
bodies. This regulation aimed at growing a safe, reliable, and efficient airline industry
on a national scale and ensuring the public utility of air transport services (i.e., provid-
ing air traffic accessibility to the broad public). Besides safety and other regulations,
fares between cities were regulated to prevent ruinous competition but also the abuse
of oligopolistic or monopolistic market structures (Delfmann et al., 2005; Pompl, 2007).
When in the 1970s the airline industry had become a mature industry with a sufficient
number of carriers that were able to offer safe, reliable, and efficient air transport, the
regulations where rather hampering than promoting innovation, efficiency gains, and
ultimately consumer welfare.
Consequently, air traffic was deregulated first 1970 in the US and later step by step un-
til 1984 in Europe. The deregulation enabled the entry of new carriers with different
business models, the differentiation of transportation service offers, and pricing mech-
anisms that were based on demand and offer. At this point, airlines with new business
models entered the market, such as low-cost carriers offering no-frills flights to low
fares or regional carriers that filled niche routes which were not provided by larger air-
lines (Bermig, 2005; Pompl, 2007; Daft, 2015). In consequence, an industry with high
levels of competition and dynamic growth was established that continues evolving to-
day.
While different theoretical approaches exist that explain the profitability of firms, the
industry structure analysis, also known as Porter’s five forces (Porter, 1979) is one of
the most established models to explain profitability in an industry.6 In 2011, Michael
Porter collaborated with the IATA, to perform an analysis of the structure of the airline
industry, concluding that only a few industries existed in which the five forces were as
strong as in the airline industry (Pearce, 2013):
• High bargaining power of suppliers: The airlines’ supply chain is characterized of
concentrated oligopolies in aircraft manufacturing, local monopolies at airports,
air navigation service providers (ANSP) with powerful labor unions, persistently
high fuel prices, and increasing concentration in the manufacturing and service
supply chain.
• High bargaining power of distribution channels and customers: Global distribution
6Porter’s industry structure analysis determines the potential for profitability of an industry by analyzing
rivalry among existing competitors, the bargaining power of suppliers and customers, as well as the
threats of substitution and new entrants (Porter, 1979).
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• Rapid but volatile growth
• Perishable product
• Limited differentiation 
through increasing 
business model 
convergence
• High sunk costs per 
aircraft, low marginal 
costs per passenger
• Limited economies of 
scale
• Significant exit barriers
• Multiple direct and 
indirect rivals
RIVALRY AMONG EXISTING 
COMPETITORS: HIGH
• Powerful labor unions 
especially when 
controlling operations at 
network hubs
• Aircraft and engine 
producers are both 
concentrated oligopolies
• Airports are local 
monopolies with 
significant power
• Airport services 
(handling, catering, 
cleaning) are also 
concentrated in a small 
number of firms, but low 
switching costs
BARGAINING POWER OF 
SUPPLIERS: HIGH
• High concentration 
among GDS and 
aggregator websites
• Websites increase price 
transparency
• Travel agents focus on 
the interests of corporate 
buyers to reduce travel 
costs
BARGAINING POWER OF 
CHANNELS: HIGH
• High concentration 
among GDS and 
aggregator websites
• Websites increase price 
transparency
• Travel agents focus on 
the interests of corporate 
buyers to reduce travel 
costs
BARGAINING POWER OF 
CUSTOMERS: HIGH
• The number of customers who can afford air travel 
is increasing substantially, mainly in emerging 
markets
• Technology for web-conferencing is improving
• Fast trains are competitive with airlines on short 
haul due to security measures
• Travel can be delayed, limited or done without
• Environmental issues challenge air travel
THREAT OF SUBSTITUTES: MEDIUM AND RISING
• Limited incumbency advantages 
• Low switching costs 
• Some demand-side benefits of scale 
• Easy access to distribution channels
THREAT OF NEW ENTRANTS: HIGH
Figure 4.2: Airline Industry Structure (adapted from Pearce, 2013, p. 17)
systems (GDS) and computer reservation systems (CRS) are important distribu-
tion channels that are divided amongst three companies, each with high mar-
ket power. Customers perceive air travel increasingly as a commodity, have low
switching costs, and high transparency via flight comparison websites.
• Medium but rising threat of substitutes: improving web conference systems and
high-speed trains can partly substitute air travel.
• High threat of new entrants: low switching costs for customers, easy access to dis-
tribution channels, leased aircraft and limited advantages for incumbents result
in low market entry barriers.
• High competition among airlines: a perishable service, limited economies of scale,
the low marginal cost per passenger and high fixed costs lead to high competi-
tion on many routes. Government constraints restrict consolidation of airlines,
especially across borders, which leads to overcapacity.
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In consequence, airline revenues have always followed unit costs closely, while price
premiums have been quickly competed away by intense competition. This is illustrated
by Figure 4.3 for the timeframe of the early 1960s up to the 2010s:
Figure 4.3: Airline Revenues and Unit Cost Development (Source: McKinsey Analysis, Saxon &
Weber, 2017, p. 2.)
The Need for Cost Savings This industry structure results in a constant price pressure
through heavy competition that results in yield deterioration, which often cannot be
compensated by passenger growth (see Figure 4.3). Simultaneously, airlines face an
annual increase in total operating costs of about 1% due to inflation, which is working
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steadily on decreasing profitability. As a consequence, many airlines pursue strict cost
savings measures to retain or increase profitability.7
Options for lowering operating costs are however limited, as the major cost factors —
fuel, taxes, and fees for e.g., landing or air traffic control — are non-negotiable. MRO
services, on the other hand, are and accumulate to the considerable proportion of be-
tween 15-18% of airline’s direct operating cost.8 Thus, MRO services are often on top
of the airlines cost-cutting priority list, as airlines try to improve their cost positions.
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Figure 4.4: International Comparison of Development of Airlines’ Passenger Growth and Rev-
enues (Source: Koenen, 2017, p. 21)
For airlines, pure cost reduction efforts are however not the only efforts to undertake
to increase profitability. Both network and low-cost carriers also increasingly innovate
their business model to remain competitive. For example, the former German flag car-
rier Lufthansa outsourced all non-hub flights to its low-cost point-to-point platform
Eurowings, while the low-cost carrier Ryanair introduced connecting flights into their
portfolio. The resulting convergence of airlines business models may, however, lead
to unintended, adverse effects on profitability as airlines may get stuck-in-the-middle
7Cost Savings programs of the main Network Carriers in Europe include: “SCORE” (Lufthansa), “Tur-
bine” (Air Berlin, now bankrupt), “Transform 2015” (Air France) (Air France, 2012; Air Berlin, 2013;
Lufthansa Group, 2013).
8Figure varies considerably, according to source, e.g. 7-12% (Henningsen, 2010), or 15-18% (Berger, 2014).
Year-to-year MRO cost share of direct operating costs varies due to a high share (ca. 30%) of fluctuat-
ing fuel prices, and the performance of cost-intensive engine overhaul and base maintenance events.
According to an Oliver Wyman Analysis, for NCs, MRO represents a 10% DOC share, for LCCs, 10.4%
(Stalnaker et al., 2016, p. 32).
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between price leadership and differentiation (Daft & Albers, 2015). Another important
trend is the airline’s concentration on the core competence of passenger transport, effec-
tively outsourcing aircraft maintenance, repair, and overhaul and decreasing in-house
capabilities (Schneider et al., 2013). The airline’s business model innovation activities
and their effect on the business model of MRO firms are discussed in detail in Section
4.4.
Buying the Big Jets Aircraft represent the most important asset of an airline, as they
are the Key Resource in fleet planning, determining which destinations can be served
with which cost structure. Also, aircraft financing costs make up around 8% of the
cost structure of an airline (Berger, 2014).9 Traditionally, the selection criteria of an
aircraft depend on the airline’s business model: While traditional carriers perceived
airplanes as a vehicle for transporting their brand to the passenger, low-cost carriers
instead perceived the aircraft as a commodity that delivers seat kilometers at lowest
possible costs (Clark, 2007). Today, a shift of airlines towards cost savings (notably
fuel and direct operating costs), and less focus on speed is noted, as sinking cruising
speeds of aircraft from the 1970s to the 2000s show (Berrittella et al., 2007). For lessors,
the aircraft is rather a financial than an operational tool, as they are more concerned
with maintaining the asset’s value than its operation (Clark, 2007). Nowadays, lessors
have established themselves as a large customer segment of aircraft manufacturers, as
in 2015, circa 42% of all aircraft worldwide were leased (FlightAscend Consultancy,
2016b).
In the aircraft procurement process, airlines typically buy the airframe and the engine
separately to pit manufacturers against each other and achieve a maximum negotiation
power. This possibility arises since airlines can choose between two engine options on
most aircraft types. On newer jets some exceptions exist, as on the A350 airlines have to
rely on the specifically developed Rolls-Royce Trent XWB engine, while on the B737NG
only CFM56-7B is available (see Table 4.1 further down). Similarly, components such
as wheels and brakes are procured from competing component OEMs in a vendor se-
lection process for the same reasons.
9Consists of rental costs for leased aircraft and depreciation for owned aircraft. Cost-share depends on
fluctuation of primary cost drivers such as fuel or major MRO events (e.g., Engine or Base Mainte-
nance).
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4.2 Aircraft Manufacturing
Design and Production
Commercial Aircraft are highly complex goods that consist of two to three million com-
ponents, subcomponents, and piece parts (Canaday, 2017a). Hence, they represent the
archetype of a complex product system (CoPS), involving many interdependent sub-
systems that can be considered themselves as complex product systems of high tech-
nology and capital intensity (see Figure 4.5, Davies & Hobday, 2005). The main parts of
an aircraft are its airframe (incl. fuselage, wings, horizontal and vertical stabilizer), sec-
ondary structures (e.g., fairings, doors, and nacelles), engines, the auxiliary power unit,
landing gears, and hundreds of other components such as avionics. Once assembled,
the aircraft is completed with interiors including seats, galley, inflight entertainment
systems, carpets, curtains, etc., and painted before final inspection and delivery to the
customer (Esposito & Raffa, 2007).
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Figure 4.5: Aircraft Structure (adapted from Niosi & Zhegu, 2005, p. 8)
Due to the high complexity of aeronautical equipment, planning, monitoring, and con-
trolling are crucial in aircraft manufacturing. Commercial aircraft such as the A320 or
B737 are usually produced with large-scale production techniques such as flow-lines,
while some smaller series are constructed using small-batch techniques (Hinsch, 2012).
In summary, three critical success factors for developing and producing aircraft exist.
These are: (a) a reasonable development of new aircraft types, balancing new technolo-
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gies and development costs on one side with customer demand and willingness to pay
on the other hand, (b) the adaption of platform concepts (e.g. the A319, A320, and A321)
to realize economies of scale and allowing for efficient operations at airline by realiza-
tion of commonalities (e.g. common type ratings, ground support equipment, spares,
maintenance overheads, etc.), and (c) forming co-operations, especially with suppliers
of technologically-intensive components (Clark, 2007; Esposito & Raffa, 2007; Wittmer
et al., 2011).
Figure 4.6 illustrates the typical lifecycle of an aircraft program: It starts with the initial
definition of the new aircraft type and ends when the last unit leaves the production
line. A typical production program can last 30 - 40 or even more years. In the definition
phase, which has a minimum duration of five years, the initial design and performance
metrics are defined, resulting in the initial specifications. Then, the development phase
commences, in which the aircraft undergoes further development, in which prototypes
are built and thoroughly tested. One of the principal milestones is the first flight of the
airplane, which is a major part of its certification.
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Figure 4.6: Lifecycle of Aircraft Production (Source: Clark, 2007, p. 9)
Subsequently, the airplane enters into the production phase. During this phase, further
upgrades and enhancements are developed; often multiple versions of an aircraft (e.g.,
the A350-900 was followed by the stretched version A350-1000 in February 2018) or
product families are launched (e.g., A319, A320, A321). As aircraft earn their initial de-
velopment costs over extended periods of their lifecycle, usually spanning more than
a decade, the aircraft manufacturer assumes significant financial, technological, and
market-related risks with each aircraft program. The long amortization period is illus-
trated by the fact that even recent aircraft programs may suffer from less than expected
success: For example, the A380 that has been developed since 1988 has supposedly just
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reached the break-even-point in 2016 (Clark, 2007; Tovey, 2016; Sato & de Freitas Cha-
gas Jr, 2014) before Airbus decided to discontinue the program (Pfeifer & Kerr, 2019).
At the end of the lifecycle, manufacturers are obliged to continue support of their air-
craft, as long as a fleet remains operational. With shifting technologies, one of the main
risks in this context is obsolescence.10
Airframers rely heavily on a multi-tier supply chain to supply high-technology compo-
nents, share financing needs and technological risks to produce aircraft. Also, engine
manufacturers rely on a sophisticated multi-level supply chain, as the engine represents
the most complex component with the highest impact on aircraft performance and effi-
ciency. Besides, component manufacturers have evolved from providing single parts to
assuming responsibility for the design and integration of entire systems (Horng, 2007).
Due to increasing financial and technological requirements, the configuration and us-
age of the supply chain have developed dramatically along with the manufacturers’
business models from early years of aircraft production to the latest aircraft such as
the Boeing 787 (Esposito & Raffa, 2007). The business model innovation in the aviation
manufacturing industry is further explored in Chapter 4.4.
The Aircraft Supply Market
Aircraft Manufacturers Aircraft manufacturers build a concentrated oligopoly (Pearce,
2013), due to high entry barriers such as technology and capital requirements. Wide-
body aircraft are provided by a duopoly of the pan-European manufacturer Airbus
S.A.S. (“Airbus”) and its American counterpart The Boeing Company (“Boeing”) whose
relationship is commonly characterized as an intense rivalry11 resulting in periodic
pricing of aircraft below static marginal costs (Benkard, 2000; Esposito, 2004; Pompl,
2007). Every year, both manufacturers try to outcompete each other with the amount of
aircraft delivered and new sales acquired at airshows. For example, at the Dubai Air-
show in 2017, Boeing was able to secure deals in the magnitude of $42bn order volume,
selling 252 737MAX to Fly Dubai (Dubai’s low-cost carrier) and 40 787-10 Dreamlin-
ers to Emirates. However, Airbus was also highly successful, being able to secure the
biggest deal in company history, worth $49.2bn of order book value for 430 A320neo
aircraft (Zhang & Banerji, 2017).12
10A component is obsolete, “when the technology that defines it is no longer implemented and, therefore,
that component becomes no longer available from stock of own spares, procurable or produced by
its supplier or manufacturer” (Rojo et al., 2010, p. 1235), as the production of some components may
prematurely end when technology is outdated (e.g., CRT monitors that are used in cockpits are not
produced anymore and need to be upgraded with newer displays, Rojo & Roy, 2009).
11For an extensive account on the competition between Airbus and Boeing see Lynn (1998).
12For orders of this size discounts on the order book value around 45% are typical in the industry (Zhang
& Banerji, 2017).
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In the past, both manufacturers have pursued different product strategies, with Airbus
betting on the ultra-large A380 to connect big city pairs and Boeing with the smaller
B787, providing seat capacity at lower total cost and comparable marginal cost per pas-
senger. Airbus matched the B787 by developing the A350XWB (extra wide body), re-
placing the outdated A330 (Clark, 2007). In hindsight, Boeing’s vision of the future
seems to have more accurately predicted customer needs, as both B787 and A350 can
spur considerable order volumes while Airbus decided to discontinue the production
of the A380 in February 2019 (Pfeifer & Kerr, 2019).
Narrow body aircraft with less than 100 seats mostly used for regional routes were
until recently provided by an oligopoly formed by the Canadian manufacturer Bom-
bardier Inc. (“Bombardier”), the Brazilian manufacturer Embraer S.A. (“Embraer”) and
the French-Italian Joint Venture Avions de Transport Re´gional (“ATR”).13 The manu-
facturers of regional aircraft are tackling Boeing’s B737 and Airbus’ A320 in the mid-
dle segment of roughly 120 to 150 seaters from below with models as Bombardier’s
C-Series that carries between 108 to 133 passengers in the CS-100 configuration (Bom-
bardier, 2016). Most recently, further consolidation has taken place as Airbus has just
acquired the majority stake of Bombardier’s C-Series program free of charge after heavy
legal price-dumping assault by Boeing.14 In reaction, Boeing signed a deal with Em-
braer, taking over 80% and operational control of its commercial aerospace program for
$3.8bn. Both agreements effectively reduce the competitive landscape on western-built
commercial jets from four to two, opening Airbus and Boeing the possibility to tap into
the emerging new midsize aircraft market (Flottau, 2018).
However, new competition arises for the two giants from the Japanese Manufacturer
Mitsubishi Aircraft Corporation (“Mitsubishi”) that was founded in 2008 and the Chi-
nese manufacturer Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China Ltd. (“Comac”), founded
in 2008 in Shanghai. Mitsubishi is launching the Mitsubishi Regional Jet (“MRJ”) in a
70-seater and 90-seater configuration. The first delivery is due in 2020, resulting in an
eleven year development period, including five years delay (Perret, 2015a,b; Toh, 2017).
Comac launched the C919 program in 2008, developing a regional to middle range air-
craft, accommodating 156-168 passengers. Initially, an ambitious eight years develop-
ment time was planned with the goal to deliver the first aircraft in 2014. However, this
program has also was delayed to 2020 (Comac, 2016; Perrett, 2017). Whether these pro-
grams can crack the Airbus/Boeing duopoly with 120+ seaters remains to be seen. It is
expected that COMAC will pursue a price leadership strategy to attract customers out-
side of China, which will be at a disadvantage as it is not supported by the economies
of scale and learning curves that Airbus and Boeing possess. Another major issue will
13The world fleet also encompasses active aircraft by the manufacturers Fokker that filed bankruptcy in
1996 and McDonnell Douglas that was acquired by Boeing in 1996 (Cole, 1996; O’Toole, 1996).
14This has been a stunning competitive move by Airbus, improving its competitive positioning against
Boeing, replacing its own A319 aircraft by the C-Series and further delaying the market entry of the
Chinese manufacturer Comac that requires western certification knowledge to speed up its C919 pro-
gram (Flottau et al., 2017; Michaels, 2017c).
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be achieving Western certification, which is required to operate on the Western market.
On the other hand, Comac can tap into a vast domestic Chinese market, Western-built
engines and avionics, as well as massive support from the Chinese government (Goh &
Hepher, 2017).
Suppliers Aircraft manufacturers rely on an extensive supply chain of suppliers that
produce engines, components, systems, and other parts of the aircraft. Generally, three
major types of suppliers can be discerned: engine manufacturers and original equip-
ment suppliers (OES) that are located on the first tier of the production pyramid, as
well as lower-tier suppliers that typically deliver components or subsystems to these
tier 1 suppliers.
The market for aircraft engines has oligopolistic structures, since only the three manu-
facturers General Electric (GE), Rolls-Royce (RR), and Pratt & Whitney (P&W) manufac-
ture complete engines for commercial aircraft. These are complemented by other ma-
nufacturers of major engine modules such as MTU Aero Engines (MTU) and Snecma,
which however do not develop entire engine programs on their own (Herzog, 2010).
Airframer Aircraft Type (excerpt) Engine Type Engine OEM / Consortium
Airbus A318 PW6000
CFM56-5B
Pratt & Whitney
CFM International
A320 V2500-A5
CFM56-5A/5B
International Aero Engines
CFM International
A350XWB Trent XWB (exclusively) Rolls-Royce
A380 GP7200
Trent900
Engine Alliance
Rolls-Royce
Boeing B737 NG CFM56-7B (exclusively) CFM International
B747-8 GEnx-2B
Trent1000
General Electric
Rolls-Royce
B777-200 GE90-94B
PW4000-112
Trent800
General Electric
Pratt & Whitney
Rolls-Royce
B787 GEnx-1B
Trent1000
General Electric
Rolls-Royce
Table 4.1: Selectable Engines on Modern Airbus and Boeing Aircraft (Source: Herzog, 2010, p.
99)
As engines are a typical example for complex product systems (COPS, Hobday et al.,
2005), they involve enormous capital and technological requirements, as well as a high
level of interdependencies of subsystems. To stem the capital requirements of typically
$1bn involved in the development of a new engine program and share the risks in the
development phase, engine manufacturers and system suppliers have founded a hand-
ful of joint ventures: the “Engine Alliance” (GE & P&W), “CFMI” (GE & Snecma) and
“International Aero Engines” (IAE) (P&W, RR, MTU Aero Engines, and Japanese Aero
Engines Corporation) (Pompl, 2007; Herzog, 2010). These engine manufacturers and
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consortia develop all engine programs of Airbus and Boeing aircraft, as Table 4.1 illus-
trates. Besides alliancing, engine manufacturers add services to their business model
to finance the amortization period of 15 to 25 years (Lazonick & Prencipe, 2002) and
reduce the commercial risk tied to the success of the aircraft. This service-led business
model innovation is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.4.
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Figure 4.7: Top 7 Aerospace Companies15
The second type of tier 1 suppliers are original equipment suppliers16 such as avion-
ics producer Honeywell, airframe structures suppliers such as Goodrich, and major
components suppliers such as the landing gear producer Messier-Dowty that has been
integrated into the French Safran group (Niosi & Zhegu, 2005). While the market for
aircraft systems is less concentrated than the engine market, a major consolidation can
be observed in the last years, as large system manufacturers employ M&A programs
to increase in-house system seller capabilities and secure larger shares of the aircraft
systems market (Berger, 2013a).17 This development is further fueled by the aircraft
manufacturer’s outsourcing of development by establishing risk-and-revenue-sharing
partnerships, which will be further discussed in detail in Chapter 4.4.
Furthermore, it needs to be noted that commercial aerospace and the defense industry
are intertwined, and major aerospace companies base their revenues in commercial avi-
ation and defense, due to the high technological synergies between both applications.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.7, which shows the top aerospace companies based on
2015 revenues.
15Author’s evaluation based on data by Best (2016); Duddu (2016), Bombardier and Embraer are not
consolidated into Airbus and Boeing.
16Also known as aircraft system suppliers.
17Among many examples of M&A activities of the last years are: UTC acquired tire supplier Goodrich,
Zodiac purchased galley supplier Sell, Safran acquired Zodiac’s seat division, and Transdigm Group
acquired safety equipment supplier AmSafe.
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4.3 Aircraft Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul
4.3.1 Fundamentals
Definition and Early Development Aircraft require Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul
(MRO) services to ensure airworthiness and thus safety of flight operations. While in
practice, the boundaries between maintenance, repair, and overhaul are at times blurry,
the different types of activities can be delimited from one another: Maintenance ac-
tivities are activities that limit wear and tear of the aircraft and its parts. Repair and
overhaul include all measures that restore the aircraft or its components into their orig-
inal state. Another main difference between repair and overhaul is that the latter is
a more comprehensive activity (Hinsch, 2012). Modern maintenance programs aim
to strike the balance between cost-efficiency and reliability by optimizing scheduled
maintenance to minimize unscheduled events.
Historically, only little reliable data was available on which aircraft maintenance pro-
grams could be based, which is why they relied mostly on the experience of mechanics
and often followed a paradigm “the more, the better”. This changed only in the age
of jets when aerospace agencies were founded and introduced condition-based mainte-
nance schedules. Since the 1980s this philosophy has been further developed, consid-
ering the consequence of errors instead of their occurrence as units of analysis and con-
sidering economic factors. Today, three types of maintenance concepts can be differen-
tiated: scheduled maintenance, which includes preventive and predictive maintenance
concepts, as well as unscheduled maintenance. Preventive maintenance is a concept in
which planned actions are predetermined at pre-set intervals in a maintenance program
that aims to ensure the airworthiness of the aircraft. Predictive maintenance pursues
the same target as preventive maintenance (i.e. keeping the aircraft and its parts in air-
worthy condition), relies however on data to schedule maintenance activities instead
of pre-set intervals. Unscheduled maintenance requires non-routine maintenance pro-
cesses that when a component demonstrates a failure in operation (Garg & Deshmukh,
2006; Hinsch, 2012).
In early times, MRO was conducted internally by airlines, who built most of the re-
quired MRO capabilities in-house in a specific MRO division. To achieve economies of
scale on the small fleets that required extensive maintenance work compared to today’s
standards, airlines founded alliances. One example is the maintenance cooperation
ATLAS between Air France, Alitalia, Lufthansa, Iberia, and Sabena Technics to ensure
cost-efficient MRO services on the B747 in the 1970s (Henningsen, 2010). At this time,
manufacturers offered only few services but provided extensive maintenance manuals
instead. These enabled the certification of internal MRO divisions to provide all re-
quired maintenance services. As fleets grew, large legacy carriers as Turkish, Lufthansa,
Delta Airlines, or Air France span-off their maintenance division to offer MRO services
to other airlines, achieving higher cost-efficiency, economies of scale, and profitable
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third-party revenues (Garg & Deshmukh, 2006; Johnstone et al., 2009; Henningsen,
2010). As these MRO providers perform the same services often at lower costs than
internal providers, they represented and still represent a competitive opportunity for
outsourcing MRO services (Carpenter & Henderson, 2008).
The Development of the Maintenance Function Alongside the development of main-
tenance philosophies also the role of MRO for airlines has evolved considerably. His-
torically, MRO has been regarded as a mere cost center causing necessary expenses that
were accounted for in the operating budget. Airlines relied on an internal division to
maintain assets according to the break-it, fix-it logic (Garg & Deshmukh, 2006). Nowa-
days, maintenance has evolved from these antiquated views towards a core function
that delivers value to the organization. In asset-intensive industries as the airline busi-
ness18, a capable maintenance organization is a driver of firm performance, as it ensures
asset safety, reliability, and availability (Tsang, 2002) in a cost-effective manner. In com-
parison to other industries, maintenance is of especially high importance in the airline
business, due to fact that safety is an imperative and that passenger transportation is a
service that needs to be provided just-in-time, since, unlike products, it cannot be stored
(Auramo & Ala-risku, 2005). While all Western airlines possess high levels of safety, re-
liability and punctuality are less straight forward (Rieple & Helm, 2008). Here, MRO
services play an important role, as they are one of the key factors determining the air-
lines’ punctuality: although technical problems account only for 5% of the delays, the
caused delays have a larger duration (40 to 100 minutes) than delays caused by other
incidents. Punctuality is an important factor for airline profitability, as airlines lose in
between 0.6 and 2.4% of their revenues due to unpunctuality, and the fact that punctual
airlines are in general more profitable (Niehues et al., 2001). Additionally, unpunctual-
ity and flight cancellations impact the customer’s future airline choice (Al-kaabi et al.,
2007b) and a steadily rising percentage of compensation claims especially in the last
years. Last but not least, MRO services are an important cost factor for airlines, as they
represent around 10% of their direct operating costs.19
Rules and Regulations for Continuous Airworthiness Airlines are legally obliged to as-
sume the responsibility of their aircrafts’ airworthiness through active involvement and
control. To fulfill this responsibility, they are required to possess an adequate, dedicated
Continuous Airworthiness Management Organization (CAMO) and an individual oc-
cupying the position of the Postholder Maintenance to control internal and external
18Asset intensity has been measured as gross book value of assets / revenues (Hambrick, 1983). In the
airline industry, values may vary considerably due to differences in the ownership/leasing structure.
However, the airline business can be considered as being asset-intensive, no matter which financing
option is chosen.
19As discussed previously, year-to-year cost share depends on factors such as variability of fuel price and
the performance of the cost-intensive engine and base maintenance events.
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maintenance processes.20
However, airlines do not need to perform all airworthiness tasks internally but are per-
mitted to subcontract airworthiness tasks to external parties that hold the CAMO ap-
proval if an interface allowing direct involvement and control is established. The sub-
contracted services are referred to as Subcontracted Airworthiness Management Tasks
(SCAMT) and involve mainly engineering tasks such as job card creation and planning
tasks such as conceptualizing the maintenance schedule.
For MRO firms, the rules for the continuing airworthiness and maintenance of aircraft
that are stated in Regulation No 2042/2004 of the European Commission are among
the most relevant. According to this regulation, MRO firms are organizations that en-
sure continuing airworthiness of aircraft and thus require certification as maintenance
organizations according to the rules and regulations stipulated in EASA Part-145 Main-
tenance Organization Approvals. These extensive regulations include technical, orga-
nizational, and personnel requirements such as appropriate facilities and tools, as well
as qualified staff, and an appropriate qualification system. Furthermore, the MRO firm
is required to possess a system for production planning, control, and quality assur-
ance (Hinsch, 2012). Also, all maintenance tasks need to be conducted according to
approved maintenance manuals (Instructions for Continuous Airworthiness, ICA) that
are provided by a certified production organization (EASA Part 21/G), typically the
manufacturer (Hinsch, 2012).21
MRO Firms and Market The development of the global demand for MRO is induced
by the development of commercial air travel. Air travel, typically measured by revenue
passenger kilometers (RPKs), increased by approximately 6.2% in 2016 and is projected
to grow about 6.0% annually over the next 20 years. The largest gains are expected
in the regions of Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America as these regions
benefit from increased incomes, open-skies agreements, improved service quality, and
additional routes (Cooper, 2017). MRO for commercial aircraft is predicted to grow
accordingly at a healthy compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 3.8% over the next
10 years, growing from the current demand of $75.6bn to just over $109bn by 2027
(Cooper, 2017). The difference in MRO and airline growth rate is explained by the fact
that new aircraft types require less maintenance than older types due to advances in
technology. For example, the use of carbon fibers on new the A350 and B787 allows for
stretching Base Maintenance intervals from six to twelve years (Cooper, 2017).22
20In Europe, EASA Part M is applicable; the FAA and other authorities have released similar regulations.
See Hinsch (2012, p. 33-36).
21For a detailed description of maintenance organization approvals in Europe, see Hinsch (2012, p. 28-
33) or Continuing Airworthiness EASA Part 145. The FAA and other civil aviation authorities have
released similar regulations.
22Details regarding predicted growth regions, aircraft types, market segment and hence opportunities for
growth are discussed in the Revenue Streams section of the MRO business model.
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In comparison to the aircraft manufacturing market, the market for MRO services is
more dispersed (see Figure 4.8). Some airline third-party MRO providers such as SIA
Engineering Company (Singapore Airlines), AFI KLM Engineering and Maintenance
(AFI KLM), or Lufthansa Technik (Lufthansa) have grown to provide services on a
global scale. Other, independent MRO providers that mostly focus on one or some
of the MRO segments, such as HAECO, a Hong Kong-based Base Maintenance Provi-
der, or AAR Corp., who provide Component, Landing Gear and Base Maintenance in
more than 100 countries. The third type of competitor are manufacturers that have en-
tered the MRO market and are now gaining an ever-increasing market share with their
component-, engine-, and aircraft service and solution offers.
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Figure 4.8: Top MRO Companies by Type and Revenue Share in 201623
4.3.2 The MRO Market Segments
The MRO market is commonly divided into the four market segments Line Mainte-
nance, Base Maintenance, Engine Overhaul, and Component Maintenance.24 MRO
firms can choose to serve all segments as “one-stop-shops” (e.g., Air France Industries,
Lufthansa Technik, Delta Tech Ops), or focus on single market segments such as the
component maintenance specialist AJ Walter (Tegtmeier, 2009).25
23Source: Cannacord Genuity estimates (Herbert & Morales, 2016, p.4). Revenues for airline groups in-
clude service for in-house carrier and third parties. Estimates have been used where commercial main-
tenance revenues are not published, MRO revenue of manufacturers may include spare parts revenues.
24Other niche services exist, such as converting passenger to freighter aircraft or the cabin completion
services for VIP aircraft, which are not considered part of the analysis. Modification services for com-
mercial airlines are considered part of Base Maintenance.
25In the MRO business model, I conceptualize performing a particular service, as, e.g., Component Main-
tenance as a Key Activity. Hence, Component Maintenance may either refer to the market segment or
the service itself.
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Since all segments form part of the MRO industry, they have many trends in common
that are induced by developments in the adjacent airline and aircraft manufacturing
business. However, the market segments, competitors, resources, and capabilities re-
quired to offer the different MRO services differ considerably between the segments
(Carpenter & Henderson, 2008), for which reason they are introduced separately.
The MRO market has an estimated volume of $75.6bn in 2017, with Engine Overhaul
having the largest share ($29.6bn), followed by Base Maintenance ($17.7bn), Compo-
nent Maintenance ($15.5bn), and Line Maintenance at $12.8 bn.
Line
18%
Base
25%
Engine
36%
Component
21%
Figure 4.9: Market Share of MRO Segments26
Line Maintenance Line Maintenance describes all minor checks of the aircraft that are
regularly performed between to ensure its airworthiness, such as diagnosing errors and
minor troubleshooting. The primary aim of Line Maintenance is to solve any problems
without causing delays or affecting the flight schedule (Kinnison & Siddiqui, 2004).
Line Maintenance is categorized into Transit Checks, Daily-/48 hours/Weekly-, and
A-Checks (see Table 4.2). Modern maintenance schedules aim at increasing aircraft
availability by reducing the time that the aircraft is removed from service. Maximum
availability is achieved by modularizing maintenance tasks that formerly belonged to
Base Maintenance Activities (e.g., C-Checks) into smaller work packages that can be
performed in weekly or A-Checks, thus lowering the time the aircraft is parked for
Base Maintenance. These measures and the fact that new composite aircraft as the
B787 are serviced in larger Base Maintenance intervals, increasingly blur the boundaries
between Line and Base Maintenance.
26Author’s illustration based on Oliver Wyman’s 2017 Global MRO and Fleet Forecast (Cooper, 2017, p.4).
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Check Frequency
Labor / 
Costs Description Examples
Transit 
Check
Each flight 
cycle
1-4 MH
$75-350
• Sometimes described as turn-around check
• Visual inspection of aircraft (“walk-around”), 
checking for obvious damage and deterioration
• Check fluid levels of equipment, inspect 
wheels and brakes, troubleshooting
Daily / 
48h / 
Weekly 
Checks
Daily:
24-48h
Weekly: 
4-8 days
Daily: 
5-10 MH
Weekly:
10-30 MH
$150-500 
per day
• Daily checks at intervals of 24-36 hours, 
sometimes described as overnight checks
• Weekly checks include 7/8day checks and 
3/4day checks
• Additional work may be specified for the aircraft 
downtime by the maintenance planners e.g., 
defect rectification, out-of- phase checks
• Tire change, refueling lubricants, minor repairs
• Inflight entertainment and cabin maintenance
A-Check Regional:
350-500 FH 
Narrow- &
Widebody
500-700 FH
(~2 months)
Regional:
150-250 
MH
Narrow- &
Widebody
250-500 
MH
$15-50 
per FH
• Accomplished at a designated maintenance 
station and includes the opening of access 
panels to check and service certain items. 
• Additional work may be specified for the aircraft 
downtime by the maintenance planners e.g., 
defect rectification, out-of-phase checks
• Some limited special tooling, servicing, and test 
equipment is required.
• General external visual inspection of aircraft 
structure for evidence of damage, deformation, 
corrosion, missing parts
• Crew oxygen system pressure check; 
operationally check emergency lights; lubricate 
nose gear retract actuator; check parking brake 
accumulator pressure; perform Built-in Test 
Equipment (BITE) test of Flap/Slat Electronics 
Unit.
B-Check ~1,100 FH 200 – 700 
MH
• A slightly more detailed check of components 
and systems. 
• Special equipment and tests may be required. 
• Does not involve detailed disassembly or 
removal of components.
Table 4.2: Types of Line Maintenance Checks27
Compared to other maintenance services, Line Maintenance is of a very manual, de-
centralized nature, comprising around 50% of non-routine activity. Since Line Mainte-
nance is performed between each flight, it is highly intertwined with airline operations
and critical for airline operations. Highly qualified mechanics understanding the air-
craft’s complex system of electronics, engine, hydraulics, emergency equipment, cabin
systems, with high troubleshooting capabilities are essential to ensure a quick turn-
around of the aircraft. Since Line Maintenance is performed at every turn-around, staff
is needed both on the airline’s line stations (e.g., the hub or other dedicated sites on
which the aircraft are based) and outstations (the destinations served). As Line Main-
tenance is essential for aircraft reliability and availability, most airlines consider Line
Maintenance a core competence and are reluctant to outsource this service entirely. In-
stead, they aim at bundling most work (approx. 80%) on line stations through internal
staff and only the required tasks (i.e., pre-flight-, transit-, daily-, and overnight checks)
through external staff on outstations, where limited operations do not warrant own
staff (Henningsen, 2010; Aeronautical Repair Station Association, 2013; Brown, 2015).
Further efficiency gains in Line Maintenance can be achieved by improving capacity
utilization and efficiency of labor through the optimization of the maintenance sched-
ule, efficient troubleshooting, and selling spare capacity to third-party airlines (Hen-
ningsen, 2010). On outstations, Line Maintenance tasks such as turn-around checks
are mostly performed by local MRO providers or airport operators such as Swissport.
As the IATA standard ground handling agreement standardizes most of the contents
27Adapted from Aeronautical Repair Station Association (2013, p. 20) and Vieira & Loures (2016, p. 23).
FH: flight hours, MH: man-hours.
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and pricing of these services, in general, little negotiation potential exists on these sta-
tions.
Base Maintenance Base Maintenance (also referred to as airframe or heavy mainte-
nance) characterizes major checks and including structural repairs of the aircraft that
are usually performed at a hangar or specialized Base Maintenance facility (Kinnison
& Siddiqui, 2004). Base Maintenance can be divided into C-Checks, which are major
checks that are performed yearly or bi-yearly depending on the aircraft type and oper-
ational profile and D-checks, which are the most comprehensive maintenance activity
on the aircraft (see Table 4.3).
Check Frequency
Duration/ 
Labor Description Examples
C-Check Every 2.500  -
4,000 FH or 
12 - 20 
months
72h - 7+ 
days
2,000 -
4,000 MH
• Detailed, scheduled inspections, maintenance, 
preventive maintenance and alteration of the 
airframe, components and accessories and 
portions of applicable corrosion prevention 
programs
• Requires extensive tooling, test equipment, and 
special skill levels. 
• C-checks remove the airplane from the 
operations for 3 to 5 days. 
• Modern maintenance schedules shorten C-
checks by modularizing work packages and 
including them into A- or B-checks.
• Visually check flight compartment escape 
ropes for condition and security; check 
operation of DC bus tie control unit; visually 
check the condition of entry door seals; 
operationally check flap asymmetry system; 
pressure decay check APU fuel line shroud; 
inspect engine inlet TAI ducting for cracks.
D-Check 20,000 -
25,000 FH or
6 - 12 years
30 days
10,000 -
50,000+ 
MH
• Comprehensive maintenance, preventive 
maintenance, and alteration of the entire 
aircraft, intending to return it to its original 
condition (to the extent possible) with interiors 
and components removed and replaced.
• Includes detailed visual and other non-
destructive test inspections of the aircraft 
structure. 
• Requires a hangar, special equipment, and is 
very labor-intensive.
• Inspect stabilizer attach bolts; inspect floor 
beams; detailed inspection of wing box 
structure.
• Often installation of new cabin equipment, 
landing gears, or other major aircraft 
modifications.
Table 4.3: Types of Base Maintenance Checks28
The requirement for Base Maintenance is significantly decreased for new aircraft types
due to modularization of work packages (see the previous section) and new aircraft
technology. For example, a B787 requires three C-Checks and one D-Check during
12 years of operation, compared to a B767, that still needed six C-Checks and two D-
Checks. In total, this enables savings of approximately 65% maintenance work (62,000
MH) and 90 additional days the aircraft is available (Brown, 2016).
Base Maintenance is very labor cost-driven with approximately 70% labor, 20% mate-
rial, and 10% for repair and specialty services. Currently, airlines outsource more than
half (54%) of their Base Maintenance work to independent MRO providers and 2% to
airframe OEMs, while 44% are performed internally (Aeronautical Repair Station As-
sociation, 2013).
28Adapted from Aeronautical Repair Station Association (2013, p. 4) and Vieira & Loures (2016, p. 23).
FH: flight hours, MH: man-hours.
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The market for Base Maintenance services is highly price-competitive and commodi-
tized. Thus, most Base Maintenance providers have established a cost leadership strat-
egy, centering their Value Proposition around providing the quality stipulated by the
authorities at a competitive price. Input-based pricing is the predominant form of
pricing for Base Maintenance events. For each type of check, work packages and re-
quired man-hours are defined. These are priced according to a regionally established
market price, the so-called man-hour rate (MHR). The MHR greatly varies per region,
with China and Southeast Asia offering the lowest MHRs, lying roughly 36% below
North America and 50% below Western Europe (Spafford & Rose, 2013). It is uncertain,
whether a further decline will take place, e.g., via movement of facilities into countries
with yet lower costs, or whether increasing wages in low-cost countries will stabilize
or even raise the MHR.
Although competition in Base Maintenance is very cost-driven, opportunities for com-
petitive differentiation exist: first, shortening the duration of the maintenance event
(the so-called turn-around-time, TAT) decreases the number of days the aircraft is re-
moved from service.29 Second, the MRO provider’s ability to constantly deliver the
aircraft within the previously agreed TAT is measured through the KPI on-time-perfor-
mance (OTP).30 A provider with a high OTP provides value to the airline by reducing
uncertainty and costs for the operator: When an aircraft is not overhauled on time, the
operator needs to either organize a replacement aircraft through leasing or its mainte-
nance reserves, or cancel the flight and rebook the passengers. OTP is especially vi-
tal if the MRO performs several subsequent base maintenance events for his customer
(“nose-to-tail operations”), since summing up delays lead to substantial increases of the
total TAT and disruptions of the airline’s operation. Other opportunities for differenti-
ation are guaranteeing homogeneous quality and providing base maintenance services
locally, which avoids time and costs associated with ferry flights.31
Engine Overhaul Engine Overhaul includes all maintenance, repair, and overhaul
tasks done on a dismounted engine (off-wing). In contrast, all engine-related tasks
that are performed on-wing are usually categorized as Line Maintenance activities. For
commercial airlines, the overhaul is performed on an as-needed (on condition) basis,
except for the replacement of life-limited parts (LLP) which are replaced at fixed times
stipulated by the national aviation authority (Kinnison & Siddiqui, 2004; Aeronauti-
cal Repair Station Association, 2013). Advances in technology have increased the ser-
29For an exemplary calculation, please refer to Section 1 in the Annex. The value of aircraft availability
varies throughout the year due to the seasonality of the commercial passenger transport business.
Availability is especially valuable in the summer months during peak travel times, while in winter
aircraft utilization is generally lower.
30OTP: percentage of overhaul events finished within the stipulated TAT.
31An intra-European ferry flight of an A320 with the duration of 3 block hours results in one-way costs of
circa 14,000 USD (see Section 2 in the Annex) and results in lower aircraft availability, since the aircraft
cannot be used for commercial operations during the ferry flight.
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vice life32 of engines from previously 4,500 FH to 24,000 FH on modern engine types.
Depending on the size of the engine, costs for the overhaul of a single engine lie in
between $450,000 and more than $5 million (Aeronautical Repair Station Association,
2013). Consequently, airlines may incur substantial costs, if they are required to per-
form Engine Overhaul of a whole fleet in a single period.33
Engine 
Disassembly
Parts Inspection Repair and Replacement
Certification
and re-
assembly
Engine Testing 
& Release
Workscoping
DAT
EPAR
Work-
scoping
Figure 4.10: Engine Overhaul Process34
Typically, Engine Overhaul is divided into three inter-related sub-processes, shown in
Figure 4.10. Engine disassembly, assembly, and test (DAT) is performed in flow lines,
in which the engine is dismantled into its sub-modules as it travels from station to sta-
tion. If necessary, these submodules are subsequently disassembled into single piece
parts. After cleaning and an initial inspection, e.g., with non-destructive testing meth-
ods, blades, vanes, and engine parts are repaired in specialized workshops. Engine
Parts Repair (EPAR) aims to return worn engine parts to their original or even into an
improved state. Workscoping determines the scope of the overhaul, and which parts
are to be repaired or replaced. Workscoping is a critical activity in Engine Overhaul,
as it determines the costs and time required for the overhaul event. Finally, the engine
is re-assembled in the flow line as part of the DAT process, re-certified, tested, and re-
leased into service (Kinnison & Siddiqui, 2004; Aeronautical Repair Station Association,
2013).
Engine Overhaul is a very material-driven MRO service, as spares and material con-
stitute roughly 68% of all overhaul costs, while labor and facilities take a considerably
smaller share with 22% and 10%, respectively (Aeronautical Repair Station Associa-
tion, 2013). It represents the largest of the MRO market segments, accounting for 36%
of its value (Cooper, 2017). In this segment, Engine OEMs have already successfully
established themselves with a 55% market share, while 20% is performed by airlines
32The service life of the engine is the timeframe between overhaul events. It is commonly measured as
Mean Time between Shop Visits (MTBSV) in flight hours. The service life is determined mostly by the
construction and technology used by the manufacturer, the environment in which the airline operates
and the maintenance and engineering services performed.
33Assuming $5 million per engine overhaul, a small airline with 12 single-aisle aircraft (24 engines) incurs
a one-time operative expenditure of $120 million in a single year.
34Source: own illustration. DAT: Disassembly, Assembly, Test. EPAR: Engine Parts Repair.
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in-house, and 25% by third-party MRO providers (Brown, 2015). With the growing fleet
of next-generation aircraft (Airbus A320neo, A350, A330neo, Boeing B737MAX, B777X,
B787), engine manufacturers’ market share in engine services is expected to increase
even further to in between 65% and 90% (Bourke, 2018).
Component Maintenance Component maintenance describes repairs, replacement, and
testing of the components that provide the aircraft with its basic functionalities such
control and navigation, steering, communications, electrical power, cabin air condi-
tioning, landing, and braking. An aircraft includes many different categories of compo-
nents such as avionics (e.g., navigation and communication systems), hydraulics (e.g.,
pumps and actuators), the auxiliary power unit (APU) and electrical distribution sys-
tems (see Figure 4.4). Components need to be repaired either due to wear and tear
resulting from regular operations, limited lifetimes determined by the manufacturer, or
sporadic defects. Wheels and brakes, for example, require a regular exchange of the
brake pads due to wear and tear, while avionics equipment is overhauled at regular
intervals and if an erratic failure occurs.
The MRO component market segments and their average cost share are shown in Table
4.4). Wheels and brakes cause the highest costs due to the wear they sustain in each
aircraft landing. They are followed by the maintenance of avionics equipment and
APU.
Market Segment Maintenance Activities
% of Component
MRO Costs
Wheels & Brakes Brake pad, servo valve, wheel maintenance, antiskid maintenance 25%  
Avionics Maintenance of displays, communications equipment, navigation systems, and 
autopilot
14%  
Auxiliary Power Unit Maintenance of the aircraft’s auxiliary power unit including accessories 9%  
Fuel Systems Maintenance of engine fuel controls and aircraft fuel systems 8%  
Thrust Reversers Maintenance of aircraft thrust reversers, including actuation and surfaces 6%  
Landing Gear Maintenance of aircraft’s landing gear systems 6%  
Equipment/ Furnishings Maintenance of removable items of equipment and furnishings externally mounted on 
the aircraft or contained in the flight and passenger components
5%  
Flight Controls Maintenance of primary and secondary flight control actuators 4%  
Hydraulic Power Maintenance of hydraulic pumps and conveyance hardware 3%  
Electrical Maintenance of electrical generation and distribution systems 3%  
Other Maintenance of myriad other systems including environmental control, in-flight 
entertainment, safety, water & waste, and pneumatics
17%  
Table 4.4: Component MRO Segments35
As the aircraft consists of hundreds of different components of dozens of different sys-
tem suppliers, the market for component services is very fragmented compared to En-
gine Overhaul or Base Maintenance (Aeronautical Repair Station Association, 2013). In
35Source: Aeronautical Repair Station Association (2013, p. 14).
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total, independent service providers hold a market share of 40%, followed by 25% of
airline in-house work, and 35% of subcontracting to OEMs (Brown, 2015).
Due to the diversity of the components, the maintenance cost structure varies between
the different major categories (see Figure 4.11). The most labor-intensive activities in-
clude electrical power systems, landing gear, thrust reverser repair, and fuel systems,
while wheels and brakes, avionics, and APUs are rather material-driven. Overall, la-
bor is approximately 35% of component MRO spending; materials represent 60% and
outside services 5% (Aeronautical Repair Station Association, 2013).
0% 50% 100%
Evacuation equipment
Electrical Power
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Thrust Reverser
Fuel
Hydraulics
Cabin Systems
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Air Systems
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Figure 4.11: Component Maintenance Cost Share of Major Component Categories36
Two main types of Component Maintenance contracts need to be distinguished: Single
Component Maintenance contracts and Pooling contracts.37 Single Component Main-
tenance contracts cover the repair of single components at a negotiated price and turn-
around-time. In these types of contracts, the airline sends the removed unserviceable
component to the repair station, where it is repaired and sent back to the customer.
Pooling Contracts allow the airline to gain access to a component pool, guaranteeing
the availability of a set of components in a specific timeframe. Here, the airline sends
the unserviceable component to the repair station, which provides an exchange unit
from a pool of serviceable parts. Pooling contracts are a specific type of solution offer-
ing that is covered in detail in Chapter 5.
While the former type of contract is provided by the system suppliers, airline third-
party, and independent MROs, the latter requires an integrator that manages a pool
across the different system and maintenance suppliers. Hence, pooling contracts are
provided by either independent and airline-third party MROs, or the airframers as part
of their service-led growth strategy.
36Source: Aeronautical Repair Station Association (2013, p. 16).
37For reasons of simplicity, contractual agreements in between these two types are not further elaborated
here.
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4.3.3 The MRO Industry Structure
Michael Porter argues in his seminal article that the nature and degree of competition
and profitability within an industry depends on the industry structure, which is deter-
mined by five forces (Porter, 1979). These forces are the bargaining power of suppliers,
bargaining power of customers, the threat of new entrants, the threat of substitutes
and the level of rivalry within the industry. Each of the five forces has the potential
to lower the profitability of the industry and be a determinant of strategy formulation
(Porter, 1979). While the industry’s impact on companies’ profitability has been under
discussion with varying results (e.g., Rumelt, 1991; McGahan & Porter, 1997), Porter’s
industry structure analysis depicted has become a widely used framework for analyz-
ing industries (Grant, 2010). Due to its ability to identify the relevant features of an
industry’s structure and its implications on competitive behavior as well as the posi-
tioning of a firm relative to the market forces (Grant, 2010), I use Porter’s approach to
organize the MRO market analysis (see Figure 4.12).
• High asset intensity and considerable 
economies of scale
• High technological intensity and sunk 
costs required to build capabilities on 
new aircraft types
• Partly cyclical, ”perishable” service 
business
• Significant exit barriers
RIVALRY AMONG EXISTING 
COMPETITORS: HIGH
• Manufacturers are often the sole 
source of resources required for 
aircraft maintenance
• Favorable contractual conditions can 
be generated by airlines during the 
initial sale of the aircraft when high 
competition between manufacturers 
exists
BARGAINING POWER OF 
SUPPLIERS: HIGH
• Price sensitivity of airlines, due to low 
profitability and few savings options
• Bargaining power of airline depends 
on fleet type, size, and uniformity
• Services are often perceived as 
commodity, little switching costs 
between MRO providers
• Local idiosyncratic investments (e.g., 
hangar) increase customer’s 
bargaining power
BARGAINING POWER OF 
CUSTOMERS: MEDIUM
• No direct substitute for aircraft 
maintenance, repair, and overhaul
• MRO services can be substituted by 
surplus parts or replacement of aircraft 
to a limited extent
• New aircraft technology requires less 
maintenance than legacy technology
THREAT OF SUBSTITUTES: LOW
• Considerable technological, financial, 
and capability barriers to entry
• Aerospace manufacturers can 
surmount these barriers
THREAT OF NEW ENTRANTS: REALIZED
Figure 4.12: MRO Industry Structure Analysis (based on Porter, 1979, p. 141)
Bargaining Power of Suppliers High bargaining power of suppliers may limit the prof-
itability of an industry, as surplus shifts to the supplying companies. Different condi-
tions exist that increase suppliers’ bargaining power, such as a high concentration of the
supply market by few companies, concentrated offerings, or only a few or no available
other sources. Suppliers may also increase their bargaining power by imposing switch-
ing costs on customers. Buyers can decrease the bargaining power of their suppliers
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by establishing alternative sources or making a credible threat of backward integration
(Porter, 1979; Cox, 2001; Grant, 2010).
To perform MRO services, firms require specific resources such as spare parts, test
equipment, tooling, and instructions for continuous airworthiness (ICA) such as Com-
ponent Maintenance Manuals (CMMs) to provide MRO services. These resources are
procured from different sources in the Aircraft and MRO value chain, which is illus-
trated in Figure 4.13.
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Enforcement
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• Spare Parts
• MRO Services
• MRO Services
• Spare Parts
• MRO Services
Alternative 
Sources • Surplus
• PMA Parts
Product and service flows
Contractual relationship
Figure 4.13: Aircraft and MRO Value Chain38
For some of those resources, manufacturers are the sole source, whereas in other cases,
multiple opportunities for either procuring or making these resources exist. As manu-
facturers can largely determine pricing and access to resources on which they are pos-
sess a monopoly, they generally have high bargaining power in the aftermarket against
MRO firms and airlines. The OEM’s bargaining power is however limited by Product
Support Agreements (PSAs). PSAs are parts of the purchasing agreements between air-
line and airframer that grant airlines access to ICA, warranty terms, spare parts, and
pricing conditions. Airlines can delegate the rights from the PSA to their MRO pro-
vider of choice, who can then procure the respective resources from the manufacturer
according to the airline’s conditions stipulated in the PSA. These rights are not limited
38Author’s illustration. ICA: Instructions for continuing airworthiness, PSA: Product support agreements.
Distributors that sell spare parts or surplus on behalf of the manufacturers or independently have been
excluded from the figure for the purpose of clarity.
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to the airframer but also contain regulations regarding the system suppliers and their
vendors. Since typically a high level of competition exists during aircraft purchase
(Airbus versus Boeing models), airlines still possess significant negotiation power that
is partly transferred into the aftermarket through the PSA. Once airlines have decided
which aircraft to buy, they become locked-in however due to the high switching costs
involved in switching fleets. Hence, it is crucial to take MRO costs into account, as they
accumulate over the decades a fleet is in operation. Once the aircraft purchasing con-
tract has been closed, PSAs can only realistically be influenced when performing new
aircraft procurement campaigns.
Surplus and so-called Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA) parts represent alternative
sources to the manufacturer’s spare parts. Surplus materials are second-hand parts
that are removed from retired aircraft that are restored to serviceable conditions and
re-installed in aircraft. Typically, surplus parts are available from specialized surplus
dealers that operate a business model of purchasing retired aircraft, performing tear-
down, removing and possibly repairing/re-certifying its parts. Alternatively, new sur-
plus material is available if airlines or MRO providers sell their excess stocks that have
not been installed in the aircraft yet. Surplus materials are an important alternative
source to manufacturers’ spare parts as they typically enable savings of approximately
50% in pricing (Broderick, 2013b).
PMA parts are approved to comply with airworthiness standards under US Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Parts Manufacturer Approval order. These parts can
be built into aircraft without any changes necessary in the Type Certificate or Sup-
plemental Type Certificate. The USA is historically the major PMA market, but since
PMA certified parts were approved by the EASA as well, usage of PMA parts has in-
creased worldwide (Avia Solutions Group, 2017). As surplus and PMA materials limit
the manufacturer’s spare part revenue streams and aftermarket bargaining power, they
heavily oppose their usage. Also, lessors mostly do not allow PMAs on their aircraft
to protect the value of their assets (Broderick, 2014). The role that surplus and PMA
parts play in the MRO’s business model and their effects on the MRO’s cost structure
is further elaborated in Section 4.3.4.
In conclusion, manufacturers possess high levels of bargaining power against MRO service
firms, which can, however, be offset by airlines during the aircraft purchasing campaigns. The
prerequisite is however that airlines take the total lifecycle costs into account and negotiate
favorable conditions for the aftermarket with manufacturers and system suppliers.
Threat of Substitutes Substitutes are products or services that for the customer per-
form the same function as the product or service of the industry under analysis. Substi-
tutes often emerge from other industries and can sometimes entirely replace the original
product, if it provides a better price-performance trade-off (Porter, 1979).
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Because airplanes need regular MRO services to be maintained in airworthy condition,
no substitute for MRO services is per se available. However, some MRO services can
be substituted by using spare parts and vice versa. For example, unserviceable com-
ponents or engine parts can be replaced with surplus material, which may be a more
economical option, depending on the state of the component and the availability of
these alternative sources.
As some major events such as Base Maintenance events and Engine Overhauls are re-
quired in larger timespans, typically between six and eight years, airlines may forgo
these events by retiring the aircraft before these services are necessary. However, the
decision of whether to prematurely renew the fleet is a complex one, as trade-offs be-
tween higher capital, versus lower maintenance and fuel costs need to be considered.
Bargaining Power of Customers The customers’ bargaining power over their suppli-
ers is increased in situations in which the suppliers are dependent on their customer,
e.g., when only a few buyers exist, and these procure large quantities of their supplier’s
production. In industries with high fixed costs, dependence may be caused by idiosyn-
cratic investments by the supplier which cause high sunk or switching costs, when the
relationship ends. Customers with low profitability that procure commodities demon-
strate a higher price-sensitivity than customers that procure products or services that
add considerable value to their offering or decrease its costs. In these cases, the cus-
tomers’ bargaining power is increased by the fact that they can procure these items
regularly from multiple competitors that enter in price-based competition (Cox, 2001;
Crook & Combs, 2007; Porter, 1998).
Airlines show a high price-sensitivity in procurement, due to their generally low prof-
itability. As MRO services make up a considerable share of 15-18% of direct operating
costs, airlines continuously search for ways to reduce that expense (McFadden & Wor-
rells, 2012). Their price sensitivity is increased by the fact that large other portions
of direct operating costs, such as fuel, airport charges, and staff are challenging to in-
fluence. For low-cost carriers, low operating costs and hence low MRO costs is even
one of the three main strategic priorities39. Network carriers are under increased price
pressure on through the market entry of their low-cost counterpart, which is why they
take measures to close the MRO cost-gap (see Figure 4.14). However, it needs to be
noted that the difference in maintenance expenses per block hour between LCCs and
NCs is difficult to compare, as it is influenced by the following factors: First, LCCs
typically operate younger fleets that require less maintenance. Second, LCCs operate
narrowbody aircraft with only two engines, which cause considerable less MRO costs.
Third, the stage length, which is often used to adjust to compare DOC (Saxon & Weber,
2017) differs between both types of carriers (Belobaba et al., 2009). Ultimately, different
accounting procedures between carriers and their internal maintenance divisions also
39Simple product, positioning, low operating costs (Klaas & Delfmann, 2005).
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significantly limit the comparability of airline operating costs between carriers (Saxon
& Weber, 2017).
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Figure 4.14: Maintenance Cost Gap US LCC and Network Carriers 1995 - 200740
For MRO services, the airline’s bargaining power depends on different factors such as
the type of service procured, the fleet type, and its size. In general, MRO services are
perceived as a commodity with limited potential for competitive differentiation (more
details in Section 6.1.1). For example, Line Maintenance on outstations is generally re-
garded as a commodity, with often more than two suppliers per airport. As simultane-
ously only limited switching costs exist, these contracts are often re-tendered frequently
to gain the best conditions. On other services, such as Engine Overhaul, only a few (or
in extreme cases only one) supplier exists, which severely limits the airlines bargaining
power. The fleet type operated by the airline shows an effect on bargaining power, as
for very common fleets such as the A320 or B737, many different suppliers with ca-
pabilities exist around the world. On “niche” fleets such as the A380 however, only
a few suppliers for e.g., component maintenance exist, which potentially have higher
bargaining power. Airlines that possess larger, more uniform fleets enjoy higher nego-
tiation power, as these are more attractive to MRO providers since they allow for the
provisioning of standardized services and predictable capacity utilization.
Threat of Entrants Supernormal profits within an industry attract entrants that can
capture market shares and lower prices, reducing the profitability of the industry. If en-
try and exit barriers are sufficiently low, a contestable market exists, which makes firms
vulnerable to hit-and-run attacks (Baumol, 1982). Therefore, firms are forced to charge
a deterrent price, inhibiting attacks from potential entrants and lowering market prof-
itability (Porter, 1998). However, in most industries, entry and exit barriers limit the
40Source: Belobaba et al. (2009, p. 127).
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threat of entry (Grant, 2010). These include capital requirements (e.g., research and de-
velopment and production facilities), economies of scale needed for achieving lower
unit costs or absolute cost advantages, e.g., from low-cost sources of materials or a fa-
vorable position on the learning curve. Other barriers of entry are access to distribution
channels, legal barriers, e.g., in regulated industries, or the entrant’s expectation of re-
taliation in the same or different markets (Grant, 2010). Companies may also erect entry
barriers by increasing switching costs for their customers or by establishing proprietary
standards in an industry, which gives them the ability to charge license fees or pursue
a monopolist strategy (Porter, 1998; Scherm & Borowicz, 2001).
In the MRO industries, considerable barriers to entry are present, such as technical
complexity, certification and financial requirements (Hinsch, 2012), as well as impor-
tant economies of scale, due to the abovementioned asset intensity. Another barrier
is the existence of learning curves that are generally present in service industries, as
services often involve tacit knowledge and room for optimization (Darr et al., 1995).
For these reasons, it is unlikely that competitors from other, unrelated industries enter
the MRO service market. Airframer, engine OEMs, and system suppliers are however
well poised to invade the service market through servitization: Being the manufacturer
of the equipment, they possess much of the relevant certification required for mainte-
nance, have invested in production facilities, and understand the technology that is un-
derlying the service offer (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). On the other hand, manufacturers
need to overcome significant barriers, such as adaptions in organization, culture, and
the underlying business model to successfully enter the service business, (as discussed
in Chapter 2.3.4).
In practice, airframers such as Airbus and Boeing, engine manufacturers such as Rolls-
Royce, and system suppliers such as Honeywell or Rockwell Collins have added ser-
vices to their business model. Servitization was an appealing strategy as the profitabil-
ity of the aerospace service business is comparatively higher compared to manufactur-
ing with a WACC of 11%, while manufacturers were able to achieve only 9% (see Figure
4.1). In consequence, the threat of entry of manufacturers is now no longer just a threat
but has already materialized, leading to “intense price wars” (Schneider et al., 2013, p.
297). Hence, MROs need to adapt their business model to cope with the new entrants
and combat the suffering profitability of their current business model.
Rivalry Among Existing Competitors An intense rivalry between established competi-
tors within an industry may lead to more competitive moves such as price wars that
can negatively affect the profitability of an industry. The rivalry may depend on struc-
tural, product-specific, and other factors. Structural factors such as numerous equally
balanced competitors and slow industry growth may lead to high competition between
rivals (Porter, 1998). However, the effect of seller concentration within an industry on
profitability is considered weak (Schmalensee, 1989). Product-specific factors, such as
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high fixed or storage costs, a lack of switching costs, or product differentiation as well
as the ability to increase production only in large increments increase competition. In-
dustries with durable and specialized resources such as the airline industry may face
substantial barriers of exit, which lead to intense price wars in times of recession (Grant,
2010). Diverse competitors with different goals and strategic stakes may also lead to in-
tense competition on a market, as these competitors may continually “run head-on into
each other” (Porter, 1979).
In the MRO industry, rivalry inside the industry is increased by various factors. First,
MRO is an asset-intensive industry that requires workshops (e.g., for component and
engine overhaul) as well as hangars/docks for Line and Base Maintenance. Especially
for Base Maintenance, a large quantity of mechanics is required, which cause fixed
costs. Likewise, the technology-intensity of the aerospace industry implies that consid-
erable financial effort is needed to build MRO capabilities on new aircraft types. These
factors cause substantial economies of scale that in turn require firms to secure a certain
market share, to ensure profitability. Hence, competition for large contracts is intensely
carried out on a global scale, as each firm aims to improve its competitive position.
At the same time, economies of scale and synergies between MRO services constitute
significant exit barriers. In consequence, firms are reluctant to abandon capabilities or
entire business units, as this also endangers their ability to offer MRO services as a one-
stop-shop. For example, aircraft painting services are difficult to competitively perform
in Germany, due to high price pressure and environmental standards compared to other
countries, e.g., in Eastern Europe. As a consequence, Lufthansa Technik decided to
relinquish this capability in 2011, which in turn left them with high sunk costs for the
modern painting facility and the incapacity to offer Base Maintenance and painting
as integrated services from a single location (Kranz, 2011). Six years later, the Base
Maintenance facility in Hamburg was closed as well, permanently abolishing all Base
Maintenance capabilities in Hamburg (Preuß, 2017). The closure, in turn, has adverse
effects on the still present VIP completion business, since now seasonality cannot be
balanced anymore between both services with very similar underlying resource base.
This is not to say that either of these decisions was wrong from a managerial point of
view, as aircraft are mobile and can be overhauled in other, more competitive locations.
However, it does illustrate the significant synergies and economies of scale present in
the MRO industry.
Another factor that limits competitive differentiation and fosters price-based competi-
tion is the fact that MRO services underlie strict regulations and standardizations that
lead to a natural commoditization. For repair and overhaul service, the input, output
and large shares of the conducted repair processes are standardized: the input is an
unserviceable part, the repair process is performed according to the manufacturer’s
manual, the output is a serviceable part. Differentiation is, however, possible through
process innovation (e.g., improvement of repair methods) and performance parame-
ters inherent in the service offers such as turn-around-time (TAT, i.e., the time required
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for the repair), or the mean-time-before-removal (MTBR, i.e., the time the component
remains on average in serviceable condition). Advanced services such as engineering
and cabin modifications are less commoditized and hence present more opportunities
for differentiation.
The entry of manufacturers into the MRO market represents the situation mentioned
above in which diverse competitors with different backgrounds and strategic goals
compete differently on the same market, leading to a steep increase in competition
(Schneider et al., 2013). Hence, it can be concluded that a high level of rivalry and
competitive pressure exists within the industry.
4.3.4 The Traditional MRO Business Model
The traditional MRO business model (Figure 4.15) explains how Maintenance Repair
and Overhaul firms do business on the strategic (corporate core logic), structural (value
chain activities), and resource level (assets), following a systemic, multi-level approach
(Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2013). It abstracts the complex reality of MRO providers into
a comprehensible model that enables to describe and understand the firm’s core logic
of creating value (Shafer et al., 2005; Rentmeister & Klein, 2003). Besides, the tradi-
tional MRO business model is the basis of what is being innovated, when developing
solution- and alliance-based business models.
The Engine, Components, and Aircraft Case deliver in-depth information on the core
logic of MRO providers that offer traditional service offers (the focus of this section),
solutions, and alliances with manufacturers. All interviews have been coded with the
nine business model elements, aiming to identify the items that were regarded as most
important in each dimension. These empirical findings are triangulated with industry-
specific literature (e.g., the yearly MRO studies by Oliver Wyman, and various articles
from periodical outlets such as AviationWeek or MRO-Network) and internal docu-
ments of the focal company to further substantiate each business model element.
Thus, a comprehensive modular system based on theoretical concepts and practice is
formed. Practitioners may use the MRO business model’s elements to combine Value
Propositions, Customer Segments and existing or to be developed Key Resources, Ac-
tivities and Partners into new, viable business models.
Value Proposition
MRO providers make a set of Value Propositions to their customers that are delivered
through traditional MRO services such as Engine, Component, or Base Maintenance.
140
Chapter 4. Structure and Development of the Aerospace Industry
Key Capabilities
• Repair and Engineering 
Capability
• Multi-vendor Capability
• Data Processing and 
Interpretation Capability
Key Resources
• Maintenance Network
• Operator Experience
• Serviced fleet
• Financial strength
• Tangible and intangible 
manufacturing-specific 
resources
Cost Structure
• Cost structure varies with services segment, averaging at: 
• 48% labor
• 46% material
• 7% services
• Increase of material and service cost share to be expected
• Lower cost base by use of PMAs, DER repairs, surplus
Key Activities
• Operational services: 
Line-, Base, Engine-, 
Components Repair and 
Aircraft Engineering
• Development of 
alternative parts- and 
repairs 
• Process optimization
Value Proposition
• Reduction of Direct 
Maintenance Costs
• Service Quality
• Broad portfolio of basic 
and advanced services 
across aircraft platforms
• Airline Perspective
Customer Segments
• Airlines
• Aircraft lessees and 
lessors
Channels
• Key account manager for 
dedicated personal 
assistance predominant
• Other channels (e.g. AOG 
desk) present
Customer Relationship
• Often: long-term 
relationship driven by 
trust, cooperation, and 
cost-efficiency
• Low level of long-term 
dependence of airline on 
MRO provider
Revenue Streams
• Time & material-based revenue streams
• Market growth mainly in China, Middle-East, and Asia Pacific 
• Segment growth mainly Engine- and Component maintenance
• Aircraft types newer than 2000s will represent 50% of market in 2027
Key Partners
• Affiliated airline
• MROs
Figure 4.15: The Traditional MRO Business Model
As in traditional offers, the MRO does not assume responsibility for the airline’s pro-
cesses and risks associated with the service offers, the value that MROs can provide is
mainly limited to a competitive cost position at decent service quality. Additionally,
customers value a broad service portfolio and a provider who can understand their
specific needs.
Reduction of Direct Maintenance Costs As previously described, airlines face heavy
pressure to reduce their cost base every year, to combat the annual yield decrease of
tickets. Options for lowering an airline’s direct operating costs (DOC) are minimal,
since the primary cost factors fuel, taxes, and fees, e.g., for landing or air traffic control
are non-negotiable. The airline’s direct maintenance costs (DMCs), are one of the few
negotiable elements of DOC and accumulate to the considerable proportion of between
15-18% (Berger, 2014).41 The importance of maintenance costs for airlines becomes ev-
ident, considering that it even has been described as one of the two “major yardsticks of
airline and civil aircraft performance” (Knotts, 1999, p. 336).
DMC are typically benchmarked between airlines per flight-hour (FH), flight-cycle (FC),
and aircraft (AC). A 2014 IATA benchmark comprising 47 airlines calculated average
41Annual airline maintenance spend as a % of total cost fluctuates depending on the timing of major visits
(e.g., heavy airframe checks & engine overhauls), fleet age, size, mix and composition and changes in
the fuel price.
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Fuel 
Labor and 
Benefits
Depreciation Aircraft 
rent
Other 
16%
34%
28%
14%
5%
3%
Airline’s direct operating costs Airline’s direct maintenance cost split
Maintenance 
Costs
Base
Line
Modifications
Engines 
Components
6%
16%
17%
21%
40%
Figure 4.16: Airline Direct Operating and Maintenance Cost Split (own illustration based on
Berger, 2014)
DMC of $1,082/FH, $3,518/FC, and $3.06m/AC per year (Cros, 2015).
Maintenance Costs can be split into direct maintenance costs (DMC) and indirect main-
tenance costs (IMC), which accrue to total maintenance costs at an approximate 50/50
share (see Figure 4.17). In traditional service offerings, MROs can only influence di-
rect maintenance costs, as the airline retains overhead for fleet and asset management
functions internally and thus also determines spares and inventory costs.
Broad Portfolio of Basic and Advanced Services Across Aircraft Platforms Airlines
seldom contract all necessary MRO services as an integrated package at the point of
aircraft sales but prefer individual sourcing of MRO services, when the need arises
(interviewees 5, 11, 15, 22, 23, 24). In their MRO sourcing decision, airlines prefer
providers with an ample service portfolio, as choosing such a provider allows them
to contract additional services at a later point in time with their trusted provider. Man-
ager Product Management MRO 1 explains: “interestingly, some [airlines] have bought our
product keeping in mind that we can do more than just that. And that was a decisive point. As
to say, I am buying now from you spare parts provisioning and I buy it from you because you
can send an engineering order if necessary or repair my nacelle ... and I can talk to you about
Base Maintenance in two, three years.”
Customers with multiple fleets value the MRO’s capacity to offer a set of services (e.g.,
an antenna installation) out of one hand. “So, the differentiation exists actually in the
product portfolio that you offer. Because the biggest value that airlines still see at an established
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Direct Maintenance Costs
51%
Spares and Inventory
38%
Overhead
9%
Maintenance Reserve
2%
Figure 4.17: Airline’s Total Maintenance Cost Split (own illustration based on Cros, 2015)
MRO provider [is] that we first of all offer across aircraft types, since regularly the customer’s
fleet consists of various types and that we find fast and flexible solutions. Especially regarding
engineering.” (–Manager Product Management MRO 1).
Thus, providing a broad portfolio of basic and advanced services supporting the prod-
uct and the client forms an essential part of the MRO value proposition. The service
portfolio may include services supporting the whole aircraft life cycle, such as entry-
into-service, aircraft modification, and lease return. Also, services supporting the cus-
tomer, such as engineering, consulting, and support services (e.g., AOG42 support or
warranty management) may be provided.
Service Quality Most definitions of service quality focus on meeting the customers’
needs and requirements and how well the service delivered matches the customers’
expectations of it (Namukasa, 2013). Customers may judge or evaluate service quality
through a comparison between their experiences and expectations over several qual-
ity attributes (Gro¨nroos, 2000). Service quality (in the sense of adherence to what is
promised or expected from a service offering such as delivery dates) forms an inte-
gral part of the MRO’s Value Proposition (interviewees 3, 4, 5, 8, 11, 13, 15, 19, 20, 22).
However, service quality is rather an enabler of business relationships than a means
of competitive differentiation. Hence, it is likely to enable only gaining a small price
42AOG: Aircraft on Ground, a situation in which an aircraft is grounded typically for technical reasons
(e.g., a faulty component) that requires urgent support by the airline to restore airworthy conditions
and resume operations.
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premium over more price-competitive offers. Pricing is accordingly perceived as the
main differentiator in most of the cases, as Manager Engine Repair Services reports for
the engine segment: “The quality is basically defined, the turn-around-time is defined so that
it fits in the timeline of the overhaul. And the topic of pricing, well the one with the cheapest
price is awarded”. The same is reported for Line Maintenance services on outstations by
SVP Fleet Management Airline 1: “you can fly today even into the deepest east and get A320
Line Maintenance any time. That thing is a commodity.”
Airline Perspective Five interviewees named the airline perspective as a vital Value
Proposition, best described as: “we think and act like an airline” (Team Lead Aircraft En-
gineering Services). This airline perspective allows MROs to act in the best interest of
their customers. For example, the economic viability of Service Bulletins recommended
by the manufacturers can be assessed individually for each customer regarding its ef-
fects on costs, reliability, and availability. This Value Proposition is especially crucial for
smaller airlines that do not have access to MRO data and whose purchasing team can
easily underestimate the leverage of certain modifications (Henningsen, 2010). Both,
the affiliated airline and operator experience strengthen the airline perspective, as they
allow the MRO to deepen its understanding of its customer.
Key Resources
Maintenance Network MRO providers are legally obliged to continuously fulfill the
TOP-requirements (Technical, Organizational, Personnel) stipulated by the applicable
aviation authority (Hinsch, 2012). To fulfill these requirements, the MRO needs to pos-
sess a set of resources and organize them in an appropriate way.43
Technical requirements include ensuring a proper working environment, tools, proce-
dures, and material. For example, hangers are to be used to ensure protection from
weather and climatic influences as well as to provide proper lighting of the working
environment. The MRO needs to make available appropriate, calibrated equipment
required for the conducted tasks as stipulated in the respective repair manuals. Also,
materials require proper storage, which includes the separation of serviceable and un-
serviceable materials, and the tracking of the service life of life-limited parts (Hinsch,
2012).
Organizational requirements stipulate that the MRO needs to implement an appropri-
ate organizational structure for the conducted tasks. Additionally, a quality manage-
43The legally required resources are not sufficient to make an MRO business model work and do not
capture the essence of how MROs conduct business. Hence, the Key Resources presented in this section
focus less on detailed legal requirements but aim at capturing the core and often intangible logic of the
business.
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ment system that ensures that employees perform tasks according to the latest applica-
ble version of documents (e.g., maintenance manuals) needs to be installed. Personnel
requirements stipulate that sufficient qualified personnel (e.g., mechanics, engineers,
material planners) needs to be available to perform all tasks (Hinsch, 2012). A prop-
erly configured enterprise resource planning and maintenance information system can
improve efficiency in the management of the complex MRO supply chain (Kashyap,
2012).
The extent, to which this network has to be available on a local, regional, or global
scale, differs per maintenance segment. While turn-around checks are performed at
virtually every airport in the world by local providers, major internal capabilities for
Line Maintenance are concentrated at the operator’s home base located at the bigger
stations or hubs.
Base Maintenance in contrast, requires a hangar, dock and ground support equipment
for performing work packages on all sides of the aircraft, nearby shops for the repair
or refurbishing of the removed cabin material, lavatories and ample commissioning
space for to be installed equipment such as seats or antennas. To limit ferry costs, Base
Maintenance hangars are constructed predominantly in countries of each region with
the lowest available labor costs, such as Malta for Europe, Puerto Rico for America, or
the Philippines for Asia. Widebody aircraft are placed regularly at stations that offer
comparatively lower maintenance costs in China or Southeast Asia (Spafford & Rose,
2013), leading to the Asia Pacific being a net exporter of roughly 30% of its supply to
North America, Europe, Middle East and Africa (Aeronautical Repair Station Associa-
tion, 2013).
Engine Maintenance requires a regional to global infrastructure of specialized work-
shops, since engines are large, high-value assets, inflicting considerable shipping and
capital costs. The workshops are typically split to the performed activities such as Dis-
assembly, Assembly, Testing, Engine Parts Repair, or inspection. Europe, Middle East,
and Africa supply the largest proportion of the engine overhaul market, with 61% for
domestic purposes and 29% export (Aeronautical Repair Station Association, 2013).
Component Maintenance is performed predominantly on a global scale, since most44
components are inexpensive to ship. MRO providers that rely on a regional infrastruc-
ture can however benefit from reduced shipping times and costs and may potentially
leverage labor costs advantages. In contrast to workshops, the underlying logistics
system (also known as components asset supply system) has to be designed to ensure
components availability at the customer’s destinations in a short delivery time. Thus,
an MRO provider requires worldwide logistics infrastructure such as warehouses and
cooperative agreements with logistics providers.
44Does not apply for large components such as landing gears and airframe-related components.
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Human resources in particular include skilled mechanics and engineers that understand
the aircraft’s complex systems in varying breadths and depths. As outlined above,
sufficient qualified staff is essential for complying with the TOP-requirements and the
aeronautical certification of the MRO provider. Also, a professional purchasing organi-
zation needs to be considered a Key Resource, as on average 46% of MRO costs result
from components and materials that are procured from a highly concentrated supply
market.
The qualification of mechanics and engineers differs somewhat per service segment,
which is why specific qualification systems need to be developed. While Base Mainte-
nance relies on mechanics specialized on aircraft systems, such as electrical or avionics,
mechanics performing Component and Engine Maintenance are specialized on the re-
pair of the respective system. Line Maintenance mechanics require a rather broad and
holistic understanding of the aircraft: “[The mechanics] has to have a holistic understanding
of the system, an aircraft is very, very complex. You are on an outstation without great technical
support, he has to master electric, master engines, master cabin, hydraulic, emergency equip-
ment, pressure system, he has to be good more or less at everything, and that is the difference to
the experts in an overhaul or workshop for components or engines, that’s why it is a different job
profile” (SVP Fleet Management Airline 1). Although modern aircraft implement ma-
ture and reliable technology that requires less maintenance, qualified technicians are at
a shortage. On an international scale, Boeing predicts that repair stations will require
609,000 technicians in the next 20 years for their workforce (Shay, 2015a). For example,
in the US 45% of all technical workforce in between 45 and 54 in the year 2011 (Spafford
& Rose, 2013). In consequence, MROs are forced to use aggressive hiring techniques
to achieve a sufficient number of qualified applicants, especially in Western Europe
(Spafford & Rose, 2014).
Engineers are one of the MRO’s most important (human) resources, since they are re-
quired for most MRO services and play a key role in optimizing costs and TAT of the
service offers. In Base Maintenance, for example, engineers plan each event, design all
types modifications, issue work orders amongst other tasks. In Engine Maintenance,
workscoping, the development of part repair methods, the planning and continuous
management of each overhaul event is among their tasks. Depending on the findings,
engineers need to develop and certify custom repairs to ensure engine overhaul on
time and in budget. In Component Maintenance, engineers develop alternative repair
methods, PMAs, and improvements to components.
Operator Experience (OE) is the Key Resource that has received the most robust qual-
itative empiric support being mentioned by 16 interviewees. I define OE as the tacit ex-
perience and data gained by maintenance, repair, or overhaul of an aircraft or its com-
ponents in operation. Operator experience is essential, as it enables MRO providers to
build and improve their repair and engineering capabilities. By gaining OE, the MRO
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can develop an understanding of the operations of an airline, which enables it to fulfill
the airline’s needs better. Thus, OE is the prerequisite for the Airline Perspective Value
Proposition.
OE is gathered through direct physical contact with the aircraft in operation and can
be estimated by the number of flight hours the serviced fleet has completed under con-
tract. Besides, MROs can realize learning curves (Darr et al., 1995) by gaining operator
experience, which enable them to increase their efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
Serviced Fleet The serviced fleet (named by seven interviewees) is the number of
aircraft or engines of a particular type (e.g., B787, LEAP-1A) an MRO performs services
on.45 Thus, it closely resembles the installed base concept known from servitization
literature (Wise & Baumgartner, 1999).
The serviced fleet is one of the most important resources for an MRO due to various
reasons: building repair capability for a specific aircraft type requires multi-million ini-
tial investments in infrastructure and capabilities that are amortized via a sufficiently-
sized customer base during the life cycle of the aircraft. Also, significant economies of
scale are present in most MRO segments: Component Maintenance is the most obvi-
ous example, due to the pooling effect but also Base and Engine Maintenance require
a high capacity utilization that can be achieved only via a sufficiently-sized serviced
fleet. Thus, MROs need to make the capability building decision early in the aircraft’s
life cycle to amortize initial investments by winning the highest possible market share.
Besides, the serviced fleet determines the extent to which MROs can build operator
experience and strengthen their repair and engineering capabilities.
Financial Strength Aircraft are high-value, complex technological products and sys-
tems (CoPS) (Acha et al., 2007) and consequently require considerable financial resources
of all actors in the supply chain (Esposito, 2004). For example, the development costs
carried by the aircraft manufacturers for the B787 and the A350 amount to $20bn each
(Aaronson et al., 2016). While financial exposure may be obvious for manufacturers,
MROs require sufficient capital to build repair and engineering capabilities on new
aircraft technologies, pursuing innovation in new materials, repair technology, digiti-
zation, and additive manufacturing, as well as for forming partnerships with OEMs.
Building capabilities to serve new aircraft types require immense financial strength and
hence sufficient profitability on current aircraft types, acting as an entry barrier for
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). As the CEO of MRO 1 explains: “if you look
how many aircraft you need today, respectively the resulting repairs, to even buy some of the
45In some cases, commonalities between aircraft and engine types are present. The A330 and A340 are a
prominent example of high commonalities between aircraft types.
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test equipment, to develop [it], or to develop or buy the associated software, you can’t do it. I
don’t know how many of these small mom and pop shops in the US; they make ten part numbers.
They can’t [stem] an investment of 30 million. They will never earn that.”
Tangible and Intangible Manufacturing-specific Resources MROs need manufacturing-
specific resources such as spare parts, test equipment, tooling, and instructions for con-
tinuous airworthiness (ICA) to perform MRO services. The most important examples
of ICA are the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), Component Maintenance Manu-
als (CMMs), the Engine Manual (EM), and the Structure Repair Manual (SRM). These
manuals indicate the required actions to be performed to return the aircraft and its com-
ponents to a serviceable state. MROs are required to perform maintenance, repair, and
overhaul services based on these legally binding instructions provided by the design
organization (typically the manufacturer) (Hinsch, 2012)
Spare parts are another essential type of manufacturing-specific Key Resource for MROs
that constitutes a considerable cost share for MROs. Simultaneously, spares also repre-
sent one of the main OEM revenue streams. Prices paid for spare parts by airlines and
MRO are significantly higher than the production prices, leading to healthy margins at
manufacturers (Vieira & Loures, 2016).
Key Capabilities
MRO providers require a set of operational capabilities to operate their traditional busi-
ness model and a set of dynamic capabilities to adapt it to changing environments and
pursue business model innovation. As dynamic capabilities are required for transform-
ing, not operating a business model, I do not include them into the Key Capabilities
section.
Repair and Engineering Capability The repair and engineering capability is the capac-
ity of the organization to plan, perform, and optimize MRO and modification activities
such as Line, Base, Engine, and Component Maintenance. MROs typically provide ca-
pability lists, detailing which services are offered per aircraft type. The repair capability
is inherent in the organization through certified mechanics, engineers, repair manuals,
and knowledge management systems, which are operationalized through the mainte-
nance network.
Repair capabilities are increased through learning curves realized with operator expe-
rience, meaning that a mechanic having performed hundreds of repairs of a particular
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component will be able to repair it more efficiently. Similarly, the organization loses re-
pair capability if it is not used since mechanics need to renew their certification.46 The
extent to which repair capabilities can be transferred from one aircraft or engine type to
another depends on the level of commonality between the assets. Commonalities ex-
ist not only as previously discussed between airplanes but also between engine types,
as a Manager Alliance Function at MRO 1 explains: “we don’t know only one engine, we
know many, and we can steal ideas like crazy.”. In summary, MROs with a broad and well-
developed set of repair and engineering capabilities are more likely to be able to benefit
from spillover effects across different types of equipment.
Multi-vendor Capability This capability is similar to what is known in solution litera-
ture as the capacity “to specify and integrate a competitor’s technology if the customer
demands it or it provides a superior solution.” (Davies et al., 2006, p. 42). However,
also in traditional service offers, the multi-vendor capability adds value to the MRO’s
offerings, as it can provide services for different types of fleets operated by the cus-
tomer. For example, MRO providers can provide repair and engineering service for
Airbus, Boeing, and other OEMs’ aircraft. Also, they can make use of alternative, more
price-competitive materials, while manufacturers rely on their proprietary parts.
Data Processing and Interpretation Capability The data processing and interpretation
capability refers to the solution provider’s capacity to analyze data resulting from usage
of the installed base to develop offerings that allow for productivity gains and cost
reductions (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). In aerospace, MRO providers require the data
processing and interpretation capability to offer additional services such as predictive
maintenance and aircraft health monitoring that aim at increasing the performance and
cost-efficiency of the aircraft. Access to operational data is a much-debated topic in the
aerospace industry (Spafford et al., 2015) and is further elaborated in the competitive
advantage section.
Predictive maintenance departs from traditional preventive maintenance, where a compo-
nent is replaced after a pre-set interval and unscheduled maintenance, where a part is
exchanged upon failure (Hinsch, 2012). When using predictive maintenance methods,
MROs rely on data to replace a part before breakdown, avoiding unscheduled mainte-
nance (Spafford et al., 2015). The share of predictive maintenance services is estimated
to cut between 15-20% of today’s spending on MRO services by 2020 (Spafford et al.,
2015), which underlines the importance of this capability. Engine condition monitoring
is one example of advanced predictive services that predict maintenance intervals by
monitoring different parameters of the engine, such as fuel burn and exhaust gas tem-
perature to ensure that spare parts are available at the destination if required (Pozzi,
46Learning curves and the depreciation of knowledge gained through learning-by-doing in service indus-
tries has been discussed by (Darr et al., 1995).
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2017b).
New aircraft types are capable of measuring, storing and transmitting approximately
thirty times more data than their more mature counterparts. For example, a B777 gen-
erates less than 1MB of data per flight, while the B787 measures 100,000 aircraft health
parameters, creating approximately 28MB of data per flight. In total, the amount of data
available will increase 1,100% from 2012 to 2022 from around 11TB to 137TB (Brown,
2015). Simultaneously, blockchain technology may enable a fully verifiable and trust-
worthy history of asset lifecycles in real time, improving data accuracy and quality
(Canaday, 2017a).
These developments increase the importance of data processing and interpretation ca-
pabilities to improve aircraft reliability at lower costs. In practice, many MROs such
as Lufthansa Technik, ST Aerospace, HAECO, and AAR have started to invest to build
these digital capabilities (Shay, 2017b). At the same time, the required platforms that
facilitate the interchange of data between the different parties have been established by
a variety of MRO software developers, OEMs, and MROs (Shay, 2017c).
Key Partners
Traditionally, MROs typically form some cooperative agreements with other firms, of
which some may become Key Partners. A special case are MRO providers that form
part of an airline group and thus are affiliated with an airline.
Affiliated Airline For the traditional MRO business model, the affiliated airline repre-
sents a Key Partner, as it allows the MRO to develop and test services internally, rely
on a serviced fleet, and gain operator experience.
If the affiliated airline is an early customer of a new aircraft type, the MRO can aim
at capturing a sufficiently-sized share of the aftermarket which justifies the investment
required for capacity building and allows gaining operator experience and economies
of scale.47 The affiliated airline also enables the MRO to enter discussions with other
airlines on equal footing and not as a mere supplier or even competitor for their MRO
division. Finally, successfully servicing the affiliated fleet makes for a strong sales ar-
gument.
This airline-MRO relationship is however not only beneficial for the MRO, but also the
airline can benefit strongly from an affiliated MRO provider. One contribution of an
47On the other hand, an MRO may also be required to build capabilities for fleets owned by the affiliated
airline that do not result in any profitable business.
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internal MRO provider is a profitable third-party revenue that can bolster the airline’s
profits with an on average superior margin. For example, Air France KLM Engineer-
ing & Maintenance earned 16.8% of AFI-KLM’s revenues, contributing a considerable
22.7% of the operating result in 2016.48
Second, the internal MRO provider may achieve more cost-competitive services for the
airline by achieving economies of scale with third parties, given that the appropriate
costing model is defined. Third, the airline also benefits from reduced dependency
on the OEM through increased in-house MRO competency, as the example of an un-
contained engine failure of a Trent 900 engine on flight QF32 from London to Sydney
shows: “all operators of the Trent 900 engine had a power-by-the-hour contract with Rolls-
Royce. And when the motor blew up [. . . ] the market claimed to know how the engine worked.
We knew nothing, we knew nothing. And if we wouldn’t have built our own knowledge, Rolls-
Royce would have pulled us on the nose ring through the technical and commercial arena.” (SVP
Fleet Management Airline 1, emphasis added by author).
MROs In the traditional business model of MRO firms, some alliances between MROs
exist, albeit on a somewhat peripheral level. One example is explained by a Manager
Business Development MRO 8: “Spairliners is a joint venture between AirFrance/KLM and
Lufthansa Technik. The company offers the security of supply [for components and C&Es] not
just for small fleets but also for the A380 or E-Jet fleet segments of large airlines. The idea
behind this is to reduce cost, increase capability and capture market share.” A cooperation
within market segments with small fleets such as the above-mentioned is reasonable
since only a significant market share allows the MRO to amortize investments.
Besides these selective collaborations, alliances between MROs are not very common
in the Aerospace industry, yet. Whether or not these types of partnerships are a viable
response to servitization is discussed in Chapter 6.1.3.
Customer Segments
The main customer segments that can potentially be served by MROs in their tradi-
tional business model are the different types of airlines and to some extent lessors.
Airlines could be further segmented between commercial, and cargo airlines, private,
government, and military clients. The emphasis here is on MRO for commercial oper-
ators, special needs of private operators such as VIPs and government-owned aircraft
are not considered.
48Including internal revenues with Air France KLM. Air France KLM Group: 24,844m€ revenues, 1,049m€
operating margin. E&M Division: 4,182m€ Revenues (of which 1,834m€ ( 43.9%) third-party business),
238m€ operating margin. Source: Air France KLM (2017).
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Airlines Airlines are by far the most important Customer Segment in the traditional
MRO business model. As previously discussed, airlines are typically segmented ac-
cording to their business model, which counter-intuitively has proved little helpful for
MROs, as Manager Engine Product Management, MRO 1 explains:
“In our product management, we have clustered the customers for a long time, according to
legacy carrier vs. start-up and low-cost carrier. We don’t do that anymore, because how do
they differ? Supposedly the cost pressure, but then I would say that a DLH would have less
cost pressure as possibly an EasyJet. That, I could not confirm now. All have cost pressure.
So, we are rather saying, how do they differ in their purchasing behavior? Well, and Emirates
has, for example, a huge purchasing organization. If they’re up for it, they can buy each screw
individually and negotiate the optimum, and then such a big procurement department is worth
it. And on the other side, I think it’s Wizz Air that says ‘I want to negotiate once and then have
my peace of mind.’ And then they outsource quasi all MRO, or at least all components and
engines. And the rest of the world is somewhere in between.”(Emphasis added by author).
To determine the specific demands of their customers, MROs also need to consider
the characteristics of the fleet in question. When a small fleet is operated, airlines can
achieve cost-efficiency by contracting more comprehensive services. New types of air-
craft promise greater cost-efficiency but also imply more pronounced risks, which an
airline can partly mitigate by performance-based contracting.
Another relevant segmentation criterion emerging with servitization is the OEM-mindedness
of airlines, which is their tendency to prefer OEM versus MRO offers. While Airbus and
Boeing have been most successful with their service offers in Asia, interviewees point
out that some airlines deliberately forego OEM offerings to limit the dependence on the
manufacturer.
In conclusion, MROs can segment airline according to their purchasing setup, the fleet in ques-
tion, and their OEM-mindedness. Besides these aerospace-specific criteria, general market seg-
mentation criteria such as geographical location and growth can be applied to identify markets
and customers of interest.
Aircraft Lessees and Lessors Since operators of leased aircraft have special require-
ments, they are named as a distinct customer segment. Lessees49 are generally re-
stricted in the usage of PMA parts or alternative repair methods because lessors re-
quire the use of original equipment only to maintain the asset value (Broderick, 2014).
Lessees are a steadily increasing customer segment for MRO providers, considering
that the rate of leased aircraft has risen from 7% in 1985 to 42% in 2015 as Figure 4.18
49Operating under long-term finance leasing agreements. For discerning this type of leasing from short-
term dry- and wet-lease contracts, which are usually used to overcome shortages in capacity, please
refer to (Pompl, 2007; Conrady et al., 2012).
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illustrates.
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Figure 4.18: Development of World Fleet and Share of Leased Aircraft50
Lessees provide MROs with the opportunities to offer specialized services, as they are
required to return the aircraft to the lessor in a contractually predefined state. The
lessee’s main interests lie in (a) leasing the aircraft to the best possible conditions, (b)
high aircraft reliability and availability during operations, and (c) a smooth lease return
of short duration that inflicts no additional costs.
Lessors, on the other hand, have different but partly overlapping concerns. Their pri-
mary interest is maintaining a maximum asset value safeguarded by the usage of OEM
parts and MRO services of a certain standard, as this influences the future reliability
of the aircraft for the next lessee. Also, lessors require complete and transparent doc-
umentation of the components and life-limited parts (LLPs)51 installed in the aircraft
upon lease return. The documentation needs to include all cases of non-compliance
with the lease agreement, as well. Just as the airline, lessors should prefer a smooth
and on-time lease return to make the aircraft available to the next customer.
Considering these partly overlapping, partly contrary interests, the MRO can aim at
establishing itself as a neutral party or an “arbitrator of interests” between Lessor and
airline. In that position, the MRO can ensure both asset value and a smooth, transpar-
ent, and quick lease return. In this lease return service, the MRO provider handles the
lease return of the aircraft, assuming responsibility for all communications, ensuring
proper and transparent certification, and the finalization of all required maintenance
50Only western-built, non-regional aircraft considered. Source: based on data by FlightAscend Consul-
tancy (2016a).
51LLPs are parts that need to be replaced when they have been in service for a defined period which is
usually measured in flight hours, flight cycles, or days (Hinsch, 2012).
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activities on time (interviewees 23, 24, 26).52
Relationships and Channels
Relationships As MRO services are delivered continuously to the client and consist of
many interdependent activities, complex customer relationships consisting of multiple
channels evolve between airline and MRO (Hsu & Liou, 2013). In these relationships,
airlines and MROs need to work as an integrated team, so that the service provider
sees and understands the business issues and requirements for the airlines and can find
adequate solutions to everyday problems (Jenner, 2009).
Also, interviewees report that the MRO-airline relationship should be long-term and
driven by trust, cooperation, and cost-efficiency. Airlines benefit from this type of rela-
tionship since they can identify cost savings and efficiency improvements by cooperat-
ing with MROs in everyday operations. The interviewed former COO of Cargo Airline
1 remarks that a cooperative relationship will deliver better results: “If everybody works
against each other, we don’t get anywhere. If I optimally work together from the airline, via the
MRO to the OEM, then I have the chance, not the certainty, but the chance to leverage scale
economies really well, achieve high reliability, and let’s say, differentiate yourself cost-wise from
third parties.”
In general, airlines want to work with reliable MROs that know their business and need
little oversight, as the Director Sales of MRO 7 describes: “The MRO understands exactly
what the requirements of the customer are and the airline understands what the MRO needs,
and then the job just gets done. There is trust that has been built up over time so that the airline
does not have to keep probing the MRO and scrutinizing because the quality speaks for itself”.
The CEO of MRO 4 believes that the small size of the MRO industry plays a decisive
role in determining the relationships are due to the small size of the industry with only
a handful of players: “It is usually a long-term relationship; it is not about the lowest cost.
The reason is that there are very few players in the industry. With the large fleet of aircraft, you
need to work with your vendors like they are partners. So, it is very important to develop these
long-term relationships”.
Nonetheless, the level of long-term dependency between airlines and MRO providers
can be characterized as low in Base, Component, and Engine Maintenance, where air-
lines need to make only a few idiosyncratic investments and can easily switch suppli-
ers, once a contract ends, given that alternative providers are available in the market
52Alternatively, the MRO could also aim at providing consultancy services to especially inexperienced
airlines, aiming at optimizing leasing contracts. In this scenario, the MRO would not assume a neutral
but rather airline-sided position.
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(Al-kaabi et al., 2007a).53
Channels MRO providers use a variety of communication and service delivery chan-
nels, such as telephone (e.g., an AOG help desk), email, trade fairs, customer service
representatives, and interconnected IT systems. The probably most important of these
is the key account manager that acts as a single personal point of contact for the MRO’s
major customers. Due to the high value of the exchange relationships, a personal rep-
resentative is often present at the customer’s site. Depending on the location of service
provisioning, the customer may also place a representative at the MRO’s site. For ex-
ample, customers place regularly their own staff at the MRO provider to supervise Base
Maintenance events or send a team to inspect the aircraft before handover.
Key Activities
The MRO provider needs to perform a set of Key Activities to make its business model
work, which include the offered MRO services, development of alternative parts and
repairs, and process optimization.54
Providing Operational Services In the traditional MRO Business model, performing
the MRO service modules Line, Base, Engine, and Component Maintenance, as well
as Aircraft Engineering Services are the most important Key Activities. As these ser-
vices have been described already in the introduction into the Commercial Aerospace
Industry, they are not further elaborated at this point.
Development of Alternative Parts and Repair Methods While design and manufactur-
ing are generally of the manufacturer’s domain, the MRO performs a variety of alter-
native part and repair development activities that belong to this field.
PMAs are parts that are approved by the FAA to comply with airworthiness standards
under the Parts Manufacturer Approval. They can be built into an aircraft without
any changes in the Type Certificate or Supplemental Type Certificate and allow for
cost reductions of typically 20-30% compared to OEM parts (Avia Solutions Group,
2017; IATA, 2015). MROs can either buy or internally develop PMA parts to create an
alternative to the OEM’s part to lower the costs of their service offers.
53For Engine Maintenance, this statement is only valid for legacy aircraft types, where multiple engine
OEMs and MROs exist.
54General Key Activities as sales and marketing are omitted at this point since they are not specific to the
MRO industry or servitization.
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DER repairs are non-OEM repair methods that are approved by a Designated Engi-
neering Representative of a Civil Aviation Authority. MROs can develop DER repairs
to reduce material costs since repair is often a more economical option than replace-
ment with a new part. Some private DER consulting firms offer a selection of DER
repairs, which the MROs can obtain the right to use these repair designs by paying
a fee or royalty (IATA, 2015). In cases in which manufacturer-approved repairs exist,
DER repairs still may be more economical or improve the life cycle costs of the part in
question. According to (Avia Solutions Group, 2017), DERs may offer cost reductions
of approximately 7% on an engine overhaul event. Engine Parts repair techniques use
additive manufacturing techniques to restore parts such as fan blades to their initial or
even improved shape.
Besides lowering cost structure, the increasing barriers raised by manufacturers to sup-
port their move downstream act as a driver for MROs to increase design and manufac-
turing activities through re-engineering of ICA and testing equipment. However, these
activities are becoming increasingly complex and challenging to perform due to the use
of more electronic and fewer purely mechanical components. Other engineering activ-
ities such as the development of PMAs and DER repairs constitute a type of backward
integration towards manufacturing and are performed in all service segments aiming
at lowering repair costs and increasing parts reliability.
Process Optimization Process optimization is the action of increasing service produc-
tivity, i.e., making service processes more effective and efficient (Gro¨nroos & Ojasalo,
2004), for example through the employment of lean methods. Process optimization is
capable of improving competitiveness through the reduction of labor costs, improved
TATs, and an improved OTP. While it can be considered of general importance in manu-
facturing and service industries, it is of special interest in the MRO business due to the
high complexity of aircraft and their repairs and the global footprint, often involving
multiple service stations across the globe.
For manufacturers, a set of widely used productivity concepts and measurements are
available. In service industries, however underlying assumptions of these models do
not hold (Gro¨nroos & Ojasalo, 2004). In repair services, the state of the system and thus
the tasks required to return parts into a serviceable condition are unknown before the
inspection of the failed component. Therefore, MRO is less plannable then production
and consequently more difficult to optimize. However, preventive and predictive main-
tenance methods can be employed to prevent unplanned failure with planned main-
tenance events. These methods are worthwhile pursuing when the costs of planned
maintenance are lower than the costs of unexpected equipment failure (Chen & Trivedi,
2005).
Process optimization is effective in all four MRO segments: In Line Maintenance, com-
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petitiveness is determined mainly by the capacity utilization and efficiency of labor,
which are improved through the optimization of the maintenance schedule and effi-
cient troubleshooting (Henningsen, 2010). In Base Maintenance, efficient processes are
of particular importance, since they aim at reducing the man-hours required for an
overhaul event, which constitutes 70% of the total costs. In Engine Maintenance, effi-
cient workscoping can be employed to reduce the material, man-hours and time spent
on each overhaul event. Lastly, In Component Maintenance, efficient processes influ-
ence the TAT required to repair each part. At the focal company, considerable results
have been achieved, reducing the TAT to about 30% of its original value. Because un-
serviceable assets are repaired and returned to the pool faster, the total amount of asset
required for the pool could be reduced, considerably lowering capital costs. Just as al-
ternative parts and repair methods, process optimization is a Key Activity aiming at
lowering the MRO’s cost base.
Cost Structure
The MRO’s typical cost structure for service provisioning varies with the type of service
provided. While Line and Base Maintenance are mainly labor-driven, Engine Mainte-
nance is driven strongly by material costs. The weighted average results in 48% labor,
46% material and 7% services (see Figure 4.19). The share of labor will likely decrease
in the future due to two trends: First, new technology requires fewer maintenance ac-
tivities at larger maintenance intervals at the expense of typically higher material costs.
Second, OEMs increasingly limit the MROs’ repair capabilities to favor in-house re-
pair. Therefore, the share of labor will decrease, while material and costs for externally
provided services will be of increasing importance.
To reach improved competitiveness in the highly cost-driven airline industry, MROs
undertake a variety of tactics to lower their cost position. Regarding labor, off or near-
shoring of particularly labor-intensive services such as Base Maintenance into low-cost
countries is common practice. Thus, Base Maintenance facilities in low-cost countries
close to operations such as Malta for Europe, Puerto Rico for America, or the Philip-
pines for Asia are founded (Aeronautical Repair Station Association, 2013; Spafford &
Rose, 2013), while established stations such as LHT’s facility in Hamburg, Germany
are forced to close their gates (Preuß, 2017). These practices are also performed in less
labor-intensive segments such as Engine Maintenance, in which manual activities such
as disassembly, assembly, and testing are conducted in facilities with low labor rates
(Preuß, 2017). Realizing economies of scale is a vital lever to achieve lower unit costs.
In fact, improved capacity utilization and economies of scale were the initial drivers
for airlines to provide MRO services to 3rd party airlines (Henningsen, 2010). Due to
the asset intensity of the MRO business, economies of scale are present in each MRO
segment. The component pool in which each airline requires fewer assets to supply the
fleet with serviceable components is the most obvious example of scale economies.
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Figure 4.19: Cost Share per MRO Segment (own illustration based on Aeronautical Repair Sta-
tion Association, 2013; TeamSai, 2014)
However, also Base and Engine Maintenance require a high capacity utilization of
maintenance facilities, which can be realized by serving more aircraft with the respec-
tive service. Scale economies are also present in engineering services, where many
efforts required to perform tasks such as modifications typically arise wholly only once
per aircraft type. Thus, providing engineering services for large fleets or fleets with
high commonalities is generally considered more cost-efficient. To realize economies
of scale, MRO providers aim at contracting large, uniform fleets and achieving a high
market share in the respective market segment. The VP Purchasing of MRO 1 gives
a vivid testimony: “The whole MRO business has very strong economies of scale. [...] The
larger I am, the more engineering I can do, the more PMAs I can develop, repairs... That leads
to a better cost position. And when I can do that, then I can offer a lower price. There is a high
possibility that I can earn higher margins compared to others. So, it is not a winner-takes-it-all
situation, but there are strong economies of scale that lead to an ever-stronger concentration to
big [players].”
Material constitutes a substantial share (ca. 46%) of MRO costs and an important rev-
enue stream for OEMs who escalate prices yearly on average by 3-5%55. MROs can
reduce their cost base by developing or using alternatives to the OEM material, such as
PMAs, DER repairs, and surplus material.
PMAs allow for considerable cost reductions amounting to 20-30% compared to OEM
parts (Avia Solutions Group, 2017; IATA, 2015). Overall, the usage of PMAs is estimated
55Interviewees reported that even higher material price escalations of 7% or more are not uncommon.
These are decoupled from the development of other price indexes such as labor or material and are
commonly employed to improve the profitability of aftermarket programs.
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to grow at 4% per year to a total volume of $740m by 2023, especially with a focus on
legacy engine parts (Brown, 2014b). DER repairs are another viable option to lower
repair costs for engines, components or the aircraft itself. The aviation consulting firm
Avia Solutions Group (2017) estimates that DER repairs may offer cost reductions of
approximately 7% on an engine overhaul event.
Surplus material can be in new or used condition and results from the tear-down of re-
tired aircraft and the sales of spares such as engines, landing gears, and the component
pool. Currently, 600 - 700 aircraft are retired each year, which represents approximately
2 - 2.5% of the global fleet and a total market volume of around $3bn (Berger, 2013b).
Sources for surplus parts are airlines, lessors, specialized surplus dealers, and aircraft
manufacturers that often need to take back their or their competitors’ aircraft when an
order for new aircraft is placed. Just as PMAs, surplus material can reduce material
costs significantly, savings of 50% compared to new parts are common (the price for
surplus material depends on supply and demand).
PMAs, DER repairs, and surplus material are especially useful in Engine and Compo-
nent Maintenance, where more OEM material and less Consumables & Expandables
(C&E) are used. The options for MRO providers to use alternative sources to OEM ma-
terial are however becoming increasingly limited. One driver is the increase in leased
aircraft (see Figure 4.18). Since leasing companies typically require the use of only OEM
material to maintain the asset value, PMAs cannot be used on the increasing share of
leased aircrafts (Broderick, 2014).
A second driver is the growing reliance of manufacturers on aftermarket revenues
to sustain their business model. Manufacturers fiercely oppose the use of alterna-
tive materials and repair methods, raising concerns of decreased safety and reliability.
These concerns are however regularly dispelled by aviation authorities (Avia Solutions
Group, 2017). OEMs are actively shaping the surplus market by the foundation of affil-
iated surplus companies such as Rockwell Collins’ Intertrade (Rockwell Collins, 2013).
In doing so, OEMs a) participate from the revenue potential of the surplus market and
b) actively limit the supply of surplus material for MROs and airlines. The latter tac-
tic is used to increase sales margins on surplus parts and to boosting the high-margin
sales of new spare parts (Spafford & Rose, 2014, Manager Procurement MRO 1,). If an
MRO aims at allying with the OEM, it is mostly forced to cease the usage of alterna-
tives to OEM material. In compensation, typically MRO and OEM agree upon rebates
on OEM material. Thus, it is to be predicted that the use of alternative materials and re-
pair methods will decrease on new aircraft types, limiting competitive options for MRO
providers and airlines, while the market for surplus and PMAs will thrive mainly on
legacy aircraft types (Cooper, 2017). Once today’s new aircraft types enter the second
and third life-cycle, it is to be estimated that increasing surplus material will be avail-
able. Whether PMAs and DERs can be developed and warrant the required efforts on
these aircraft types, remains however subject to speculation.
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Revenue Streams
In their traditional business model, MROs earn most revenues on an input so-called
“time & material” (t&m) basis. In t&m contracts, the customer agrees to pay for the
man-hours and material required to perform the service task (Johnstone et al., 2009).
The MRO creates profits through margins on both elements. Also, even this type of
basic contracts contains a risk-capping clause that limits the risk of exceeding mainte-
nance costs for the customer.
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Figure 4.20: Predicted MRO Market Volume in Billion USD and Growth per Region (own illus-
tration based on Cooper, 2017)
The development of commercial air travel induces the growth of the global demand
for MRO. Air travel, as typically measured by revenue passenger kilometers (RPKs),
increased by approximately 6.2% in 2016 and is projected to grow about 6.0% annually
over the next 20 years. The most substantial gains are expected in the regions of Africa,
Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America as these regions benefit from increased in-
comes, open-skies agreements, improved service quality, and additional routes (Cooper,
2017).
These developments induce a healthy growth of the MRO market especially in China
(10.1% CAGR), India (6.7% CAGR), Middle East (5.7% CAGR), and Latin America (5.1%
CAGR). Since the development on the North American, European, and African Market
are expected to be flat with low growth rates, China and Asia Pacific will reach approx-
imately the same market volumes as North America and Western Europe (see Figure
4.20). Growth also varies between the four MRO market segments (see Figure 4.20):
Engine Maintenance is expected to have the most substantial growth (4.9% CAGR) due
to higher operating temperatures and -pressures which require more expensive materi-
als. The share of component and Line Maintenance is expected to be more or less stable
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with a CAGR or 4.0% and 3.5%, respectively. The use of carbon fibers on new aircraft
types allows for stretching Base Maintenance intervals to twelve years, which restrains
growth to 1.4% per year (Cooper, 2017).
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Figure 4.22: Development of Total MRO Spend by Aircraft Vintage56
More important than the relatively stable growth rates of the maintenance segments,
is the shift of the global fleet towards new aircraft types. The reason is that MRO
providers need to invest heavily in building repair capabilities for new technologies,
such as carbon fibers for Line and Base Maintenance, new test equipment and licenses
for Component Maintenance and the forming of OEM-alliances to remain in the Engine
Maintenance market. Oliver Wyman expects that new aircraft types from the 2000s and
2010s will represent 50% of the MRO market in only ten years (see Figure 4.22).
56Own illustration based on Cooper (2017). Examples of 2010s aircraft types: A350, A330neo, B787, B777X,
A320neo, B737MAX, C-Series; 2000s aircraft types: A380, B777ER, B737-700; 1990s aircraft types: A330,
A340, B777.
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4.4 Business Model Innovation in the Commercial Aerospace
Industry
Just as the commercial aerospace industry has undergone some major changes, so have
the business models of their actors, manufacturers, and airlines alike. As MRO firms
are placed in the value chain between manufacturers and airlines they are affected by
the changes in their suppliers’ and customers’ business models. In the next sections,
each type of actor (airline, airframer, engine manufacturer, and system supplier) and
the major changes to their business models are discussed, then interim conclusions
regarding effects on the MRO’s business models are drawn.
4.4.1 Airlines
Innovation and Convergence of Airline Business Models
Airlines are commonly classified into five different business models: (a) traditional air-
line or full-service carrier (fully integrated), (b) aviation group (separate business units,
such as passenger transport, catering, MRO), (c) Low-cost-carrier57 (d) charter carrier,
and (e) regional carrier (Scott et al., 2005; Doganis, 2010; Daft, 2015; Saxon & Weber,
2017).
The different carrier’s attempts to improve profitability through business model inno-
vation have received broad attention both in practice and academia. Especially the
entrance of the Low-cost carriers (LCCs) that have severely challenged established car-
riers with a “virtual airline” business model has been present in academia and public
media alike. LCCs offer simple, no-frills services at a significantly lower cost-structure,
based on the use of secondary airports, high seat density, and aircraft utilization, a stan-
dardized fleet, direct online sales channels, and partly precarious employment condi-
tions for their pilots, cabin-, and ground staff (Klaas & Delfmann, 2005). In this manner,
they are able to reduce their unit costs considerably58 while earning an increasing share
of their revenues with ancillary revenues for checked baggage, onboard catering, extra
legroom, priority boarding, transportation from and to the airport, hotels, and other
revenue sources.
As a result, established network carriers increasingly adapt their business model to
lower the price gap towards LCCs, for example by charging for checked baggage. At
the same time, LCCs innovate their business model, by including more and more ele-
ments of Network Carriers. One example is Ryanair that added connecting flights to
57Also called virtual airline or as of lately value carrier.
58In 2005, Ryanair’s unit costs (CASKs) where 40% and easyJet’s 50% of the unit costs of established
European Network carriers (Doganis, 2010).
162
Chapter 4. Structure and Development of the Aerospace Industry
their point-to-point offerings for over 20 routes throughout 2017 and 2018 (O’Halloran,
2017). In consequence, traditional and low-cost airline business models increasingly
converge, which may lead to unintended, adverse effects on profitability as airlines
may get stuck-in-the-middle in between a price leadership and differentiation strategy
(Daft, 2015).
Another imaginative approach is the use of platform-based business models in the avi-
ation industry: The former German flag carrier Lufthansa chose this approach with
the foundation of Eurowings, a low-cost platform for its own and former competitors’
point-to-point traffic. As thoroughly discussing all types of business model innova-
tions of the different types of airlines is beyond the scope of this book, only the main
developments relevant to maintenance, repair, and overhaul are discussed.
Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul: An Airline Core Capability or Candidate for
Outsourcing?
For more than a decade, outsourcing has become a critical business practice for airlines
to cope with increasing global price pressure. Many large carriers go through a pro-
cess of de-integration, contracting-out large parts of their business model in pursuit of
greater efficiency and effectiveness (Rieple & Helm, 2008). Maintenance, Repair, and
Overhaul is one of the functions affected by this practice as airlines increasingly out-
source MRO services to external providers (Brown, 2015). For modern post-regulation
airlines, MRO is a function that can range from being an elementary part of their busi-
ness model up to being outsourced almost completely (McFadden & Worrells, 2012).
Airline MRO Configurations Al-kaabi et al. (2007a) identify different configurations of
strategic MRO outsourcing approaches that are typically employed by airlines that are
operating different business models (see Figure 4.23 and Table 4.5).
Traditional Airlines and Aviation Groups typically employ the fully integrated con-
figuration, in which all MRO services are provided internally, except for very few or
specialized services. This type of airlines has successfully created an in-house main-
tenance division capable of delivering most MRO services for the passenger transport
division as well as third-party customers. Many large legacy carriers have taken the
traditional airline business model one step further. By spinning-off their maintenance
division to offer MRO services to other airlines, they were able to build diversified avi-
ation groups. For these aviation groups, the MRO function represents a strategic busi-
ness unit, with internal and external benefits. Internally, the MRO provider can achieve
59Author’s illustration, based on Al-kaabi et al. (2007a, p. 220). Dashed lines cutting through maintenance
segments indicate that these are typically partially outsourced.
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Figure 4.23: Airline MRO Configurations59
higher cost-efficiency and economies of scale through complementary business, while
the third-party business adds profitable revenues and to the aviation group’s business
model (Scott et al., 2005; Garg & Deshmukh, 2006; Johnstone et al., 2009; Henningsen,
2010).
Configuration Fully Integrated Partly Outsourced Mostly Outsourced Wholly Outsourced
Description • Provides most MRO 
services internally
• Either internal MRO 
division or independent 
subsidiary providing 
services to airline and 
third-party customers
• Maintain most MRO 
capability in-house, 
outsourcing some non-
core MRO activity, 
typically Engine 
Maintenance
• Typically internal MRO 
division
• Rely mostly on external 
MRO providers but either 
retain or insource some 
MRO capabilities, 
typically Line 
Maintenance and 
Engineering 
• Consider MRO as non-
core activity and retain 
only the minimum 
capabilities required to 
ensure airworthiness and 
sourcing of MRO 
services in-house
Typical Business 
Model
• Aviation Groups
• Traditional Carriers
• Traditional Carriers • Low-Cost Carriers • Low-Cost Carriers
• Startup-Airlines
Examples Lufthansa Group: 
Aviation group with 
independent internal MRO 
subsidiary Lufthansa 
Technik that provides all 
MRO services for Lufthansa 
and third-party customers
Delta Airlines:
Traditional carrier with 
internal MRO division Delta 
Tech Ops that provides 
approximately half of Delta’s 
MRO demand and caters to 
third-party customers
EasyJet:
Most MRO services 
outsourced, Line 
Maintenance partly 
insourced, retain 
engineering capabilities in-
house
Wizz Air:
All MRO services, including 
engineering and Line 
Maintenance outsourced
Table 4.5: Airline MRO Configurations
Traditional Airlines often employ the partially outsourced configuration in which they
maintain most of their MRO capabilities internally, with some limited outsourcing of
MRO services. Typically, Engine Maintenance is the first candidate to be outsourced,
followed by Component and then Base Maintenance (Al-kaabi et al., 2007b). Airlines
that employ this configuration still provide MRO overcapacity to other airlines to in-
crease utilization of hangars and staff. Delta Airlines can be seen as an airline adhering
to this configuration, as it outsourced almost half of its MRO work, including Engine
and Line Maintenance (Field, 2005).
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The mostly outsourced configuration is typical for Low-Cost Carrier, smaller airlines,
and airlines that have successfully transitioned through their start-up phase. These
airlines retain Line Maintenance internally due to its high impact on punctuality or
insource this function once the sufficient capabilities have been built (Seidenman &
Spanovich, 2005). However, anomalies exist: For example, the large US carrier Con-
tinental outsources about 60% of its maintenance, aiming at providing the base load
in-house and outsourcing the peaks — a policy that allows Continental to keep its ex-
perienced mechanics and Key Capabilities in-house (Rieple & Helm, 2008).
The wholly outsourced MRO model is preferred by airlines that consider MRO as a
non-core activity or Start-up Carriers that do not possess the required capabilities to
perform Line Maintenance and Engineering in-house. While it has been proposed that
the wholly outsourced configuration is a common approach for LCCs (e.g., Al-kaabi
et al., 2007b), in practice many LCCs retain Line Maintenance internally and thus ad-
here to the mostly outsourced configuration. EasyJet is a very illustrative example of a
typical low-cost carrier. During its start-up phase, easyJet outsourced most of its main-
tenance activities including Line Maintenance even at its main stations to third-party
providers (Keller, 2012), retaining only engineering capabilities internally. When easy-
Jet grew, the engineering and maintenance team grew as well from 7 to 140 people, so
the airline set up an internal technical fleet management unit in 2010 to increase control
and achieve cost savings (Gubisch, 2013; Wild, 2014). As of today, easyJet still relies
on the MRO provider SR Technics to provide substantial proportions of Line and Base
Maintenance both in the UK and Switzerland (SR Technics, 2016).
Ryanair chose a similar path, relying first on comprehensive MRO services from the
MRO provider Lufthansa Technik (N.N., 2009), which was followed by insourcing and
the subsequent extension of maintenance capabilities, also including Base Maintenance
up to the C-Check level (Pozzi, 2015). However, other LCCs stick more firmly to the
concept of a virtual airline. For example, Wizz Air recently renewed a strategic part-
nership with Lufthansa Technik as it grew beyond the start-up phase, now operating
more than 100 aircraft. In this partnership, LHT provides Wizz Air with comprehen-
sive MRO solutions, including Line Maintenance and Engineering Services such as fleet
monitoring (Wizz Air, 2015).
In summary, most start-up airlines rely on Aircraft Solutions in a wholly outsourced setup
to benefit from simplicity in operations, plannable maintenance costs and the expertise of es-
tablished MRO providers. When carriers grow in size, they increasingly insource CAMO,
Engineering, and Line Maintenance to internally drive cost-savings and limit dependence on
external providers.
The-Make-or-Buy Decision While these strategic outsourcing approaches deliver a
general guideline for airlines, technical fleet management departments are confronted
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with the task to ensure competitive Line, Base, Engine, and Component Maintenance
services for their entire fleet, possibly encompassing different aircraft types, vintages,
and technology. Managing this task involves the monitoring of the competitiveness of
both internal and external service providers and revising the reallocation of services
in the case that competitive conditions are not met. Consequently, airlines require a
strategic sourcing approach to the make-or-buy decision of MRO services, especially as
switching suppliers can have a significant impact on direct operating costs (Bazargan,
2016) and punctuality.
Maintenance Management and strategic sourcing literature informs about different fac-
tors that have to be taken into account in the MRO decision: Al-kaabi et al. (2007b) pro-
vide a strategic MRO outsourcing framework for Airlines, incorporating the following
factors: (a) criticality of service, (b) quantity of internal demand, (c) internal MRO capa-
bilities, (d) production capacity to satisfy the internal demand. Further, the outsourcing
decision is also affected by fleet-specific factors such as size, -mix, and percentage of
leased aircraft (Al-kaabi et al., 2007b).
This approach is however rather a tactical, short- to mid-term approach, which does not
take long-term strategic targets into account. For example, internal engine maintenance
capabilities on new engine types are costly to develop internally, which would lead to
the decision to outsource this service. However, engine manufacturers may emerge
as the only source of these engine services, which would result in their increased bar-
gaining power, making the establishment of alternative sources a preferable scenario
(Humphreys et al., 2000; Cox, 2015). Hence, building internal MRO capabilities may
lead to a lower total cost of ownership, reduced OEM dependence throughout the life-
cycle of the engine, and attractive third-party revenues in this scenario.
Tsang (2002) rightly criticizes the lack of a strategic approach typical for many orga-
nizations that still perceive maintenance management rather as an operating expense
than a strategic lever to increase business performance. The author recommends out-
sourcing of MRO services only if they do not represent a core competence of the firm
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1990), i.e. (a) result in a competitive edge if performed internally,
or (b) result in strategic vulnerability through either a powerful supplier or lack of in-
ternal capabilities to manage this supplier. If the external market provides these critical
types of services more price-competitive or at a higher performance, it is preferable to
drive the internal organization to close the performance gaps to external suppliers than
outsourcing the service (Tsang, 2002).
Another driving factor behind the make-or-buy decision is the airline’s business model
as it determines the present in-house capabilities and implications of the outsourcing
decision. Low-cost carriers possess typically little internal MRO capabilities but have
instead built capabilities to select and monitor external providers. For them, the make-
or-buy decision is not one of out-, but instead of insourcing.
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Traditional airlines typically have ample internal MRO capabilities at their disposal,
combined with a fleet size and diversity that warrants the internal provisioning of MRO
services. Traditional airlines that wish to outsource MRO services need to consider cor-
porate social responsibility aspects if outsourcing cannot be compensated by growth.
For example, Delta’s move to outsourcing resulted in the threat of 2,000 people losing
their employment (Field, 2005).
For aviation groups, the outsourcing decision is very complex due to path dependen-
cies that affect the internally available capabilities and the external competitiveness of
the affiliated MRO firm. Hence, outsourcing of a previously in-house conducted ser-
vice is a strategic decision with considerable long-term implications that need to be
taken into account. First, the internal and external business may synergistically pro-
duce economies of scale that make the internal provision competitive. In this case, the
loss of capacity utilization by the internal customer may have severe implications, ren-
dering even external business uncompetitive. Second, synergies between the different
service segments or between different fleets may be more difficult to reap, if certain ser-
vices are outsourced to external providers. Third, image effects need to be considered
in the outsourcing decision, as the affiliated MRO firms may be regarded as uncompet-
itive by third parties if its aviation group does not rely on its services for a specific fleet
or service segment.
For these reasons, an internal provider may be required to make considerable conces-
sions to its aviation group to retain business internally. On the other hand, outsourcing
of internally provided MRO services may have adverse effects on the performance of
the whole aviation group. Besides, the airline’s technical fleet management division
is most likely required to build extensive additional procurement capabilities to out-
source, monitor, and manage external MRO firms (Bazargan, 2016). For example, the
precise description of the elements contracted in the services and KPI to measure costs
and performance are paramount to be able to compare different MRO providers. This
challenge is amplified if switching from internal to external service provisioning, as
separate elements of a service may have been provided complimentary or not even be
labeled as a service at all.
In summary, each sourcing decision for aircraft MRO services is a complex decision that can
affect airline performance and thus should involve both strategic and tactical considerations on
behalf of the technical fleet management team.
MRO Solutions: a Start-up Support or Industry Trend? The general outsourcing trend
of MRO services compared to the pre-2000 levels is indisputable (Brown, 2015). Major
American carriers have outsourced on average of 64% of their airframe maintenance
expenses in 2008, compared to only 37% in 1996 (McFadden & Worrells, 2012). This
trend is supported by recent studies that estimate an increasing share of outsourced
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work in Line Maintenance, Base Maintenance, and Engine Maintenance.
In Line Maintenance, experts estimate that outsourcing will slightly increase from 21%
in 2013 to 24% in 2020 (Berger, 2014). In Base Maintenance already higher levels of out-
sourcing are the norm, as airlines outsource more than half (54%) of their Base Mainte-
nance work (Aeronautical Repair Station Association, 2013). The engine segment dis-
plays the highest level of outsourcing, as 80% of all maintenance work is outsourced
to either OEMs (55%) or independent MROs (25%), while only 20% is performed inter-
nally by airlines (Brown, 2015).
Does this also mean that airlines rely increasingly on comprehensive MRO solutions?
Some evidence of this trend exists, as the increasing success of Airbus FHS, with Asian
carriers such as Singapore Airlines, Tiger Airways, Asiana, Malaysia Airlines and Viet-
nam Airlines (Airbus, 2015, 2017c,d,e). Also, larger Airlines such as Wizz Air are re-
ported to divert from the mantra to keep engineering and Line Maintenance in-house
but rely increasingly on solution packages, to concentrate on their core competencies
(Carpenter & Henderson, 2008; Johnstone et al., 2009; Schneider et al., 2013).
In addition, industry experts report the increasing importance of MRO solutions. For
example, Jim Sokol, president of MRO services for Haeco Americas states: “There is
increasing interest in full turnkey MRO packages, and the competition to do this is definitely
between the airframe OEMs and the independent MROs. I have seen this within the last few
years, as airlines have asked us to offer more complex maintenance services” (Seidenman &
Spanovich, 2016a, p.3-4). Another testimony is given by network carrier SAS’ CEO
Jurgen Lindegaard: “Outsourcing in the (maintenance and repair operations) industry will
move from a niche management tool to a mainstream, strategic weapon for many firms and as
the move to a multi-sourced environment accelerates, outsourcing will become the next new
business-critical process” (Rieple & Helm, 2008, p. 283).
These developments have some implications for MRO firms. First, internal MRO divi-
sions need to strive for competitiveness, as their affiliated carriers increasingly consider
the outsourcing option for all non-core MRO services. For these carriers, MROs need
to develop specific Value Propositions that differentiate them from external, often more
price competitive providers. Second, MROs need to innovate their business model to be
able to cater to the demand for those airlines that increasingly demand solution pack-
ages, guaranteeing aircraft availability, and reliability at a fixed rate per flight hour. As
these type of offers deviate considerably from traditional, input-based MRO services,
developing solutions represents an organizational challenge that involves multiple ele-
ments of the MRO’s business model.
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4.4.2 Manufacturers
Historically, aircraft OEMs commonly were vertically highly integrated, to handle the
high efforts required for certification. In this setup, aircraft OEMs designed and man-
ufactured airplanes mostly in-house, only a small part of the value creation was out-
sourced to suppliers, who usually delivered standard parts (MacPherson & Pritchard,
2007). In modern times, this traditional setup has changed drastically, as described in
the next two chapters.60
The 1990s: Build-to-Print Setup
With the introduction of the A380 in 1990, Airbus introduced the “build-to-print” setup.
Besides steady airline cost pressure, four different factors led to the introduction of the
new production setup (Esposito & Raffa, 2007):
1. A high technological level of aircraft parts leads to huge potential losses if an
erroneous combination of technological and price level is selected. This challenge
fostered the selection of specialized partners and the cooperation with airlines to
determine the optimal technological level and resulting cost base.
2. A high technological complexity resulting from the combination of different tech-
nologies (materials, engines, avionics, etc.) combined with pervasive61 technolo-
gies (electronics, ICT), high required reliability, and cumulative knowledge re-
garding products. Therefore, firms were obliged to focus their development ef-
forts on small technological areas.
3. High financing needs of estimated $15bn for the development of the A380 made
it necessary to minimize the risk of cost increase through the selection of the right
partners.
4. Due to the late break-even point (usually 15 years after the beginning of the pro-
gram) and limited national markets, aircraft manufacturers needed to maximize
the number of customers. By selecting international production partner, market
barriers were overcome, and consequently, the customer based was amplified.
In the build-to-print setup, Airbus was still responsible for large parts of the design but
asked its major suppliers to cover about 25% of the development costs (A.T. Kearney
Inc., 2003). To deal with the complexities described above, Airbus created a consortium
that was responsible for the manufacturing process (see Figure 4.24). The consortium
60For further reading: Scott et al. (2005) provide an in-depth analysis of aerospace business models.
61Pervasive refers to technologies migrating from outside areas (e.g., consumer electronics) into the
aerospace industry.
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was built of the four companies EADS-SPAIN, EADS-FRANCE, EADS-GERMANY,
and BAE Systems. While EADS-FRANCE led the consortium and carried out the fi-
nal assembly, the other members were responsible for one part of the production line.
In their responsibility, they could decide whether to manufacture parts in-house or sub-
contract them to other suppliers.
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Figure 4.24: Airbus A380 Production Pyramid (Source: Esposito & Raffa, 2007, p. 177)
The result of this setup is a complex network of relationships in the supply chain, com-
prising strategic alliances between the first level firms and buyer-supplier relationships
between the other levels. These strategic alliances create the above-mentioned benefits
for the OEM; however, they also lead to an increase in dependency towards his partners
and enables former lower tier suppliers to move up the supply chain and potentially
compete against him in the future. As a result, complex relationships between the lead-
ing companies in the aerospace supply chain in which cooperation and competition
co-exist have developed (Esposito & Raffa, 2007).
The 2000s: Risk-and-Revenue-Sharing Partnerships
On modern aircraft as the A350 or the B787, the aircraft manufacturers have continued
the outsourcing trend, changing the contractual terms of longstanding buyer-supplier
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relationships towards Risk-and-Revenue-Sharing Partnerships (RRSPs). This practice
has at least partly been induced by airlines that, under steady cost pressure from LCC
and high competition, demand more fuel and cost-effective aircraft (Rossetti & Choi,
2008; Krol, 2011). Rose-Anderssen et al. (2015) state as additional factors that aircraft
manufacturers realized that they needed to involve their supply chain to advance from
incremental to radical improvements, satisfy customer demand, and gain a competitive
advantage. These factors seem to be in line with the findings of Esposito & Raffa (2007)
that initially led to the creation of the build-to-print setup.
Parts build by the IAM union of Boeing workers
Figure 4.25: Boeing’s Shift towards RRSPs (adapted from Peterson, 2011)
In RRSPs, the aircraft OEM takes a system integrator approach (Davies et al., 2007),
defining requirements for structure, systems, and cabin of the aircraft, while subcon-
tracting large component groups to his tier 1 suppliers. Full control is given to the
suppliers for their component group and the administration of the necessary value net-
work. They carry all the cost for the development, sourcing, manufacturing, and assem-
bly of systems (e.g., pilot control system) and sub-assemblies (e.g., forward fuselage)
and bear the risks associated with the development, testing and certification, produc-
tion, and sales of the component. As compensation, payment is conducted according
to the share of value-added to the aircraft once operational. Additionally, the intellec-
tual property rights from the system development are granted by the aircraft OEM to
remain with the supplier (Horng, 2007). Since the start of this process in the 90s, for-
merly unthinkable dimensions have been reached, in which up to 80% of the aircraft
(as measured by its parts) is developed by suppliers (Krol, 2011; Wallin, 2013b).
Manufacturers have also formed RRSPs for middle-range and short-haul jets. Airbus
maintains a dual-source strategy for engines on the A320neo (new engine option) offer-
ing the PW1100 by Pratt & Whitney and the LEAP-1A by CFM International (Airbus,
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2017a). In the cabin, Airbus reduces complexity by introducing a system called Airbus
Catalog Supplier (ACS), in which airlines’ interior choice is restricted to pre-certified
suppliers. On the B737MAX, Boeing has selected the CFM LEAP-1B as single engine
option (Boeing, 2017a), limiting development costs but also airlines’ choice and after-
market competition. On its middle range aircraft C-Series62, Bombardier is following
the strategy to outsource great parts of the value creation to risk-and-revenue-sharing
partners. Embraer has established risk-and-revenue-sharing-partnerships with its sup-
pliers for the short haul E-Jet 1 Family. In both cases, RRSPs become single-sources of
equipment, limiting aftermarket competition the engine, avionics, and many aircraft
systems (Krol, 2011).
Risk-and-revenue-sharing partners are selected by aircraft OEMs on a global scale,
leading to a globalization of the aerospace supply chain. A good example is the B787 in
which suppliers from Japan have been selected for parts of the final assembly, the full
wing, landing gear production, and various components (see Figure 4.25). Outsourcing
has transferred research, development, and production together with jobs and knowl-
edge from the aircraft manufacturer to its suppliers. Tacit, industry-specific knowledge
transferred and further developed by the international suppliers will enable new, partly
government-funded players to enter the market. One example is Mitsubishi Heavy In-
dustries which is running an R&D program partially funded by the government aiming
to introduce its first regional Jet the MRJ in 2020 at the time of writing (MacPherson &
Pritchard, 2007; Perret, 2015b; Rexroth, 2018). Outsourcing practices and the downturn
in US aerospace sector has let to severe job losses in the US, where jobs in the aerospace
products and parts manufacturing industry (NAICS 33640) were almost cut in half from
840,000 in 1990 to 490,000 in 2014 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014).
Similar to aircraft manufacturers, engine OEMs are facing the same challenges of high
complexity and development costs that are associated with engine development. Con-
sequently, they also employ RRSPs outsourcing an estimated 30% to 70% of value
creation to their suppliers (Hygate, 2013a). Currently, aircraft OEMs start reversing
RRSPs through insourcing of high-value components and multi-sourcing strategies to
improve their bargaining power in the supply chain and profitability at the time of
writing (Aaronson et al., 2016).
Today: Servitization
Today, OEMs have moved downstream into service provisioning, offering comprehen-
sive service and solution to airline customers. Drivers that have spurred the OEMs
include increased price pressure, technological maturity, increased product life-cycles,
customer demand, and the predicted $100bn annual revenue potential of the MRO mar-
62The C-Series has been re-named into A220 after Airbus’ takeover of the program (Eislein, 2018).
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ket in 2025 (Schneider et al., 2013; Spafford & Rose, 2014; Spafford et al., 2015).
As Figure 4.26 illustrates, engine manufacturers have been the most successful in in-
creasing their service revenues, being followed by system OEMs, while aircraft manu-
facturers trail behind.
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Figure 4.26: Share of Aftermarket Revenues of Aerospace and Diversified Industrial OEMs63
The entry of the manufacturers in the service market represents a dramatic environ-
mental shift for incumbent MRO firms, that have been operating in the service market
for many years. Usually, the MRO industry is characterized by low environmental
dynamism — long product lifecycles, few market entries and exits, and high safety reg-
ulations, slowing down technological innovation. Now, MRO firms are attacked by the
OEMs, equipped with unique resources and capabilities resulting from their manufac-
turing background (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011), leading “merciless price wars” (Schneider
et al., 2013, p. 297). While Airlines may profit in the short term through competitive
pricing in some market segments, they have repeatedly addressed their concerns re-
garding possible monopolization of the MRO market, and the inflicted cost increase
(Tanaka et al., 2003; Gubisch, 2011a; IATA, 2012). The following sections portray each
type of manufacturer (aircraft-, system-, and engine), their employed business model
and servitization practices individually.
63Illustrational selection. Year of company figures varies between 2013 to 2016. Aftermarket revenues
include revenues from spare parts and service offerings. Source: N.N. (2014b); Herbert & Morales
(2016); Pozzi (2016); Seidenman & Spanovich (2016a).
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Engine Manufacturers Engine manufacturers were both the first and the most effec-
tive of the aerospace companies to capture the service market with their service offer-
ings. While on legacy engines, manufacturers held around 30% of the service market,
they are expected to gain between 65% and over 90% of all maintenance contracts on
new engine types (see Figure 4.27) with Engine Solution offers.
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Figure 4.27: Market Share of Engine Manufacturers on Legacy and New Engine Types64
Additionally, servitization by the engine manufacturer Rolls-Royce has been well-docu-
mented in servitization literature (e.g., Scott et al., 2005; Baines et al., 2007; Johnstone
et al., 2009; Ng et al., 2012). For these reasons, the engine manufacturers’ servitization
practices are introduced first and in most detail, followed by the airframers’ and system
suppliers’ servitization practices.
The (even for the aerospace industry) high investment needs, long development cycles,
and the high level of competition (Schneider et al., 2013) act as antecedents of the engine
manufacturers’ move towards hybrid value provisioning: the engine manufacturers
require high investments for the development of an engine, which typically spans sev-
eral years. This period of engine development takes place under high uncertainty of
success of the developed engine type: first, engine manufacturers need to endure ex-
treme competition to become the engine provider on a new aircraft type, as the battle
between CFM and Pratt & Whitney overpowering the A320neo shows (Trimble, 2013).
Second, the newly developed aircraft type needs to be commercially successful to en-
sure the amortization of the incurred investment. Third, the developed engine needs
to be sufficiently competitive for operators to select this engine option, given the case
that various engine options exist. In consequence, amortization periods for commercial
64Source: own illustration, based on Bourke (2018).
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engine programs of 15 - 25 years are not uncommon (Lazonick & Prencipe, 2002; Derber
et al., 2014).
These factors lead to a level of competition at the point of sale of the engine, that re-
sults in a sales price at or below production costs, while development costs need to be
amortized through revenue in the aftermarket. To gain aftermarket revenues, the ma-
nufacturer has two main choices: (a) to increase sales margins on spare parts, or (b) to
seek profitable growth through service revenues.
In the past, engine OEMs have chosen to limit their business model to manufacturing
and providing spare parts. This choice seems reasonable since the engine OEM does
not need to build a competitive offer, the required repair capabilities and take over
risks inherent in the operation of the engine. However, MRO providers have made
use of alternative sources such as PMA and surplus material and the development of
alternative repair methods, in an attempt to lower the costs of engine overhauls for their
customers. Consequently, the engine OEM needed to either take measures to increase
their material-driven aftermarket profits or enter the service market themselves. Hence,
the MRO’s efforts to lower maintenance costs need to be considered as an antecedent
to servitization of the engine manufacturers’ business model, as these were deprived of
a reliable source of income in the aftermarket.
To compete with services, engine manufacturers have implemented some changes to
their previous, product-focused business model, illustrated in Figure 4.28. Through
servitization, engine manufacturers can gain additional service Revenue Streams that
complement the irregular revenues from initial sales of the engine. The “Power-by-the-
hour” concept launched by Rolls-Royce in 1997 serves today as a boilerplate for the
other engine manufacturers that sell engine maintenance services based on the flight-
hours the engine is in operation. In this offering, the airline pays a fee per flight hour
it is used, while Rolls-Royce is responsible for all maintenance tasks throughout the
engine’s lifecycle (Baines & Lightfoot, 2013). In practice, this offer is referred to as “fla-
trate”, as no exceeding costs of the engine overhaul event need to be carried by the
airline. For the manufacturer, this arrangement leads to a steady revenue flow when
the engine is in operation, avoiding the previous cyclical revenue flows that were asso-
ciated with the sales of an engine (Baines et al., 2007; Johnstone et al., 2009). Through
servitization, service revenues have already increased to the considerable proportions
of 40% or even over 50% of total revenues for all engine manufacturers.
In spite of the high level of competition between and the resulting price pressure for en-
gine manufacturers, the relationship with airframers has evolved towards an increas-
ingly integrated partnership. While historically engines were developed in isolation
from the airframe, the development has become mostly incorporated into the devel-
opment of the airframe. The main reason is that engines are the major driver of air-
65Source: own illustration. MTOW: maximum takeoff weight.
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Figure 4.28: Engine Manufacturers’ Innovation towards a Service-led Business Model65
craft performance and economics. By integrating the power plant design into the air-
frame conceptualization, airframers can maximize the benefits of the new technology
and increase the performance gap of the aircraft against its predecessors (Scott et al.,
2005). Similar to the aircraft manufacturers’ RRSPs, engine manufacturers increasingly
outsource engine manufacturing to their suppliers. For example, Rolls-Royce has out-
sourced 70% of its value creation to its supply chain by 2011 in the programs “Advance
2” and “Advance 3”(Bandle, 2013).
Long-lasting service contracts, individually tailored solutions, and the increased re-
sponsibility for customers’ processes allow the engine manufacturers to build deeper
Relationships with the customer. For example, the removal of the engine is determined
by the manufacturer, which has direct implications for operations and thus requires
intensive coordination. One important aspect is the alignment of interests between en-
gine OEM and customers in solution offers. In contrast to traditional time & material
offers, both engine OEM and airlines are interested in achieving maximum availability
of the engine, while minimizing maintenance costs (Johnstone et al., 2009).
To successfully build service-specific Resources and Capabilities, engine manufacturers
have added global service networks to their manufacturing footprint that are operated
partly internally, partly in cooperation with MROs and partly by MROs only. For exam-
ple, Rolls-Royce has established an extensive international network of service stations,
including 25 component repair stations, 140 engines repair stations and 11 pure service
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locations (Rolls-Royce, 2017). Also, developing a service culture, service-specific capa-
bilities, and resources have been highlighted as a challenge not only for manufacturing
companies in general but also for engine manufacturers specifically. Two examples
are the establishment of a 24-hour available aircraft-on-ground (AOG) support center
and the change of the engineering-/product-focused corporate culture towards services
(Johnstone et al., 2009). Key Activities include the management of the production and
service network, and additionally the conduction of engine overhauls via the internal
MRO shops.
Engine manufacturers rely on traditional MRO firms as Key Partners to create their ser-
vice network and complement their service capabilities. MROs become licensed service
partners within the manufacturer’s network and provide engine overhaul services on
behalf of the OEM or directly to the end customer.
Aircraft Manufacturers For decades, the airframers’ suppliers have reaped substantial
benefits from the aftermarket, selling spare parts (and more recently services) at healthy
margins to operators. Aircraft OEMs have, however, typically not participated in the
aftermarket to the same degree, in part because they rely on suppliers to build the
majority of parts that require replacement (Aaronson et al., 2016). Another contributing
factor is the intense level of competition between Airbus and Boeing that have driven
jet prices down, resulting in a level profitability that is significantly lower than the one
of their RRSPs (Michaels, 2013).
Even with the introduction of RRSPs and the system integrator setup, aircraft OEMs
require enormous financial resources, much higher than their partners, to develop new
aircraft. As a BCG analysis shows, Boeing spent about $20bn for the development of
the 787, while Spirit AeroSystems, who is responsible for fuselages, nacelles, and wing
components, spent “only” about $30 to $40 million for the development of these sys-
tems (Aaronson et al., 2016). Since aircraft manufacturers require a steady flow of rev-
enues to offset the initial investment but possess only limited possibilities to profit from
the sale of proprietary spare parts due to the RRSP setup, offering services is a promis-
ing way to benefit from the aftermarket potential. In fact, by adding services to their
aftermarket portfolio, aircraft manufacturers can tap into a revenue potential that is
comparable to their narrow body and wide body manufacturing business (see Figure
4.29).
For these reasons, airframers follow the Engine OEMs’ role model in shifting the focus
of their business model towards services. The actors in the industry clearly perceive
this shift in focus as Manager Procurement MRO 1 underpins: “With Boeing, you see the
tendency very clearly: they do sell aircraft, but rather to earn margins on the aftermarket. So,
66Source: Herbert & Morales (2016), based on Boeing’s estimations, aftermarket includes spare parts sales
and services, which are both marketed in Boeing’s Commercial Aviation Services division.
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Figure 4.29: Airframers’ 20 years Commercial Market Opportunities by Business Segment66
it almost seems that the idea with which Boeing is earning money, really gets a different focus
and that the aircraft is a means to an end and not the other way around, as it has been for many
years.”
This process is clearly visible in both Airbus’ and Boeing’s target setting and organi-
zational adaptions: Boeing founded the Commercial Aviation Services (CAS) business
unit in 2010 to provide aftermarket services for Boeing aircraft. The company has for-
mulated the ambitious growth target of increasing service revenues by 300% over the
next five to ten years to $50bn, marking a substantial shift towards service provisioning.
To achieve this goal, Boeing uses mergers and acquisitions to bolster its service capabil-
ities and evens plans to introduce service offers for Airbus aircraft. Airbus employs a
similar organizational configuration, having established the business unit Airbus Cus-
tomer Services to bundle the responsibility of all commercial service activities. Airbus
follows similar very ambitious growth targets for service revenue, aiming at achieving
25% of revenues with services while capturing 75% market share in the service market
on the newest types of aircraft (Michaels, 2013; Herbert & Morales, 2016; Anselmo &
Norris, 2017; Shay & Anselmo, 2017).
The aircraft manufacturers bundle their service offerings typically under the label of
Aircraft Solutions. Boeing, for example, provides five main service segments under its
CAS division: 24/7 customer support, Parts Solutions, Maintenance and Engineering
Solutions, Flight Operations Solutions, and Comprehensive Solutions.68 According to
Boeing, the service capabilities have been extended to the full line of business and com-
67Source: own illustration, arrows depict added service-specific business model elements, which are
printed in italics. Product-specific business model elements remain part of the business model. N.d.:
not disclosed, AC: aircraft.
68Interestingly, both Airbus and Boeing have dissolved their initial service offerings Boeing Gold Care
and Airbus Flight Hour Services and revamped their service business into Boeing Global Services and
Airbus Support Services, respectively (Shay, 2017b).
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Figure 4.30: Airframers’ Innovation towards a Service-led Business Model67
mercial jets; however, in practice comprehensive service offers are only contracted for
the latest generations of jets (Herbert & Morales, 2016; Boeing, 2017b). Airbus promotes
similar offerings under the name Airbus Support Services, encompassing 24/7 services,
Maintenance & Engineering, Upgrades, Flight-Ops, Training, and Airport Operations
and Technical Support Services (Airbus, 2017c).
The most comprehensive bundle of service offers are Aircraft Solutions. In these, the
provider assumes the responsibility to ensure aircraft airworthiness through the def-
inition of a maintenance schedule and maintenance processes that are tailored to the
airline’s individual needs and standards. Simultaneously, goals for aircraft reliability,
availability, and a reduction of operating costs are jointly defined. Aircraft Solutions
are typically priced per flight-hour. One example is Embraer’s Total Support Package
(TSP) that is being developed for the market entry of the regional E-Jet E2. The TSP is
a comprehensive maintenance support program that includes material support, asset
and repair management, logistics and engineering services, and maintenance activities
on a pay-by-the-hour approach (Seidenman & Spanovich, 2016a).
For their commercial aviation business, aircraft manufacturers possess two main Cus-
tomer Segments: Leasing Companies and Airlines. The former are of steadily rising im-
portance, as in 2015, approximately 42% of all Western-built commercial aircraft were
leased (FlightAscend Consultancy, 2016b). For lessors, the airplane is a financial asset
that generates stable returns; hence their main concern is the residual asset value (Clark,
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2007). Airlines can be distinguished into customer segments according to their business
models, which determines the type of plane and requirements regarding the product.
While traditional Network Carriers perceive aircraft as a vehicle of transporting their
brand to the passenger, low-cost carriers instead see it as a commodity that delivers
seat kilometers at the lowest possible costs. In general, a shift of airlines towards cost
savings (notably fuel and direct operating costs, higher seat density), and less focus on
speed and comfort is notable (Berrittella et al., 2007; Airbus, 2017b).
The main Customer Segments, including LCCs and network carriers, do not regularly
purchase integrated Aircraft Solutions. Instead, most source single service offers to sup-
port their in-house capabilities individually. In contrast, only start-up airlines (Seiden-
man & Spanovich, 2016a) and a few low-cost carriers that either lack the in-house En-
gineering and Line Maintenance capabilities or choose a pure virtual airline approach
(Doganis, 2010) rely on integrated Aircraft Solutions. Moreover, even for these airlines,
relying on the comprehensive airframer solution offer is often a time-limited approach
until they have built the required in-house capabilities.69
The Relationship between airframers and airlines can be characterized as long-term, and
intensive with many ties on different hierarchical levels, even without the provisioning
of services. The reason is that aircraft are the Key Resource for airlines, which is man-
aged throughout the complete lifecycle: first, Airframers have always maintained close
customer relationships, especially with Network Carriers that have been involved in
the development of new aircraft types. For example, PanAm has intensely influenced
the design of the B747 and Emirates has actively pushed the development of the A380
(Bieger & Agosti, 2005; van Hinte, 2015).
Second, aircraft are not delivered all at once but rather enter service at the airline at a
predetermined yearly rate. Airline and manufacturer are in a regular exchange during
delivery and the initial warranty period, as claims and concessions are made during
the operation of the aircraft. Even after the warranty period, the manufacturer regu-
larly offers upgrades (Service Bulletins and Airworthiness Directives) to increase the
safety and performance of the plane. Third, airlines that have relied in the past on one
aircraft supplier are likely to renew their fleet again with aircraft from the same sup-
plier, as high switching costs occur between aircraft manufacturers. These switching
costs arise through new technology that needs to be mastered, new certification re-
quirements for flight crews and mechanics, and the cultural aspects of working with a
different manufacturer and its idiosyncratic company culture and philosophy (Pompl,
2007).
69Examples are the Russian regional carrier Nordavia (Pozzi, 2017a), the Hungarian LCC WIZZ, and the
Norwegian LCC Norwegian Air Shuttle (Broderick, 2013a; Wizz Air, 2015). WIZZ employs a pure
virtual airline approach, relying long-term on the Aircraft Solution offer by Lufthansa Technik. In gen-
eral, little has been written about which airlines rely long-term on solution offers; however, Krol (2011)
states that especially small airlines concentrate on their core business and rely on external partners to
deliver increasing parts of maintenance work.
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Consequently, it is not untypical for airframers to maintain one or various customer
service representatives at the base of larger customers. By adding services, this rela-
tionship is further extended, as the manufacturer assumes increasing responsibility for
maintenance tasks. Whether this increase is significant is however questionable, as a
very intense relationship between airframer and airline already exists even without a
focus on the service business.
Ever since the introduction of RRSP and service offers, aircraft manufacturers follow a
business model that has been described in literature as system integrator (Davies et al.,
2007). In this business model, the airframer builds system integration as their central
internal capability, while outsourcing significant parts of design, manufacturing and
service provisioning to its partners. When choosing the system integrator approach
for service provisioning, the manufacturer first builds and the service network through
acquisitions and partnerships and then limits itself to the sales, management, and inte-
gration of the different service components.
Different Key Partners form part of the manufacturers’ service network: Component
Maintenance services are mostly provided by the system suppliers that manufacture
the components, with whom the airframers have established cooperative agreements
to support their solution offers (Seidenman & Spanovich, 2016a). Line and Base Mainte-
nance are provided by a network of both airlines and independent MRO service firms,
while aircraft manufacturers rely mostly on their internal engineering division for the
provisioning of engineering services.
Boeing, for example, maintains a service network consisting of Magnetic MRO, Monarch
Aircraft Engineering, British Airways Engineering, and Norwegian Air Shuttle as Line
and Base Maintenance providers in Europe (Pozzi, 2017c), servicing customers such
as Norwegian Air Shuttle and LOT Polish Airlines (Gubisch, 2012). Airbus follows a
similar approach with the formation of its MRO network in 2005 (Frank et al., 2010),
consisting of partners such as SIA Engineering Company Limited (SIAEC, Singapore
Airlines’ MRO provider), to provide training and Line Maintenance services for A320,
A330, A380, and A350 aircraft.
To increase profits and support aftermarket revenues, Airbus and Boeing are currently
restructuring their supply chain from the RRSP setup to what has been called a “Post-
Tier 1 Setup” (see Figure 4.31). This program aims to increase profitability by insourc-
ing design and intellectual property rights of major components, such as nacelles, py-
lons, flight controls, and landing gears, which can then be marketed in the aftermarket.
These components are then produced in a build-to-print setup according to the air-
framer’s specifications by smaller tier 2 suppliers (Michaels, 2017d).
Aircraft manufacturers possess an extensive set of valuable Key Resources and Capabil-
70Adapted from Michaels (2017d, p. 5).
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Figure 4.31: RRSPs to Post-Tier 1 Setup70
ities due to their size and various fields of activity. Airbus, for example, employed in
2016 approximately 134,000 employees, had 66bn € revenues (of which 50bn € for com-
mercial aircraft), and 11bn € net cash (Airbus, 2017b). Similarly, Boeing has constructed
a global presence of more than 160,000 employees in over 60 countries, allocated all over
the world and major production facilities in Everett and Renton (both Washington, US)
as well as North Charleston (South Carolina, US) (The Boeing Company, 2017).
Intellectual resources, such as aircraft design, production, and certification expertise
are another Key Resource that enables aircraft manufacturers to build more competi-
tive airplanes, and represents a significant entry barrier to firms such as COMAC and
Mitsubishi that are just launching their first major aircraft programs (Goh & Hepher,
2017). By protecting their intellectual property rights, manufacturers hinder imitation
and market this resource through, e.g. license agreements.
Another Key Resource with utmost importance especially for aircraft manufacturers is
a large, professional, and effective sales force. The sales force requires very highly de-
veloped product sales capabilities, due to the single large volumes of aircraft deals, the
high level of rivalry between the manufacturers, and the frequent involvement of gov-
ernments. This is underlined by the legendary status that Airbus salesman John Leahy
has achieved in his career, being nicknamed “Mr. Airbus” and the fact that Airbus’ rise
from an underdog to a fierce Boeing competitor is often attributed to his contributions
(Tovey, 2017).
Through servitization, additional service-specific sales resources and capabilities are
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required (Gebauer et al., 2005), which Airbus and Boeing gather under one roof in their
dedicated service business units. To serve its approximately 9,300 aircraft under service
agreements, operated by about 430 customers, Airbus has created a service network of
more than 100 Maintenance and Repair Organizations and employs more than 5,000
internal staff (Airbus, 2017b), which is to be considered as a Key Resource. According to
expert estimations, 2,500 staff work internally at Airbus in its service division, of which
approximately 200 are dedicated to delivering the integrated solutions offering.
Two Revenue Models are defined in Aircraft Solutions: just as in Engine Solutions, a
usage-based pricing model is established, in which the airline pays a certain, (hefty)
fee per flight-hour the aircraft is used. Typically, additional performance-based pricing
models are created, in which the solution provider benefits or is penalized depending
on how performance parameters such as reliability and availability are met. In cases
in which airlines do not rely on a comprehensive, integrated Aircraft Solution, single
services, such as engineering are priced individually. In general, a steady shift of rev-
enues towards China and India is notable, where the market for commercial aircraft is
expected to grow 9% annually (Cooper, 2017). Here, especially Airbus is also most suc-
cessful with its service offerings, as many Asian carriers decide to procure new Airbus
aircraft such as the A320neo together with a service package.
To build service capabilities, airframers change their Cost Structure through the founda-
tion of their service business units, staff, training, and the establishment of the service
network. One common approach to limit the required investments while simultane-
ously moderate political costs is to form partnerships with local companies: for exam-
ple, Boeing founded the JV BAPAS together with Singapore Airline’s MRO division
SIATEC to jointly service Singapore’s recent order of 20 B787 in 2014 (Broderick et al.,
2014). Simultaneously, acquisitions of aftermarket specialists do require considerable
capital. For example, Boeing spent $1.7bn for the parts specialist Aviall, while Airbus
acquired the aftermarket distributor Satair for $504m (Airbus, 2011; Holland & Davies,
2014).
While the airframers’ move into the aftermarket through spare parts and single ser-
vice business has been quite successful, the success of integrated solution offers shows
mixed results. Boeing’s Commercial Aircraft Services (CAS) division generated approx-
imately $8.1bn revenues and approximately $1.1bn operating profit in 2016, represent-
ing 13% of Boeing’s total sales but over 18% of the segment profits. Boeing is expected
to extend the aftermarket business to approximately $10bn in 2020, with 16% margins,
extending the total margin share of Boeing’s service business to 40%. This places Boe-
ing as the second biggest MRO provider on a revenue basis of the fragmented MRO
market with a revenue share of 6.5% (Herbert & Morales, 2016).
However, a closer look is required, as Boeing’s aftermarket success is mostly driven by
sales of proprietary spare parts (approximately $5.4bn, representing 66% of aftermar-
ket revenues), while the performance of Goldcare and other comprehensive services
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has been disappointing (approximately $0.5bn in 2016, (Broderick, 2013a; Herbert &
Morales, 2016). Since the launch of the GoldCare program in 2005, Boeing was only
able to convince Tui Travel for B787 support until the year 2012. It has even been sug-
gested that Tui may have been put under pressure to contract Boeings GoldCare service
in order to avoid contract penalties when it canceled ten 787 orders (Dpa-AFX & Ddp,
2009). In conclusion, Boeing is trying to market themselves as a successful service pro-
vider by labeling their manufacturing-based spare parts business as “services”. Instead,
their actual service business accounts for only 4% or revenues and 5% of profits.
Different sources argue that Boeing’s limited success may be attributed to the fact that
Boeing’s solution was too overwhelming (“take-it-or-leave-it”), too expensive at $300
per flight-hour, and did not meet customer needs (N.N., 2012; Herbert & Morales, 2016).
Additionally, the lack of the aircraft manufacturer’s experience in aircraft operations
did not help to increase GoldCare sales. In fact, Boeing’s performance has been criti-
cized after the repeated grounding of one the GoldCare customer Norwegian Air Shut-
tle’s aircraft, which lead to the lease of two Airbus A340-300 which incurred costs of
$17m (Broderick, 2013a). Problems like these may be the reason for Boeing to have re-
named their aftermarket services program into Boeing Global Services as of July 2017
and concentrate on services based on digital analytics (Shay, 2017b).
Airbus trails behind Boeing in aftermarket penetration with only 5% aftermarket rev-
enues in the commercial aircraft BU, accounting for its 13% profits. Just as Boeing,
Airbus earns most revenues from its parts business. However, it is generally assumed
that Airbus is more successful with its FHS program than Boeing, covering more than
150 aircraft71 of various, mostly Asian airlines (Ballantyne, 2015; Herbert & Morales,
2016). An example of this is the A350, where Airbus has successfully established it-
self as one of only three Component Solution providers, competing against the Airline
third-party MROs AFI KLM Engineering & Maintenance and Lufthansa Technik (Her-
bert & Morales, 2016).
In conclusion, it is not entirely clear, whether airframers already have reached complete
legitimacy as capable MRO providers. However, it is only a matter of time until they
will build the required capabilities to integrate and market their service successfully
offers to a sufficiently large customer base, which will in turn further legitimize them as
viable providers for aircraft-related services. This estimation is in line with the business
analysts at CreditSuisse, that forecast further efficiency gains is an average low-double-
digit profitability in 2020 of Airbus’ and Boeing’s service business (Michaels, 2017a).
For MRO providers, the entry of the manufacturers into the MRO market has various impli-
cations. First and foremost, competition is increased, especially in Component Solutions and
engineering support. However, opportunities also present themselves for cooperation and com-
petitive differentiation. MROs can gain additional revenues by participating in the airframers’
71As of Q1/2015.
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service networks, providing MRO services for the airframers’ customers. This collaborative op-
tion is a difficult choice, as it strengthens the competitor. On the other hand, not all MROs
will resist this temptation; hence it is not a question of whether to cooperate but rather to which
terms. Second, airline needs are driven by the OEMs offers towards more integrated solutions,
encompassing various services, which are tailored to the individual customer needs. Here, estab-
lished MRO providers can build on their expertise to develop unique value-added services and
offerings that enable competitive differentiation versus other MROs and OEMs alike.
System Suppliers As previously described, system OEMs such as Honeywell, UTAS,
and Rockwell Collins deliver entire aircraft systems that determine much of the func-
tionality of the aircraft. The development of RRSP with aircraft manufacturers has im-
plied significant changes in the structure of the supply chain, which allowed these for-
merly smaller suppliers to build their system integration capabilities and grow to be-
come major players in the aerospace supply chain. Through the introduction of RRSPs,
these tier 1 suppliers were able to reach a very high share of components on newer air-
craft types. Examples are the A350 in which Honeywell provides approximately 40%
of the systems or the B787 in which approximately 42% of the components are sub-
contracted to Hamilton Sundstrand (Gubisch, 2011a). This development represents a
substantial change from the B777, where Boeing relied on ten primary tier 1 suppliers,
which were reduced to five when developing the B787 (see Figure 4.32).
Other
Rockwell Collins
Messier
Vickers
Menasco
Moog
Sundstrand
Smiths
Goodrich
Honeywell
AlliedSignal
B777
Other
B/E Aerospace
Panasonic
Hamilton Sundstrand
Goodrich
Safran Group
B787
Su
pp
lie
rS
ha
re
100%
Figure 4.32: Tier 1 Supplier Share (adapted from Berger, 2014, p. 23)
Making use of their position in the supply chain, system suppliers have been able to
earn healthy margins, well above their airframer counterparts, primarily through the
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sales of proprietary spare parts in the aftermarket. Airframers, in contrast, have gained
shallow margins, due to the high level of competition in the Airbus-Boeing duopoly
which resulted in jet prices little above marginal costs. To “rectify” the situation and
achieve double-digit profitability, aircraft manufacturers started squeezing profits from
their suppliers with contract re-negotiations, threatening to ban non-cooperative sup-
pliers from future aircraft.72
On the newest aircraft types, such as the B777X, aircraft manufacturers have restruc-
tured their supply chain even further to the abovementioned Post-Tier 1 Setup (see
Figure 4.31). In this new Supply Chain Structure, Boeing aims to increase its profitabil-
ity through insourcing of design and intellectual property rights of major components,
such as nacelles, pylons, flight controls, and landing gear, which can then be marketed
in the aftermarket. These components are then produced in a build-to-print setup ac-
cording to the airframer’s specifications by smaller tier 2 suppliers.
However, even this source of revenues is increasingly threatened, as Boeing tries to
squeeze profitability out of the supply chain by establishing alternative vendors for
RRSPs’ materials and insourcing of proprietary technology (Herbert & Morales, 2016).
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• Regularly no channel to 
airlines
▼
• Attempts to establish 
direct airline channels
Customer Relationship
• Airframer: limited 
bargaining power 
▼
• Increased competition 
with MROs
• Establishment of more 
airline relationships
• Increased bargaining 
power vs airframer
Revenue Streams
• System Sales to Airframer / Airlines (under price pressure)
• Spare Parts Sales
▼
• Service Revenues make up to 30% of total revenues
• IP fees: licenses, test stands, repair manuals
Cost Structure
• System research, development, manufacturing costs
• Spare parts manufacturing costs
▼
• Limited costs associated with local service organization 
• Costs for M&A
Key Partners
• Airframer: aircraft 
systems developed in 
adherence to airframer’s 
specification
• Tier 2 suppliers develop 
sub-systems and 
components
▼
• Partnership with 
Airframers providing 
MRO for the AF’s 
solution offer
• Partnerships with MROs 
that provide aftermarket 
solutions
• M&As with other system 
suppliers and Tier 1 
suppliers to extend 
capabilities and 
bargaining power in 
supply chain
Value Proposition
Product-based:
• State-of-the-art aircraft 
systems
• Spare Parts
▼
Service-based:
• Component 
Maintenance
• Limited Component 
Solutions (e.g. APU, 
Avionics)
Figure 4.33: System Supplier’s Innovation towards a Service-led Business Model73
72Ironically, Boeing named this supplier cost-cutting program “Partnering for Success” (Michaels, 2013,
p. 2).
73Source: own illustration, arrows depict added service-specific business model elements, which are
printed in italics. Product-specific business model elements remain part of the business model. AF:
airframer.
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The increasing relentless pricing pressure from airframers is antecedent to system sup-
pliers adapting their business model through two main Key Activities: (a) increased
M&As to bolster their bargaining power and (b) tapping into the lucrative aftermarket
for revenues (Michaels, 2013, 2017d).
Some major M&A deals are a clear sign of the former activity, resulting in a consolida-
tion of the aerospace supply chain: When Safran bought Zodiac Aerospace for 8.5bn €,
two of Europe’s largest Aerospace Suppliers merged into the second-largest component
supplier (excluding Engines) in the world. As a result, Safran was able to extend its ca-
pabilities from Engine manufacturing and components (through the CFM International
Joint Venture), landing gears, nacelles, to seats, cabin equipment, electrical power sys-
tems, airframe fuel, oxygen and water, and waste. Combined, the new European super
supplier possesses a portfolio spanning the entire aircraft, with positioning similar to
UTC Aerospace Systems following its 2012 acquisition of Goodrich (Michaels, 2017b).
Another example of system supplier consolidation is the leading avionics specialist
Rockwell Collins that acquired the aircraft interior supplier B/E Aerospace for $6.4bn
(plus the assumption of $1.9bn of debt), resulting in a broad product portfolio spanning
both aircraft systems and -interiors (Michaels, 2017e).
As a result of these mergers, only two or three suppliers are available on most equip-
ment segments, which reduces cutthroat competition between a dispersed supplier
base, increases the system suppliers’ bargaining power against manufacturers, and bol-
sters their profits (Michaels, 2017b). Especially component suppliers as UTAS, Honey-
well, or Rockwell Collins enjoy monopolies for particular systems, and their products
cannot realistically be replaced by a competing product, due to the expensive, complex
changes to the aircraft that would be required (Flottau et al., 2017).
System suppliers benefit from the increasing bargaining power, especially when they
are selected as the single source for a particular aircraft type. In these situations, they
possess monopoly-like bargaining power in the aftermarket, which they use to create
healthy profits through the sale of spare parts, charging licensing fees to MROs for
component overhaul, or completely insourcing component MRO services.
The resulting Value Proposition of this shift in business model entails not only enhanced
product but also service components that are offered to both the airframer and increas-
ingly airlines. Honeywell, for example, offers “Maintenance and Service Plans” for its
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)74 for Boeing Business Jets directly to airline customers.
This Solution offering includes maintenance, repair, material management, 24/7 sup-
port, and warranty at a fixed rate per flight hour and aims at providing a cost-efficient
solution guaranteeing high dispatch reliability (Croft, 2016; Honeywell, 2017). Service-
74The APU ensures the aircrafts’ supply with electricity and pressured air when the engines are not run-
ning, and the aircraft is not connected to ground power. It is one of the aircraft’s components with the
highest value.
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based Value Propositions are also offered to the airframers, as system suppliers support
their solution offers with spares and MRO services for their share of components (Sei-
denman & Spanovich, 2016a).
The System Suppliers’ Key Partners are Aircraft Manufacturers, newly acquired aerospace
suppliers, and in some cases also MRO providers to provide service capabilities for
their growing aftermarket revenue. Airbus’ and Boeing’s aftermarket solutions are
backed through collaborative agreements in which these system suppliers have com-
mitted themselves to support the airframer’s service offers with spares and MRO offers
of their own (Seidenman & Spanovich, 2016a).
To some extent, system suppliers also rely on MROs as partners to support them with
their specific service capabilities to create successful aftermarket solutions. One par-
ticular partnership is the collaboration between Honeywell and Lufthansa Technik in
which both providers jointly provide the global largest maintenance capacity for A350
component and APU maintenance (Brecken, 2017).
System suppliers have a vast amount of Key Resources, and Capabilities such as employ-
ees, technological expertise, and financial resources at their disposal that are required
to develop and integrate state-of-the-art aerospace systems, pursue M&A tactics, and
finance servitization. Intellectual Property (IP) and the capability to protect and appro-
priate the value inherent in IP is of critical importance to system suppliers. Using IP,
OES pursue three primary tactics to successfully capture aftermarket profits that I call
the (a) market dominance, (b) licensing, and (c) alliance tactic.
In the market dominance tactic, competition is eradicated by erecting market entry barri-
ers through the required test equipment. Although the OES is legally obliged to provide
the test-equipment to MROs due to the PSA stipulated between operator and OES, it
can limit the access. To do so, the OES typically sets a prohibitive price that renders
the business case for all competitors unprofitable. Additionally, re-engineering of the
test-equipment is prevented by the installation of effective encryption technology. By
employing this tactic, one avionics supplier on the B787 has achieved a 100% share of
the repair service market on its own equipment.
The licensing tactic is the establishment of a network of licensed MRO repair stations.
In this tactic, the OES erects market entry barriers through discounts on spares in a
magnitude that renders all non-licensees uncompetitive. This aftermarket tactic has the
advantage for the OES that it is unobjectionable from a legislative, anti-trust point of
view and that it can rely on the resources and capabilities of various MROs to provide
MRO services. In this setup, aftermarket revenues are generated through license fees,
not service revenues.
In the alliance tactic, the OES relies on a single MRO to deliver MRO aftermarket sup-
port. This approach has the advantage that the system supplier can focus on its core
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competence manufacturing and still participate in aftermarket revenues. Additionally,
it enables decoupling economic success from the consumption of spare parts, which in
turn allows for the development of efficient repair methods and lower overall costs.
Furthermore, the number of interfaces and complexity of channels to the customer can
be reduced by relying on a single partner.
While OES can secure aftermarket revenues by the tactics just discussed, usually it is
difficult for them to provide services or solutions directly to operators. The reason is
that in a product-led business model, the airframer and MRO providers are the sales
channel for equipment and spare parts to the airlines. To successfully provide MRO
services to the end customer, OES need to establish direct Channels and Relationships
with airlines (see Figure 4.13).
In general, this is however problematic, as aircraft OEMs and traditional MROs can of-
fer integrated Component Solutions for the entire aircraft type and not only the system
supplier’s share. Consequently, most operators prefer contracting a Component Solu-
tion by one of these integrators rather than making individual repair contracts with a
multitude of OES. However, some system suppliers that provide large proportions of
the aircraft have been able to secure direct agreements with airlines that possess large
fleets and hence have more capacity to manage the aftermarket support of individual
spectra of components. For example, AirAsia concluded a maintenance contract di-
rectly with the avionics supplier Thales that also offers a pooling offering after placing
an enormous order of 304 A320neos (Kjelgaard, 2017b).
System Suppliers incur additional costs especially through extensive M&A activities
and to a more limited extent through building service capabilities. The reason is that
only a few facilities are required on a global scale, as components are removed from the
aircraft for service, easily packed and shipped to these workshops. Additional costs for
the extension of service activities arise through establishing the required infrastructure
as well as network, employee training, marketing, and mechanics to provide the repair
services.
As a result of the increased price pressure and the airframers’ attempts to shift the prof-
itability in the supply chain to their favor, system suppliers attempt to earn profitable
Revenue Streams with aftermarket spare parts and service offers. Some extraordinarily
successful system suppliers are reported to already earn up to 30% of their total sales
with services (Seidenman & Spanovich, 2016a). Like other types of aerospace manu-
facturers, system suppliers offer pricing models according to a usage-based logic per
flight-hour as well.
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4.5 Interim Conclusions
In the last sections, the commercial aviation industry was introduced with an emphasis on Air-
craft Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul. Aircraft MRO is $75 billion industry that is grow-
ing at approximately 3.8% annually on a global scale, with the most active development taking
place in Asia. The MRO industry is highly competitive due to the high bargaining power of
suppliers and intense rivalry among the existing firms caused by economies of scale inherent in
technology- and asset-intensive industries.
Traditional MRO service firms compete in this industry with their traditional MRO business
model that I have outlined, using the Business Model Canvas as an analytical tool. As cor-
nerstones of their business model, MROs provide aircraft maintenance, repair, and overhaul
services to airlines that can be disaggregated into Line, Base, Engine, and Component Mainte-
nance. The cost-base for these services can be optimized by the use of alternative, non-OEM,
parts and the development of alternative repair methods. MROs often engage in long-term trust-
ful relationships that they can achieve through excellent service quality and taking the customer
perspective.
As Key Resources and Capabilities, MROs can develop repair and engineering capabilities
through learning curves on the serviced fleet, while increasing the span of their maintenance
network to provide services on a larger geographical footprint. However, MROs rely on the
manufacturers’ spare parts and repair manuals which creates one-sided dependency on these
players.
Business model innovation in the aerospace industry on both supplier and customer side exerts
considerable pressure on the traditional MRO business model. Airlines are the central but
least profitable actors of this industry, who operate a global fleet of more than 28,000 aircraft
that require MRO services to remain in airworthy conditions. As MRO services constitute
approximately 15% of airlines’ operating costs and are easier to influence than fuel, salaries,
or airport charges, price pressure is passed down to aircraft manufacturers and MRO firms.
To cope with this price pressure, airlines increasingly outsource MRO services to professional
MRO firms and manufacturers. Some airlines even dispense with the paradigm of keeping
Engineering and Line Maintenance internally but rely instead on integrated MRO solutions,
requiring guaranteed aircraft availability and reliability at a fixed rate per flight hour.
On the other side of the value chain, aircraft-, engine-, and component manufacturers have added
services to their business model aiming to extend their position in the supply chain from being
mere suppliers towards being suppliers and competitors at the same time. This phenomenon is
caused by the high levels of competition and supply chain dynamics among the different actors in
the commercial aerospace supply chain. Aircraft manufacturing has undergone some significant
logic changes, supply chain structure and business models from the build-to-print setup in the
1990s, to an increase in outsourcing through risk-and-revenue-sharing-partnerships between
airframers and their suppliers and the latest “post-tier 1” area in which significant consolida-
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tions in the supply chain lead to the emergence of super system sellers.
Engine manufacturers have led the way in shifting from a goods-dominant to a service-focused
logic in their business model, which enabled them to earn stable revenues at healthy margins
throughout the life cycle of the engine. Servitization allowed them to escape cut-throat compe-
tition at the point of engine sales and finance new engine programs. Aircraft manufacturers
and system suppliers have followed this blueprint, by adding services and solution offers to their
business model. Servitization in the aerospace industry is on the rise, as increasing levels of ser-
vice revenues at all types of manufacturers indicate. For the established Maintenance, Repair,
and Overhaul Providers competition by the manufacturers constitutes a severe threat but at the
same time an opportunity, as they often rely on competent partners for the fulfillment of their
service offerings.
Due to the contemporary developments in the commercial aerospace manufacturing and airline
industry, MROs are challenged to innovate their business model to cope with these changes
and ensure long-term profitability. Two strategic options to innovate the business model are (a)
developing solutions to fulfill the increasing demand of airlines and differentiate service offer-
ings against OEMs and (b) forming different types of alliances with manufacturers to ensure
competitive survival and jointly provide superior offerings to airlines.
Successfully developing solutions involves changing multiple elements of the MRO’s business
model, as providing guaranteed aircraft availability and reliability at a fixed rate per flight hour
deviates considerably from traditional, input-based cost-plus MRO services. Alliancing with
OEMs is no less of a challenge, as OEMs have been stigmatized by MROs as the industry’s
bogeyman for many years and are now emerging to their new super role of being simultaneously
suppliers, competitors, and partners. In the next chapter, we will address what strategic options
MROs have at their disposal, how they can implement these options, and in which case which
business model innovation path is deemed the most promising.
191
5
The Cases
Contents
5.1 The Engine Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
5.2 The Components Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
5.3 The Aircraft Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
192
Chapter 5. The Cases
Following up the pilot study, the multiple case study consisting of the Engine, Compo-
nents, and Aircraft Case was conducted, to explore the different strategic options that
MROs can employ to cope with servitization in the aerospace industry.
5.1 The Engine Case
Traditionally, engine overhauls were conducted on a “time and material” basis, in
which the customer paid for the time and material required for the refurbishment of
the individual engine. This model resulted in high risk of exceeding maintenance costs
for airlines, high mark-ups for spare parts and often long lead times (Johnstone et al.,
2009).
Rolls-Royce has pioneered engine Solutions under the “Power-by-the-hour” concept
that has been introduced in section 4.4.2. However, all engine manufacturers’ serviti-
zation attempts can be characterized as very successful, as OEMs are expected to share
approximately 80% of the service market on new engine types (see Figure 4.27). Also,
interviewees report that virtually all customers of new aircraft rely on flatrate contracts,
which was the case for only half of the legacy engine service contracts.
For MRO providers, this means that they are either forced to limit their service activities
to mature engines or form alliances with the engine OEMs to form part of their service
network. However, limiting the business to legacy engines is not considered an option
that ensures competitive survival, even if direct market access should be possible in the
future, as Manager Alliance Function MRO 1 vividly explains: “I can’t put my people in
the garage for two or three years and tell them to go paint some fences, I believe we need to secure
business volume that ensures our existence”.
Thus, the OEMs’ control of the service market marks a severe environmental shift for
MRO service firms that were formerly competing against each other for airlines’ busi-
ness. Now, they need to innovate their business model, to provide value to engine
OEMs as part of their servie networks. This represents a fundamental change in the un-
derlying business logic, requiring new Value Propositions, Partnerships, and a change
in corporate culture.
On new engine types, airlines rely almost exclusively on solution offers that are now
provided by all of the engine manufacturers.1 Due to the high success of the manu-
facturers’ solutions and the limited capabilities to offer competitive alternatives, many
airline third-party providers form alliances with an engine manufacturer. The focal
company is a suitable example of this practice, as it has established various alliances of
different configurations with the manufacturers to be able to provide repair services for
1For example, IAE provides Flight Hour Agreements that provide with coverage for maintenance events,
based on flight hour basis (International Aero Engines, 2017).
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the newest types of engines (see Figure 5.1). These alliances are of high importance for
the focal company, as they are expected to reach a revenue share of approximately 50%
in the next eight years in the engine segment.
Engine Type Manufacturer Aircraft Type
GE-nx2B General Electric B747-800
LEAP-1A CFM International A320neo
PW1000g Pratt & Whitney, MTU A320neo, C-Series, MRJ, MC-21, E190-E2 
Figure 5.1: Selected New Engines Served by the Focal Company2
Interviewees unanimously report that MROs need an affiliated airline with a suffi-
ciently sized sourcing campaign as an “entry ticket” to enter alliance negotiations with
an engine OEM. Using their bargaining power in the sourcing campaign, the airline
demands the license required to build MRO capabilities for the respective engine type
internally. Consequently, all independent MRO providers that are not able to convince
an airline or investor to attain a license for them will need to focus on niches in legacy
engine repair and thus most probably discontinue engine overhaul in the long term.
The OEM Workbench The focal company has formed a joint venture with one ma-
nufacturer that I label “The OEM workbench setup”. In this setup, the manufacturer
holds all customer solution contracts and subcontracts engine overhaul events to the
joint venture that has been founded for this purpose. This arrangement implies some
changes to the traditional business model of the focal company that includes the loss
of channel access to the final customer for this type of technology. Also, the scope of
the overhaul is reduced to mainly manual labor for engine disassembly, assembly, and
testing that is compensated at a fixed rate per manhour3. Engineering tasks, such as
determining the workscope of the engine overhaul are, in contrast, now performed by
the manufacturer.
2Source: own illustration, based on illustrations from the manufacturers’ homepages.
3Revenue Streams are determined based on a man-hour-rate (MHR), which lies at around $90 per hour at
the time of writing. Despite its suggestive name, the rate includes all overhead costs, e.g., engineering
and facilities. For each service, a working package including an estimation of the required man-hours
is predefined by the manufacturer.
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This setup results in a multifaceted relationship with the manufacturer in which the
OEM has become simultaneously a supplier, customer, and partner for the respective
engine type, while the two parties remain competitors for other engine types that are
not covered by the agreement. The alliance itself can be defined as strategic since it is
designed to span decades of aftermarket support. It is characterized by high idiosyn-
cratic investments and mutual dependency. While the MRO depends on the OEM to
receive parts, documentation, and support, the OEM is to some extent also dependent
on the MRO, since the MRO is responsible for providing aftermarket services, with a
direct influence on the OEM’s performance and company image (Interviewee 19). The
joint venture can even become critical to the system if it supplies a substantial amount
of overhaul capacity.
Besides, the focal company needs to adapt its core business logic in two further aspects:
One aspect is the importance of material and repair methods. While in the legacy busi-
ness model alternative material sources and repair methods were used to minimize
the consumption of expensive original material, the MRO provider is now granted ac-
cess to spare parts at discounted rates. In return, the MRO commits itself to only de-
velop and use PMA parts and alternative repair methods in consent and coordination
through gain-sharing models with the manufacturer to not endanger the OEM’s prof-
itable spare parts business. Also, the repair of engine parts such as turbine blades is of
less importance, since it is only valuable to the manufacturer if cost savings compared
to production costs, not the catalog list price of spare parts are present.4 However, for
some complex and expensive components, the restoration of engine parts is still the
most economical option. In terms of cost structure, the cost-reduction for access to ma-
terials are offset by higher initial investments required for acquiring a license to become
OEM network partner.
The Coopetitive Solution The second type of alliance that the focal company has formed
with an engine manufacturer is becoming a licensed partner of the manufacturer that
competes with its own offerings against the manufacturer and other airline-affiliated
third-party MRO shops. Due to the simultaneously competitive and collaborative as-
pects of this relationship, I call this arrangement “The Coopetitive Solution”. Compared
to the workbench setup, this arrangement is more beneficial because it allows the focal
company to sell its traditional and solution offers directly to airline customers.
Another difference to the workbench setup is that in the coopetitive solution, the focal
company aims to provide value to the manufacturer by providing advanced services
such as mobile engine services and dynamic feedback loops aiming to increase the ma-
nufacturer’s production- and service-related engineering capabilities. Mobile Engine
Services are micro repairs that are conducted with the engine remaining mounted onto
4As production costs constitute only about 10% of the list price, the utility of repair of engine parts is
significantly reduced compared to the traditional business model.
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the aircraft (so-called on-wing), so they can be performed directly at the location of
the airplane, wherever in the world. Conducting Mobile Engine Services can help to
achieve higher engine availability and lower costs, e.g., through repair of damaged
blades before consequential damage occurs, possibly mitigating a complete overhaul
event. Mobile Engine Services are of rising importance due to the increased technical
maturity and service life of engines, requiring fewer shop visits. In these repairs, infor-
mation about the wear status of the engine that is not available digitally (e.g., of specific
blades) can be gathered. This information allows for an informed decision of whether
a repair can be performed on-wing, or whether a costly engine overhaul off-wing is re-
quired. Engine wear data is shared with the manufacturer, allowing him to determine
design deficiencies and improvement measures.
5.2 The Components Case
Traditionally, airlines owned a stock of components at their major line stations to re-
place components in the aircraft upon failure. The repair of these components was
either performed by the internal maintenance division, third-party MROs, or the ma-
nufacturers. This practice required stocking of all critical components and negotiating
maintenance contracts with diverse parties. In contrast, Component Solutions allow the
airline to gain access to a shared component pool that is managed by the service pro-
vider. Similar to Engine Solutions, the provider guarantees the availability of a set of
components within a certain timeframe and is compensated on a flight-hour basis.5
Component Solutions have been pioneered by airline third-party MRO providers well
before the manufacturers and were very successful due to the high cost-savings and
reductions of risk and complexity that airlines could realize by relying on these con-
tracts. Pooling enables cost reductions because components fail erratically according to
a Poisson distribution. While the expected service life of each component is measured
by the KPI “Mean Time Between Unscheduled Removal” (MTBUR), a component may
fail well before this time limit is reached. Airlines that access a shared parts pool can
economize this risk, as the service provider needs to stock components for the average
risk of many customers and not the individual eventual risk that a component may fail
earlier. Hence, Component Solutions are especially valuable on small to medium size
fleets (less than approximately 250 aircraft), for new technology with uncertain MT-
BUR, or for critical parts that can cause an AOG (Canaday, 2016). Besides, airlines can
partly forego the investment required for initial provisioning.
5Different options in pooling agreements exist, which differ in aspects as the spectrum of parts included,
validity for all stations or outstations only, and whether the pool is shared with other airlines. Typically,
airlines retain a certain spectrum of owned stock at their main stations.
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Providing a Two-sided Solution The focal company has formed an alliance with a prin-
cipal systems supplier on the A350 aircraft, in which the MRO was able to extend its
solution capabilities upstream towards the manufacturing domain. In the alliance, the
OES limits its activities to manufacturing, while the focal company has assumed the
responsibility for conducting all aftermarket activities under the umbrella of a joint ser-
vice offer. Since the focal company effectively provides an aftermarket solution to the
manufacturer and Components Solutions to airline customers, I have labeled this setup,
the “two-sided solution”.
The OES’ alliance decision was influenced mainly by two antecedents: First, the in-
creased price pressure by aircraft manufacturers induced by RRSPs forced the system
supplier to increasingly earn revenues and profits in the aftermarket either through
licensing agreements or an internal service division. Second, the OES’ previous ser-
vice provisioning attempts on legacy aircraft types have had limited success in regards
to customer satisfaction in the dimensions of costs, quality, and time. Also, previous
attempts to improve service quality and profitability have not resulted in the aspired
improvements. Third, and maybe most importantly, the system supplier cannot pro-
vide components solutions for the whole A350 but only for its own, albeit significant,
share of components. Hence, all but the largest customers are more likely to sign a
component support agreement with an integrator such as an airline third-party MRO
or the airframer Airbus.
Consequently, the OES had two choices: the first option was to “get in line”, becom-
ing a second-tier repair provider for Airbus who acts as a solution integrator. This
option would result in the previously discussed workbench setup, with the OES being
the subcontractor of the airframer, leading to increasing dependency on Airbus in both
manufacturing and service provisioning. The second option was to leverage the large
component share on the A350 to create a Components Solution offer jointly with an
independent MRO provider, capable of integrating various vendors’ components into
a seamless Component Solution. This option offers two major benefits: first, achieving
a better position in the aftermarket with improved customer access, contract owner-
ship, and less dependence on the airframer. Second, the OES can improve its service
capabilities by relying on an external MRO specialist as an alliance partner.
The focal company faced a similar situation as the OES that made alliancing a favorable
option: first, the very intense competition with Airbus that sells its components solution
offer directly with the sales of the aircraft resulted in pressure on margins. Second, in-
creasingly difficult access to intellectual property, less in-house repair capabilities, and
increasing costs for licenses resulted in a less competitive cost structure. Thus, allianc-
ing would create a win-win situation for both actors in which they could combine their
resources and capabilities into an improved service offer. Hence, both firms decided
to form an alliance, which involved some significant changes to the MRO’s business
model, which are discussed below.
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In contrast to the Engine Case, the MRO does not provide single MRO services but a
complete aftermarket solution for the OEM. The solution involves taking over the re-
sponsibility for all aftermarket activities, including MRO, integration of competitors’
components, customer management, and logistics. In essence, the customer is pro-
vided with a seamless components solution directly from the focal company. This ar-
rangement provides considerable value to the system supplier, as he can focus on his
core business (development and manufacturing of aircraft systems), while the MRO is
responsible for fulfilling contractual obligations of PSAs and solutions agreements.
The alignment of interests between system supplier and MRO, which involves sharing
risks, costs, and revenues is an important underlying principle of the alliance, which is
stipulated in a risk-and-revenue-sharing model. In this model, both companies share
revenues and profits from the joint offering and participate in efficiency gains and other
improvements. In essence, this enables the alignment of interests in which the OEM’s
profitability is not dependent on the sales of spare parts but the efficiency of the joint
solution offer.
Similar to the Engine Case, the alliance results in a multifaceted relationship: while for
the A350, both companies are partners with aligned interests, the OES is a large sup-
plier and partly even competitor on other aircraft types. Also, the alliance has led to
an increased mutual dependency between both parties. The MRO is dependent on the
OES’ performance in providing material and the required information for the repair of
components overhaul. On the other hand, the OES is dependent on the MRO’s perfor-
mance in sales, repair, and the professional management of the pool. If the MRO fails
to perform, the OES is held responsible by the airframer for not fulfilling parts of the
PSA.
New Key Activities are required in regards to adding value to the OES and manag-
ing the alliance: To enable the OES an improved new product development process,
customer and engineering feedback including sources of errors and improved repair
methods are regularly shared in the form of an engineering council. Two-way com-
munication ensures that the required information for both new product development
process and MRO services is made available to both parties. A second activity is the
commercial alliance management through regular commercial, business owner, and
annual top management meetings. Additionally, a personal representative is placed
at both the OES’ and MRO’s facilities to intertwine the operations and adaptions to
the IT systems, which are required to enable both operational processes and contract
structure.
198
Chapter 5. The Cases
5.3 The Aircraft Case
When choosing Aircraft Solutions, airlines rely on an external provider for most engi-
neering, planning, and maintenance tasks, who assumes the responsibility to ensure
airworthiness, reliability, and availability of the aircraft for a fixed fee per flight hour.6
The solution provider performs most of the tasks that are usually conducted by the in-
ternal technical operations division of the airline, including aircraft engineering, plan-
ning of the maintenance schedule, reliability, and quality management. The provider
also integrates the MRO services Line-, Base-, Engine-, and Component Maintenance
from its internal service division and external providers.
Typical example of Aircraft Solutions are Embraer’s Total Support Package (TSP), Boe-
ing’s GoldCare, and Airbus’ Flight Hour Service offer that have been described in Sec-
tion 4.4. The airframers’ aggressive service market entry results in enormous price
pressure on traditional MRO firms, and industry experts even report buying-the-deal
behavior at prices below production costs.
Besides, the airframers’ solution offerings have spawned increasing demand for inte-
grated Aircraft Solutions, especially with start-up airlines such as Nordavia and partly
also with LCCs such as Wizz Air. Aircraft Solutions are especially popular for start-
up airlines as they usually lack the required in-house fleet management capabilities
and rely on an external expert to kick-start their operations. Most airlines insource
fleet management at a later point in time, once they have built the required capabilities
(Arendt, 2015; Klooß, 2013; Wizz Air, 2015; Pozzi, 2017a). Interviewees report two main
reasons, of why most airlines do not rely on Aircraft Solutions on a longer time frame:
First and foremost, airlines suffer from a high dependency of the solution provider, as
they lose their internal capabilities to steer their maintenance function directly and as-
sess the competitiveness of their solution provider. SVP Fleet Management Airline 1
gives a vivid testimony:
“I think that the customers by now want less of a service package or because of the cost pressure,
they want to know their MRO service costs much, much more directly. Now then, these high
insurances within the total service packages, they want to have these less and more transparency
and more decision-making power about what they buy at the end of the day.”
Second, each MRO provider has strengths and weaknesses across the different service
segments and fleets. Thus, it is reasonable to establish competition between the MRO
providers through tenders and select the most competitive for each service category.
However, interviewees are divided with the assessment of whether Aircraft Solution
will remain a niche product, due to the reasons mentioned above (Interviewees 5, 7,
and 23) or of rising importance in the future (e.g., Interviewees 8 and 13). The argument
6Does not include ultimate accountability. For legal details, please refer to Section 4.3.1.
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of the latter group is that fleet management and MRO services will increasingly become
commoditized and thus not serve as a source of competitive differentiation, leading to
increased provisioning of Aircraft Solutions offers. VP Purchasing MRO 1 summarizes
his opinion: “So generally speaking, this is my personal opinion, I believe that in the same
extent to which the passenger says today: ’I don’t give a shit what type of aircraft this is, bring
me from A to B!’, the airline goes into the direction to say: ’I don’t care what type of tube this is,
take away the risk so that I can sell tickets.’” Also, Vice President Sales of MRO 1 already
notes a trend towards solution offerings with one of the focal company’s customers
from the LCC segment: “I can already imagine that we will migrate [towards solutions]. Now,
we see this for example with customer A, for who we provide certain services and customer A
is strongly driven by aircraft availability. They say: ’we need the aircraft for 18 hours per day,
you can repair the other six or seven hours.’”
In conclusion, whether or not Aircraft Solutions will remain a niche offering for start-ups and
some LCCs or become a significant market segment, remains elusive as of today. However,
airlines need to decide whether fleet management is one of their core competencies or a candidate
for outsourcing. While the former path requires excellent fleet management and engineering
skills, the latter will require the airline to excel at managing a principal supplier with strategic
importance. However, MROs need to develop Aircraft Solutions to cater to all airlines that
decide to outsource their Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul function.
Developing Stand-alone Aircraft Solutions For traditional MRO firms, the airframers’
entry into the service market constitutes an environmental shift, with possibly severe
effects on MRO industry structure, the traditional MRO’s business model, and conse-
quently, profitability. The most imminent threat is that aircraft manufacturers may suc-
cessfully establish themselves as the sole integrator of all products and services on their
installed base. This move would allow them to reap much of the profitability of the
MRO market through this platform-based integrator business model, in which MRO
firms would be reduced to being mostly workbench partners, while airlines would be
left with few choices for their maintenance decision.
At the focal company, two strategic options were discussed to cope with the manu-
facturers’s aftermarket incursion: (a) developing Aircraft Solutions and (b) assessing
whether an alliance would be a favorable option. The development of a stand-alone
Aircraft Solutions offer was triggered by the change in customer demands that chal-
lenged the focal company, as Manager Product Management MRO 1 reports: “our cus-
tomers are asking for something that we don’t have in the drawer. [. . . ] They are asking for a
full integration that I don’t have.”
The service development process included various internal and external development
and review stages, including the internal development of a minimum viable service of-
fering, a challenging session with top management, and further co-creation cycles with
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customers. One of the major challenges for the focal company was the development of
a fully integrated offering that included extensive aircraft performance guarantees and
could be tailored to the individual needs of each airline.
Another critical part of Aircraft Solution offerings is the co-development of mecha-
nisms to offset the one-sided dependency of the airline on the provider. The focal com-
pany and one major customer have established significant bonus/malus regulations in
the contract that effectively moderates the buyer-supplier relationship, as Team Lead
Aircraft Engineering Services MRO 1 reports: “[performance-based pricing] increases the
pressure on us to find solutions for the customer. It also increases the collaborative approach,
so that you have a joint interest in solving problems and not block each other while finding the
solutions.” In essence, Aircraft Solutions go well beyond traditional MRO service offers
and require substantial adaptions of the service offerings.
One of the strategic questions that needed to be answered was, whether the MRO
should partner with the airframer, becoming a subcontractor in the airframer’s solution
network. On the one hand, this collaborative option would present the focal company
with some benefits, such as increased revenues by servicing the airframer’s customer
base, or improved access to IP that is otherwise increasingly restricted (Seidenman &
Spanovich, 2016b). On the other hand, the collaboration would further strengthen the
airframer’s offer and possibly weaken the long-term position of the focal company in
the industry.
In contrast to the Engine and Component Case, the focal company deliberately decided
not to pursue a strategic alliance with the airframer but rather to seek punctual collab-
orations, where beneficial for both parties. For example, the focal company plans to
participate in tenders in which the airframer subcontracts Line and Base Maintenance
services to service partners, who then deliver these services on behalf of the airframer
to the end customer. This arrangement allows the focal company to serve the customer
directly and not enter a relationship that closely resembles the workbench setup. As a
result, a multilateral relationship with the airframer emerged, in which the airframer is
simultaneously supplier, competitor, and partly even customer.
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“Aviation’s Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) sector is undergoing a seismic shift as
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) win more and more long-term after care contracts
from airlines. The aggressive strategy is a threat to the bottom lines of global maintenance
providers.” (– Ballantyne, 2015, p. 1).
As this opening quote from the introduction indicates, the entry of the Aerospace ma-
nufacturers into the service market represents a dramatic increase in competition for
established MRO firms that has not gone unnoticed, neither in the press nor in the
MRO’s balance sheets. MRO firms need to compete against this new type of competitor
with a different business model including unique resources and capabilities resulting
from their manufacturing background (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). While increased com-
petition is generally welcomed by customers, as it improves their bargaining position
(Porter, 1979), airlines have addressed their concerns regarding possible monopoliza-
tion of the MRO market because manufacturers erect increasing if not insurmountable
barriers to hinder MROs from competing (IATA, 2012; Arendt, 2015).
Simultaneously, many airlines focus on their core business and require guaranteed air-
craft availability, maintenance costs, and cost models based on aircraft utilization (Ward
& Graves, 2005; Rieple & Helm, 2008; Schneider et al., 2013). Developing and com-
petitively offering these new Value Propositions poses additional challenges to MRO
firms.
Nonetheless, MRO firms sustain competition against manufacturers to varying degrees
of success. While engine manufacturers are expected to gain between 65% and 90% of
all maintenance contracts on new engine types (Hygate, 2013b), aircraft manufacturers
have not successfully established themselves as providers of base maintenance services,
at least yet (Shay, 2017a). In component services, both aircraft manufacturers success-
fully offer components solutions with a focus on new aircraft types such as the A350
and B787, while MRO firms are expected to remain very competitive in this market
(Herbert & Morales, 2016).
In this chapter, I develop a portfolio approach for business model innovation of Aero-
space Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul firms to cope with challenges and realize
opportunities resulting from servitization. As discussed in the conceptual background
chapter (Chapter 2), the different configurations presented in the portfolio allow MRO
firms to achieve a fit between strategy, the business model and internal and external
conditions. Using a portfolio approach enables MROs to deal with strategic uncer-
tainty and make resource commitments to the chosen plan, which allows them to gain
a competitive edge.
The chapter is structured as follows: in the first section, the MRO Business Model Port-
folio is conceptualized based on the generic BMI paths that MROs can employ to cope
with servitization, resulting in a total of five viable business models for MRO service
firms.
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The second part of this chapter is dedicated to generating an understanding of com-
petitive strategies in the Aerospace MRO industry, which is an essential building block
for the development of a portfolio approach to MRO business model innovation. The
second part starts with the exploration of the viability of Porter’s (1980) generic com-
petitive strategies cost leadership, differentiation and focus in the MRO industry. Then,
I extend the existing literature by establishing a two-sided approach to explain business
model-based competitive advantage between firms that come from the increasingly
blurring manufacturing and service industries (Zott & Amit, 2010; Ulaga & Reinartz,
2011; Wise & Baumgartner, 1999).
Based on this understanding, I build a contingency approach to support the choice of
the appropriate configuration in the MRO Business Model Portfolio. This approach
extends today’s limited and anecdotal knowledge of alliance and stand-alone Busi-
ness Models of pure service firms in the context of servitization (Jaakkola & Hakanen,
2013).
Finally, I will explore the four configurations of the MRO business model (Section 6.3)
as well as the specific dynamic capabilities that MROs require for transforming the
business model along the two continua of developing solutions and alliancing with
manufacturers (Section 6.4). In conclusion, this chapter allows us to understand MRO
business model innovation in the context of servitization in terms of what is being in-
novated, why it is being innovated, and how innovation can be achieved.
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6.1 Strategic Options for MRO Service Firms to Cope with
Servitization
Against the backdrop of the manufacturers’ incursion into the MRO service market and
the changing customer needs of airlines, MRO service firms are challenged to innovate
their business model into configurations that can cope with both, the manufacturers’
downstream movement into the service market, and the airlines requirements for main-
tenance cost guarantees and pricing models based on aircraft usage.
The portfolio is constructed along the two dimensions of promising generic types of
strategic options that allow MROs to innovate their business model to remain compet-
itive in the face of these two trends. One option is to develop outcome-based solution
offerings themselves to be able to compete with manufacturers in serving airlines that
increasingly focus on their core business. The second strategic option is to ally with the
manufacturer to become part of the manufacturer’s solution network.
6.1.1 Developing Solutions
The first strategic option is for MROs to develop outcome-based solution offerings
themselves to be able to compete with manufacturers in serving airlines that increas-
ingly focus on their core business (Schneider et al., 2013).
A Definition of Aerospace MRO Solutions To determine why and how aerospace main-
tenance, repair, and overhaul firms can develop solutions, we require a definition of
what MRO solutions are and their common characteristics. So far, literature has mostly
focused on Rolls-Royce’ engine solutions offering, while only a few studies are avail-
able that investigate the servitization efforts of aircraft manufacturers and other types
of solution offers (e.g., Johnstone et al., 2009; Ferreira et al., 2013, 2016). I have derived
the following definition by identifying the common characteristics of MRO solution of-
fers through a comparison of Engine, Components, and Aircraft Solutions, which are
the three most common types of solution offerings in the Aerospace industry.
MRO Solutions are service offers in which the provider assumes the responsibility for planning
and performing maintenance, repair, and overhaul services targeting the aircraft, its engines, or
components that are compensated on a usage- and performance-basis.
The first common characteristic of MRO solutions is that they comprise mostly services
in which the provider assumes the responsibility for the customer’s maintenance plan-
ning processes which were previously performed by the internal technical operations
function. In addition to traditional maintenance services, solutions, therefore, involve
subcontracting continuous airworthiness management tasks such as engineering and
205
Chapter 6. A Strategic Approach for MRO Business Model Innovation
maintenance planning. Against a common misconception, the ownership of the asset is
typically not included in the solution fee (Baines & Lightfoot, 2014). Hence MRO solu-
tions are to be placed on the right side of the product-service continuum (Vandermerwe
& Rada, 1988) (see Figure 6.1). Components Solutions are somewhat an exception, as
here the solution provider is the owner of the components pool. However, a large part
of the value of Component Solutions lies in the service content, as components from
different manufacturers need to be repaired, stocked, and transported from and to the
airline. Due to this high service content, not only manufacturers but also MRO ser-
vice firms can potentially provide competitive MRO solutions, based on their unique
resources and capabilities from a base in service provisioning.
Product content
(tangible)
Service content
(intangible)
Product + Service Product & Service Service + Product Pure
Service 
(value
mainly in 
service
content)
Pure
Product
(value
mainly in 
product
content)
1. Product-related
2. Advice and
consultancy
3. Product lease
4. Product renting/sharing
5. Pooling
6. Activity Management
7. Pay per Service Unit
8. Functional Result
• Engine Solutions
• Aircraft Solutions
• Component Solutions
MRO SOLUTIONS
A: PRODUCT-ORIENTED B: USE-ORIENTED C: RESULT-ORIENTED
Figure 6.1: Aerospace MRO Solutions in Tukker’s Product-Service Continuum
Second, MRO solutions typically encompass services for systems of a multitude of dif-
ferent vendors. The reason is that aircraft and its components are the archetypes of a
complex product-system (Hobday et al., 2005). COPS include a variety of sub-systems
and adjacent systems which interact with each other. Hence, MRO solution providers
need to manage the interdependencies and involved supply chains to guarantee overall
system availability and performance. Providing a component pool is the most promi-
nent example of this characteristic; however, also engine and aircraft solutions entail
the management of a multitude of vendors and their subsystems.
The third common characteristic of MRO solutions is that they typically employ usage-
and performance-based payment models simultaneously. Engine Solutions are com-
pensated based on flight-hours and flight-cycle ration, while Components Solutions
and Aircraft Solutions are billed on a flight-hour basis. In addition, performance-based
pricing mechanisms are used to ensure the performance of the solution provider and
enable the customer to perform effective supplier performance management. Addi-
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tional service elements that are not core to the solution offer can either be included in
the flight-hour rate or billed separately.
Drivers of MRO Solutions Development Developing solutions is commonly perceived
as being one of the most important BMI paths for MRO providers to remain competi-
tive in the face of servitization in both industry-specific as well as to a limited extent in
academic literature. For example, Tegtmeier (2009) notes that integrated support pack-
ages continue to grow in popularity, as an increasing number of operators aim to shift
their risks of maintenance expenses to the MRO providers. In consequence, Tegtmeier
argues that MROs should provide integrated services at budgeted, known quality, be-
coming so-called one-stop-shops. This phenomenon is part of a wider adaption of the
business models of many major airlines that go through a process of de-integration,
contracting-out large portions of their business model in pursuit of greater efficiency
and effectiveness (Rieple & Helm, 2008). This practice also affects the previously in-
ternal Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul function that is increasingly outsourced to
external providers (Brown, 2015).
As a result, solution development is regarded as a necessary business model innova-
tion to address changing customer needs of airlines that increasingly focus on their
core business (Schneider et al., 2013). In contrast, focusing on airlines that rely on tra-
ditional service offers would result in a reducing market share for MROs, especially in
the light that many growing start-up airlines and low-cost carriers contract solutions
over various stages of their development. Even if an airline contracts solutions for a
limited time-frame, providing them allows MROs to establish Channels and Relation-
ships with customers early on, and gain an in-depth understanding of their operation
and needs. Two examples of airlines that have contracted solution offers are the Hun-
garian low-cost carrier Wizz Air that relies on Lufthansa Technik (Wizz Air, 2015) and
Norwegian Airlines that have contracted Boeing’s Gold Care offer (Pozzi, 2017c).
Solutions as an Enabler of Differentiation Advantage Porter’s (1980) three generic
competitive strategies cost leadership, differentiation, and focus, which were outlined
in Chapter 2.1.2 build the theoretical framework of this chapter. Here, I seek to answer
the question of whether MROs should rather choose a cost leadership or differentiation
strategy to compete against their peers and manufacturers. First and foremost, airlines
are under an enormous price pressure due to the strong competitive forces in the in-
dustry and the entry of operators with low-cost business models, which has in sum led
to poor profitability and many cost-reduction efforts (see Chapter 4).
While the airline’s cost pressure is a prejudice for following a cost leadership strat-
egy, traditional service offers provide few opportunities for competitive differentiation,
which makes charging high price premiums unlikely. The reasons for this mostly cost-
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based competition lie in the properties of MRO services: Due to their relevance for
safety, most MRO services are strictly regulated and to a high extent standardized in
manuals. Thus, traditional MRO services are in general perceived as a commodity, as
Manager Product Management of MRO 1 illustrates: “it’s not like we would have the big
label [. . . ] ’Quality Leader’ . . . AFI, MTU, SRT, they can do that, too. They are all regarded
as equal and deliver proper results”. In consequence, airlines treat maintenance often as a
necessary expense that belongs to the operating budget and is a common item on the
hit list of cost-reduction programs (Tsang, 2002).
Second, input-based MRO services result is maintaining a part, system, or entire air-
craft in airworthy condition. Airworthiness, good workmanship, and safety are typical
must-be-quality requirements in the Kano Model (see Figure 6.2) that do not allow for
competitive differentiation (Kano, 1984; Matzler et al., 1996).
Customer dissatisfied
Customer satisfied
Requirements
not fulfilled
Requirements
fulfilled
Must-be requirements
Attractive requirements
One-dimensional 
requirements
Figure 6.2: The Kano Model (Kano, 1984)
The Kano Model differentiates between three types of quality requirements: must-be,
one-dimensional, and attractive requirements. Must-be quality requirements are the
ones that need to be fulfilled to ensure customer satisfaction but do not allow for com-
petitive differentiation by increasing customer satisfaction. In contrast, only the ab-
sence of these hygiene factors leads to dissatisfaction. One-dimensional requirements
are requirements that lead to customer satisfaction in proportion to their level of fulfill-
ment. Attractive requirements have the most significant influence on customer satisfac-
tion, if met, are however typically not expressed by the customer (Kano, 1984; Matzler
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et al., 1996).1 Having to fulfill must-be-quality requirements, not the MRO services are
visible to the passenger, but just a lack quality timely repair.
Third, bar some exceptions such as cabin modifications, airlines do not want to but
have to buy the service (“it’s not like the customer would want his engines to be over-
hauled, rather there is no real alternative. So, the decisive factor at the end of the negotia-
tion is always the price”, Manager Product Management of MRO 1, emphasis added by
author). These effects are stronger for established technology, where few risks of uncer-
tainties exist, and a stable market has developed.
While these characteristics hold for traditional service offers, developing solutions al-
lows firms to escape harmful price-based competition and further differentiate their
offers (Matthyssens et al., 2006). The reason is that solutions are typically priced ac-
cording to output or performance (Tukker, 2004), which allows decoupling pricing from
the consumption of resources (Baines et al., 2007). This pricing model enables MROs to
earn premiums over through pain-gain-sharing models if they can achieve performance
gains for airline customers and mitigate possible cost disadvantages on material versus
manufacturers. As VP Purchasing MRO 1 explains: “The customer does not perceive the
things that we do [to mitigate] the cost disadvantages that we may have in value creation. Well
now, if they are not included crystal-clear in the pricing.”
Besides, solutions entail the integration of various product and service components
into a seamless offer that provides more value than the individual parts alone. The
provider is integrated into the customer’s business, which allows them to optimize
the total costs for the customer (Brax & Jonsson, 2009). The two aspects of adding
value through integration and being able to optimize the customer’s costs by forming
part of his business system offer additional differentiation potential that providers of
traditional service offers do not possess. VP Purchasing MRO 1 reflects upon the value
of reduced complexity especially for small customers: “I have the advantage to reduce
the complexity of [my customer’s] system by providing additional services. [...] There are many
advantages for small or very small airlines to say: ’I will go to one [provider], where I indeed have
to pay a premium but the complexity [is reduced] and I don’t have a negotiation lever anyway
and am bamboozled by everybody.’” The typical price premiums for Aircraft Solutions are
visible in the hefty rates that are charged by aircraft manufacturers, which are reported
to reach up to $300 per flight hour for offerings like FHS or Gold Care.2
The Engine, Component, and Aircraft case support the general assumption that offer-
ing solutions does not only address changing customer needs but also enables competi-
1Either an aircraft is airworthy, or it is not, no “very airworthy” exists. Of course, some basic performance
parameters such as turn-around-time also exist in traditional service offers. Usually, these are however
expected to be met as stipulated in the contract, while non-compliance with these performance param-
eters leads customer dissatisfaction and penalty charges.
2Pricing for engineering, planning and integration services only, MRO and other services (e.g., logistics)
not included.
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tive differentiation and escaping purely price-based competition (Gebauer et al., 2010a;
Nordin & Kowalkowski, 2010). Also in the Aerospace Industry, MRO firms have the
opportunity to pursue competitive differentiation by providing solutions. In contrast to
traditional service offers, solutions allow MROs to make Value Propositions that fulfill
one-dimensional quality requirements such as increased aircraft reliability and avail-
ability. Hence, these Value Propositions are likely to have a positive effect on customer
satisfaction (Kano, 1984; Matzler et al., 1996) and thus allow for competitive differenti-
ation.
In summary, providing MRO solutions is a promising way to assume additional responsibilities
along the supply chain and extend the scope of their service offers. By taking over the airlines
technical operations management processes, solution providers can reduce their customers’ com-
plexity involved in aircraft maintenance and enable airlines to focus on their core business.
Additionally, solutions allow MROs to employ a differentiation strategy as economic success
is decoupled from material consumption and value-added services that reduce complexity and
have a direct impact on airline performance can be provided. This mechanism allows MROs to
depart from the cost leadership strategy that they typically employ for traditional service offers,
where little room for competitive differentiation is present. This finding is in line with previous
literature that suggests that for this type of product lifecycle services3 only little opportunities
for non-price-based differentiation exists (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). This approach requires
building solution-specific resources that allow for competitive differentiation (e.g., specialized
and skilled aircraft engineering or customer service representatives supporting the individual
customer) while organizing the remaining resource base according to the overarching low-cost
strategy.
In contrast, not developing solutions and hence focusing on customers that prefer traditional
service offers, needs to be considered counterproductive to cost leadership, due to the high sig-
nificance of economies of scale in the Aerospace industry that I have outlined in Section 4.3.4.
As cost leadership is the most promising strategy for offering traditional MRO services on a
large scale, firms that do not develop solutions are threatened to be reduced niches. This, in
turn, dramatically hampers their ability to stem the necessary investments to build capabilities
for new generations of equipment and thus ultimately threatens competitive survival. Hence,
developing solutions needs to be considered as a promising generic strategy to tap into lucrative
customer segments, enable competitive differentiation, earn additional revenues, and increase
profits. Hence, MROs should seek opportunities for developing solutions within and across all
types of service segments.
3Services that facilitate the access to the supplier’s good and ensure its proper functioning during all
stages of the life cycle, see Ulaga & Reinartz’, 2011 Typology of Industrial Services for Hybrid Offerings,
Figure 2.7.
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6.1.2 Alliancing with Manufacturers
The alliancing BMI path of MROs stems from the phenomenon that servitization does
not occur in an isolated way at manufacturers, but instead in the form of solution net-
works in which traditional service firms play a vital role. As a general agreement, ma-
nufacturers face limitations in performing all tasks associated with solution-provision-
ing themselves (Baines et al., 2007; Gao et al., 2011), and this is often economically less
viable to do so (Gebauer et al., 2013). Therefore, manufacturers tend to outsource non-
core services to third-party service providers (Cohen et al., 2006; Helander & Mo¨ller,
2007), who possess more experience in service provisioning (Beuren et al., 2013). As a
result, manufacturers form networks with these third-party service providers as “so-
lution integrators”, which are usually referred to as service or solution network (e.g.,
Windahl & Lakemond, 2006; Gebauer et al., 2013; Eloranta & Turunen, 2016). In the
service networks, each actor contributes to the offering (Lusch et al., 2010), focusing
on their core competence and cooperation with other network actors (Basole & Rouse,
2008). In this context, service firms need to reconfigure their business model to become
network partners of these manufacturer-led solution networks, changing the existing
relationships with manufacturers that enter the service market.
In the Aerospace MRO market, alliancing with the manufacturer has been suggested
as the second viable option to cope with servitization. Three main reasons exist why
an alliance is a promising BMI path for MROs to deal with servitization. The first ma-
jor reason is the manufacturer’s ability to limit the MRO’s access to repair manuals,
licenses, and the required tooling (Schneider et al., 2013). This practice allows them to
create entry barriers or a cost advantage against MROs that make competing an un-
viable alternative. The quote ”if you can’t compete you better cooperate” (–Vice President
Sales MRO 1) illustrates the common perception among many MROs for these cases.
Second, the manufacturer’s strategy to incur revenues in the aftermarket has resulted
in the threat of rising maintenance costs for airlines. As a reaction, airlines are increas-
ingly trying to increase this threat by pinning one manufacturer against another in ne-
gotiating the asset purchase and maintenance contract simultaneously (see Figure 6.4).
However, this typically excludes the MRO from directly competing for a service con-
tract with the airline and leads therefore to fewer opportunities for revenue generation
directly with airlines (Spafford & Rose, 2013). As a result, MROs are increasingly con-
fined to participate in service tenders for the diminishing proportion of legacy and
sunset aircraft types (see Figure 4.22). Needless to say, that focusing purely on a di-
minishing portion of the market leads to shrinking revenues and endangers growing a
sustainable business. Third, participating in manufacturer-led solution networks also
offers opportunities to realize benefits such as access to new customer segments and
extension of the own service offerings (see Table 2.5).
However, alliancing has not remained free of critique as an unsustainable approach to
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innovate the MRO’s business model. Firstly, it has been criticized as a short-term ap-
proach as some types of relationships place MROs in an inferior, dependent position
on the OEM. For example, license agreements allow manufacturers to shift profit mar-
gins to their own benefit away from MROs (Spafford & Rose, 2013). Some industry
experts fear that an alliance represents a time-limited approach for MROs that works
until OEMs have built sufficient service-specific capabilities to insource the entire ser-
vice business (Schneider et al., 2013).
However, MRO-OEM alliances are common practice to cope with the environmental
changes induced by servitization. For example, 82% of respondents of Oliver Wyman’s
MRO survey stated that they had closed an alliance agreement with one or more OEMs
(Spafford & Rose, 2014). Examples of these alliance include BAPAS (Boeing and SIA
Engineering and Maintenance), N3 (Rolls-Royce and Lufthansa Technik), or Pratt &
Whitney’s MRO network comprising of MTU Maintenance, IHI, and Lufthansa Technik
(Derber, 2013; Broderick et al., 2014; Kjelgaard, 2017a). Even though the topic has been
on the agenda for some time, it has remained one of the most critical trends in the
MRO industry. For example, the MRO Europe 2018 featured various sessions and panel
discussions on the OEM aftermarket incursion and MRO-OEM alliances (Informa USA,
2018) in its program.
In conclusion, alliancing with the OEM is a promising business model innovation path for pure
service firms to sustain competitive survival and potentially realize benefits in general and in
the aviation industry in particular. This is further underlined by the number of collaborations,
especially between MROs, airframers and engine manufacturers that have and are currently
taking place in the industry. Hence, the question is not whether or not MROs need to form
alliances with manufacturers. Instead, the question is how they can perform this deed in the
most sustainable and value-creating manner. To guide MROs in this challenge, I outline a
portfolio of different strategic options of alliance configurations in Chapter 6.1.4.
6.1.3 Alliancing with other MROs
While Schneider et al. (2013) suggest partnering with other MROs as viable BMI path
to cope with the manufacturers’ servitization efforts, this type of alliances is rather
an exception within the MRO industry. If alliances between MROs are formed, then
predominantly to cover jointly small fleets such as the A380 or E-Jet in which provid-
ing competing service offers would leave each competitor with an insufficient market
share.
Besides relational rents though complementary resources, cost and differentiation ad-
vantages could be gained if a similar resource and capability base is reaped more syn-
ergistically: for example, economies of scope could be reached by allocating comple-
mentary engineering capacities and capabilities into centers of competence to gain a
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differentiation advantage. Alternatively, joining the two maintenance networks could
increase the flexibility of utilization (e.g., slot allocation in base maintenance facilities)
and build economies of scope (e.g., by founding a dedicated A320 Base Maintenance
facility for the joint serviced fleet). This endeavor would, however, require the estab-
lishment of common standards (i.a., processes, qualifications, manuals, IT tools, pric-
ing), which represent a significant intervention in the business model of the individual
MROs. Also, financial resources could be joined to split the investment required to re-
engineer repair manuals or develop new repair methods, which may somewhat limit
manufacturer-dependence.
A second mechanism by which an alliance between two MROs might result in an im-
proved competitive position is by combining the serviced fleet. The larger maintained
fleet makes it more viable to co-develop PMA parts, reaching a cost advantage because
investments for PMA developments can amortize across more aircraft. Also, substan-
tial economies of scale can be achieved by sharing assets such as spare engines, landing
gears, airframe-related components (e.g., inlet cowls or nacelles) if commonalities exist
between the fleets and the MROs establish a contractual basis that enables them to loan
or exchange these assets swiftly at better than market conditions. Besides, joining the
serviced fleet data pools would give MROs a head-start in developing the data process-
ing and interpretation capabilities required for predictive maintenance methods. The
reason is that the development of the algorithms underlying the predictive maintenance
methods require large amounts of data. Once MROs have developed these algorithms,
they can be applied to a single aircraft to improve its maintenance schedule, reliability,
and cost position.
Finally, alliancing could be used to increase the MROs’ bargaining position. In pro-
curement, combined bargaining power may result in an improved position against dis-
tributors, service providers, or other non-monopolistic vendors, which could result in
improved material or service conditions. Against manufacturers, an improved bargain-
ing position is, however, more challenging to achieve as the affiliated airlines would
need to coordinate their aircraft procurement campaigns. Achieving this coordination
is, however, very unlikely if no alliance agreement or even merger between the airlines
exist.4
Although MRO alliances may enable both partners to create relational rents, they do
not solve the MROs’ main problem induced by servitization, which is gaining access to
the manufacturer’s resources. While a joint approach towards the manufacturer may
somewhat increase the bargaining power of each MRO, overall, dependence on the
4The reason is that airlines are typically not willing to make the required compromised regarding timing
and specification of aircraft and the manufacturers’ unwillingness to let such practices erode their
pricing politics. Due to these reasons, the joint procurement of aircraft outside of financially affiliated
airline groups remain an exception (Clark, 2007). Known examples are the purchase of an A330 by
Swissair and Sabena, as well as the purchase of 187 aircraft outside of a formal alliance by LanChile,
TACA, and TAM (Delfmann et al., 2005).
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manufacturer will be complicated to decrease. For independent MROs that experience
even more difficulties in acquiring access to IP and licenses, partnering with an airline-
affiliated MRO may be considered a promising option. However, it is unclear whether
the airline-affiliated MRO is allowed to share these resources and why it should do so.
As independent MROs do not possess any structural advantage versus airline-affiliated
MROs that they may use, these firm would need to formulate an attractive Value Propo-
sitions based on their own unique resources and capabilities. Since alliances between
MROs do mitigate threats or capture opportunities that result from servitization, I have
not included them in the MRO Business Model Portfolio.
In conclusion, alliances between MROs provide many opportunities to pursue cost and differ-
entiation leadership strategies, especially if broad fleet commonalities exist. On the other hand,
partnerships between MROs with low fleet commonalities can be used to amplify the service
portfolio of each alliance partner. Reaping these benefits would however require a large extent
of harmonization of processes and data structure; moreover a many responsibilities would have
to be shifted between partners. This makes an acquisition of one MRO by another a more likely
option than a cooperation between equal partners. For MROs that are not affiliated to an airline,
alliancing with an airline-affiliated MRO is an attractive opportunity to increase its bargain-
ing position considerably. The independent MRO, however, needs to make considerable Value
Propositions to its potential partner to be sufficiently attractive to warrant alliance negotiations.
As partnerships between MROs are not a specific strategic option to cope with servitization, they
are omitted however in the MRO Business Model Portfolio.
Practice resonates well with the proposed two BMI paths, especially in the engine segment:
cooperations and joint ventures with manufacturers are seen of even increasing importance in
the future compared to current levels, as OEMs need to provide sufficient overhaul capacity on
new engine models. Besides, MROs can achieve competitive differentiation against other MROs
and OEMs by developing highly customized integrated solutions (Horwitz, 2019). Moreover,
additional advanced alliances between independent MROs and airline third-party MROs or
even with OEM-MRO JV come into existence.5
6.1.4 The MRO Business Model Portfolio
The MRO Business Model Portfolio (see Figure 6.3) is constructed along the two just
discussed business model innovation paths: the first dimension (x-axis) of the portfo-
lio distinguishes between business models that provide either traditional services or
solution offers, whereas the second dimension (y-axis) distinguishes between business
models that entail an alliance with a manufacturer.
The two-by-two field matrix results in principle in four different configurations of MROs
5One example of the latter partnership is the cooperation between MTU, an independent engine MRO
provider with EME AERO, a joint venture between engine manufacturer Pratt & Whitney and LHT.
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Nature of the Value Proposition
Traditional service offers Solution offers
Alliance 
Arrangement
Alliance with 
manufacturer OEM Workbench
No alliance with 
manufacturer
Traditional
Business Model
Stand-alone
Solutions
Two-sided
Solutions
Coopetitive
Solutions
Figure 6.3: MRO Business Model Portfolio
business models, providing traditional service offers either to the airline or the OEM
alliance partner, and providing solutions, either without an OEM-alliance (stand-alone
solutions) or together with an OEM. Providing solutions in an alliance with the OEM
can, however, take two different sub-configurations, which results in a total of five con-
figurations that are described further below.
Traditional Business Model In the traditional business model, MROs provide aircraft
maintenance, repair, and overhaul services that are billed typically on a time- and
material-based revenue structure to airlines. In this business model, the MRO assumes
only a limited amount of risks for its customers and typically does not take over re-
sponsibility for the customer’s services.
As manufacturers increasingly limit the MROs access to intellectual property rights
and many airlines focus on their core business, MROs need to develop approaches to
innovate into another configuration of their business model (Schneider et al., 2013).
MROs that fail to do so run into the danger of being reduced to niche markets which
may leave them unable to ensure competitive survival in the long term.
Stand-alone Solutions In the stand-alone solutions configuration, the maintenance
firm provides service offers in which it assumes the responsibility for planning and per-
forming maintenance, repair, and overhaul services targeting the aircraft, its engines, or
components that are compensated on a usage- and performance-base. The second im-
portant characteristic of stand-alone solutions is that MROs provide solutions in com-
petition with the OEM. One example would be the aircraft case in which the focal firms
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provides its customers with aircraft solutions, competing with the airframer’s offers.
Developing stand-alone solutions allows MROs to tap into the lucrative market of start-
up carriers in the aircraft segment, for components and engines, solution offers need to
be considered as being important market segments. Also, developing stand-alone so-
lutions lets MROs provide output-based offers and unlock mechanisms of competitive
differentiation against other OEMs and manufacturers.
The OEM Workbench In the OEM workbench setup, MROs form an alliance with the
OEM in which they provide time- and material-based maintenance services to the ma-
nufacturer as a sub-contractor. Although this setup allows to continue providing ser-
vice offers, it possesses some disadvantages compared to other, more advanced, OEM
alliances. First and foremost, the MRO suffers from a significant dependency of the
OEM that is at the same time the supplier of all material, intellectual property, and the
only customer. Second, the MRO loses access to the market, as the OEM holds all cus-
tomer contracts and only subcontracts services to the MRO. Hence, MROs can choose
this configuration to ensure competitive survival, should however aim to develop more
advanced solution capabilities that will allow them to execute the next two, more ad-
vanced configurations.
The Coopetitive Solution In the coopetitive solution configuration, the MRO becomes
a partner in a network of typically independent and OEM-owned repair shops, which
compete for customer business. The cooperative aspect of this arrangement is that the
MRO becomes a license partner with access to repair manuals, spare parts, and tool-
ing. This arrangement is advantageous for the MRO compared to the OEM workbench
setup since the MRO has direct market access, can retain the customer channel, is less
dependent on the OEM, and can pursue reaching a competitive edge with its solution
offers — at least if the OEM assures a level playing field between all network part-
ners.
The Two-sided Solution The two-sided solution is the most advanced configuration
of MRO business models and requires both excellent solution-specific and relational
dynamic capabilities to be established. In this setup, the MRO simultaneously provides
a solution for both, the airline customer and the OEM by assuming responsibility for
the outcome of the solution offer and processes that would traditionally be performed
by either party.
While for the customer, a solution offer is provided (e.g., availability of components for
a fixed rate per flight hour), the MRO takes over the responsibility for the manufac-
turer’s aftermarket business for the joint offering. This task typically includes the ad-
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ministration of customer contracts, managing the customer channel and relationship,
repairing equipment, planning of inventory and logistics, as well as risk management,.
This arrangement allows the manufacturer to de-servitize and focus on the core ma-
nufacturing business (Kowalkowski et al., 2017). It can typically be characterized as a
risk-and-revenue-sharing partnership that includes performance-based compensation
mechanisms. The advantage for the MRO compared to other setups is the lower level
of one-sided dependency; instead, both OEM and MRO are highly interdependent.
Interim Conclusions In this section, a portfolio containing five different configurations of
MRO business models entailing both solution and alliance arrangements has been developed.
By innovating their business model towards the configurations described in this portfolio, MRO
can achieve a better fit with the environment and are thus likely increase their firm performance
compared to remaining in their traditional business model. The next section discusses which
business model innovation is appropriate in which circumstances by the development of a con-
tingency approach.
6.2 Choosing the Appropriate Business Model Configuration
In this section, I develop an approach for MRO service firms that allows them to choose
the appropriate BMI path. The choice is based on the analysis of sources of competitive
advantage inherent in manufacturing and MRO service-based business models, as well
as the contingency factors that influence the alliance decision.
6.2.1 Competitive Advantage of Manufacturers and MRO Service Firms
This section explores the competitive advantage between servitizing manufacturers
that enter the service market with product-based business models and MROs that come
from a base in services. This contribution extends the current knowledge-base that has
been mostly one-sided, focusing on the advantage that manufacturers can gain through
service infusion. The research question “How can competitive advantage between MROs
and manufacturers be explained based on their respective business models?” reflects the holis-
tic business model approach to explain competitive advantage (see Section 2.1) that is
employed here. Choosing this approach allows us to broaden our scope beyond purely
resource-based competition, and instead take the whole business model as the unit of
analysis (Osterwalder et al., 2005).
In the chapter covering business models (Section 2.1.2), we have outlined how business
models can explain competitive advantage on a generic level, i.e., either by its elements
or their hard to imitate combination. Here, we apply the Business Model Canvas to
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explain how the respective business model of MROs as pure service firms and manu-
facturers can explain competitive advantage in pure service and solution offers. As this
represents a shift from the generic business model concept to the concrete manifesta-
tion delineated in the form of the Business Model Canvas, we need to define which
elements are eligible in explaining competitive advantage. Previously, we have already
outlined that Key Resources and Key Capabilities are potential sources of competitive
advantage, explained by the resource-based view (Barney, 1991) and its extension, the
resource advantage theory (Hunt & Morgan, 1995). Also, Key Partners were identified
as a possible source of competitive advantage, explained by strategic network theory
(Jarillo, 1988) and the relational view (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Now, we need to clarify the
role of the remaining business model elements in the creation of competitive advan-
tage.
Value Propositions are the result of using Key Activities to transform Key Resources
through Key Capabilities to marketable offers to the customer (Amit & Schoemaker,
1993; Osterwalder et al., 2005). Hence, Value Propositions are not a source but a medi-
ator of competitive advantage and discussed as such as part of the analysis.
By controlling customer Channels, firms may gain a positional advantage over other
firms that would like to make Value Propositions to the same customers. Through the
control of customer channels, customers can be locked-in, while other competitors may
be locked-out (Heide & John, 1988). Hence, channel control may indeed be a source of
positional advantage, inhibiting other competitors from competing through switching
barriers that are created for the customer (Porter, 1979).
A firm’s Cost Structure results from the Key Activities a firm performs and the required
Resources, Capabilities and Partners used (Osterwalder et al., 2005). Only firms with a
lower cost structure than their peers can employ a sustainable cost leadership strategy
(Porter, 1998). A firm’s Cost Structure is then a mediator between the firms base of
resources, capabilities, and partners towards achieving a competitive advantage and
treated as such in the analysis. On a similar note, Revenue Streams result from the
successfully marketed products and services of a company. Hence, they are the result,
not an antecedent of competitive advantage.6
Customers are the recipient of the Value Proposition and firms compete if they aim to
serve similar Customer Segments with comparable offers. Companies can reach compet-
itive advantage when they can serve a specific Customer Segment with lower costs or
better Value Propositions than its competitors (Porter, 1998). Hence, I have excluded
Customer Segments from the analysis.
6Nonetheless, financial resources result to a considerable part from Revenue Streams and are included.
This segregation aims to mitigate the threat of tautological reasoning that may result from considering
Revenue Streams as an antecedent of competitive advantage.
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Table 6.1 summarizes and compares the manifestation of the six business model ele-
ments relevant to the competitive advantage of MROs and manufacturers, as well as
their proposed effect on this advantage. The MRO’s items are based on the traditional
MRO business model and selected by the inclusion criteria stipulated in the methodol-
ogy section. The manufacturer’s items are based on the literature review on the role of
pure service firms, the Aircraft, Engine, and System manufacturers’ business models,
and the case studies.
Business Model 
Element Relevant Items MROs
Relevant Items 
Manufacturers Proposed Effect on Competitive Advantage
Key Partners • Affiliated airline • Risk-and-revenue-sharing 
partnerships with other 
tiers in the manufacturing 
supply chain
• MRO: limited positional advantage and unique resources 
and capabilities result from the affiliated airline 
Key Activities • Operational services
• Development of 
alternative parts- and 
repairs
• R&D, manufacturing of 
products
• MRO: differentiation advantage by providing a broader 
set of operational services than OEMs
• MRO: cost and differentiation advantage through lack of 
product-business and  development of alternative parts-
and repairs
• OEM: R&D and production of products are antecedents 
to unique manufacturing-specific resources and 
capabilities
Key Resources • Maintenance network
• Operator experience
• Maintenance network
• Product development and 
manufacturing assets 
• Product Sales Force and 
Distribution Network 
• MRO: cost and differentiation advantage through 
operators experience, serviced fleet, and maintenance 
network
• OEM: cost- and positional advantage through protection 
of intellectual property and  access to assets
Key Capabilities • Repair & engineering 
capability
• Multi-vendor capability
• Bundling capability
• Risk management 
capability
• Hybrid offering 
deployment capability
• MRO: cost and differentiation advantage through repair 
and engineering capability  
• MRO: cost and differentiation advantage through multi-
vendor capability
• Data-based comparative advantage depends on data 
access and ability to link data to service in operations
• OEM: differentiation advantage through risk management 
capability in offerings that involve high risks
• OEM: no sustainable competitive advantage through 
hybrid offering deployment capability
Customer Relationship • Long-term trustful 
relationships with airlines
• Intensity of airline 
relationships depend on 
type of manufacturer 
• MRO: positional advantage through long-term, service-
focused relationships
Channels • OEM: positional advantage through preferred customer 
channel access
Table 6.1: Unique Business Model Elements of MROs and Manufacturers, Proposed Effect on
Competitive Advantage
Key Partners
In the Key Partners segment, MROs and OEMs possess different elements in their busi-
ness model that they can potentially leverage into an advantage. While airline third-
party MROs possess an affiliated airline, manufacturers have formed far-reaching risk-
and-revenue-sharing partnerships with other manufacturers from different tiers of the
supply chain.
219
Chapter 6. A Strategic Approach for MRO Business Model Innovation
Affiliated Airline MROs that possess an affiliated airline are part of the organization
of the OEM’s customer. Exploiting this position in the supply chain, MROs can intend
to use the purchasing power of their parent company to raise entry barriers to OEMs
that wish to enter the market. Well-known examples of this practice are flight train-
ing schools that have thwarted the market entry of the flight simulator manufacturer
Thales, who tried to add pilot training and the management of simulator training facil-
ities to his product portfolio (Davies et al., 2006).
Another promising tactic may be to increase the resilience of airlines against the OEMs’
service offerings by means of the affiliate. This tactic may work since manufacturers
who wish to enter service markets with firmly established service providers first need
to change the current industry culture to reach legitimization (Turunen & Finne, 2014).
In Aerospace, the value of the affiliated airline to erect market barriers is however lim-
ited, as aircraft, engine, and component manufacturers have already successfully en-
tered the service market to a large extent.
Another third way in which an affiliated airline may be valuable for MROs is to pro-
vide them with unique resources or capabilities. Affiliated airlines that place an early,
substantial order of a new aircraft types and contract all maintenance business to the
affiliated MRO, provides it with the Key Resource of a serviced fleet. A sufficiently-
sized serviced fleet allows the MRO to capture a considerable early share of the grow-
ing aftermarket that justifies initial investments and enables the MRO to gain operator
experience and economies of scale. In contrast, manufacturers need to win early cus-
tomers for their service offers on their aircraft types, which can initially be a burden, as
Boeing’s initial limited aftermarket success demonstrates (Herbert & Morales, 2016).
Another important point that sets affiliated MROs apart from manufacturers is that
they are typically highly integrated with their airline (Al-kaabi et al., 2007a) by provid-
ing Line Maintenance which is closely intertwined with the airline’s operation. This
allows them to achieve a unique, in-depth understanding of “how an airline works”,
benefiting their operator experience (a Key Resource) and the airline perspective Value
Proposition. A last, albeit softer argument is that affiliated MROs can use ties of the
affiliated airline to their peers to enter discussions with other airlines on equal footing,
instead of being a mere supplier.
In conclusion, an affiliated airline and the benefits gained from the relationship definitely con-
stitute a potent source of competitive advantage that MROs need to consider in their BMI deci-
sions. Independent MROs that do not form part of an airline group do not enjoy the associated
benefits, which makes it harder for them to both endure competition with their peers and manu-
facturers, as well as to form alliances with the latter. This lack of benefits places independent
MROs in an awkward position, in which they have to aim to thrive in niche markets or markets
that require less ICA.
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Risk-and-Revenue-Sharing Partnerships Today, Aircraft and Engine Manufacturers
have formed extensive Risk-and-Revenue-Sharing Partnerships (RRSPs, see Section
4.4), outsourcing up to 80% of the aircraft and its parts to suppliers (Krol, 2011; Wallin,
2013a). By integrating the different systems that are provided by their suppliers, both
engine and aircraft manufacturers have become system integrators, which can poten-
tially leverage the associated benefits of a central network position and complementary
resources into competitive advantage (Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013).
In the Aerospace industry, the central supply chain position does however only result
in limited potential for competitive advantage regarding aftermarket and service offer-
ings, for a variety of reasons: First, the considerable amount of outsourcing of both R&D
and production limits the internal knowledge about the respective components and
thus hampers knowledge-based advantage. Second, the intellectual property rights
from the system development are granted by the aircraft OEM to remain with the sup-
pliers and hence are of minimal use in the aftermarket (Horng, 2007). Third, integrators
can only exert limited pressure on their RRSPs in the aftermarket, as the suppliers have
already been squeezed for initial production pricing and need to reach amortization of
their initial investment via the service business (the revenue-sharing part of the alliance
agreement). Hence, these players are barely inclined to grant more favorable aftermar-
ket conditions for e.g., spare parts or services to the integrators. Also, it is likely that
many large suppliers possess considerable bargaining power once they have become
RRSP on a particular aircraft platform, as they are positioned as a single equipment
source on a specific aircraft type and almost not interchangeable due to the enormous
switching costs that would result from such a move (Krol, 2011). This is underlined by
the components case, in which an alliance strengthens the competitive position of both
OES and MRO against the airframer. The alliance shows that partners for manufactur-
ing are not necessarily partners for service provisioning if their margins are further put
under pressure by the integrator. Hence, a coopetitive relationship between airframer
and its RRSPs develops that spans manufacturing and service sides of their business
model.
Key Activities
Key Activities can principally affect competitive advantage either directly or indirectly.
To reach a direct advantage vis-a-vis their competitors, firms should either deliberately
choose to perform different Key Activities or perform the selected Key Activities in
a different manner (Porter, 1996). Key Activities also have an indirect effect on com-
petitive advantage, as they strengthen the firm’s Key Capabilities. The reason is that
Key Capabilities are developed over time through interaction with the firm’s resources
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993), i.e., through performing Key Activities to transform re-
sources into Value Propositions.
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Comparing the business models of MROs and OEMs, differences in Key Activities be-
come apparent (see Table 6.1). “Operational Services” and “Development of alterna-
tive parts and repairs” are Key Activities that are predominantly performed by MROs,
whereas research, development, and the production of goods, is predominantly per-
formed by OEMs.
Operational Services While MRO providers can principally perform all major types
of operational services (Line, Base, Engine, and Component Maintenance) on equip-
ment of multiple manufacturers, OEMs limit themselves much more on the operational
services of their own equipment. Engine and component OEMs provide repair services
only for their equipment, while airframers typically possess little internal operational
services but integrate these from a network of service partners. The broad service port-
folio principally enables MROs to achieve competitive advantage directly or indirectly
via their resource and capability base.
A direct effect on competitive advantage can result from performing a broader set of op-
erational services internally. One option is that customers may prefer a one-stop-shop
that offers all types of services. Here, the internally available broad service portfolio
acts as a differentiator (Tegtmeier, 2009). This effect is expected to be especially pro-
nounced in solution offerings, as these are more encompassing as traditional offers,
which are typically contracted separately. The quote of one interviewee underlines this
claim: “take alone the fact that Airbus is doing [Aircraft Solutions] with many partners. They
know that they can’t do it themselves, but they also need to integrate, but not their own shop
but many many others and that is a lot more cumbersome. And we are sure that our product fits
much better with the demand of a one-stop-shop.” (–Team Lead Aircraft Engineering Ser-
vices MRO 1). However, it is unlikely that customers have any preference to whether
services are provided internally at the provider or integrated from external sources.
Hence, competitive advantage can only result if MROs integrate internal services more
seamlessly than external services, or if the services themselves enable cost leadership
or differentiation advantage.
Competitive advantage should also result if unique synergies can be leveraged across
the different service segments that are more difficult to reap across firm boundaries.
This mechanism should be especially pronounced in solution offers, where providers
integrate an increasing amount of internal or external service modules into a seam-
less offering (Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013). Manager Product Management MRO 1 gives
testimony regarding the existence of such synergies:“unfortunately, we still have the phe-
nomenon that our divisions focus on their performance and [service] portfolio and we do not
reap the suspected — and what we are currently seeing — really exciting potential of our holis-
tic setup. And this is something that we consider as absolutely necessary, especially on new
aircraft types, to reap this potential and to understand what potentials we can realize for the
customer that other competitors can’t”.
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One facet is the fact that MROs, unlike their manufacturing counterparts, perform Line
Maintenance. Line Maintenance is closely connected to all other maintenance services
and may thus enable a broad set of potential synergies: for example, unserviceable
components are removed from the aircraft during Line Maintenance, Engine Mainte-
nance tasks are performed during Line Maintenance checks, and work packages are
frequently shifted between Line and Base Maintenance events to optimize aircraft avail-
ability. Performing Line Maintenance allows the MRO to “connect the dots” between
operation and the different maintenance services, which enables him to identify more
areas of improvement than an OEM could, which is especially vital in integrated Air-
craft Solutions. In contrast, the aircraft OEM as solution integrator is limited by firm
boundaries and would need to ensure the flow of this tacit information between its
network partners to be able to achieve these synergies.
Performing operational services also has an indirect effect on competitive advantage,
i.e., by delivering services and thus interacting with the resource-base of the firm. For
example, operator experience is built which strengthens the MRO’s repair and engi-
neering capabilities. The reason is that a firm that repeatedly performs a specific ac-
tivity can realize learning curves (Darr et al., 1995), which enables MROs to establish
higher levels of efficiency and cost-effectiveness compared to their counterparts that are
newer to service provisioning. This indirect effect in which operator experience acts as
a mediator is discussed in the operator experience section.
R&D and Manufacturing of Products Manufacturers perform “R&D and manufacturing
of products” as one of their Key Activities, with pronounced implications for competi-
tive advantage. For manufacturers, these activities primarily have an indirect effect on
competitive advantage, as they result in unique manufacturing-specific resources and
capabilities such as product development assets and capabilities and intellectual prop-
erty (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). The impact on the competitive advantage through these
resources and capabilities is explained in the respective section.
In contrast to manufacturers, MROs do not possess a relevant amount of manufactur-
ing business, which counter-intuitively may give them an advantage against manufac-
turers. The reason is that the lack of manufacturing business places them in a neutral
position between airlines and OEMs, who are, in turn, inclined to increase the prof-
itability of their spare parts business (Fischer et al., 2010). This unique, neutral position
is valuable for a variety of reasons:
First, some airlines formulate a deliberate sourcing strategy favoring MRO over OEM
offerings for two reasons: First, airlines are concerned of an OEM hegemony in the
MRO market and the inflicted long-term price increase. The resilience of these airlines
against OEM offerings increased as the servitization of the engine MRO market has left
them with little or no choice in their maintenance decision and thus dependent on the
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OEMs’ aftermarket strategies. A second factor is that a single sourcing strategy, sourc-
ing both equipment and maintenance services from a single supplier, leaves the airline
exposed to greater risk (Treleven & Schweikhart, 1988). One interviewee cited an air-
line owner: “I want to oblige the OEM to build only the aircraft, I don’t want to do anything
else with them, he should please only deliver the aircraft.” (–Director Finance, Product Sales
and Key Account Management MRO 2) However, not all airlines share this view, espe-
cially Asian carriers are reported to be more OEM-minded, even preferring OEM over
independent service offers.
Besides these direct effects on the airline sourcing decision, the MRO benefits from
an absence of manufacturing business and thus the OEM’s constraints. This absence
allows the MRO to develop alternative parts and repairs, develop the multi-vendor
capability, and develop an “airline perspective”. Five interviewees assessed that MROs
can differentiate themselves from OEMs through this airline perspective, which is best
summarized by Team Lead Aircraft Engineering Services MRO 1: “we think and act like
an airline, not like the OEM”.
The airline perspective is valuable for airlines, as MROs can deliver a credible OEM-
independent consultancy approach that is in the airline’s best interest. For example,
the MRO can independently assess the economic viability of service bulletins recom-
mended by the OEM, while the OEM is naturally inclined to sell his upgrade. Another
topic is performing warranty claims against manufacturers. MROs can make these
claims, having only the airline’s interest in mind, while the manufacturer’s service di-
vision is limited in credibly supporting warranty claims against its parent company. A
third example is the initial provisioning7 in a Component Solution offer: while MROs
are inclined to determine the optimal pool stock level for airlines, OEMs have fewer
incentives to do so, since this would decrease their initial spare parts sales. In con-
clusion, airlines have many reasons to keep the responsibility for manufacturing and
maintenance separated and not rely on a single partner.
In conclusion, this airline perspective is difficult to imitate for OEMs even in the long term,
as it rests on both tacit operator experience and the affiliated airline that both permit gaining
the in-depth understanding of an operator. The second factor is that MROs have close to no
in-house parts manufacturing business and thus do not need to balance the interests of both
business units (Gebauer et al., 2011; Kindstro¨m et al., 2013).
Development of Alternative Parts and Repairs The usage of alternative spare parts
and alternative repair methods (DER repairs) may be one source for both cost and dif-
ferentiation advantage against manufacturers. As outlined in the traditional MRO busi-
ness model, PMA parts are known to enable savings of regularly 30% to 50% compared
7Initial provisioning is the process of determining and supplying the Line Stations with the required
components that are replenished from the pool upon usage.
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to the OEMs’ spare part price. Similarly, surplus material can enable savings of com-
monly 50% compared to new parts, depending on supply, demand, and the remaining
service life of the part. With an average share of 46% material costs in the MRO’s cost
structure, these types of parts have a considerable potential to lower MRO costs.
In contrast to manufacturers, the MRO is inclined to use alternative sources because for
him they are transitory items: as a pure service provider, MROs do not rely on parts to
generate profits; instead, they are billed to the purchasing price plus handling charge
to the customer. OEMs, on the other hand, rely on the sales of spare parts as a revenue
stream in their business model and is hence not inclined to lower the price or make use
of alternative parts (Fischer et al., 2010). In similar terms, alternative repair methods
that prolong the service life and reliability of parts are of limited interest for the OEM,
as they limit the sales of spare parts. While these arguments hold for input-based of-
ferings, they lose relevance in pure output-based offerings, as here manufacturers can
decouple economic success from material consumption (Baines et al., 2007).
However, the value of these parts for cost reduction purposes is limited by some fac-
tors: First, PMAs are not available on all parts and lack acceptance with some airlines
and most lessors (IATA, 2012). The steadily increasing share of leased aircraft (42% in
2015 (FlightAscend Consultancy, 2016a) further limits usability. Second, manufacturers
fiercely oppose the usage of alternative materials and repair methods, raising concerns
of decreased safety and reliability. These concerns are however regularly dispelled by
aviation authorities (Avia Solutions Group, 2017). Also, OEMs such as Rockwell Collins
are actively shaping the surplus market by the foundation of affiliated surplus compa-
nies such as Intertrade (Rockwell Collins, 2013). In doing so, OEMs (a) participate from
the revenue potential of the surplus market and (b) actively limit the supply of surplus
material for MROs and airlines. At the time of writing, many OEMs even have estab-
lished so-called “buy-back” agreements that ensure them privileged access to surplus
parts after removal from the aircraft, further decreasing the availability of surplus ma-
terial. One important last point is that MROs usually are required to agree to cease the
usage of alternatives to OEM material when entering an alliance with an OEM.
Thus, it is to be predicted that the usage of alternative materials and repair methods will
decrease on new aircraft types, limiting competitive options for MRO providers and
airlines, while the market for surplus and PMAs will thrive mainly on legacy aircraft
types (Cooper, 2017). Once today’s new aircraft types enter the second and third life-
cycle, it is to be estimated that increasing surplus material will be available. Whether
PMAs and DERs can be developed and warrant the required efforts, remains subject to
speculation.
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Key Resources
Resource- and capability-based competitive advantage between OEMs and pure ser-
vice firms has so far received most academic attention. The seminal work of Ulaga &
Reinartz (2011) requires special mentioning, as it is to my knowledge the only academic
work explicitly concerned with this topic. The authors uncover resources and capabil-
ities not available to traditional service providers that manufacturers can use to build
a competitive cost or differentiation advantage in hybrid offerings. In this section, I
aim at making a contribution to the understanding of this phenomenon by (a) adding
unique resources only available to pure service firms and (b) examining the proposed
effects of manufacturer-specific resources in a different empirical setting.
Maintenance Network In the MRO industry, a maintenance network is required on
a local level for Line Maintenance, regional level for Base and Engine Maintenance,
and global level for Component Maintenance (Arendt, 2015). Having an internal main-
tenance network at one’s disposal allows a firm to gather operator experience and de-
velop its repair and engineering capabilities. Firms that possess a superior maintenance
network, operator experience, repair, and engineering capabilities can aim to leverage
the combination of these unique resources and capabilities to provide superior services
and hybrid offers.
Servitization literature acknowledges that a maintenance network is a Key Resource re-
source for providing after-sales services that is difficult for manufacturers to construct
(Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). In Aerospace, traditional MRO providers possess a mainte-
nance network rooted in their base in services, that they can leverage to their advantage
against manufacturers that first have to either build an internal maintenance network
or rely on external partners. Hence, in Aerospace, a maintenance or service network is
not a unique resource of manufacturers, as has been previously assumed but rather a
source of competitive advantage for established service firms.
Manufactures may encounter difficulties to construct mature and efficient networks
themselves, as they require mechanics and engineers with the suitable capabilities (San-
tamarı´a et al., 2012). Hiring this workforce constitutes a barrier for manufacturers that
encounter difficulties due to a shortage of skilled workforce available on the market as
of today (Spafford & Rose, 2014). The shortage of skilled labor is not likely to decrease
soon, as Boeing predicts that the industry will need 679,000 new maintenance techni-
cians over the next 20 years (Shay, 2017e). Hence, manufacturers need to use aggressive
and thus costly hiring techniques to achieve a sufficient number of qualified applicants,
especially in Western Europe (Spafford & Rose, 2014).
The manufacturers’ relative disadvantage of hiring and training such a workforce is
however limited by the fact that they can form alliances with airlines to access staff
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of their maintenance division. Another option to mitigate this barrier is to rely on
external partners that provide MRO services. Manufacturers that employ the system
integrator business model commonly choose this external approach to capability build-
ing. Boeing, for example, relies on a network of MRO providers of Magnetic MRO,
Monarch Aircraft Engineering, British Airways Engineering, and Norwegian Air Shut-
tle that form their Gold Care network in Europe (Pozzi, 2017c). This approach allows
airframers to overcome workforce shortage for their service business but leaves them
with the challenge to integrate external providers into a network that is capable of de-
livering services to a consistent quality and performance standard.
While the reliance on partners is not a disadvantage per se, MROs possess opportunities
to leverage the fact that they possess an internal maintenance network to achieve com-
petitive advantage. Interviewees stated three main direct underlying mechanisms: (a)
cost advantage through leveraging economies of scale, (b) differentiation and cost ad-
vantage through shortened repair TATs, and (c) consistent quality standards through-
out the network. Additionally, superior repair and engineering capabilities can be
achieved by gathering operator experience through the internal maintenance network,
while integrators have to rely on knowledge spillovers from external partners to gain
these resources and capabilities.
Economies of scale on tangible and intangible resources are the first mechanism by which
large maintenance networks can be leveraged to gain an advantage against manufac-
turers that enter the service market. In MRO, tangible resources such as maintenance
facilities or test benches require high investments and are thus subject to economies
of scale through utilization. Firms with a broad established customer based are better
able to exploit these resources than firms who first need to invest to credibly build the
repair capability and then earn a sufficient customer base to ensure a high asset uti-
lization. Also, intangible resources such as engineering orders for cabin modifications
are subject to economies of scale. One example is the assessment of a Service Bulletin8:
The total amount of engineering hours required to assess an SB and write the needed
engineering orders for its implementation incur only once per aircraft type (e.g., the
A320). Once an assessment and working order has been designed for the particular
aircraft type, just minor adjustments for the idiosyncrasies of each customer need to be
made.
Component Solutions represents one example where a shortened repair TAT and quick
fixes to problems lead to a cost and differentiation advantage. Cost savings are reached,
as components that are repaired internally require less shipping to dispersed repair sta-
tions around the world and are thus returned quicker to the serviceable pool. In effect,
less shipping and capital costs accrue for the pool’s upkeep. A short repair TAT is espe-
8Service Bulletins (SBs) are non-mandatory recommendations issued by manufacturers. Typically, they
are not safety-relevant but include modifications that aim to improve optimizing operations or passen-
ger comfort (Hinsch, 2012).
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cially relevant for time-critical parts, e.g., in case of an AOG. While Airbus and Boeing
subcontract most component maintenance to their tier 1 component suppliers, the MRO
possesses workshops that repair most of the components in-house. Manager Product
Management at MRO 1 explains that “in 80% of the cases we can act faster as someone
who is doing [the repairs] externally. Let it be Air France or even Airbus.” This is especially
valuable in case of AOG, as the Head of Business Development Strategy Component
Maintenance at MRO 1 resumes: “Dear customer, please consider what happens, when you
have an AOG [. . . ]? Then, I walk over into the workshops and tell the boys: ’drop everything
and finish this unit first, no one goes home before it’s finished!’ But if I subcontract it, like
Airbus, then I don’t have it in my direct control, but I have to call my suppliers and beg him to
expedite that damn part somehow.” These quick fixes allow to lower the substantial costs
that airlines incur in case of an AOG.
Pure service firms that rely on an internal maintenance network may also differenti-
ate themselves through the establishment of constant service quality standards through-
out the network. For system integrators, this may be more difficult, as the education
and work ethics of the workforce, processes, IT, quality assurance systems, and other
factors are more challenging to influence across firm-boundaries. Consequently, ma-
nufacturers that want to successfully follow this path first need to develop distinctive
capabilities (Paiola et al., 2013). In fact, Boeing’s service quality has been criticized after
the repeated grounding of one the GoldCare customer Norwegian Air Shuttle’s aircraft,
which lead to the lease of two Airbus A340-300 which incurred costs of 100 million kro-
ner (USD 17 million) (Broderick, 2013a). However, an equal service quality does not
come for free but requires considerable investment. MROs need active efforts to estab-
lish global standards across the individual units to actively increase their cost efficiency
and service quality (Haubensak et al., 2010).
If, in contrast, manufacturers choose to build their maintenance network internally,
traditional MROs initially have an advantage through their established operator ex-
perience and associated learning curves, leading to superior Repair and Engineering
Capabilities.
Operator Experience The MRO’s Operator experience is the resource that enables
competitive differentiation against OEMs which received the most robust empirical
support, being named by 16 interviewees. Operator experience is considered vital as
it (a) is valuable for competing through both cost leadership and differentiation, (b) is
tacit and thus difficult to imitate for OEMs, and (c) allows the MRO to address the air-
line’s needs better. Operator experience enables MROs to gain competitive advantage
through cost leadership and differentiation in both traditional services and solution
offers.
In traditional service offers such as Engine Maintenance, operator experience allows
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the MRO to improve its repair and engineering capability through learning-by-doing.
These learning curves present in both manufacturing and services industries (Darr
et al., 1995) enable to lower the unit costs and increase efficiency for service provi-
sioning. As operator experience is accumulated over the years by servicing aircraft,
manufacturers cannot easily imitate it but need to walk down the learning curve them-
selves.
The effect of operator experience on cost and differentiation advantage is even more
pronounced in solution offerings. This is because solutions involve taking over the
responsibility for the customer’s processes (Matthyssens & Vandenbempt, 2008) and
thus require explicit and tacit knowledge components that are related to taking over
airline-specific processes. Manufacturers that lack some of those knowledge compo-
nents or underestimate the complexity of solution-provisioning may experience servi-
tization failure (Valtakoski, 2017).
The Vice President Sales of MRO 1 nicely illustrates the manufacturers’ difficulties in
understanding customer operations: “The OEMs are very good in developing, designing
and approval of new equipment. But actually, they have no idea what it means to operate the
equipment. They only receive rudimentary information about what problems are associated with
that, and there we are much closer.”
The lack of operator experience becomes especially crucial in Aircraft Solutions, where
MROs can make use of its operator experience to optimize the maintenance schedule
because it can “think and act like an airline and not the OEM” (Team Lead Aircraft Engi-
neering Services MRO 1). Thinking like an airline allows the MRO to achieve improved
levels of aircraft availability, reliability, and cost-efficiency. This understanding of the
airline is also limited in the engine segment as, as a Manager Engine Repair Services
explains: “do they [the OEMs] also have the experience of the operations? The proximity to
the airline, the proximity to the customer through operations? Do the OEMs have that per se?
In my opinion, you surely cannot accredit that to everybody [. . . ]. That they actually know
now how an airline works. And that they can also handle the complexity of the airline business,
I would say, to the expectation of the customer. In my opinion, many OEMs cannot perform
that.”
Operator experience is tacit knowledge, which is gained by servicing the aircraft and
customers’ operation directly. Being tacit, it is difficult to replicate for manufacturers,
since they do not operate the aircraft themselves and often use third parties to provide
Line Maintenance to airlines. Thus, airlines and MRO providers have a better knowl-
edge of the airplane and components in operation, which can influence customers in
their maintenance decision (Valtakoski, 2017).
The gap in operator experience is estimated to narrow in the future, as OEMs make
use of increasing levels of sensor technology, data transmission, and data analysis in
their products (digitization), which I explore further in the next section. Another factor
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that has to be taken into account is that manufacturers will gain more experience by
providing services in the future and thus narrow today’s knowledge gap.
Serviced Fleet (Incl. Data) Two main mechanisms have been identified by which a
serviced fleet acts a Key Resource that can be leveraged into a competitive advantage:
First, firms can build the just discussed operator experience and the associated service
capabilities by performing services on the fleet. Second, servitization literature argues
that manufacturers should aim to provide services on the installed base (i.e., fleet of
serviced aircraft in the aerospace industry) of their products (Wise & Baumgartner,
1999) to build data processing and interpretation capabilities that they can leverage to
cost and differentiation advantage against pure service providers (Ulaga & Reinartz,
2011). According to servitization literature, installed base data is a unique resource
for those manufacturers that systematically construct their equipment in a manner that
neither competitors, third parties or pure service firms can properly provide service on
their equipment (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011).
In the Aerospace Industry, MROs are however generally the established providers ser-
vicing this installed base. In contrast, manufacturers first need to increase their market
share to gain a comparable amount of serviced aircraft, which they have now achieved
to a varying degree. Besides, data is broadly available on legacy aircraft types while
on new types of equipment manufacturers establish barriers to third-party data access.
This serviced fleet is valuable, as increasing data-availability has the potential to lower
maintenance costs (Baines et al., 2007), which may result in a competitive advantage
for whoever has access to the data, be it OEM, airline, or MRO. To successfully lever-
age data, firms then require data processing and -interpretation capabilities, which are
elaborated in the Key Capabilities section.
Hence, the three questions that need to be answered are: (a) “how much value and thus
potential for competitive advantage can be derived from the data?”, (b) “who has preferential
access to operational data of the serviced fleet?”, and (c) “do MROs or OEMs possess superior
data processing and interpretation capabilities?”.9
In Aerospace, digitization has raised the debate about the utility and ownership of
the exploding amount of available data in aerospace, as well as who is best poised
to profit from these developments (Spafford et al., 2015; Valeika, 2015; Hoyland et al.,
2016; Shay, 2016; Canaday, 2017b). While some authors (e.g., Spafford et al., 2015) argue
that big data will be disruptive, other authors (e.g., Anselmo, 2017) and interviewees
(2, 7, 11, 16, 20) predict only incremental improvements in cost efficiency and aircraft
performance. This is because aircraft already have very high reliability (typically above
95%) and provide ample data that is used for maintenance optimization.
9Questions (a) and (b) are elaborated in this section, question (c) in the Key Capabilities section.
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However, a consensus exists that increasing availability of big data and analyzing ca-
pabilities will enable reduced costs and improved aircraft performance through meth-
ods as predictive maintenance (Brown, 2014a; Spafford et al., 2015). Another consen-
sus is that digitization will enable new, platform-based business models such as asset-
free component pooling or data consolidation and provisioning.10 These new business
models will however not replace maintenance, repair, and overhaul activities, as the
CEO of MRO 1 notes: “One thing is for sure, there will be no revolution. We will continue
having workshops that repair parts; engines need to be repaired, and also Base Maintenance will
continue existing in the future. Digitization doesn’t help here at all.”
So, does data generated by the serviced fleet enable competitive advantage? While
it is still too early to predict the exact amount of cost-reductions that can be reached
by digitalization (Shay, 2017b), interviewees estimate single digit up to 15% of MRO
cost-reduction through increased efficiency and reliability gains. Much of the effi-
ciency gains are enabled by predictive maintenance, i.e., the performance of mainte-
nance tasks, when required by a predictor and not by a fixed interval. For example, a
maintenance technician will inspect and change a tire, once indicated by a sensor and
not depending on a maintenance schedule that cannot take operational effects into ac-
count. Also, indirect effects on aircraft operating costs exist. One example is reduced
fuel burn of engines when maintained in optimal condition, or fewer disruptions in
operations if parts are changed at the hub before failure on outstations.
Increased data also raises opportunities for competitive differentiation. For example,
MRO providers can tailor offers more individually to the customer’s needs as improved
data improves their customer knowledge. Additional data may also enable MROs to
make further consulting offers to the customers that could increase their aircraft perfor-
mance or cost-efficiency. In conclusion, many opportunities exist to leverage the fleet’s
data into cost leadership and differentiation advantage, while the specifics still need to
be determined.
The second question is, whether MROs or OEMs are better poised to access and inter-
pret the data generated by the serviced fleet. Three distinct types of data exist that can
be combined and leveraged for competitive advantage: (a) sensor-generated data, (b)
operations-generated data (e.g., flight routes that inform about hot and sandy condi-
tions), and (c) data generated through maintenance events.
Sensor- and operations-generated data is per default property of the airline and thus
can, in theory, be accessed by both MROs and OEMs alike. Here, MROs can gain an
advantage against OEMs, as many airlines prefer to share data with a neutral inter-
mediator and not directly with the OEM (Spafford et al., 2015), to limit their OEM-
dependency. MROs are better poised to take this intermediator role, as CEO MRO 1
10First signs of these new business models are already visible as of today, e.g., Lufthansa Technik’s AVI-
ATAR Platform that collects and provides MRO-relevant data from different airlines (Shay, 2017b).
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confirms: “we are underway with the concept of an open platform, while the manufacturers
offer a closed system, in which I [the airline] have to even pay for the findings of my own data!
[. . . ] And of course, you don’t want that. Plus, there are many airlines — not all, but many —
that do not want to let the dependency on the manufacturer grow even further.” This depen-
dency is especially critical as OEMs encounter a conflict of interest as they determine
the timing of parts removal while they are inclined to sell more spare parts (Spafford
et al., 2015). However, it is common practice for manufacturers to gather certain pro-
prietary portions of data in encrypted channels that is not shared with the customer.
The third type of data is generated through maintenance events. This includes for ex-
ample findings of the mechanics during removal that are documented in maintenance
records. As Line Maintenance is regularly not provided by the manufacturer but by the
airline or the MRO provider, MROs have an advantage in accessing this type of data.
Manager Product Management MRO 1 illustrates with an example: “The OEM has the
advantage that he can in principle have access to data from all airlines [...] and the MRO has the
advantage to have access to in-depth data. That means knowing really everything from the con-
tracted airlines. It means knowing not only that a component has broken, Airbus knows that as
well [. . . ], but we also know exactly which washer has broken.” One challenge is to combine
and interpret these different types of data, which requires a capacity that is discussed
as the data processing and interpretation capability in the Key Capabilities section.
Product Sales Force, Distribution Network, Customer Relationships, and Channels 11
The product sales force and distribution network that underlies the hybrid offer sales
capability provides the manufacturer with close ties and privileged channel access to
the customer (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). Interviewees have asserted this claim, stating
that Engine and Aircraft manufacturers enjoy earlier access to the customer on a higher
organizational level (usually the CEO instead of the Technical Director), which allows
them to pre-shape the maintenance provider decision. This claim is confirmed by a
recent survey conducted by Oliver Wyman that shows an increasing willingness of
airlines to procure maintenance services at the time of aircraft purchase to pit one OEM
against another and secure beneficial long-term aftermarket contracts, often leaving
independent MROs out of the equation (Spafford & Rose, 2013). In many cases, this
enables the OEM to “bag the deal”, before MRO providers even know of it, as Manager
Product Management MRO 1 puts it: “They have the big advantage that they have the first
point of contact that you can have, every airline has to speak to them, that’s not the case for us.
And for sure they have the advantage that they can partly already put the pig in the poke before
we even knew that there was a pig.”
11This section all three business model elements as they are closely tied to one another and are difficult to
disaggregate.
12Source: Spafford & Rose (2013, p. 4). Sourcing of MRO services during the aircraft selection process
does not necessarily exclude MROs. For airlines, this timing decision is the most sensible to be able to
reap full bargaining power and transparently compare the full lifecycle costs.
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Figure 6.4: Timing of Airline’s MRO Sourcing Decision12
The manufacturers’ superior channel access through their sales force is however partly
offset by the MROs’ long-term trustful relationships with airlines regarding MRO ser-
vices. Additionally, the MRO’s sales force may initially be more effective, since a prod-
uct sales force needs to acquire additional knowledge and capabilities. The reason is
that sales managers have to transform from a passive recipient of a predefined offer
into more active participants in a value creation relationship typical for services (Ko-
walkowski et al., 2015). It has even been argued that a separate service organization
with a dedicated sales force should be created and a service culture needs to be built
to provide services successfully (Gebauer & Friedli, 2005). In practice, both Airbus and
Boeing have followed this logic by establishing separate service business units includ-
ing a dedicated service sales force.
In conclusion, unlike previously assumed, the manufacturer’s sales force is a unique resource
that provides manufacturers with a definite sustained competitive advantage. Instead, the source
of competitive advantage rather lies in preferential channel access. For MROs, long-term rela-
tionships that have created trust in the MRO’s service quality may provide a differentiation
advantage, at least until manufacturers have been able to gain legitimization and earn their
customers’ trust in the provisioning of services (Sirdeshmukh et al., 2002).
Product Development and Manufacturing Assets Manufacturers hold unique tangi-
ble and intangible resources relevant for R&D and production of goods, such as tools,
patents, and licenses that pure service firms do not possess. Unlike service firms, manu-
facturers can thus exploit spillover effects between production and service provision-
ing to gain a differentiation advantage against pure service firms (Ulaga & Reinartz,
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2011).
However, this proposed mechanism of unique service innovation has received only lit-
tle empirical support in the study, where interviewees did not report any mentionable
unique Value Propositions to airlines. One reason that was repeatedly mentioned by
interviewees was the high level subcontracting in the aerospace supply chain and the
associated limitation to systems integration on behalf of the airframer (Krol, 2011), as
the CEO of MRO 1 explains: “What is the actual added value that Boeing provides via Gold-
Care? Boeing is doing nothing besides system integration; Landing Gears are not overhauled
internally, engines are not overhauled, have a look at Boeing partnumbers: on a 737 or 787, of
these 600 partnumbers, Boeing can repair maybe only 200 - 250, the so-called Boeing partnum-
bers. The rest are all suppliers, so what Boeing is doing today in aftersales is nothing but a huge
integration service.”
The perception of the interviewees may, however, be somewhat biased, as manufac-
turers are the only ones legally entitled to approve certain repairs and modifications.
Also, Engine Solutions on new engine types in which the manufacturer is capable of
providing more maintenance cost guarantees than pure service firms.13 In conclusion,
some evidence of spillover effects between production and service provisioning exist.
The question, whether MROs or OEMs can differentiate their service offers thus de-
pends on the OEMs’ capability to better leverage those spillover effects in the future
and the MROs’ capacity to build offers that are based on their unique operator experi-
ence.
However, a different predominant mechanism of gaining competitive advantage by
manufacturing-related assets became salient in the study. By protecting access to in-
tellectual property rights and testing equipment, manufacturers systematically erect
entry barriers to servicing their equipment. These entry barriers constitute a positional
or cost advantage as they increase the MRO’s cost of competing or inhibit competition
altogether. Therefore, product development and manufacturing asset enable competi-
tive advantage, however not by differentiation but instead by the creation of barriers to
competition.14
Other MRO Key Resources The two remaining Key Resources of the MRO business
model, i.e., financial strength and manufacturing-specific resources have not received
empirical support as a source of competitive advantage for MRO firms against manu-
facturers. In contrast, dependence on manufacturing-specific resources is discussed
as one main contingency factor determining the MRO-OEM alliance formation (see
section 6.2.2). While financial strength is required to make necessary investments in
new generations of technology, the funds available to MROS as pure service firms are
13See the discussion of the Risk Management Capability in this section.
14See discussion in the section 6.2.2.
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dwarfed by the budgets regularly available for the research and development of air-
craft manufacturing programs. Hence, financial strength is instead a prerequisite for
competitive survival and many small MRO shops are not expected to be able to stem
the investments that are required for servicing new generations of aircraft.
Key Capabilities
Repair and Engineering Capability Manufacturers and pure service firms differ con-
siderably in both their repair and engineering capability due to their base in either
products or services. While for manufacturers, performing repairs was traditionally
seen as a “necessary evil” (Lele, 1997, p. 141), maintenance, repair, and overhaul is at
the heart of the traditional business model of MRO firms. Manufacturers do however
possess an in-depth knowledge of the product as they have designed and manufactured
it, possibly under the considerations of easy maintainability (Lele, 1997).
Engineering capabilities, on the other hand, are rooted in the manufacturers’ R&D de-
partments, which are at the core of their business model. Recent research suggests
that product and service innovation follow similar underlying mechanisms (Nijssen
et al., 2006) and that manufacturers can transfer their product-based engineering capa-
bilities for service innovation (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). However, other studies find
that in service innovation, increased interaction with the customer is required to make
the front-end of service innovation less “fuzzy” and positively affect innovation per-
formance (Alam, 2006). Hence, it is not apparent why one party or the other should
possess superior service-specific engineering capabilities.
However, interviewees perceived the MROs’ engineering and repair capabilities as
superior to the OEMs’ throughout the different segments, as they have been honed
through years of operator experience and the fact that MROs repair the equipment of
multiple OEMs. While the former allows MROs to accumulate tacit repair knowledge
and realize learning curves, the latter will enable them to fix errors that are outside
the scope of a specific OEM and benefit from knowledge spillovers between technolo-
gies.
One quote illustrates exceptionally well how tacit repair and engineering knowledge is
created through interaction with the technology: “The OEMs [...] only receive rudimen-
tary information about what problems are associated with [the operation of the equipment], and
there we are much closer, so we see the unserviceable units in our shop, we repair them and
our engineers think about: ’what could you do different, so that they are not these are not as
susceptible here or there’?” (–VP sales of MRO 1). This quote shows that MROs possess
service-specific repair and engineering capabilities that are closely linked to the prod-
uct in operation and that these specific capabilities are challenging to imitate through
development and production of equipment. Also, the Aeronautical Repair Station As-
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sociation (2013) reports that airlines prefer providers that can differentiate themselves
through repair capabilities that are based on operator experience and entail the ability
to find quick solutions to non-routine errors.
A second advantage arises as MROs possess repair capabilities across the equipment
of multiple OEMs (i.e., the multi-vendor capability). By servicing the equipment of
various manufacturers, MROs can participate on knowledge spillovers across products
and services, which is illustrated by the following quote: “we can learn across different
models of equipment: the new engine technologies are similar, first comes one manufacturer,
then the second, then the third. We can gather experience on all models.” (–CEO MRO 1).
In summary, a complex interplay of repair and service-specific engineering capabilities across
OEM platforms, operator experience, and the integration capability allows MROs to gain supe-
rior repair and engineering capabilities that they can leverage to gain a competitive advantage
against OEMs who do not possess these capabilities.
Multi-vendor Capability The capability to provide services on multiple types of OEM
equipment is unique to MRO service firms and allows MROs to provide repairs across
the boundaries of a single OEM. This capacity furnishes MROs with a differentiation
advantage that spans from finding solutions to problems that are outside the scope of
a specific manufacturer up to becoming a one-stop-shop for all of customers service
needs. The latter solution offer can reduce costs and complexity of operators that wish
to concentrate on their core business and rely on Aircraft Solutions to outsource their
maintenance needs (Schneider et al., 2013).
One quotation illustrates how the multi-vendor capability allows MROs to find and
repair errors outside of the scope of a specific OEM on a particular aircraft type: “We
have the view on the whole aircraft: if, for example, Pratt needs to perform a repair and the
failure does not concern the engine directly, then they are K.O. We, on the other hand, are a full
integrator that can exchange all parts. This is our Value Proposition on the one hand towards the
OEMs who themselves are giving performance guarantees, and on the other hand also towards
the airlines.” (–CEO MRO 1). Here, more value is created for the customer, especially in
solution offers, where the provider is responsible for the outcome and integrating the
repair of the equipment of multiple manufacturers.
The multi-vendor capability is of some, albeit more limited, value across different air-
craft types. The reason is that most MRO services are sourced individually per fleet,
e.g., a landing gear overhaul for a carrier’s A320 and B777 fleet would typically not be
procured within the same tender. Here, added customer value lies mostly in reduced
complexity by having to deal with only one instead of two suppliers. Furthermore, all-
encompassing Aircraft Solutions are mostly purchased by start-up carriers that usually
operate a single aircraft type and hence do not benefit from the multi-vendor capability.
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Some room for differentiation exists, however, as this example shows: A network car-
rier operating a diversified fleet of both Airbus and Boeing aircraft that wishes to install
a connectivity system for its fleet. If the operator prefers to deal with a single supplier
that is able to design one solution for its entire fleet, it cannot rely on the airframer but
requires an independent provider.
The manufacturers have realized the importance of this capability and the advantage
it gives to independent MROs. Hence, they are actively pursuing to build multi-OEM
capabilities, as David Longridge, Vice President of Sales of Boeings Commercial Avia-
tion Services stated at a panel at MRO Americas on 27 April 2017: “Airlines don’t want
an Airbus solution, an Embraer solution, and a Boeing solution. They want a service solution.
[. . . ] The rise of independent of MROs is proof of that.” (Trimble, 2017, p. 2). However,
it is highly questionable if manufacturers will be able to build multi-OEM capability,
as their competitors will try to inhibit all attempts to service their installed base and
additionally gain information about technical properties of their aircraft.
Data Processing and Interpretation Capability As discussed in the Key Resource sec-
tion, digitization and the inherent increase of available data can lead to competitive ad-
vantage through increasing cost-efficiency of MRO services as well as increasing aircraft
availability and performance. Also, we clarified that both OEMs and MROs can access
serviced fleet data, however with a different scope: While the OEM can potentially ac-
cess equipment-related data for its entire installed base, the MRO has potentially more
access to operations- and maintenance-related data.
Competitive advantage then arises if either party possesses the required capabilities
to transform the available data to superior service or solution offerings. To build these
service-related data processing and interpretation capabilities, manufacturers can make
use of their product development and manufacturing assets that provide them with an
in-depth understanding of their system to create unique customer benefits such as cost
reductions and productivity enhancements (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011).
Pure service firms lack this in-depth product-related knowledge, especially on new
types of equipment, which puts them at a disadvantage against manufacturers in this
field. However, they possess unique other resources and capabilities that they can
leverage in the process of building service-related data processing and interpretation
capabilities. First, their multi-vendor capability allows MROs to gather and analyze
a broader set of data than their manufacturing counterparts, making use of spillover
effects between equipment. Second, MROs can build independent platforms, such as
Lufthansa Technik’s AVIATAR that allow customers to perform health monitoring of
all their aircraft, engines, and essential components, irrespective of the manufacturer.
This creates unique value for customers that can access one single platform for all their
assets instead of multiple OEM platforms, with the associated usage costs and com-
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plexity. This one-stop approach, in turn, may enable them to gather even more data
than their manufacturing counterparts and further elaborate their data interpretation
capabilities. Third, by utilizing their unique access to maintenance- and operations-
relevant data, MROs are better able to link operating conditions, data generated by the
equipment, and its physical condition, which may allow them to make superior pre-
dictive models than their OEM counterparts that have only limited access to operating
and maintenance data.
In conclusion, it is questionable whether OEMs can create superior service-related data pro-
cessing and interpretation capabilities than independent service firms. The result is likely to be
contingent on the MROs’ data access and the manufacturers’ ability to link data to operations,
and superior service or solution offers. Alternatively, also new business models in which manu-
facturers provide their data-driven solutions on independent platforms may evolve in the future,
combining the strengths of both competitors.
Bundling Capability As manufacturers possess a product and service portfolio, they
possess the unique capability to bundle the pricing of both product and service com-
ponents in a seamless hybrid offer. MROs, on the other hand, are somewhat limited in
their bundling options, as they would first need to procure the product to then bundle
it with their service offers. In the Aerospace Industry, this is only regular practice in
Component Solutions, while the airline itself typically purchases or leases aircraft and
engines.
Bundling asset and service sales inseparably is a strategy that can be employed by ma-
nufacturers to achieve complete channel control, effectively inhibiting other firms from
competing (Stremersch & Tellis, 2002; Nalebuff, 2004). However, customers generally
prefer debundled pricing, due to the higher transparency in the procurement process.
Although debundled pricing results in more customer value and a higher willingness
to pay (Steiner et al., 2016), it has been shown to drive servitization failure (Forkmann
et al., 2017a).
Unlike MROs, manufacturers can bundle and hence to some extend cross-subsidize
product and service sales, by granting conventional discounts on equipment only in
case that service packages are selected: “the OEMs want to make money off [the MRO
market], so they will sometimes even sell the airplane at a lower cost, and they won’t make any
money on the airplane, but they will make money in the aftermarket.” (–Technical Operations
and Maintenance Instructor, Airline 6). If detected, manufacturers, however, refrain
from this practice, since its legality is rather doubtful if employed to a great extent.
For example, Rolls-Royce has successfully performed an inseparable bundling strategy
on its Trent engine, holding over 90% of all maintenance contracts in the past. Today,
however, Rolls and other engine manufacturers have abolished this strategy to dispel
anti-competitive concerns and to establish more competitive engine service networks
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(Shay, 2015b). Hence, bundling is nowadays less relevant in the aerospace industry to
create entry barriers.
Also, airlines usually demand debundled pricing of the asset (e.g., the aircraft or the
engine) and related service offers to (a) ensure a more transparent asset and service
buying decision, (b) reduce dependence on the OEM, and (c) establish competition be-
tween providers of service offers. A more subtle bundling option of manufacturers is
to offer more cash flow flexibility to airlines, discounting the initial purchasing price of
the aircraft, which is offset through higher MRO rates at a later point. This way, air-
lines can shift their capital expenditure in favor of future operative expense, which is
an attractive option for airlines under financial pressure.
Risk Management Capability My study confirms previous findings, according to which
manufacturers can gain differentiation advantage through their ability to assess and
manage risks associated with performance-based contracts, as they are better able to as-
sume their customers’ risks (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). Engine Product Manager vividly
sums up his perception of the situation: “we can’t assess the risk, we don’t know the engine
from a technical standpoint, we don’t know the prices, we only have an idea how they can de-
velop, so [pause] making a Flatrate offer is threatening our business. [. . . ] Well, the OEM is
actually the only one who can really do that.” (emphasis added by author).
Three mechanisms were identified on which manufacturers base their superior risk
management capability. First, they possess superior product design data and abili-
ties which allow them to better assess the service life of the product from a technical
standpoint and lower the level of risk before the product starts its operational phase.
Second, manufacturers are less exposed to risks as their ample profit margin on spare
parts15 acts as a risk buffer. In cases in which the product does not meet the perfor-
mance requirements, the profitability of the combined spare parts and service business
will decrease, however much less than for the MRO who has to carry the list price
not production costs of the replaced parts. A third advantage is the manufacturers’
ability to influence the profitability of the aftermarket business through material price
increases, which shift the risk back to the customer and third-party service providers.
In aerospace, manufacturers are typically able to increase the prices on spare parts, as
often little or no alternative to OEM spare parts exist. In conclusion, manufacturers
have superior risk assessment and -mitigation capabilities that are especially valuable
for offerings that involve assuming high levels of risk, such as engine maintenance.
Here, MROs are limited in their ability to offer solutions and hence suffer from a differ-
entiation disadvantage.
15Interviewees report unanimously between 500% to 1,000% profit margins on spare parts.
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Hybrid Offering Deployment Capability Manufacturers possess the unique hybrid of-
fer deployment capability, which is the capacity to “rely on flexible platforms that allow
for standardizing production and delivery processes while safeguarding its ability to
adapt to individual customers’ needs” (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011, p. 16). Recent research
has found that manufacturers indeed transfer manufacturing concepts to service pro-
visioning, “industrializing” services, in order to increase their repeatability, scalability,
and profitability (Kowalkowski et al., 2015). In the process, OEMs are confronted with
barriers of transferability of manufacturing-based models, as the underlying assump-
tions do not hold in service industries (Gro¨nroos & Ojasalo, 2004).
Hence, it is questionable whether the industrialization of services is a unique capability
of manufacturers, especially as unlike much of manufacturing it requires the standard-
ization of back-end processes while maintaining a customized front end (Miller et al.,
2002). In fact, interviewees reported the usage of lean methods to improve a variety of
services, partly with considerable results. One example is the reduction of component
repair TAT to about 30% of its initial value, allowing the company to return customers
components faster and reducing capital costs in their components solution offer.
Hence, the hybrid offering deployment capability is not unique to manufacturers. In-
stead, both manufacturers and pure service providers have taken efforts to adopt ef-
ficiency concepts such as lean methods from manufacturing to a service context. The
difference between both parties is that manufacturers typically adapt their product-
based platforms to fit for service-provisioning, while pure service firms directly apply
similar concepts on their service business. Therefore, it is unlikely that either party can
achieve a sustainable competitive advantage through this capability, as the efficiency
gained depends on how well the related activities are executed.
Conclusions: both manufacturers and pure service firms possess unique elements in their busi-
ness model that they can leverage into a competitive advantage. Not surprisingly, the manufac-
turers’ foundation of competitive advantage lies in their base in products, whereas MRO firms
can compete based on their service-based business model. Stating that one party possesses a
total competitive advantage over the other would be a simplification. Instead, different contin-
gency factors exist that favor either manufacturers or pure service firms in attaining competitive
advantage. These and other contingency factors that influence the MRO BMI path to form al-
liances with manufacturers are explored in the next section.
6.2.2 Alliancing with Manufacturers: a Contingency Approach
In this section, an empirically-founded contingency approach towards alliancing with
manufacturers from a service provider’s view is established. According to contingency
theory, a fit between a firm’s business model, strategic intentions, and the firm’s envi-
ronment needs to be achieved (Osterwalder, 2004; Zott & Amit, 2008; Demil & Lecocq,
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2010). Contingency factors are then those internal (e.g., firm- and offering-specific) and
external (i.e., market-specific) factors that determine which type of business model in-
novation is best suited to fit these particular circumstances (Davies & Brady, 2000).
This contingency approach contributes to our understanding of antecedents of alliances
between OEMs and service firms from the currently under-developed service firm side.
Considering the size and diversity of the sample relative to the size of the Aerospace
industry, it needs to be assumed that a practically relevant approach has been identified
that reflects the perception of managers in the industry.
Pure service firms that become partners in manufacturer-led solution networks are a
common theme in solution literature (e.g., Gebauer et al., 2013; Paiola et al., 2013),
which has due to its manufacturing-focus created very little knowledge regarding this
BMI path and the different types of network partner business models. Partnerships be-
tween pure service firms and OEMs also occur in the aerospace industry but have come
under critique regarding a lack of added customer value and sustainability for service
firms Schneider et al. (2013).
The pilot study showed however that MROs do not need to form alliances with manu-
facturers in every case to offer solutions. Consequently, forming a partnership is not
necessarily the best way to innovate the MRO’s business model in any given situation,
especially considering the aforementioned adverse side effects. Instead, contingency
factors exist that determine whether allying is the best response and may have an im-
pact on the type of alliance that will be formed (Mintzberg, 1979). Additionally, MROs
can pursue various configurations of partnerships with manufacturers, which differ in
many facets such as the Key Activities performed and the roles of each actor in the al-
liance. The contingency approach is limited to the alliance decision, i.e., whether or not
to form a partnership. The subsequent choice of which type of collaboration is most
beneficial is discussed in Section 6.3.
The contingency factors were identified through a cross-case analysis of theoretically
sampled cases including different outcomes of competitive advantage and the subse-
quent alliance decision (Miles & Huberman, 1984). The result of this analysis is illus-
trated in Table 6.2 and the factors that shape the alliance decision of pure service firms
are explored in the next sections.
For readers, it may come as a surprise that the main contingency factors that deter-
mine whether MROs enter alliances with OEMs stem from resource dependence theory,
which is a stark contrast to the alliance approaches that have been identified from the
manufacturer’s side (see Chapter 2.3). The reason for the difference in approach by pure
service firms lies in the fact that manufacturers are not only competitors and possible
partners but also the most important suppliers of MRO firms. Hence, a buyer-supplier
relationship between these pure service firms and manufacturers with considerable lev-
els of bargaining power of one party over the other exists. When manufacturers evolve
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Case characteristics Engine Components Aircraft
Description
Solution offer Engine Solution Component Solution Aircraft Solution
Main OEM Competitor Engine OEM Aircraft OEM Aircraft OEM
Main OEM Supplier Engine OEM Component OES Various different sources
Outcome Alliance / Competition Decision Alliance w/ Engine OEM • Alliance w/ OES• Competition w/ A/C OEM Competition w/ A/C OEM
Dimension Contingency factors Engine Components Aircraft
DRIVERS OF OEM 
BARGAINING 
POWER
Material dependence H M L
Material share ~ 60-70% ~ 30% ~ 10-15%
Availability of 
alternative sources L M H
IP / tool dependence H M L
IP necessity H M L
Tool necessity M H L
IP / Tool Imitability L M M
DRIVERS OF MRO 
BARGAINING 
POWER
Airlines Sourcing Practices
Fostering competition present present present
Short-term focus present present present
Industry Position & Environment
Affiliated Airline with 
sourcing campaign present present present
Legal Norms H H H
Table 6.2: Cross Case Analysis: Contingency Factors per Case
their role from suppliers to competitors through servitization, MRO-OEM interdepen-
dence serves as the main factor driving the MROs alliance decision. In the next sections,
the drivers of OEM and MRO bargaining power are analyzed in greater detail.
Drivers of OEM Bargaining Power
In the study, I identified five drivers of bargaining power of manufacturers against pure
service firms. These drivers are outlined in Table 6.3.
Material Dependence describes the MRO’s dependence on the OEM’s materials for
service provisioning. The magnitude of material dependence depends on the two
drivers (a) the material share, i.e., the percentage of material costs in total costs re-
quired to provide the service offering and (b) the availability of alternative material
sources besides the manufacturer.
The value created by returning a part of an aircraft or the aircraft itself into a serviceable
condition is created through services such as the performance of maintenance tasks and
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Dimension Contingency Factor Item Proof Quotas
DRIVERS OF 
OEM 
BARGAINING 
POWER
Material 
Dependence
OEM material share
The market entry of the component OEM has another facet, as 
it is not only our competitor but also our most important 
supplier. [...] And then [...] we have in many places a 
dependency, [as] we buy much of the material [...] from the 
manufacturer. When the OEM says at the same time ‘I would 
like to enter the market‘ then he does not have an interest in 
providing us with incredibly good material conditions.”
– Head of Business Development Strategy Component 
Maintenance MRO 1
Availability of alternative material 
sources
„We know of Honeywell that they buy all the Honeywell 
material directly after an aircraft is scrapped, they are very 
active. […] and we know of others that buy the surplus material 
to scrap it to shorten the supply.“ 
– Manager Procurement MRO 1
IP / Tool 
Dependence
IP necessity
“what is a massive determinant in the engine market is that I 
need the access to IP. I need the access to manuals and repair 
data. And if I am not a member of the club I don’t get it. And 
then I lack the basis for even performing repairs” 
– Manager Alliance Function MRO 1
Tool necessity
"The essential entry barrier [for component maintenance] is the 
test equipment for avionics. And because of data scrambling I 
can't re-engineer it, I can’t access it. And when I say: ‚I have a 
authorization in the supply support conditions that you have to 
make an offer“, then the usual approach is that the test bench 
costs twelve million. And then the business case is not worth it. 
[There is] for example a manufacturer on the B787 that has 
100% market share of repairs. We don’t have repair capability“ 
– VP Purchasing MRO 1
IP / Tool Imitability
"We [can] build an alternative test bench. The re-engineering is 
becoming increasingly difficult, the closer it is to avionics and 
the more electric is included. But everything that is mechanic, I 
think we are confident [to build]."
– Manager Alliance Function MRO 1
Table 6.3: Drivers of OEM Bargaining Power
the exchange of material or spare parts. The MRO’s dependence on manufacturers to
provide the service depends on the magnitude of material required to perform the ser-
vices. For services such as Base Maintenance that require only a small percentage of
parts, a low dependence on the manufacturer results, while services like engine main-
tenance with a high material share result in a much higher dependence. This effect is
magnified if the concentration of the supplier base is high, i.e., when most of the ma-
terial is provided by few, or even worse, only one supplier (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
In these cases, the bargaining power of the OEM is further increased, which is under-
pinned by contrasting the three cases:
In the Aircraft case, the overall material share for service provisioning is low with ap-
proximately 15% material share in the Line Maintenance and 20% in the Base Main-
tenance segment. Additionally, most of the materials are provided by the airframer’s
suppliers, distributors and third-party vendors which results in a low estimated mate-
rial share of 10-15% provided directly by the airframer.
In the Engine case, the material share is generally high, approximately 68%. In contrast
to the Aircraft case, the material is almost exclusively provided by the OEM, except for
some surplus and PMA material. On new engine types, alternative sources are scarce,
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and engine OEMs are actively working on “drying out” (Manager Procurement MRO 1)
the material market, which further increases dependence. In summary, a single OEMs
material share is estimated to reach 60-70% of total overhaul costs.
The component case is the best indicator for this factor: the dependence on the Original
Equipment Supplier can be characterized as medium for two reasons. First, the over-
all cost-share of material is approximately 60% of the offering and second, a medium
to a large share of the components on the aircraft are provided by the respective OES,
resulting in a total material share of the OES’ parts of approximately 30% of the Compo-
nents Solution offer. In contrast, the dependence on the airframer (the main competitor)
is considerably lower because the airframer supplies fewer components than its tier 1
OES.
Intellectual Property / Tool Dependence The second type of OEM-dependence results
from the requirement of the OEM’s intellectual property (e.g., instructions for contin-
uous airworthiness) and tools (e.g., test stands) that are required to perform mainte-
nance. The manufacturer has the possibility to decrease the MRO’s competitiveness
or prevent it from competing altogether by either restricting access to IP and tools or
charging prohibitive prices, which renders building MRO capabilities uncompetitive.
The OEM’s ability to protect the IP from re-engineering depends on the technology
used in the component: While repair manuals and testers for mechanical and hydraulic
units are comparably simple to re-engineer, while doing so on testers of electronic units
is less feasible and economical due to data encryption technology. Also, the techno-
logical gap of new technology versus previous versions of equipment influence the im-
itability intellectual property. The reason is that MROs can more easily re-engineer new
technology, which is similar to legacy technology, on which MROs still possess manu-
als. The effectivity of restricting IP access is widely accepted in market periodicals, e.g.,
Derber (2017, p. 2) states: “The acid test for whether CFM is serious about retaining an open
maintenance market will be the access it grants to LEAP technical documentation. By restrict-
ing this access widebody engine OEMs have made it near impossible for third-party providers to
offer competing aftermarket services on certain powerplants.” This assessment is shared by
one manager of the alliance function of MRO 1: “So, today you are not able anymore — at
least in some areas — or it requires massive investments, to be able to overhaul parts yourself
if you don’t have access to the documentation. And the CMM’s that are available regularly
have partly become thinner [. . . ]. The MROs actually need to create the ICA themselves, verify
themselves, test themselves.”16
Licenses OEMs use licenses to (a) moderate access to the aftermarket and (b) create
revenue streams from their service network. As licenses are theoretically not required
16CMM: Component Maintenance Manual; ICA: Instructions for Continuous Airworthiness.
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to perform MRO services but intellectual property, tools, and material discounts are
only granted to licensees, licenses are a rather mediators than moderators of OEM de-
pendence.
Manufacturers can limit themselves to either earning revenues only from license fees or
competing with their own service offers against their licensees (as e.g., in open engine
networks). In the latter case, the conditions stipulated in the license agreements directly
determine the competitiveness of the MRO provider, as is illustrated by one alliance
manager of MRO 1: “you have to trust that the license conditions are good enough that [you
can] still be competitive.” As licenses are a mediator, not driver of OEM dependence they
are not included into the list of contingency factors.
Drivers of MRO Bargaining Power
Just as for manufacturers, a set of conditional factors exists that increases the bargaining
power of MRO service firms, including airline’s strategic sourcing practices and envi-
ronmental (i.e., legal) factors. The business model innovation of becoming an OEM
alliance partner is contingent on these factors, as it enables MROs to enter negotiations
with OEMs to become partners in their service networks.
Airlines’ Sourcing Practices Airline’s strategic approach to the sourcing of MRO ser-
vices (or the lack thereof) affects the competitive prospects of MRO service firms. Inter-
viewees reported an interesting duality of procedures, on one side, increased awareness
of increasing OEM hegemony in the MRO market but similarly a short-term focus on
fixing the best available price for MRO services, even if this leads to increased market
concentration in the long term. I have labeled these two aspects “fostering competition”
and “short-term cost focus”.
Airlines have been sensitized of the risk of increased monopolization of the MRO mar-
ket and associated price increases since Rolls-Royce established complete market con-
trol with its Power-by-the-hour offering for the Trent engine (see proof quotas in Ta-
ble 6.4). As a consequence, operators increasingly foster competition by enforcing
their right to delegate their entitlements of the aircraft manufacturer’s product sup-
port agreement to their MRO provider of choice (see Figure 4.13). These entitlements
then allow MROs to access repair manuals and spare parts on behalf of the airline. This
limits the MRO’s dependence on the manufacturer, as the MRO can, in principle, access
all relevant information.
OEMs counter this source of MRO bargaining power by providing maintenance manu-
als that contain only sufficient information to ensure airworthiness, indicating whether
a component needs to be replaced. Information about repair methods and the required
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Dimension Contingency Factor Item Proof Quotas
DRIVERS OF 
MRO 
BARGAINING 
POWER
Airlines’ Sourcing 
Practices
Fostering competition
“I believe that it is the biggest risk for the MRO if everything 
runs via the airframer. Because monopolization increases even 
further and because of that less competition is taking place. 
And at the same time this is also the biggest risk for the airline. 
The awareness has already increased strongly due to [the 
development in the engine market]. Because everybody 
needed to sign with the OEM although they did not want to.” 
– CEO MRO 1
“The airlines have no interest in a shut-off market and I would 
say that the airlines would need to try to inhibit with tooth and 
nails that today something like Rolls-Royce happens again. 
Where there's no competition, you know what happens with the 
prices. The airlines have the huge problem that they can 
secure [maintenance] conditions during the sales of the asset 
in the best case for 10-15 years but the aircraft flies for 20-30 
years. That is the worst-case scenario in a negotiation because 
you only have two options: either you are at the OEM’s mercy 
or you can negotiate with him on equal footing because you 
have another aircraft campaign. Otherwise you are de facto 
quite screwed.“ – Manager Alliance Function MRO 1
Short-term cost focus
They just want to get their assets fixed, but in the long term this 
is going to hurt them, the pricing will be higher and higher 
because they are not doing the due diligence necessary to 
avoid monopolization in the market.”
– Technical Operations and Maintenance Instructor, Airline 6
“if an airline like easy Jet or Ryanair gets a good price with the 
OEM because they have high volumes and also constantly buy 
new aircraft, why should they be concerned regarding the rest 
of the world?” – Commercial Director Business Unit 1, MRO 1. 
Industry Position 
and Environment
Affiliated airline
“I think absolutely that [the affiliated airline] is the entry ticket. 
Without this lever, we soon would not exist anymore in many 
fields. I am firmly convinced of this.” 
– Manager Engine Repair Services, MRO 1
Legal norms
"[UTAS] said from the beginning: ‚we have probed from an 
antitrust perspective that it is enough to have three providers 
worldwide. So, in every country it needs to be possible to say: 
‚There are three different sources for the same product, the 
same service. That’s why we will issue three licenses.‘ And 
then they have not started to officially auction the licenses but 
they issued them only to someone with a certain footprint.” 
– VP Purchasing MRO 1
Table 6.4: Drivers of MRO Bargaining Power
tools is however increasingly restricted. Thus, airlines that foster competition between
manufacturers and MROs can increase the MRO’s bargaining power only to a certain
extent.
Another facet of airlines fostering competition is that some airlines even employ a de-
liberate sourcing strategy of sourcing products from the manufacturers while providing
services either internally or buying them from MRO service firms, as Director Finance,
Product Sales and Key Account Management of MRO 2 explains: “There are very few [air-
lines] that want to put all eggs into one basket, I know of one airline that is Asiana, where Tony
Fernandes himself as owner said that he wants to oblige the OEMs to only deliver aircraft, he
doesn’t want anything else to do with them, they should please only deliver the aircraft, and he is
playing Airbus and Boeing out against each other.” These types of airlines are actively shap-
ing the market, obliging OEMs to pass the relevant information to MRO service firms,
which is often conducted via some form of collaborative agreement. A third mecha-
nism that has increased the manufacturers’ openness of allowing competition was the
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severe reduction of engine value on the second-hand market, where airlines refrained
from employing this engine due to the lack of MRO options (Schofield, 2018).
However, also a short-term sourcing approach could be identified that are instead fo-
cused on “fixing a deal” with short-term competitive maintenance costs than establish-
ing a competitive cost position over the entire service life of the asset. Interviewees
perceived the reasons for this rather short-sighted approach as being (a) financial sac-
rifices required for establishing an independent service provider, (b) initially favorable
pricing for large airlines with sufficient bargaining power, and (c) focus on short-term
operating costs.
A Product Manager at MRO 1 explains the aggressive buy-in behavior of manufacturers
and the resulting financial sacrifices required for establishing a traditional MRO service
firm against a manufacturer: “and then again, the airlines say: ’okay, Airbus is entering
[this market], it now becomes more difficult to get a good price, because once a monopolist has
established itself, he can virtually set the price.’ But none of the airlines wants to be the ’golden
rider’ in the phase before that. So to say: ’[. . . ] I chose the underdog, to not let this happen’
because they are all somehow cost-driven and are looking for the best price. And that is what is
happening on the new aircraft types, there is a fierce price war.”
As shown in Table 6.4, large airlines with sufficient bargaining power are little con-
cerned with OEM monopolization of the service market, as they possess recurring air-
craft sourcing campaigns that they can use to re-negotiate MRO pricing with manufac-
turers. Consequently, these airlines can secure competitive pricing in the long term and
suffer limited sacrifices of a market consolidation.
A third point is that smaller airlines simply lack the strategic sourcing capabilities and
bargaining power to influence the MRO market in the long term actively. Hence, they
rather focus on achieving favorable maintenance conditions for the initial contract pe-
riod, as anything beyond this period lies outside of their scope or area of influence.
Industry Position and Environment This category refers to contingency factors that re-
sult from the MRO’s position in the industry (i.e., whether it forms part of an aviation
group and thus has an affiliated airline) and legal environmental factors that positively
influence MRO bargaining power. Due to the factors mentioned above, having an af-
filiated airline is regarded as a necessary condition for competitive survival in fields of
high OEM dependency. The reason is that an affiliated airline is more likely to bear the
costs and sacrifices for keeping the market open as these can be compensated through
benefits of the MRO business. CEO of MRO 1 remarks: “When the group buys aircraft
[. . . ] that is the only time that you have them [the OEMs] by the neck. Otherwise never. So,
it is in our own interest to stay part of the [aviation] group, [. . . ] only then we can enter the
new technology.” However, the affiliated airline is only an “entry ticket” to open negotia-
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tions, as the bargaining power is limited to the aircraft operated by the affiliated airline.
When OEM dependence is high, MROs need to conduct further negotiations to attain
a license to service third-party customers. Industry experts are unison in the opinion
that an affiliated airline is a prerequisite for continuing to provide services on a broad
scale. Consequently, independent MROs will have to focus on niches if they cannot
seek alliances with OEMs (Gubisch, 2011a,b; Brown, 2015).
In conclusion, airlines that foster competition by ensuring the MROs’ access to intel-
lectual property and material generally increase the MRO’s competitiveness. In areas
where high OEM dependence is present, an affiliated airline or investor is a necessary
condition for not being forced to limit the service portfolio to legacy equipment and
service niches. Consequently, it is very questionable, whether providers without this
support will be able to attain the required financial resources and economies of scale to
ensure competitive survival in the long term. VP and General Manager MRO 5 gives a
vivid testimony: “The days of the independent MROs are numbered. The reason for that are
the new airframes introduced by the manufacturers. These are game changers. They are pro-
duced differently from traditional airframes and those airframes produced in the next 2-3 decades
will continue to be different. The entire approach towards airframe maintenance will be different
if they continue down the road of building composite aircraft. Airframes from the manufacturers
have made it impossible to access this knowledge. The barriers are insurmountable.”
Legal norms or legal interventions may reduce OEM dependence by ensuring third-
party maintenance providers with access to intellectual property, testing equipment,
and spare parts. An example of this type of intervention is present in the automotive
industry where car manufacturers have utilized similar tactics as in aerospace to limit
competition on the service market. The European Commission has intervened various
times to ensure fair competition, arguing that the independent repair shops generate
consumer benefits by exerting competitive pressure on OEM-affiliated repair shops,
which exhibit price levels between 16% and 120% above their independent counterparts
(European Commission, 2003).17
17In the automotive industry, the first antitrust act was passed by the European Commission in In 2003,
aiming to provide all independent repair shops with access to all necessary technical information, tools,
equipment, including diagnostic equipment, and training (European Commission, 2003). Clauses that
inhibited OEM-affiliated repair shops from using alternative spare parts of matching quality were de-
clared as illegal as well (European Commission, 2007). Apparently, these efforts were not sufficient to
impede manufacturers from competition-limiting practices, which led to another intervention in 2007.
In that year, the European Commission declared it mandatory to provide all independent repair shops
in the EU with standardized access to all technical repair information at a price allowing competition,
since without the required information independent repair shops would lose their ability to compete
and be driven from the market (European Commission, 2010; Preiss, 2012). Following this regulation,
car manufacturers employed tactics to ensure customer retention and revenue creation by declaring
the loss of warranties on new cars if independent repair shops have performed maintenance tasks.
However, this tactic has been declared illegal as well by the European Commission in 2010 (Boston
Consulting Group, 2012). The currently final step was taken in 2011, in which the European Commis-
sion obliged manufacturers to release electronic data enabling the exact identification of replacement
parts for vehicles, further fostering competition (Wall, 2015).
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While direct legal intervention in the MRO market is not present at the time of writing,
the European Commission has started a preliminary inquiry in 2015, aiming to assess
whether airlines are forced into anti-competitive long-term contracts for engine mainte-
nance (Hollinger et al., 2015). It was launched after an IATA complaint about restrictive
practices of manufacturers preventing competition in the aftermarket resulting in exces-
sive profit margins for manufacturers and high costs for airlines. Currently, the inquiry
is limited to the CFM56 engine, the single option for the B737 and one of two options for
the A320 as well as the Trent XWB, the only option for powering the A350 (Hollinger
et al., 2015). At the time of writing, CFM and GE have signed an agreement with the
IATA to adopt MRO conduct policies that enhances the opportunities for non-OEM
MRO providers to conduct Engine Maintenance on the CFM56 and LEAP powerplants
(Walker, 2018). While manufacturers can design different aftermarket configurations
to comply with possibly increasing anti-trust regulations, the strategy to license a few
MRO providers seems to become the dominant approach.
Two main reasons exist, why coopetitive solution configurations are more beneficial
even for manufacturers than the workbench setup. First, allowing customers to choose
from different licensed providers is less legally questionable, as it enables the customer
to retain a choice in its maintenance decision and perform tenders between different
vendors. However, the license conditions are the main factor determining whether
traditional MRO shops can, in fact, be competitive contestants to the manufacturer or
not. Second, the residual value of the asset is decreased dramatically at a point when
the OEM remains as the only service provider and airlines are left without negotiation
levers for maintenance. In essence, who would buy a second-hand engine if main-
tenance costs cannot be secured long-term? These considerations do however mostly
hold only on larger assets as the engine or APU, where airlines hold direct maintenance
contracts with the manufacturer or MRO firms. For smaller assets that are typically in-
cluded in a Component Solution, manufacturers face less opposition if they shut-off
the aftermarket as airlines are only indirectly affected. Here, it is up to the aircraft
manufacturers to formulate proper PSAs with multiple vendors to ensure sustainable
competition both in manufacturing and services, as well as the efforts of airlines to
enforce these PSAs to keep their maintenance costs under control.
Integrative Framework
The multiple case study suggests that interdependence in the supply chain between
OEMs and MROs are the main drivers for the formation of alliances in the aerospace
industry. This finding is illustrated in the integrative framework displayed in Figure
6.5 that demonstrates the relationship between the different factors.
In summary, MROs need to form alliances with manufacturers in cases in which they
are dependent to a critical degree from the manufacturer’s material, repair manuals, or
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OEM – MRO 
INTERDEPENDENCE Formation of MRO – OEM alliances
Material dependence 
• OEM material share 
• Availability of alternative material 
sources
IP / tool dependence 
• IP necessity
• Tool necessity
• IP / Tool Imitability
Airlines sourcing practices
• Fostering Competition
• Short-term cost focus
Industry position and environment
• Affiliated airline
• Legal norms
DRIVERS OF MRO 
BARGAINING POWER
DRIVERS OF OEM 
BARGAINING POWER
Figure 6.5: A Contingency Model for OEM-alliance-oriented MRO Business Model Innovation
tools that are required for the maintenance, repair, and overhaul of the manufacturer’s
equipment. OEMs on the other hand, are dependent on MROs if these possess an affili-
ated airline with an aircraft sourcing campaign that can negotiate access to the required
resources. As a result, alliances between both parties are formed. Other factors that
moderate the formation of partnerships are legal norms, requiring manufacturers to a
certain extent to allow competition in the aftermarket, as well as airline strategic sourc-
ing practices that aim at establishing a competitive market. These practices are however
often limited and instead characterized of a rather short-term cost-driven approach.
These findings suggest that the formation of MRO-OEM alliances are mostly driven
to cope with interdependence, at least according to the perception of the interviewees.
This is an exciting finding since MROs can create considerable value to the OEM through
the alliance. Possibly, a shift away from a dependence focus towards a focus on the
benefits that can jointly be generated would allow MROs to create more and better
configurations in term of sustainability and added customer value.
6.2.3 Contingency Factors per Alliance Configuration
Even though only one case per configuration is available, propositions regarding the
factors that influence the type of setup could be identified. In general, the two-sided
configuration is the most advanced and beneficial type of alliance for the MRO, which
is followed by the coopetitive solution. The reason is that the two-sided solution allows
the MRO to take responsibility for the manufacturer’s service business and places the
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service firm at the interface between the manufacturer and the customer. The work-
bench setup is the least beneficial configuration due to the high dependence on the ma-
nufacturer that acts both as the single vendor of parts and the single customer. Coopeti-
tive solutions are placed in between these two configurations. Here, the MRO can com-
pete with other independent and OEM-owned service providers for customer contracts.
Hence, MROs should aim at establishing two-sided solutions, if the circumstances al-
low and otherwise opt for a coopetitive solution network. In contrast, the workbench
setup should only be pursued as a last resort to ensure competitive survival.
By comparing the cases, three main factors that influence the MRO-OEM alliance con-
figuration could be identified. The first factor is the existence of legal norms. While
in the Automotive Industry, the European Commission has intervened multiple times
to ensure a level playing field between manufacturer-owned and independent car me-
chanics, this intervention has not taken place (yet) in the aerospace industry. However,
manufacturers design solution networks with antitrust aspects in mind (see for exam-
ple the respective proof quota in Table 6.4). This fosters the formation of coopetitive
solutions over the workbench setup or the two-sided solution. The main reason is that
the manufacturer can ensure the legality of their aftermarket approach from an antitrust
perspective.
Second, the requirement of a multi-vendor capability to provide solutions was identified
as an influencing factor favoring the two-sided solution offer. In the Components Case,
the tier 1 supplier of the airframe manufacturer can provide Components Solutions
directly to airlines. This solution offer encompasses availability of aircraft components
that are offered by competitors. By alliancing with the MRO service firm, the OEM was
able to build the multi-vendor capability and provide integrated solutions successfully.
Without this alliance agreement, the manufacturer would have been confined to the
workbench setup with another integrator such as the airframer.
Third, the lack of success with the previous service offers was identified as an antecedent
of the manufacturer’s decision to deservitize and rely on the two-sided solution. The
Components Case was an example of the service paradox that has ultimately led to the
decision to outsource service provisioning to the focal firm. As further discussed in
the limitations section, these three contingency factors are only a first approach in ex-
plaining the fit between situational factors and the three MRO alliance business model
configurations.
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6.3 Configurations of the MRO Business Model
This section explores the four configurations into which MROs can develop their tra-
ditional business model. For a concise presentation, the focus is set on describing only
the differences between the types.
6.3.1 Stand-alone Solutions
Here, I discuss the innovations that MRO firms need to make to the nine elements of
their traditional business model to offer stand-alone solutions. It is important to note
that the solution business model does not replace the traditional MRO business model.
Instead, it is a different configuration in which new items are added, while items of the
traditional MRO business model may not be needed. For real firms, business model
elements of the traditional business model are likely to remain in place, as these con-
tinue to offer traditional services, as well. The resulting stand-alone solutions business
model is depicted in Figure 6.6.
Key Capabilities
• Repair and Engineering 
Capability
• Multi-vendor Capability
• Data Processing and 
Interpretation Capability
▼
• Integration Capability
• Risk Management
Key Resources
• Maintenance Network
• Operator Experience
• Serviced fleet
• Financial strength
• Tangible and intangible 
manufacturing-specific 
resources
Cost Structure
• Average cost structure for MRO Services: 48% labor, 46% material, 7% 
services
• Increase of material and service cost share to be expected
• Lower cost base by use of PMAs, DER repairs, surplus
▼
• Cost structure lowered by use of local partners
Key Activities
• Operational services: 
Line-, Base, Engine-, 
Components Repair and 
Aircraft Engineering
• Development of 
alternative parts- and 
repairs 
• Process optimization
▼
• Integration
Value Proposition
• Reduction of Direct and 
Indirect Maintenance 
Costs
• Service Quality
• Broad portfolio of basic 
and advanced services 
across aircraft platforms
• Airline Perspective
▼
• “Getting-the-job-done” 
• Technical Dispatch 
Reliability 
• Asset Availability
• Risk Reduction
• Customization 
• Financing of MRO 
services
Customer Segments
• Airlines
• Aircraft lessees and 
lessors
▼
• Component & Engine 
Solutions: virtually all 
airlines
• Aircraft Solutions:  
typically Start-up airlines 
with little in-house 
capabilitiesChannels
• Key account manager for 
dedicated personal 
assistance required
• Other channels (e.g. AOG 
desk) present
▼
• Intertwined IT Systems
Customer Relationship
• Often: long-term 
relationship driven by 
trust, cooperation, and 
cost-efficiency
• Increased MRO-Airline 
interdependency 
• Incentive alignment in 
pain-gain-sharing models
Revenue Streams
• Market growth mainly in China, Middle-East, and Asia Pacific 
• Segment growth mainly Engine- and Component maintenance
• Aircraft types newer than 2000s will represent 50% of market in 2027
▼
• Use-based and performance-based revenue streams
• Option: bundled/unbundled pricing of services
Key Partners
• Affiliated airline
• MROs
▼
• Local and specialized 
service partners
• Lessors
Figure 6.6: Stand-alone MRO Solutions18
18The figure shows the stand-alone solutions configuration of the MRO business model with the specific
items in italics. Elements of the traditional MRO business model that need to be further developed due
to increasing importance for the solution offers are displayed above, and new items are shown below
the arrow.
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Value Proposition
Getting-the-job-Done In stand-alone MRO solutions, the provider promises to “get-
the-job-done”, which involves assuming the responsibility for planning and performing
maintenance tasks and guaranteeing availability and reliability of either the aircraft, its
components or engines. This Value Proposition enables the airline trouble-free opera-
tions and focusing on the core business (Johnstone et al., 2008; Schneider et al., 2013;
Smith, 2013), which is the transport of passengers and cargo.
Just as in other industries, MRO solutions typically include the final service provision-
ing stage, which is performing the operational MRO services (Line, Base, Component,
and Engine Maintenance). A major limitation compared to other industries is that the
MRO cannot take full responsibility for the services performed on behalf of the cus-
tomer towards the aviation authorities. Instead, the responsibility for the airworthiness
of a fleet remains with the airline, impersonated through the function of the Postholder
Maintenance, who has to prove direct involvement and control regarding all mainte-
nance tasks towards the authority (Hinsch, 2012).
All three types of solution offers have in common that the MRO reduces the capabil-
ities, complexity, and manpower needed at the operator. This allows the customer to
focus on its core competence, however without delegating the responsibility vis-a`-vis
the authorities.
Technical Dispatch Reliability Aircraft reliability is the first important performance
indicator of MRO solutions and represents one of an airline’s most important perfor-
mance metrics (Ross et al., 2006). Aircraft Reliability is measured through the perfor-
mance indicator technical dispatch reliability (TDR). This indicator is calculated as the
percentage of flights that have taken off with less than 15 minutes delay (Niehues et al.,
2001). Delays that do not occur due to technical reasons are excluded from the fig-
ure (Bineid & Fielding, 2003). While for today’s mature aircraft, a TDR above 99% can
theoretically be achieved, figures between 95% and 99% are more realistic.19 For air-
lines, achieving a high TDR of their fleet is of utmost importance, as a reliable fleet is
a precondition for high punctuality, which in turn, drives airline profitability (Niehues
et al., 2001). Unreliable aircraft, In contrast, reduce the available capacity, which leads
to flight cancellations and the inherent adverse side-effects for passengers and airlines.
While Line Maintenance procedures have a direct impact on TDR, it is also directly in-
fluenced by components and engine availability (Bineid & Fielding, 2003). Hence, the
MRO has the opportunity to add value to the airline through all three types of solution
offers.
19For example, Airbus reported as advertisement a worldwide average reliability of the A350 of 98.8% in
December 2017 (Source: undisclosed customer communication by Airbus).
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MROs can influence the TDR in solution offers through SCAMT services such as relia-
bility management. The key is to provide these services better than an airline-internal
CAMO would. To achieve this aim, MROs can make use of their Key Resources and
Capabilities: for example, MROs can utilize their engineering capabilities gained on the
diverse serviced fleets of different customers to professionalize reliability management
and maintenance programs.
Asset Availability Availability is the second important performance indicator of MRO
solutions. The MRO provides asset availability in the components, engines or the air-
craft in the respective solution offering. The difference between providing availability
and assuming responsibility for availability is that in the former the MRO owns the
asset, while in the latter it does not. Aircraft availability is one of the major concerns
for airlines (Kaelen et al., 2014), due to its influence on airline costs, punctuality and
profitability (Niehues et al., 2001). Aircraft availability is defined as the average time
per day (in block hours) the aircraft is available for operational service:20
365∑
i=1
24− block hours reserved per day for maintenance
24
The value of increased availability for airlines results from the fact that aircraft only
have the opportunity to create profits when they are available for performing com-
mercial flights. When the aircraft is on the ground, fixed direct operative costs (e.g.,
insurance, depreciation/leasing fee) still need to be carried by the airline, while only
variable direct operating costs (i.e., flight- and passenger-related costs, such as fuel)
do not incur. An exemplary calculation for an A320 (included in the Annex in Section
1) shows that an airline loses approximately $31,000 contribution margin for each day
the aircraft is not available for operations. Also, higher aircraft availability allows the
carrier to reduce its maintenance reserve, i.e., the amount of aircraft reserved for sus-
taining the operations in case of unscheduled maintenance tasks (Niehues et al., 2001).
Higher aircraft availability is especially useful in hub-and-spoke operations, where it
results in an increased capacity to perform aircraft changes. Alternatively, the higher
fleet capacity can be used to serve more connections with the same fleet size.
In Aircraft Solutions, MROs can directly affect aircraft availability by different means
such as optimizing the maintenance plan to fit with the airline’s operation, extend-
ing maintenance intervals, or preventive maintenance methods to prevent unscheduled
maintenance (Niehues et al., 2001; Kaelen et al., 2014). One crucial task in improving
aircraft availability lies in optimizing the maintenance schedule of the airline to cope
20It is sensible to calculate aircraft availability over the entire business cycle of one year because more
maintenance work is performed during the winter months.
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with the seasonality of the airline business. Airlines require significantly more capacity
in the summer months, which is why the aircraft are predominantly scheduled for base
maintenance within the winter months. The MRO can optimize the availability of the
fleet by allocating mandatory work packages within overnight checks throughout the
year and scheduling C- and D-checks predominantly within the winter season. As with
TDR, engine and component reliability directly affect the overall reliability of the entire
aircraft.
Risk Reduction In stand-alone solutions offers, MROs provide value to airlines by as-
suming risks inherent in the operation and maintenance of their assets. In all three types
of solution offerings, the provider is responsible for solution performance outcomes
such as the engine, aircraft, and component availability and reliability and agrees to
pay a penalty if the predetermined KPIs are not met. Risk reduction is especially rele-
vant on new types of equipment where little experience has been gained, and teething
troubles may persist.
Since solutions are flight-hour and hence output-based, the risk regarding the main-
tenance costs over the lifecycle is transferred from the airline to the solution provider.
This aspect is especially crucial in the Engine segment, where high uncertainties regard-
ing maintenance costs over the lifecycle of the engine exist. Again, this risk is especially
pronounced on new engine types, where little or no experience is available regard-
ing the durability of engine components throughout operations, what makes providing
stand-alone solutions especially challenging for MRO service firms.21
Reduction of Indirect Maintenance Costs In contrast to traditional MRO service offers,
in which MRO is an external cost position for the airline, MROs have the opportunity
to address the airlines’ indirect maintenance costs (IMC) through solution provision-
ing. IMC accumulate to the considerable share of approximately 50% of total mainte-
nance costs (see Figure 4.17) and accrue from inventory, overhead, and maintenance
reserves.
Directly influencing these cost positions is only possible in solution offers because the
MRO can improve the airline’s maintenance plan and asset base. Potential savings vary
per solution and customer; however, industry consultants estimate approximately 30%
cost savings of Component Solutions compared to in-house service provisioning, due
to the pooling effect (Herbert & Morales, 2016). Additional savings can be achieved by
reaping economies of scale inherent in providing CAMO services to larger fleets, which
enables the airline to reduce the capacity of the internal CAMO function.
21Depending on the purchasing contract that the airline has signed with the manufacturers, some but not
all risks are covered by the manufacturer, not the MRO.
255
Chapter 6. A Strategic Approach for MRO Business Model Innovation
Customization In line with solution literature, interviewees stated that each solution
needs to be tailored to the individual airline’s needs to satisfy the airline’s demand
better. The amount of customization required depends on the level of intertwining of
the solution offering with the customer’s operations.
Engine Solutions are somewhat standardized, since engines are removed from the air-
craft and repaired remotely. Customization is required mainly in pricing due to dif-
ferent operating conditions that result in higher or lower levels of engine wear. Also,
customizing the maintenance plan to optimize the end-of-life of an engine can lead to
considerable cost savings. In Components Solutions, a medium level of standardization
can be reached: the solution provider and customer jointly determine the stock and
service levels of component pools at the operator’s line stations, as well as delivery
times. Just as engines, components are repaired remotely in workshops, which is a pro-
cess that can be standardized. Aircraft Solutions are the most customized since this type
of solution is highly intertwined with the operations. In a solution co-design phase,
the maintenance schedule, processes, and KPI are jointly defined to meet the airline’s
individual needs and standards.
Financing of MRO Services For airlines, financing is an important issue, as almost
half of the global fleet is leased from lessors such as GECAS and AerCap (FlightAs-
cend Consultancy, 2016a). Since leasing agreements are concluded independently from
MRO agreements, aircraft financing does not form part of the Aircraft Solutions Value
Proposition.
Component and Engine Solutions include financial services for airlines: Engine over-
haul is a very cyclical and the most important MRO cost position for airlines, accruing
to approximately 36% of all MRO costs (Cooper, 2017). Coping with these fluctuat-
ing operating costs can be a challenge for airlines, as the following example shows:
Assuming the costs of $5m per engine overhaul, a small airline with 12 single-aisle air-
craft (thus 24 engines) incurs a one-time operative expenditure of $120m in a single
year.22 In Engine Solutions, these expenditures are split into predictable flight hour-
based payments. These payments act like an insurance, in which the airline saves up
the required amount for the engine overhaul, with the provider assuming the risk of ex-
ceeding maintenance costs. Hence, a highly cyclical, risky cost position is transformed
into a predictable, usage-based cost position.
In Component Solutions, the MRO directly reduces the airlines’ investments through ac-
cess to its component pool, which eliminates the airline’s need to build its own pool of
components. MROs can also provide other financing services such as buy-and-lease-
back of the airline’s components, which is a common tactic of struggling carriers to
improve their cash position.
22Assuming that all engines need to be overhauled in the same year.
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Key Resources and Capabilities
To provide stand-alone solutions, the traditional resource and capability base of MRO
firms is not sufficient. Instead, the MRO needs to develop a set of new Key Capabili-
ties, of which the most important are integration, risk management, and multi-vendor
capabilities.
Integration Capability The integration capability is the capacity of the organization to
build one integral offering comprised of a bundle of different products and/or ser-
vices. Integration may be performed over several dimensions such as the MRO service
segments, OEMs, external service providers, or internal organizational units. While
literature highlights the importance of integration capabilities especially for system
integrators (Davies & Hobday, 2005; Hobday et al., 2005) the Aircraft Solutions Case
shows that integration capabilities are also required for solutions consisting of mostly
internally provided services. Instead of integration across different vendors, the focus
here lies on the integration across different organizational (business) units required for
assuming responsibilities and risks associated with performance outcomes.
In Component Solutions, the MRO assumes the role of an integrator of a full range of
equipment and services provided by manufacturers and third-party service providers.
Just as manufacturers, pure service firms need to build the integration capability to
provide a seamless solution package to its customers. Integration is achieved by coor-
dinating all actors along the supply chain, as well as material and information flows.
The appointment of designated individuals who are responsible for all integration tasks
was highlighted as a success factor for building the integration capability. An interest-
ing debate arose of whether integration provides value to the customer and is to be
treated as a Value Proposition or not. While some interviewees are of the opinion that
integration delivers value to the customer (e.g., VP Purchasing MRO 1: “In my view,
[integration] is the biggest value contribution. The customer gives a damn who has signed that
serviceable tag”), I rather agree with literature that states “customers are not paying just
for an integrated package of products and services. They are buying guaranteed solu-
tions for trouble-free operations” (Davies et al., 2006, p. 40). This statement is supported
by the Aircraft Solutions Case, in which the customer does not pay the staff required
for integration. Instead, the airline values trouble-free operations (the outcome of in-
tegration) at a predetermined performance level and the reduced internal complexity.
Hence, not integration itself but its outcome represents a Value Proposition.
Risk Management Capability As Solutions involve assuming the risk for performance
outcomes of the customer’s operation, developing the capability to assume, manage
and mitigate risks becomes a central issue for solution providers (Ulaga & Reinartz,
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2011). Specific risk management capabilities need to be developed internally at the
MRO provider for all three types of stand-alone solution offers: In Aircraft Solutions,
the MRO required the capacity to manage risks across different dimensions such as
the manufacturer’s equipment, internal business units, and external service providers,
such as local Line Maintenance specialists. Due to the complexity of this system of
risks, assuming responsibility for aircraft TDR and availability is a challenging task.
In Component Solutions, the risk of component availability needs to be assumed. This
was however seen as less of a central theme by interviewees, possibly due to the lower
level of complexity of inter-related service providers and the MRO’s ability to opti-
mize component pool stock levels according to the requirements of the customer. In
Engine Solutions, the risk of exceeding maintenance costs was stressed as the most se-
vere and possibly endangering the business of traditional MRO firms. Here, MROs are
challenged especially on new types of equipment, as offering engine flatrates without
proper risk management capabilities was seen at MRO 1 as “threatening our business.”
(Engine Product Manager MRO 1). In conclusion, risk management is a Key Capabil-
ity for solution provisioning and a possible determinant of whether solutions can be
provided stand-alone by the MRO or only in alliance with a manufacturer.
Multi-vendor Capability While MROs make regular use of their multi-vendor capabil-
ities in the traditional business model to provide services for the equipment of various
manufacturers, this capability is not sufficient for solutions. For example, MROs can
be forced to integrate parts or services from their competitors, usually if they are more
price-competitive in a particular service segment. In Component Solutions, this means
that overhauled material from specialized component MRO shops is used to benefit
from cost advantages. As utilizing competitors’ services comes at the expense of inter-
nal workshop utilization, integrating these parts or services constitutes the “acid-test”
(Davies et al., 2006, p. 42) for MRO firms. Establishing this capability poses challenges
as in the traditional business model, relying on competitors’ service offers is not re-
quired.
Data Processing and Interpretation Capability The data processing and interpretation
capability introduced in the traditional MRO business model includes the capacities to
capture, adequately exploit, and convert this data into actionable knowledge (Kamp
et al., 2017).
Recent servitization literature highlights the importance of this type of capabilities for
providing solutions under the label of smart servitization (Kamp et al., 2017). Also
in the Aerospace industry, increased availability of big data on aircraft drives the im-
portance of data interpretation capabilities in general and for solutions in particular.
The reason why these capabilities are of higher importance in solutions is that they are
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directly linked to Value Propositions that solution providers make to their customers:
Data processing and interpretation enables MROs to perform predictive maintenance
which has the potential to increase aircraft TDR and aircraft availability at reduced
costs (Spafford et al., 2015). For MROs that compete with stand-alone solutions based
on aircraft performance parameters, this capability is especially critical, which is why
they need to extend their data processing and interpretation capabilities to differentiate
their offers from manufacturers and other service firms.
Key Activities
Integration The activity of integrating goods and services from internal and external
sources becomes one of the MRO’s Key Activities to provide solutions. Internal inte-
gration is the incorporation of service offerings from a variety of internal organizational
units which may possess their own distinct services, goals, sales force, service devel-
opment units, customer channels, and other elements into a seamless offering that is
professionally presented and delivered to the customer.
Solution delivery takes place through a single customer front-end, consisting of a cen-
tral sales force capable of selling the solution offerings and a local customer service
representative responsible for maintaining the customer channel. The focal company
has improved the capabilities of the central sales force to sell modular integrated offer-
ings, to not “send a bus-load full of people to the customer anymore” as one interviewee puts
it, saving resources and nerves both at customer and MRO provider. The personal key
account manager at the airline’s site is responsible for internal and external integration,
serving as the single customer front-end during the service delivery phase.
The second facet of integration relates to the external integration of the MRO provi-
der’s capabilities and processes into the customer’s local organization. This aspect is
most important in Aircraft Solutions since this offering is highly intertwined with the
customers’ operation. For Aircraft Solutions, integration includes connecting IT sys-
tems (e.g., the maintenance information system AMOS) and establishing various cross-
company processes. Hence, external integration is a type of co-specialization, which
requires bridging technological, organizational, and often cultural barriers.
Key Partners
Solutions in the aerospace industry are mostly delivered by relying on a network of
Key Partners to cope with challenges resulting from the global scale and technological
intensity of the industry. In the next two paragraphs, both the usage of local and spe-
cialized service partners by MROs and OEMs as well lessors as possible future partners
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are discussed. In contrast to coopetitive or two-sided solutions, OEMs are explicitly not
partners in this type of configuration.
Local and Specialized Service Partners To provide solutions, MROs often rely on a
set of local or specialized service partners to locally complement their maintenance net-
work and to extend their capacities or capabilities. In Aircraft Solutions for example,
local Line Maintenance providers or the customer’s Line Maintenance unit are used
since they can provide Line Maintenance services at new destinations with more flexi-
bility and cost efficiency than MRO providers could with their internal staff. Using the
customer’s Line Maintenance unit also yields the advantage that (a) political costs for
a solution offering can be mitigated and (b) the customer is enabled to build internal
engineering and Line Maintenance capabilities to insource engineering, fleet manage-
ment, and Line Maintenance at a later point in time.
To provide Engine Solutions, manufacturers often rely on a network of risk-sharing part-
ners, which results in both the workbench and coopetitive solution configuration. How-
ever, MROs can, in principle, provide Engine Solutions stand-alone without a partner
network if they possess the required risk management capabilities. To provide Compo-
nent Solutions, MROs often rely on Logistics providers as these can transport component
to the different pooling and line stations around the world more efficiently than internal
units could.
Lessors We discussed earlier that MROs could provide airlines and lessors with air-
craft transition management services as a “neutral arbitrator of interests” between the
two parties. In a solution-based business model, partnering with lessors represents
an appealing alternative for MROs, as MROs could target to offer a new type of dual
Aircraft Solution: For airlines, the MRO would guarantee aircraft availability and per-
formance at a fixed rate per flight hour, just as in regular solutions. For lessors, the MRO
would create value by retaining a maximum of asset value by proper maintenance and
documentation as well as usage of original parts.
Also industry consultants have suggested that MROs partner more actively with air-
craft lessors to develop joint value propositions for airlines at the point of aircraft selec-
tion. In this logic, MROs could offer their comprehensive resources, capabilities, and
services together with the lessor at aircraft purchase and thus retain channel control
from the airframe manufacturers (Spafford & Rose, 2014). According to this study, 80%
of MROs have considered partnering with lessors, while 60% of the lessors expect in-
creased cooperation (Spafford & Rose, 2013, 2014). Lessors are a promising partner for
MRO providers, considering that the rate of leased aircraft has risen from 7% in 1985 to
42% in 2015 (as depicted earlier in Figure 4.18).
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Interviewees (23, 24, 26) however perceived lessors rather as customers than partners
and proposed to build specific Value Propositions for targeting their pain points. Man-
ager Product Management MRO 1 explains: “There is no cooperation with lessors, which
would mean that a lessor would suggest us as MRO or so. That would improve our market
position. But it does not exist, and the lessor doesn’t have the interest to do that. They don’t
want to propose a certain MRO; they want to propose a certain quality of MRO. But they are
not interested in a certain MRO because then they would force an airline to go to this MRO
what maybe it doesn’t want to do that on other aircraft types.” (emphasis added by author).
Contrasting to this statement, a significant majority of lessors favor pairing MRO ser-
vices with lease agreements for both, commercial (63%) and asset marketability (100%)
reasons (Spafford & Rose, 2013).
In my opinion, MROs should pursue alliances with lessors more actively, due to vari-
ous reasons. First, lessors are often involved at the time of aircraft purchase and thus
a powerful channel intermediary. An alliance with lessors could therefore dramati-
cally improve the MRO’s chances in participating in the initial tender involving both
asset purchase and maintenance contract (Spafford & Rose, 2013). Second, they can
combine their resources and capabilities and streamline the cumbersome aircraft tran-
sition phase as a neutral expert between lessors and airlines. Hopefully, it is probably
only a matter of time until some MROs define better Value Propositions that fit both the
lessors’ and the airlines’ needs and thus considerably improve their position in the sup-
ply chain. One approach could be to develop a two-sided solution not only for MROs
but also for lessors that would be interesting for start-up airlines and lessors alike that
wish to minimize the effort and risk usually associated with lease returns. Especially
start-up airlines would profit from these services as it is more difficult for them to ne-
gotiate beneficial lease contracts. This service would ensure compliance with the doc-
umentation requirements stipulated in these contracts and lower the risks of lengthy
and costly lease returns.
Besides, the usage of PMAs is often not permitted in the leasing agreement, which can
however partly be alleviated through the involvement of the MRO. The improvement
of conditions for using PMAs through negotiations with lessors should be a top prior-
ity for MROs, as these represent unique sources of competitive advantage that MROs
possess against OEMs. Thus, alliances with lessors would allow the airline to use alter-
native materials to lower their DMC, improve the competitive position of the MRO and
significantly reduce complications associated with the lease return process. If, in turn,
manufacturers establish themselves as the lessors’ MRO solution partners, the battle
for who provides MRO services for leased aircraft is from the beginning.
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Customer Segments
In the context of solutions, servitization literature suggests to segment customers ac-
cording to their preferences about product ownership and user behavior (Manzini &
Vezzoli, 2003; Matzen, 2009; Barquet et al., 2013). In the Aerospace industry, product
ownership does however only play a limited role, as both the aircraft and the engine
are commonly either owned by the airline or leased from a third party. Hence, own-
erless consumption is rather a common misconception of servitization literature than
regular business practice (Baines & Lightfoot, 2014), at least in this industry. One ex-
ception are Component Solutions, where airlines can choose to either access a common
parts pool with other airlines or the management of their own parts.
The Customer Segments (and size of the market share) that MROs can target by offering
solutions, depends on the solution type: Component Solutions are generally contracted
by all types and sizes of airlines. However, the most value can be created for airlines
with less than approximately 250 aircraft in a single fleet, as here most pooling effect can
be achieved. Virtually all airlines rely nowadays also on Engine Solutions, especially
on new technology aircraft. In consequence, not offering Engine Solutions will signifi-
cantly limit the prospects in the vital engine segment that makes up approximately 36%
of the MRO market (Cooper, 2017).
By offering Aircraft Solutions, the MRO can tap into the customer segment of start-up
airlines that have limited internal capabilities to ensure airworthiness and perform fleet
management. Even though these airlines may later insource engineering and SCAMT
tasks, Aircraft Solutions represent an excellent opportunity for establishing an in-depth
customer relationship which can be the basis for future service offers to these growing
carriers.
Customer Relationship and Channels
When relying on Solutions, customers become increasingly dependent on the supplier,
especially when they outsource ownership of the equipment and core processes and
capabilities (Bharadwaj et al., 1993; Windahl & Lakemond, 2010). At the same time,
the provider is more dependent on the customer, as it increasingly relies on Revenue
Streams from operations of the hopefully successful customer (Windahl & Lakemond,
2010). To balance the increased, reciprocal interdependencies, firms align interests be-
tween buyer and supplier through performance guarantees, long-term commitment,
and pain-gain sharing models (Penttinen & Palmer, 2007; Windahl & Lakemond, 2010;
Kowalkowski et al., 2015).
In the Aerospace industry, customer dependence is increased through solutions to var-
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ious degrees, depending on the type of solution offer. Component Solutions are typically
contracted for a duration of approximately five years, after which the access to the com-
ponents pool can be terminated. If the airline relies on additional services such as spare
parts logistics at their home base, switching suppliers becomes more complicated due
to the required de-entangling of IT-systems and the fact that tacit knowledge needs to
be transferred to the new provider.
Engine Solutions are typically contracted between eight or ten or even up to 15 years,
after which the contract can be awarded to a new supplier. Switching a supplier is
however only possible if alternative suppliers to the OEM exist, which has not always
been the case on all engine types. In these cases, airlines were locked-in into the buyer-
supplier relationship, which has resulted in severe price increases and the loss of air-
craft and engine resale value (see Section 5). Aircraft Solutions are the most integrated
type of solution offer and hence cause the highest level of mutual interdependence.
Both airline and MRO must make idiosyncratic and local upfront investments to set up
the required resources, capabilities, and channels. Once established, both parties have
a high reciprocal dependency: the airline’s performance depends on the MRO provi-
der, while the MRO provider incurs penalties and loss of reputation if service levels are
not held. Also, everyday operations become highly intertwined, raising exit barriers of
the customer: “Once you are tied with a customer through such an essential service, like Line
Maintenance — providing the aircraft for the next flight — then you can’t be replaced, well
you can be replaced but not that easily.” (Team Lead Aircraft Engineering Services MRO
1). Thus, the relationship can be characterized as strategically integrated (Anderson &
Narus, 1990), and the complete insourcing of the CAMO organization required strong
efforts and can typically span several years.
In line with solution literature, placing Key Account Managers as knowledge integrators
and communication channel at the customer site (Hakanen, 2014) is very common in the
aerospace industry. Especially Aircraft Solutions require extensive local staff directly
at the customer’s operation to conduct fleet management services that are tailored to
the customer’s operations. Hence, sufficiently skilled key account managers that can
cope with complex customer problems are of increased importance, when providing
solutions.
Cost Structure and Revenue Streams
Cost Structure In contrast to manufacturers, MRO firms do not require an extensive
reconfiguration of their cost structure for building a service organization to provide
stand-alone solutions (Gebauer et al., 2005). Instead, they can rely on their internal
service network, products delivered by manufacturers, and external partners to provide
the required products and services that make up the solution. Especially the use of
local service partners has the potential to considerably lower the cost structure since
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the secondment of staff on a large scale leads to a considerable increase in labor costs.
However, increasing one-off costs incur for building, training, and certifying a local
labor force to work according to the processes and quality systems of the MRO.
Increasing costs also incur for integrating the different service components into one
seamless solution. In the Aircraft Solution case, for example, the focal company is
compensated on a flight-hour basis for the contracted service segments individually
but does not incur any revenues for the managers that are responsible for integration.
Hence, integration needs to be cross-financed internally through various service offers.
These additional labor costs per segment are however insignificant compared to the
considerable MRO costs that typically arise when servicing COPS such as aircraft.
Revenue Streams Solutions in the Aerospace industry are typically a combination of
use- and performance-based revenue streams, which have been broadly discussed in
literature (e.g., Tukker, 2004). In all types of Aerospace solution offers, the use-based
agreement of payment per flight-hour is the predominant revenue stream. In Engine
Solutions, a fixed fee is paid, per hour the engine is used23, Component Solutions grant
access to the component pool, based on a fee per flight hour, and Aircraft Solutions are
typically priced per flight hour, as well (Seidenman & Spanovich, 2016a; Smith, 2013).
This primary revenue mechanism is complemented by performance-based elements, which
involve KPI (e.g., TDR and availability) to determine the payments through penalties
and gain-sharing models. While the service elements making up the solution can be
priced either bundled or unbundled (Stremersch et al., 2001; Forkmann et al., 2017b),
airlines prefer unbundled pricing to increase transparency and be able to assess the
MRO’s competitiveness in each service segment (interviewees 7, 11, 15, 23).
Conclusions
In conclusion, MROs do not require an alliance with manufacturers to provide a broad set of
stand-alone solutions. As long as manufacturers provide their manufacturing-related equip-
ment, such as spare parts, repair manuals, and test stands to MROs, these pure service firms
are well-poised to provide stand-alone solutions. Instead, the manufacturers’ strategies to sup-
port their downstream movement are the root cause of the need to develop alliances. Besides,
servitization also creates opportunities for pure service firms that can support manufacturers in
servitization or even take over parts of their service business.
23Due to the considerable wear of an engine during the take-off, flight cycles are typically part of the
pricing equation; a flight-hour flight-cycle ratio is used to determine the price of the solution offer.
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6.3.2 The OEM Workbench
In the OEM workbench configuration, the MRO provides mainly time- and material-
based maintenance services as the manufacturer’s sub-contractor. As described earlier,
this setup is disadvantageous compared to other, more advanced, configurations, due
to a high dependence on the MRO, and the loss of customer channel. This section cov-
ers the changes that MRO providers must perform to the elements of their traditional
business model to reach the OEM workbench configuration (displayed in Figure 6.7).
Key Capabilities
• Repair Capability
▼
• (Engineering Capability)
• (Data processing and 
interpretation capability)
• (Multi-vendor Capability)
Key Resources
• Maintenance Network
• Serviced fleet
• Financial strength
• Tangible and intangible 
manufacturing-specific 
resources
▼
• (Operator Experience)
Cost Structure
• Average cost structure: 48% labor, 46% material, 7% services
• Increase of material and service cost share to be expected
▼
• Abstention of use of alt. materials offset by discounts on OEM material
• Often considerable one-off costs to enter alliance
• Creation of facilities in countries with low labor rates 
Key Activities
• Operational services
• Process optimization
▼
• (Development of 
alternative parts- and 
repairs)
Value Proposition
• Reduction MRO Costs
• Service Quality (internal)
▼
• Portfolio of basic repair 
services for OEM’s 
products
• Risk Reduction of service 
business 
• Financing of MRO 
Services
• (Airline Perspective)
Customer Segments
• Aircraft lessees and 
lessors
▼
• Manufacturer as only 
customer segment for the 
particular technology
• (Airlines)
Channels
• Key account manager 
• Other channels
▼
• Multiple channels to OEM 
(supplier & customer)
• Loss of channel to airlines
Customer Relationship
• With airlines: long-term 
relationship driven by 
trust, cooperation, and 
cost-efficiency
▼
• OEM: Creation of multi-
faceted relationship
• High one-sided 
dependency
Revenue Streams
• Market growth mainly in China, Middle-East, and Asia Pacific 
• Segment growth mainly Engine- and Component maintenance
• Aircraft types newer than 2000s will represent 50% of market in 2027
▼
• Considerable OEM Revenue Streams
Key Partners
• Affiliated airline
• MROs
▼
• Aircraft-, Engine-, and 
System OEMs
Figure 6.7: The OEM Workbench Configuration24
Value Proposition
In this configuration, the MRO provides basic repair services to the OEM, who typically
integrates these services into the own solution offer. One example is the Engine Case
in which the MRO provides dis-assembly, assembly, and testing services to the OEM.
The manufacturer, in turn, provides spare parts, performs the underlying engineering
tasks, and operates the communication channel with the customer.
24The Figure shows configuration-specific elements of the MRO business model in italics. Elements of the
traditional MRO business model that need to be adapted are displayed above the arrow, items that
need to be developed or discarded are shown below. Items of the traditional MRO business model that
have only limited application in this configuration are displayed in brackets.
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MROs can add value to the OEM’s Product Service System by providing MRO repair
services at lower costs than an internal service function would, especially if economies of
scale, pooling effects or learning curves are present (Cohen et al., 2006). Providing cost-
reduction to the OEM differs however from airlines as the dimension of comparison
is a different one: While for airlines, the MRO’s repairs need to be more competitive
than an in-house repair or a repair service offered by a competing MRO, repairs for
manufacturers need to be more competitive than the production of a new part. With
margins on spare parts up to 1,000%, cost savings through repairs can be achieved
only on fewer part numbers than in the traditional business model. However, for large
portions of aircraft components ranging from engine parts, hydraulic and pneumatic
units, and avionics, the repair is still more economical than the production of a new
part. On some assets, the repair is limited to dis-assembly, exchange (not repair) of
parts, re-assembly, and testing.
Service quality has been qualified as an essential enabler of a business relationship with
airlines, however with limited potential for competitive differentiation and gaining
price premiums. For manufacturers, service quality is especially important because
a lack of service quality disrupts internal operations and since customers perceive the
service provider’s quality as the manufacturer’s quality. Besides, even ramifications for
the production business are possible, if customers attribute a lack of service quality to
a lack of product quality (Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013; Nenonen et al., 2014).
Hence, service providers should aim at providing consistent, high-quality services to
minimize image risks, when they work as a sub-contractor. As many of these ser-
vices are better provided by an external specialist than an internal unit, network part-
ners support the manufacturer in achieving a differentiation advantage (Bustinza et al.,
2015). One Manager in the Alliance Function at MRO 1 underlines these previous find-
ings: “The OEM depends on the MRO because he is the one that performs the services in the
aftermarket and makes sure that [the OEM’s] reputation and quality are kept on a high level”.
However, focusing on service quality is not enough to become an OEM alliance partner,
as manufacturers strictly require meeting target cost levels. For example, at the time of
writing $90 per manhour is the established acceptable labor rate for an engine overhaul
in Europe.
Compared to the traditional MRO business model, MROs lose the ability to make use of
their airline perspective, as the Value Proposition is limited to basic services and the fact
that these services are delivered directly to the OEM, not the final customer. Compared
to more advanced alliance configurations, the MRO requires however comparatively
low capabilities to understand the manufacturer, due to the transactional relationship
that entails only basic services and the input-based pricing mechanisms.
For manufacturers, a servitization strategy is associated with a variety of risks, such as
financial risks, or risks associated with outcome-based offerings (Neely, 2008; Helander
& Mo¨ller, 2007). Hence, manufacturers need to build the capabilities to recognize and
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mitigate these risks if they want to add services to their business model successfully
(Benedettini et al., 2015). MROs can provide value to the manufacturer in the work-
bench configuration by reducing both the risk and the financial exposure associated with
entering the service business. This mechanism becomes apparent in the Engine Case,
where the manufacturer can share the risk of shop utilization by relying on a network
of service firms that are guaranteed only a certain amount of shop load events per year.
By assuming these risks, MROs even become dependent on the commercial success of
the particular aircraft type that drives the future demand for MRO services. The Head
of Corporate Strategy of MRO 1 vividly sums up this situation: “we have become part of
this risk game. So, we are part of the chain: the airframer needs risk partners Engine, Engine
needs risk partners on the side of the aftermarket. So, we have become part of this chain”.
Besides limiting the risk, these arrangements also limit the financial exposure associ-
ated with servitization which becomes apparent in both, the Component and the En-
gine Case: The component manufacturer’s investment required for pursuing a servi-
tization strategy is limited by relying on the MRO’s global asset supply system and
maintenance facilities. The engine manufacturer on the other hand benefits from cut-
ting investments in the joint overhaul facility by 50% and the financing of the stock of
engine parts at this facility by the MRO. Also, these arrangements also limit the finan-
cial exposure associated with servitization, as the engine manufacturer does not need to
stem the investment in the facilities that comprise the service network. Besides, the ma-
nufacturer can significantly reduce its warehousing and financing costs for the stock of
spare parts, as the partners are required to purchase these parts before utilization while
being compensated for the material used only after completion of the engine overhaul
event.
Key Resources and Capabilities
MRO firms require considerable financial resources to enter OEM alliances, which are
coupled with the underlying ever-increasing financial requirements for all actors in the
high-technology aerospace supply chain (Esposito, 2004). Through the case studies,
three major types of investments were identified in the workbench configuration: (a)
construction of (joint) overhaul facilities, (b) financing of spare parts, and (c) license
fees.
However, the investment for the construction of overhaul facilities and the financing
of high-value spare parts is required to build repair capabilities on new equipment —
irrespective of whether an OEM alliance is entered or not. In contrast, sharing the in-
vestment between partners even lowers the financial requirements for MRO capability
building. This effect is however offset by the license fees that are typically charged by
the OEM. Hence, financial stability is a priority not only for manufacturers but also for
services firms that need to extend their service business to new technologies to ensure
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long-term competitive survival.
Gaining or improving access to the manufacturer’s resources has been identified in this
study as the key driver for the alliance decision with manufacturers. These resources
include especially instructions for continuous airworthiness, test equipment, licenses,
and material. In accordance with Schneider et al. (2013), interviewees perceive the al-
liance as the only way to gain access to these critical resources, as the following quote
shows: “The MROs need the OEMs for the intellectual property, access to the data, so it is
forcing them into a collaboration.” –VP and General Manager MRO 5.
While gaining access to these resources ensures the possibility for competitive survival,
it does not result in a competitive advantage against other members of an OEM service
network. The reason is that all workbench partners are typically provided with similar
conditions to foster competition within the system.
In the workbench setup, MROs use mostly their repair capabilities that they use to pro-
vide repair services to the manufacturer. More advanced services that include engi-
neering tasks or dynamic feedback loops are not included in this type of configuration,
which is why engineering capabilities are of much less use than in the coopetitive so-
lution configuration. Since the MRO does not provide services and solution offers to
end customer, the usability of the multi-vendor and data processing and interpretation
capabilities is significantly reduced.
Key Activities
In the workbench configuration, operational services (e.g., engine overhaul) are provided
not anymore to the airline but only to the manufacturer. Changes to the traditional
MRO business model regarding how these services are performed may require sub-
stantial dynamic reconfiguration capabilities. One example is an engine overhaul event
that is performed according to the manufacturer’s engineering working instructions
that differ considerably to the engine overhaul conducted in the legacy business model.
Here, the driver for the different approach are the much lower material costs for the
manufacturer (production costs instead of the list price), which result in a more course
approach in workscoping. The focal company’s managers highlighted the fact that ex-
tensive co-specialization capabilities are required to adapt the operational service to the
OEM’s requirements and master the mental changes associated with this change.
In alliances that adhere to the workbench configuration, the MRO dispenses with the
development of alternative parts and repairs and uses the manuals and materials provided
by the manufacturer only. As performing these engineering tasks is one of the Key
Activities of the traditional business model, service firms require considerable dynamic
capabilities to change not only work instructions but also the mindset of their staff.
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Key Partners
Servitization drastically increases the importance of both, the affiliated airline and ma-
nufacturers as Key Partners for MRO service firms in all three alliance configurations
(workbench setup, coopetitive solution, and two-sided solution). The reason for the
increased importance of the affiliated airline is that OEMs limit the MROs’ access to
manufacturing-specific resources such as ICA, spare parts and testing equipment in
their pursuit of service revenues (Schneider et al., 2013).
Consequently, the vast majority of interviewees (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
16, 20, 22, 23, 24) named the affiliated airline with a sufficiently sized aircraft sourcing
campaign as the “entry ticket” to open negotiations with the manufacturers aiming to
receive access to these resources. As Manager Repair Services Business Unit 1 MRO 1
describes: “I think absolutely that this is the entry ticket. Without this lever, we soon would
not exist anymore in many fields. I am firmly convinced of this”. The size of this lever de-
pends on the size of the airline’s sourcing campaign. Airlines placing large orders are
equipped with high negotiation power and can consequently make far-reaching de-
mands, as Emirates’ influence on Airbus’ A380 program demonstrates (N.N., 2014a).
The aircraft selection process provides airlines with two levers to grant their MRO of
choice access to the required resources. The first lever is the product-support-agreement
(PSA). It is part of the aircraft purchasing contract in which the aircraft manufacturer
commits himself to support the operations of the aircraft. The PSA grants airlines with
diverse rights including the right to attain spare parts from aircraft and components
OEMs, guaranteed lead times, access to ICA, amongst other benefits. The airline del-
egates these rights to its MRO of choice who can then demand the required tangible
and intangible manufacturing-specific resources from the aircraft and component ma-
nufacturers (see Figure 4.13). The second lever is the selection of aircraft components
and systems for which multiple vendors exist, such as typically wheels and brakes, the
auxiliary power unit, or avionics components. In these negotiations, the airline can ne-
gotiate the MRO’s access and pricing to the required manufacturing-specific resources
directly with the respective manufacturers.
Without the sourcing campaign, the MRO is very limited in attaining the manufacturer-
specific resources required for building repair and engineering capabilities, as a Man-
ager Market Research and Competition MRO 1 describes: “Without this source fleet you
are out because the IP access by the airframers is very limited. That means the airframers them-
selves or the [. . . ] system OEMs grant licenses and the ones who first order the aircraft receive
these licenses first”. However, the source fleet provides the MRO provider only with the
capability to offer services to the affiliated airline. If the MRO plans to provide services
to third parties, it needs to enter into further negotiations with aircraft-, components-,
and engine manufacturers.
269
Chapter 6. A Strategic Approach for MRO Business Model Innovation
Due to the service infusion of their business model, all three types of manufacturers are
increasingly seeking to complete their service networks via different kinds of alliances
with MRO firms. In their study, Spafford & Rose (2014) differentiate between different
types of agreements that allow us to draw some conclusions about the frequency in
which the of the various configurations occur.
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Figure 6.8: Types of Collaborative Partnerships between MROs and OEMs 2013-2014 (adapted
from Spafford & Rose, 2014)
Figure 6.8 shows that licensing service providers to conduct MRO tasks is the most
common type of agreement. Licensed services can either resemble the workbench or
the coopetitive solution network configuration, depending on the type of license agree-
ment. Agreements to share or co-develop intellectual property are likely to resemble the
coopetitive solution configuration most closely, as value-added services are provided
from the MRO to the OEM.
Joint Ventures and other arrangements can resemble the two-sided solution configura-
tion if aftermarket services are only provided by the Joint Venture or the MRO service
firm. However, it is difficult to make exact assumptions about the frequency of each oc-
currence as the properties of the different alliance agreements are often not made pub-
licly available. However, Spafford & Rose (2014) report difficulties of MRO providers
to build deeper relationships beyond simple license agreements that are beneficial to
both parties. These difficulties underline the need for MROs to create advanced dy-
namic capabilities, to create additional value for both OEMs and airlines and reap the
resulting benefits.
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Customer Segments
The OEM workbench setup is a network structure in which the manufacturer holds all
customer contracts and subcontracts certain service tasks to its partners. This results
in a dual change for the MRO, who retains the OEM as the only customer and is forced
to give up airlines as a Customer Segment for that particular service offer. However,
even this setup may result in additional business that can be generated through the
manufacturer (Lockett et al., 2011; Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013), if the MRO can gain
a larger market share than with the traditional MRO business model or stand-alone
solutions. This is reflected in the Engine Case, where the focal company’s Joint Venture
becomes a “not exchangeable part of the system” (Head of Corporate Strategy MRO 1),
being one major of approximately ten overhaul facilities worldwide. The new setup is
a departure from previous market structures in which often more than twenty overhaul
facilities supplied services for the worldwide demand.
Customer Relationship and Channels
Whereas MROs and OEMs have traditionally entertained a buyer-seller relationship
with the OEM being the supplier, OEMs emerge through servitization as competitors
that provide aftermarket services. While in the former buyer-supplier relationship
OEMs have tried to maximize their aftermarket profits by increasing material prices
with an average of 5-7% annually (Whyte & Von Oertzen, 2001), now they addition-
ally aggressively compete against MROs for airlines’ service contracts (Schneider et al.,
2013).
By forming MRO-OEM alliances, crucial, multifaceted relationships are established, in
which the OEM simultaneously takes the role of a supplier, partner, and customer for
MRO services. These relationships can be characterized as strategic alliances that are
typically designed to span decades of aftermarket support, require high idiosyncratic
investments and result in mutual interdependence. While the MRO depends on the
OEM to receive parts, documentation, and support, the OEM is dependent on the MRO,
since the MRO is responsible for providing aftermarket services, with a direct influence
on the OEM’s performance and company image (Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013; Nenonen
et al., 2014).
In the workbench setup, the MRO suffers from a relatively high one-sided dependency
from the manufacturer. The reasons are that the manufacturer is simultaneously the
only supplier for material, the single customer for services, and the only channel to the
market. This leaves the MRO without alternative options on both sides of the supply
chain and hence in a very confined, dependent position. A silver lining is that the MRO
may have some limited bargaining power against the OEM if it provides a considerable
271
Chapter 6. A Strategic Approach for MRO Business Model Innovation
percentage of overhauls within the network. However, the level of profitability that can
be achieved with this configuration is likely to be very low.
In the workbench setup, multiple Channels are established between MRO and OEM, in-
cluding material, service supply, and delivery channels, as well as managerial channels
to manage the alliance. The number of Channels in a workbench setup is more limited
than in other, more advanced configurations, as here only input-based services and ma-
terials are exchanged, while the exchange of value-added services or the management
of a joint aftermarket offering does not take place.
Cost Structure and Revenue Streams
In the aerospace industry, OEM alliances may constitute considerable Revenue Streams
for MRO firms. As in 2027 roughly half of all legacy technology will be replaced by air-
craft of newer, post-2010 vintage (see Figure 4.22), alliances will drive Revenue Streams,
especially in the Engine Segment. However, also in the Component and Line Mainte-
nance Segment, in which Component and Airframe OEMs are expanding their service
offerings while relying on MROs for the fulfillment, growth of OEM-based Revenue
Streams is to be expected. MROs that adhere to the workbench setup will see a de-
cline in airline revenues which are replaced by turnover with the OEM. Hence, they
are challenged to make these arrangements profitable, in spite of the high one-sided
dependence on the OEM.
By partnering with manufacturers, MROs may be able to gain preferential access to
spare parts, however at the expense of the usage of alternative sources such as PMAs,
DER repairs, or surplus material. This also becomes relevant in the workbench setup,
in which all workbench partners typically receive similar commercial conditions for
spare parts. Additional one-off expenses do however incur to establish the alliance,
which involves paying a license fee to the manufacturer. Also, changes in labor costs
may occur if joint facilities are constructed, typically in countries with comparatively
low labor rates.
Conclusions
MROs that engage in the workbench setup can realize two main benefits when entering this
configuration with an OEM. First, it allows them to ensure their competitive survival and
continuing participation in the service market on a certain type of technology. Second, becoming
an OEM workbench partner may even allow them to increase their share of service turnover on
that particular type of technology. This increase occurs if larger parts of the world fleet are
serviced compared to a completely open market with more competitors.
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However, the workbench setup has the major drawback that the MRO becomes a second tier
supplier of MRO services in the value chain, behind the OEM, who becomes the MRO’s only
customer on that particular technology. Hence, the MRO loses market access, its direct Chan-
nels, and Relationships with the Customer Segments that are now served by the OEM. Since the
MRO himself could have potentially contracted these customers in other types of configurations,
taking the workbench setup means effectively surrendering the service market to the manufac-
turer. Airlines and MROs alike should insist on direct, independent MRO service offers, to
ensure competition in the MRO service market.
6.3.3 The Coopetitive Solution
In coopetitive solutions, the MRO becomes a partner in a network of typically indepen-
dent and OEM-owned repair shops, which compete with each for customer contracts.
The cooperative aspect of this arrangement is that the OEM contributes to the alliances
by equipping the MRO with all manufacturing-specific resources required to perform
repairs and offer solutions (e.g., a license, repair manuals, spare parts, and tooling).
The MRO contributes by providing overhaul capacity to the network of facilities and
adding value to the manufacturer’s service network, e.g., by providing value-added
services such as mobile engine repairs and by improving the manufacturer’s repair
and service-relevant engineering capabilities.
The competitive aspect of the arrangement is that both OEM and MRO compete simul-
taneously for customer contracts with their service and solution offers. One example
that resembles this configuration is the open maintenance network that has been pro-
claimed by the engine manufacturer CFM for the service of the LEAP engine series. In
this network, CFM has licensed third-party providers such as AFI KLM, SIATEC, and
Lufthansa Technik to perform maintenance work and engine overhauls for the Leap 1A
and 1B engine (Derber, 2018).
Value Proposition
In principle, MROs can make the same Value Propositions to airlines than in stand-
alone solution offers; however, some differences do exist: For example, MROs increase
the credibility of their brand and service quality by marketing themselves as OEM-
certified service partners (Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013). For manufacturers, the service
quality of their partners is less important than in the workbench setup because cus-
25The figure shows the coopetitive solutions configuration of the MRO business model with items that
have undergone a change from the workbench setup and stand-alone solutions in italics above the
arrow. Additional elements that need to be developed from the workbench and stand-alone solutions
configuration are displayed below the arrow.
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• Multi-vendor Capability
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• Tangible and intangible 
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Cost Structure
• Average cost structure: 48% labor, 46% material, 7% services
• Increase of material and service cost share to be expected
• Abstention of use of alt. materials offset by discounts on OEM material
• Often considerable one-off costs to enter alliance
• Creation of facilities in countries with low labor rates 
Key Activities
• Operational services
• Development of 
alternative parts- and 
repairs under tight 
supervision and control
• Process optimization 
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• Getting-the-job done
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reliability, customization, 
and risk reduction
• Reduction of Direct and 
Indirect MRO Costs
• Airline Perspective
• OEM-certified service 
quality 
to OEM:
• Portfolio of basic repair 
services
• Risk Reduction of service 
business 
• Reduction MRO Costs
▼
• Value-added services
• Improve OEM's Service 
Engineering Capabilities
• Customization
Customer Segments
• Airlines
• Aircraft lessees and 
lessors
▼
• Manufacturer is customer 
for value-added services 
• Access to OEM’s 
customer segments, 
reduction of overall 
population of service 
firmsChannels
• Key account manager 
• Other channels
▼
• Multiple channels to OEM
• OEM may serve as sales 
channel to new customer 
segments for value-added 
services
Customer Relationship
• Airlines: increased 
interdependency and 
incentive alignment
• OEM: multifaceted 
relationship including  
competitor
▼
• Aspiration: relationship on 
“equal footing”
Revenue Streams
• Market growth mainly in China, Middle-East, and Asia Pacific 
• Segment growth mainly Engine- and Component maintenance
• Aircraft types newer than 2000s will represent 50% of market in 2027
▼
• Revenues generated with end customer airlines, not OEM
• Additional revenues possible through access to OEMs’ customers
Key Partners
• Affiliated airline
• MROs
• Aircraft-, Engine-, and 
System OEMs
Figure 6.9: The Coopetitive Solution25
tomers hold direct contracts with the service partners and hence a lack in service quality
is less likely to be attributed to the manufacturer.
Just as in regular solution offers, the airline perspective remains a Value Proposition,
which is of even higher significance in the coopetitive solution configuration. The rea-
son is that it can be used to differentiate the own service offers from the manufacturer’s
competing offers. To do so, the MRO must make the credible proposition that it will be
capable of understanding the airline’s needs better than the OEM based on its operator
experience.
The portfolio of basic and advanced services is not necessarily only offered to airlines, but
also the OEM partner. One example is the mobile engine service offer from the Engine
Case, which is a value-added service that is provided by the focal company not only for
its own customers but also on behalf of the manufacturer. Engine mobile services are
a set of micro repairs of the engine that are performed on-wing and allow for reducing
the overall maintenance costs, while simultaneously improving the reliability of the
engine.
The Engine and Components Cases show how the MRO helps to improve the OEMs
service engineering capabilities by sharing engineering know-how and operational expe-
rience in coopetitive solutions and two-sided solutions. The information of how the
equipment operates and needs to be maintained serves as an input into the NPD, aim-
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ing to improve future generations of hardware. Vice President Sales MRO 1 describes
the value contribution vividly: “[We] develop repairs, also design-improvements [. . . ] when
[you] operate a part for five to ten years, then you can see its weaknesses, and then you can
maybe also develop suggestions for an upgrade”.
Value Propositions formulated for OEMs are highly customized and the result of an al-
liance negotiation phase that typically spans several years. They may range from single
services in which the MRO provider acts as an extended workbench, over additional
value through advanced services such as a reduction of maintenance costs through
engineering support in coopetitive solutions up to assuming the responsibility of all
aftermarket activities in two-sided solutions. As a manager alliance function MRO 1
recalls: “These are contracts that are started on a blank page, we don’t take any prefabricated
[. . . ] contract, we start from zero. We have a few other clauses that can be copied, but besides
that, everything is newly developed and newly invented together with the partners. These [are
all] different models, [. . . ] each project, each OEM, each business case is too individual as to
copy and paste.”
The level of customization depends on the configuration of the alliance: in the work-
bench setup, typically less customization is required, since the MRO provides standard
repair services for the OEM, often in its own facilities. Although this type of t&m con-
tracts contains collaborative aspects, such as giving a license and intellectual property
to the MRO, less customization is required compared to the coopetitive setup or the
two-sided solution. In these types of alliances, MROs and OEMs co-develop intellectual
property such as repair methods and improvements to parts which are shared through
dynamic feedback loops. Calibrating this kind of advanced service offers requires more
customization than providing operational services, as for example, pain-gain sharing
models need to be put in place.
Key Resources
Just as in stand-alone solutions, the MRO can make use of its Key Resources and its
Key Capabilities such as the maintenance network, operator experience, and multi-
vendor capability to provide solutions to airline customers. In regards to the alliance,
the main difference to the workbench setup is that these resources and capabilities are
also applied to provide value-added services to the manufacturer.
Especially service-specific repair and engineering capabilities built on operator experience
are valuable to manufacturers, who possess comparatively limited service-specific en-
gineering capabilities. The reason is that the MROs mechanics and engineers can gather
tacit service-specific knowledge that is valuable for designing alternative, more price-
efficient repair methods, developing maintenance programs and even improving the
OEM’s equipment to make it more failure resistant. In contrast, the manufacturer’s de-
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sign and engineering capabilities are geared more towards research, development, and
production of goods.
The CEO of MRO 1 vividly explains the tacit and valuable nature of these capabilities:
“from this knowledge from over 20 years you can make very valid assumptions. You would not
think so, but the ability to repair and also to have developed repair methods and to have observed
their development over ten years, those are topics [. . . ] that the manufacturers don’t have. [. . . ]
and because they exactly don’t have this type of engineering they look for example for us, to build
this [capability] jointly.”
The value of these capabilities becomes more pronounced when service firms depart
from the workbench setup and provide more value-added services to their manufac-
turing counterparts. Examples for the application of these capabilities are collabora-
tions that aim to improve the product’s design to allow for easier maintenance. As
these service-based capabilities are valuable, non-substitutable, and difficult or time-
consuming to imitate, they represent Key Capabilities that the MRO can utilize in its
collaborative business models. However, the MRO needs to be cautious to not improve
the repair capabilities of manufacturer-owned shops to an extent in which it will de-
crease the value that can be provided long-term to the alliance. As spillover effects
are not entirely avoidable, the MRO should aim at keeping these capabilities internally
while taking over more service-related responsibilities in the joint solution offer.
Key Partners
Key Partners take the same roles as in the stand-alone solution and OEM workbench
configuration and are consequently not discussed separately in this section. Nonethe-
less, differences in the Relationship with manufacturers in this configuration are dis-
cussed in the respective element of the business model.
Key Activities
MROs that venture beyond the workbench setup into coopetitive solution have the op-
portunity to provide a range of value-added services to manufacturers that can, for
example, aim to lower the OEM’s maintenance costs or improve their service-related
engineering capabilities. In coopetitive solutions, the role of the MRO hence changes
from a provider of simple repair services to a partner that contributes with its unique
resources and capabilities to add value to the network (Lusch et al., 2010). The develop-
ment of alternative parts and repairs has been identified as one of the MRO’s Key Activities
in the traditional business model that is applied significantly differently when changing
from a stand-alone to a coopetitive solution.
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In the traditional MRO business model, developing alternative parts and repairs was
used to improve the competitive position versus the OEM through lower costs or im-
proved performance of the repaired parts. In coopetitive solutions, it is used instead to
help the OEM to increase the competitiveness of its service offer. This implies changes
in logic that are nicely summarized by the Manager for Repair Services at Business
Unit, 1 MRO 1: “I believe that [developing alternative repairs] is something that the OEMs
are looking for with us. Right now, for example, we would like to introduce a major repair
with [Engine Manufacturer 1] that does not exist in the manual yet. [. . . ] [Also,] we have
made contracts with [Engine OEM 2] for the joint development of repairs. But it happens
under supervision and in tight coordination and not independent from the manufacturer. That
means, we can contribute with our engineering know-how and our competence but not as a free
radical but under strict control. And it always has to fit the business case of the manufacturer.
For example, [the repair] has to compete with manufacturing costs, not list prices, and it must
be significantly lower than manufacturing costs because I don’t develop it for a marginal delta.”
(emphasis added by author).
Developing alternative parts and repairs thus represents a Key Activity that allows the
MRO to depart from the workbench setup into higher-value business model configu-
rations, however under close supervision and control as part of the OEM-led service
network.
Customer Segments
Compared to the workbench setup, is not forced to serve the OEM as the only customer
but can sell its solution offers directly to former and new airline customers. Manufacturers
remain a customer segment, albeit a much smaller one compared to the workbench
setup, and relies mostly on value-added services. Besides, it is common practice for
manufacturers to subcontract repair services to the service network, e.g., in case the
own facilities reach their capacity limit.
Coopetitive alliances may also enable growth through access to the OEM’s customers,
with which business may be generated either directly or indirectly via the OEM (Lock-
ett et al., 2011; Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013). Increasing contact with these possibly dif-
ferent customers allows MROs to gain valuable knowledge to support their service
innovation activities (Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013) and sell value-added services, even if
the customer is contracted by the OEM. Also, MROs may be able to gain larger market
shares than in non-alliance business models, since manufacturer-led service networks
typically involve fewer service partners compared to the legacy setup. However, MROs
have difficulties in contracting those Customer Segments that prefer OEM over MRO
service offers.
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Relationships and Channels
MROs that employ the coopetitive solution configuration can, in principle, establish
the same Relationships and Channels to their airline customers as in the stand-alone
solution setup. Changes compared to the workbench setup appear towards the ma-
nufacturer, who in this configuration is not only supplier, partner, and customer but
also a competitor. This added dimension complicates the relationship and creates ten-
sions since network partners demand a level playing field between OEM-owned and
independent service partners, which is not always the case — at least according to the
perception of the interviewees. Instead, it is reported that manufacturers capture the
most attractive customers for themselves while spreading the risk of less attractive cus-
tomers, capacity utilization, and investment needs among the network partners.
Manager Product Management Engine Services, MRO 1 recalls: “If they would like to have
a Southwest with — how many airplanes do they have? 700 737’s or so? — If they would like
to contract them, then they can because they can lower their material margin that they calculate
as a part of their Flatrate offer. So they earn a bit less with the Flatrate, but then they have this
huge fleet in which all motors are more or less the same. It’s like baking buns... They all look the
same; they are all treated the same and the material costs only a fraction. We have to buy to the
CLP [Contract List Price] or a bit below. [...] If the OEM really would like to have a contract
then it can always win it via the material lever.”
However, the MRO is in a better position with less one-sided dependency towards the
OEM in comparison to the workbench setup. The main reason is that the relationship
can be characterized as a strategic alliance that is typically designed to span decades of
aftermarket support, requires high mutual idiosyncratic investments, and result in mu-
tual interdependence. While the MRO depends on the OEM to receive parts, documen-
tation, and support, the OEM is dependent on the MRO, since the MRO is responsible
for providing aftermarket services, with a direct influence on the OEM’s performance
and company image (Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013; Nenonen et al., 2014). The MRO or
Joint Venture can even become critical to the system, if it supplies a substantial amount
of overhaul capacity (Engine Case) or is responsible for the whole aftermarket support,
as in the Components Case.
This position allows the MRO to aspire to achieve a partnership “on equal footing” with
the OEM, which is an essential aspect that has been named by a total of six interviewees
(1, 6, 16, 20, 24, 26). This aspect becomes salient, for example, in the Aircraft Case
in which the focal company decided to explicitly not accept the workbench setup but
achieve a relationship on equal footing with Boeing. Being on an equal footing can be
understood as not being the OEM’s junior partner but being granted equal rights in the
relationship, balancing dependencies and continuing direct channel access to airlines.
The Head of Business Development Strategy of a Business Unit of MRO 1 sums up:
“There’s a guiding principle: we will not be the extended workbench for the OEM. We have
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the aspiration to continue servicing airlines, and we see ourselves as strong enough to enforce
this aspiration and not come into a role in which some OEMs would like to have us. As an
MRO provider that only does MRO for the OEM, the OEM holds the customer contracts and
subcontracts to us. Because when that happens, of course, you are de-coupled from the market,
you only have one customer on which you are extremely dependent. We don’t want that.”
In coopetitive alliances, multiple channels are established between MRO and OEM, in-
cluding commercial, engineering, procurement, and dedicated alliance managers. At
the same time, the alliance adds customer channels to both MRO and OEM: On one
hand, the MRO can gain access to the OEM’s customers to cross-sell additional ser-
vices, such as mobile engine services. On the other hand, the OEM can gain additional
customers, benefiting from the MRO’s established customer base.
Cost Structure and Revenue Streams
Just as in the workbench setup, the MRO is granted preferential access to spare parts and
manufacturing-specific resources. Since the manufacturer is inclined to establish a level
playing field between all third-party service partners in the network, these conditions
should not allow gaining a positional advantage against other network partners. How-
ever, it is reasonable to assume that all other service firms face significant barriers to
providing competitive services, which is why service firms are mostly protected from
competition from all firms that are not part of this network. Compared to the manufac-
turer, however, interviewees perceive to be at a disadvantage due to the gap between
costs and list price as mentioned in the Relationships and Channels section.
A benefit of this arrangement becomes salient in the possibilities to earn additional Rev-
enue Streams with the manufacturer, e.g., by providing value-added services. Also, the
service firm may be able to capture a larger market share compared to the legacy busi-
ness model or stand-alone solutions, because of the overall fewer firms that can provide
services. The Engine Case is one example where the number of worldwide service sup-
pliers has been reduced from typically over 20 on legacy engine types to five to seven
on new engine types.
Conclusions
The coopetitive solution is advantageous for the MRO compared to the OEM workbench setup
since the MRO has direct market access, can retain the customer channel, and pursue reaching
a competitive edge with its solution offers — at least if the OEM assures a level playing field
between all network partners. This results in less dependency on the OEM and better chances
to establish a relationship on equal footing. In summary, a service firm can realize many of
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the benefits associated with an alliance while only suffering from some of the inherent sacrifices.
Strengthening the competing OEM’s service offering is one of the most severe ones, may however
be inevitable depending on the given situation.
6.3.4 The Two-sided Solution
The two-sided solution is the most advanced configuration of the MRO business model
and requires highly developed solution-specific and relational dynamic capabilities to
be established. In this setup, the MRO provides a solution for the airline customer on
behalf of the OEM in the form of a joint offering. Consequently, the MRO assumes
responsibility for the outcome of the solution offer and processes that would tradition-
ally be performed by either party. One example of a two-sided solution is the Compo-
nents Case, in which the MRO has allied with a major tier 1 component supplier for the
A350 aircraft. In this arrangement, the MRO is responsible for marketing and provid-
ing the entire solution offer. Simultaneously, the manufacturer has reduced its scope
to manufacturing-related activities, effectively de-servitizing and focusing on its core
business (Kowalkowski et al., 2017).
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• Repair and Engineering 
Capability
• Data Processing and 
Interpretation Capability
• Multi-vendor Capability
• Risk Management 
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• Average cost structure: 48% labor, 46% material, 7% services
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▼
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▼
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Key Partners
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System OEMs
Figure 6.10: The Two-sided Solution26
26The figure shows the two-sided solution configuration of the MRO business model with items that have
undergone a change from the coopetitive solution setup in italics above the arrow. Additional elements
that need to be developed or elements that are discarded from the coopetitive solution configuration
are displayed below the arrow. Items of the coopetitive solution that have only limited application in
this configuration are displayed in brackets.
280
Chapter 6. A Strategic Approach for MRO Business Model Innovation
Value Proposition
Just as in stand-alone solutions, the end customer receives a Value Proposition that in-
cludes assuming responsibility for the customer’s processes and the associated risk.
One example of this business model is the Components Case, in which the MRO pro-
vides airlines with guaranteed access to a pool of components that are maintained in
airworthy conditions. This offer allows airlines to effectively outsource component
MRO, spare parts management, the administration of repair contracts with many exter-
nal vendors, and the logistics processes associated with managing a component pool.
Additionally, cost reductions can be realized due to economies of scales inherent in
component pooling (see Section 3.5). For the end customer, the main difference is that
the airline perspective Value Proposition becomes increasingly compromised. The rea-
son is that the MRO cannot act as an independent agent between OEM and airline, but
instead has become an OEM risk-and-revenue-sharing partner that optimizes the joint
commercial offering. Since the incentives of MRO and OEM are effectively aligned, it
is less credible that the MRO will be able to provide an OEM-independent consultancy
approach to the airline. For example, MROs typically need to relinquish the use of
alternative more cost-efficient parts to form an alliance.
The main innovation in the Value Proposition dimension takes place towards the OEM,
as the MRO assumes full responsibility for the joint aftermarket offering. The tasks
typically include the administration of customer contracts, managing the Channel and
Relationship, performing repairs on the manufacturer’s products, planning of inven-
tory and logistics, and risk management. This represents a solution offer for the OES,
who can overcome servitization barriers and still participate in the commercial poten-
tial of the aftermarket.
In the Component Case, a decisive part of this Value Proposition is the integration across
OEM value chains, since the MRO offers access to a pool of line replaceable units of
all tier 1 suppliers on the A350, not only the partner’s. Including the competitor’s
equipment and its repair into the own solution offer is challenging to achieve for a tier
1 supplier, which is why only the airframers as integrators offer component solutions
across all suppliers on their platforms. In consequence, integration allows the tier 1
supplier to venture beyond simple lifecycle services into solution offers that the OES
would not have been able to develop without the MRO.
Key Resources
Providing two-sided solutions requires in principle the same Key Resources and Key
Capabilities as stand-alone solution offers, which include the integration of product
and service elements into a seamless bundle, assuming responsibility for the customer’s
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processes and risks associated with their outcome, as well as the underlying repair net-
work and qualified staff. However, two major differences compared to other configura-
tions become salient: First, the MRO represents the single Key Partner of the manufac-
turer for the joint aftermarket offering, who receives favorable access to manufacturing-
specific resources, which allow him to gain a positional advantage against other ser-
vice providers. The Components Case is an example in which Airbus remains one of
two major competitors, who can gain a similar advantage against all other third-party
providers since it can negotiate favorable terms with its suppliers that have become
RRSPs on the A350.
This links directly into the second difference to coopetitive solution networks: the role
of the mutli-vendor capability. In the Components Case, this capability serves as an an-
tecedent to the formation of this type of alliance, as it enables the OES to compete with
the airframer on the same level of the supply chain with an integrated solution offer.
Manufacturers that master the multi-vendor capability internally are less likely to rely
on external partners to perform the integration for them. Instead, these firms are in-
clined to form a network of workbench partners that provide product and service com-
ponents into the solution offer. When the multi-vendor capability plays a crucial role,
and the manufacturer is not able or willing to build this capability internally, it makes
sense to rely on one external partner that can contribute this capacity. In cases in which
the multi-vendor capability plays only a peripheral role (e.g., the Engine Case), manu-
facturers can rely on various MRO service firms as network partners, e.g., in coopetitive
solution networks. Hence, the multi-vendor capability needs to be considered as crucial
for the formation of the two-sided solution configuration.
Key Partners
In the two-sided solution the manufacturer is the single Key Partner for the MRO, how-
ever with a more intense Relationship that is discussed in the respective section. Al-
though the boundaries between being a solution customer or an alliance partner are
somewhat blurred, the partnership aspects overweigh the customer aspects by far in the
Components Case. This aspect is a contrast to most of the established solution literature
that portrays the receiving party of the solution offer as a customer or client (e.g., Brady
et al., 2005; Mathieu, 2001a), however acknowledging the need for additional relational
processes to customize the solution offer (Tuli et al., 2007). This finding underpins
the complexity of providing an aftermarket solution for the manufacturers, in which
the MRO assumes the responsibility for the entire service business for a certain prod-
uct type. The inherent complexity of aftermarket solution hence requires a stronger
partnership approach then less complex solution offers, such as, e.g. Xerox’ document
management services for B2B or car availability services for B2C customers.
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Key Activities
In two-sided solutions, MROs perform the manufacturer’s operational MRO services of
their equipment and assume responsibility for the outcome of these services and the
overall service offering. Besides, Dynamic Feedback Loops (DFLs) have been identified
as the most prominent Key Activity besides operational services provisioning in the al-
liance cases that ventured beyond the workbench setup. DFLs are inter-organizational
communication routines from service staff to the manufacturer that ensure that equip-
ment is easy to maintain when operated in the field and benefit the development of fu-
ture generations of equipment (Hobday et al., 2005; Kowalkowski et al., 2011a). DFLs
incorporate sharing the technical information gained in repair and overhauls events
with the manufacturer to reduce MRO costs, improve asset service life and improve
future asset generations.
In addition, the MRO can support the manufacturer in building critical capabilities for suc-
cessful hybrid offers, such as the design-to-service capability that allows manufacturers
to gain a positional advantage by combining products and services in a synergetic, not
merely additive manner (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). To build this capability, manufac-
turers need to include service-related information in their product development pro-
cess to “think service” from the beginning. One example is sharing suggestions for
the improvement of a component that reduces the wear and tear and increases the ser-
vice life. Another example is sharing information that allows manufacturers to design
this component for easier maintainability. In the two-sided solution setup, DFLs are
of the highest importance in all of the configurations, since the manufacturer refrains
from performing most service activities that could provide him with valuable customer
feedback that is required to develop internal capabilities further and future equipment
generations.27
Customer Segments
By forming alliances with a manufacturer, service firms can gain access to the manu-
facturer’s Customer Segments that would be difficult to acquire without the alliance
(Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013). The two-sided solution is the most beneficial of these
arrangements due to two mechanisms: first, the MRO serves as an exclusive service
partner of the OEM, which channels customers that prefer OEM offers (e.g., many
Asian carriers) directly to the MRO. Second, the OEM grants preferential access to
27In the coopetitive solution configuration, DFLs can also become salient, however with a different focus:
Here, the DFLs can also be geared at improving the manufacturer’s service capabilities. However, the
MRO should carefully consider which information is shared, since it may become less relevant to the
OEM’s solution, once the OEM has built sufficient internal capabilities to provide solutions (Schneider
et al., 2013).
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manufacturing-specific resources only to this single alliance partner, which allows gain-
ing a positional advantage against most other competitors (as discussed in the Key Re-
sources section of this configuration). In effect, it is reasonable to assume that the MRO
will be able to gain substantial market shares across all Customer Segments.
Relationships and Channels
In general, Relationships with the end customer can be characterized as being simi-
lar to stand-alone solution offers and involving increased interdependencies that are
managed through performance-based contracting mechanisms (Bharadwaj et al., 1993;
Penttinen & Palmer, 2007; Windahl & Lakemond, 2010). Depending on the number of
competitors that remain for aftermarket services, customers may, however, suffer from
increased dependencies, just as in Rolls Royce’ solution offer presented in the Engine
Case.
The manufacturer requires a very high level of trust since it builds most service ca-
pabilities externally and relies on a single partner, with possible implications for the
company image. This uncertainty implies on the other hand that the MRO needs to
credibly assure that it can deliver high-quality integrated solutions (Kindstro¨m, 2010;
Paiola et al., 2013). However, the relationship is not built on trust alone but safeguarded
through performance-based compensation mechanisms that ensure an incentive align-
ment between the two risk-and-revenue-sharing partners.
Cost Structure and Revenue Streams
In the two-sided solution, manufacturer and MRO establish a risk-and-revenue-sharing
model to align the initially diverging interests of selling more spare parts (manufac-
turer) and using alternative, more cost-efficient parts (MRO). In effect, revenues and
profits but also risks and efficiency gains are shared between both parties.
Manager Alliance Function MRO 1 explains the model: “If the prices decrease and we are
not able to sell as much, then this is a risk [for the OEM] since they get less payback because the
payback is linked to the sales volume and profit. If we are able — and this is also an incentive
for the OEM — to sell more than in the past and also to higher prices, then they get more, and
we share this; this is sharing chances and risks.”
In essence, this allows shifting the manufacturer’s focus from the sales of spare parts
towards optimizing the joint aftermarket offer and the MRO to focus on the develop-
ment of more cost-efficient repair methods and the optimization of the overall solution
offer.
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Conclusions
In conclusion, the two-sided alliance configuration effectively extends the practice of risk-and-
revenue-sharing along the supply chain that has been initiated through the establishment of
RRSPs between airframers as well as engine manufacturers and their suppliers in the 2000s
(Esposito & Raffa, 2007; Rossetti & Choi, 2008; Krol, 2011) further downwards to traditional
service firms. Just as lower-tier suppliers took increasing responsibility for the financing, design,
and outcome of the equipment, upper tier maintenance firms are now taking responsibility for
designing and providing an effective system to provide seamless solutions for the customer. In
both types of RRSPs risks and profits are shared across the different levels of the supply chain,
which allows manufacturers to tap into these markets through alliances.
For MROs that are forced to form alliances with manufacturers and share the aftermarket pie,
this configuration is the most beneficial, since it allows the MRO to continue to provide most
services internally, design solutions offers themselves, and thus retain direct access to the cus-
tomer. However, this configuration requires a significant transformation of the traditional MRO
business model: developing the capabilities needed to deliver effective solutions, building risk-
and-revenue-sharing partnerships with OEMs, and developing alternative parts and repairs in
coordination with and not to compete with the OEM, are just a few examples. The transforma-
tion requires well-developed solution-specific and relational dynamic capabilities such as shifting
the mindset from competing to alliancing with manufacturers and accepting that manufacturer
have successfully entered the service market and will gain their fair share. Solution-specific and
relational sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring dynamic capabilities are essential for MROs to
innovate their business model in the context of servitization. I will explore these dynamic capa-
bilities and their microfoundations in the next chapter, outlining how MROs can innovate their
business model to realize the four different configurations.
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6.4 Dynamic Capabilities for MRO Business Model Innovation
6.4.1 Dynamic Capabilities for Developing Solutions
Manufacturers that aim at providing solutions require a service-specific set of sensing,
seizing, and reconfiguring capabilities, which have received some academic attention
(e.g., den Hertog et al., 2010; Kindstro¨m, 2010). As highlighted in Section 2.3.6, it is rea-
sonable to assume that pure service firms require different dynamic capabilities than
manufacturers to provide solutions as they come from a base in services and may re-
quire manufacturing counterparts to form solution networks. Hence, not the service
aspect of solutions but rather switching from an input- to an output-based logic should
represent a challenge for pure service firms. Here, service firms require information
about the factors that determine performance outcomes, such as expected service inter-
vals, anticipated reliability of the equipment, and future costs of spare parts. For new
assets, the manufacturer may have an advantage, as it is its designer. However, tra-
ditional service firms may have more experience with the operation of the equipment
due to customer proximity and knowledge spillover effects that enable them to assess
risks associated with performance-based contracts better.
In this section, I set out to explore the dynamic capabilities of pure service firms to en-
hance our understanding of how pure service firms in general and MROs, in particular,
can innovate their business model to provide solutions either stand-alone, as part of a
coopetitive network, or even for both airline customers and manufacturers simultane-
ously in the form of a two-sided solution.28
Service Firm-specific Dynamic Capability of Solution Sensing
The microfoundations for sensing include practices, processes, and methodologies used
to gather and assess the information of the firm’s ecosystem, including i.a. customers,
complementors, suppliers, regulatory bodies, or research institutions that may yield
valuable information for the identification of opportunities and threats (Teece, 2007). In
the context of solution provisioning, manufacturers require specific sensing capabilities
regarding customer service needs, technological developments, the service system, and
service opportunities presented by it (den Hertog et al., 2010; Fischer et al., 2010; Kind-
stro¨m et al., 2013). My research reveals three distinctive microfoundations of sensing
capabilities specific to traditional service firms.
28I would like to thank Dr. Zsofia Toth from Nottingham University for her support in outlining publi-
cation possibilities for dynamic capabilities of pure service firms and jointly working towards this in
internationally well-regarded journals.
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Microfoundations Description Proof Quotas
Customer need sensing Internal and external routines to 
sense changing customer needs 
induced by servitization
“First, there was a trigger[…]: Our colleagues from sales and […] customer 
service said: ’The customers are asking for something that we don’t have in 
the drawer.” 
– Manager Product Management MRO1
Technology sensing Scanning new technology employed 
on aircraft types for opportunities to 
increase efficiency and 
effectiveness of solutions
„[Through] digital transformation, [...] the aircrafts generate a massive 
amount of data through all those sensors [...]. What we need now is the 
competence to filter, what data is valuable? On what topics should we be 
working, to provide our customers with a better dispatch reliability, less 
costs and more aircraft availability?“
– Vice President Sales MRO1
Risk sensing Sensing the increased risk 
associated with offering solutions
“There is a risk-driver in the [solution] itself, which means that if you venture 
in these kind of contracts, you have to take the essential risks, just like the 
OEM, who however knows the design exactly.” 
– CEO MRO1
Table 6.5: Service Firm-specific Dynamic Capability of Solution Sensing
Customer Need Sensing Just as manufacturers, MROs perform routines to build their
customer need sensing capabilities. Interviewee 13 (Vice President Corporate Sales)
vividly describes the essence of customer sensing: “we are the ear to the customer, we
should always have the ears on the tracks: what do they need? Not just to a certain strategic
time, that’s the main expectation of my salespeople. That they understand, that they listen, that
they can draw conclusions when the customers tell them their problems.” (Emphasis added
by author).
While manufacturers need to build different customer service sensing capabilities, as
service-oriented values are more challenging to measure (Gro¨nroos, 2007; Kindstro¨m
et al., 2013), respondents did not mention increased requirements in customer need
sensing as a challenge for MRO providers. The reason may be that MROs come from a
base in services and thus were already able to build service-specific customer sensing
and innovation capabilities before venturing into solutions. In the case of two-sided so-
lution provisioning, customer need sensing capabilities increasingly overlap relational
sensing capabilities, as manufacturers are simultaneously the customer and partner of
the MRO firm.
Nonetheless, servitization has changed customer needs in the aerospace industry: to-
day, airlines increasingly demand solutions, more integrated offerings, performance-
based pricing coupled with longer contract durations. As Team Lead Aircraft Engi-
neering MRO 1 describes: “customers are asking for a full integration, but we don’t have
it!” Hence, MRO providers do not need to develop new or more proficient customer-
service-sensing capabilities. Instead, they need to make intensive use of their already
existing dynamic capabilities to sense changing customer needs induced by servitiza-
tion to develop solutions that match these needs successfully.
Technology Sensing Service innovation literature often emphasizes the sensing of
external technological opportunities to innovate service offerings (Lusch & Webster,
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2010). Thus, manufacturing companies perform technology sensing not only for prod-
uct innovation but also to tap into technological developments to foster the service
innovation process (Kindstro¨m et al., 2013).
For traditional service companies, new technology in- or outside of the OEM’s product
offer can provide opportunities for offering or improving solutions. Aircraft are pre-
dicted to generate 98 terabyte data volume by 2026 (Hoyland et al., 2016), which cre-
ates opportunities to improve cost-efficiency and performance, as well as the reduction
of solution-specific risks. As traditional service companies are not the manufacturers
of goods, they require specific technology sensing capabilities to identify the oppor-
tunities resulting from technological improvements that are not inherent in their own
products. In this context, pure service firms face particular challenges as they need
to overcome barriers erected by manufacturers to access the proprietary technology to
develop solution capabilities.
Risk Sensing As some hybrid offerings are priced based on usage or performance
(Tukker, 2004), providing them involves assuming the risk for performance outcomes
of customer’s operation. Developing the capability to assume, manage, and mitigate
risks thus becomes a central issue for solution providers (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011).
To develop the operational capability of risks management, solution providers need to
build the dynamic capability of risk sensing. For traditional service providers, gen-
erating the required risk sensing capabilities involves a high effort and uncertainties,
as they possess less information regarding the design of new equipment than the ma-
nufacturer. This makes estimating the equipment’s performance and required mainte-
nance efforts more difficult.
Another factor is that, in contrast to traditional service providers, manufacturers can
partially shift the risk back to customers and third-party maintenance providers. This
works by increasing prices for spare parts, which are required by customers with input-
based contracts and third-party maintenance providers alike. Another option is to raise
prices for intellectual property and testing equipment which is needed by maintenance
firms if they would like to build service capabilities on the respective hardware. This
further aggravates the difficulties to sense risks and limits the risk management capa-
bility of MROs correctly. Hence, the availability of risk sensing capabilities is a decisive
factor for whether traditional service firms can develop stand-alone solutions or need
to rely on an alliance with manufacturers to provide solutions to their customer.
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Service Firm-specific Dynamic Capability of Solution Seizing
Firms that aim at seizing opportunities from the development of solutions require the
dynamic capabilities to conceptualize, prototype, and co-create the solution together
with the customer through repeated cycles of interaction. Since this service innovation
process is more intangible and fuzzier than product innovation, manufacturers need to
develop service-specific seizing capabilities (den Hertog et al., 2010; Kindstro¨m et al.,
2013).
My research shows, somewhat surprisingly, that MRO providers are not able to provide
solutions based on their long-term service experience. Instead, they need to develop
a set of distinctive seizing capabilities to design integrated, outcome-based offerings.
These capabilities rest on a variety of specific dynamic capabilities that include solution
design, customer co-creation, sales and the increasing use of networks.
Microfoundations Description Proof Quotas
Solution design capability Capacity to delineate new outcome-
based business models across 
business units
“Taking over responsibility in the sense of bonus-malus agreements [...] is 
definitely a topic that was difficult for us in the beginning because we always 
said: ‚There are too many factors that we cannot influence.‘ And also 
because we as a company were simply too big. That means, engineering is 
not accountable for component services. So, to develop this holistic service 
offer and […] stand accountable for it, that is something we had to learn.”
– Team Lead Aircraft Engineering Services MRO 1
Customer solution co-creation 
capability
Routines to verify, adapt and 
individualize solutions to customer 
needs
“Our CEO is very [customer-]driven. He says: ‚you are the spearhead to the 
market, you have to understand what the market needs and you have to 
drive this company to deliver […] what it takes to be successful.’ Not the 
other way around, in which [we] define the solution and ask the customer ‘do 
you want to buy it?’ And this is how it has been for a long time, […] but now 
it works very, very well. Before, we were very production-oriented.”  – Vice 
President Sales MRO 1 
Sales force enabling capability Routines that enable the central 
sales force to successfully market 
solutions
“We needed to develop something to supply sales so that they don’t have to 
travel to the customer as usual with a busload full of people to answer the 
questions, instead that sales is able to get through the first appointment by 
themselves with enough material that states: ‘these are my capabilities, 
these are my differentiators, and that is what it costs.’”
– Manager Product Management MRO 1
Solution network formation 
capability
Capacity to determine which service 
and product modules are to be 
provided internally or the solution 
network
„Before, we always thought: let’s send our good mechanics, even our best. 
Just that this one mechanic costs the airline 30,000 Euro per month and the 
airlines cannot and don’t want to afford that. They need local solutions but 
anyhow with the competence of [our] mechanics. […] Now we have 
achieved that by taking the integration in our own hands […], we enable a 
local provider to local costs and not expat costs to be able to do what we 
do.“– Vice President Sales MRO 1
Table 6.6: Service Firm-specific Dynamic Capability of Solution Seizing
Solution Design Capability Developing solutions offerings requires dynamic seizing
capabilities beyond the scope of traditional service offerings. As solutions are more
comprehensive than conventional service offers (Kohtama¨ki et al., 2013), they often
need the integration of services from different business units and suppliers. Aircraft
Solutions, for example, incorporate Line Maintenance, Engineering, and Component
Maintenance Services. Clearly, this type of solutions cannot be developed by an indi-
vidual business unit alone. Multiple interviewees (11, 15, 23, 24) recognized that the
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establishment of a central organizational unit responsible for new service development
(NSD unit) has been very beneficial for the design of integrated offerings. The NSD unit
is responsible for facilitating service innovation across the company, with customers,
and with external service providers.
Developing the capacity to assume risks associated with performance-based offerings
across business units is one significant barrier in providing solutions, as these units
typically are not willing to assume risks that lie outside their area of influence. Hence,
internal systems and routines need to be established that measure risks and profitability
of the joint service offer across business units. Also, performance measurement systems
installed at the interface between customer and service provider help to identify and
mitigate factors that lead to risks associated with unsatisfactory performance.
Customer Solution Co-creation Capability Internal solution development is only a first
step, and quick verification and further co-development with the customer are essen-
tial. Designing effecting solutions requires strong customer interaction since they rely
on understanding both the customer and its needs, business goals, practice, and culture
(Windahl & Lakemond, 2006). Recent research shows that firms that co-create advanced
services through repeated cycles of interactive co-creation with their customers can cre-
ate and seize opportunities for innovation and competitive advantage (Kindstro¨m et al.,
2013).
Just as manufacturers, traditional service firms need to build customer solution co-
creation capabilities. The reason is that solutions are more customer-specific than tradi-
tional service offers and require the joint definition together with the customer from his
perspective. Hence, even traditional service providers need to shift their perspective
further towards the customer. One example are Aircraft Solutions, where the aircraft
maintenance schedule is defined and optimized based on the customer’s individual
operating profile, service demands, and hangar capacity. Hence, solution co-creation
represents a shift from the traditional offering in which the service provider aims to
optimize its own towards optimizing the customer’s operation.
Sales Force Enabling Capability Servitization research highlights the fact that the ma-
nufacturer’s sales force needs to acquire additional knowledge and capabilities, or may
even require reorganization. The reason is that sales managers have to transform from
a passive recipient of a predefined offer into more active participants in a value creation
relationship typical for services (Storbacka et al., 2013). It has even been argued that a
separate service organization with a dedicated sales force facilitates the creation of the
service culture required to market solutions successfully (Gebauer et al., 2005).
The results show that the traditional sales capabilities of pure service providers are
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not sufficient to successfully sell solutions. Instead, they need to overcome two main
barriers that hinder the development and marketing of solution offers. The integrated
nature of solution offerings constitutes the first barrier. It requires sales managers to pos-
sess both broad knowledge across the different service segments and an in-depth un-
derstanding of each service offered. Traditionally, the focal company sold individual
services through a team of central and business unit sales managers. For traditional
services, this approach works well, as general and expert knowledge can be combined
into a compelling offer. When customers started requiring integrated solutions across
various service segments, this approach resulted in “send[ing] a bus load-full of people to
the customer” as the Vice President Sales MRO 1 puts it. To overcome this barrier, the
central sales force needs to be enabled to sell integrated solutions while relying on the
business units’ sales managers only for advanced topics.
Differentiating the own solution offers from the OEMs’ solution offers constitutes the sec-
ond barrier for traditional service providers. As manufacturers represent new com-
petitors with unique resources and capabilities (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011), unique selling
points based on the strengths of their own organization compared to the manufacturers
need to be developed. This capability becomes especially interesting in cases in which
service firms form parts of coopetitive service networks. In these cases, they are forced
to differentiate their own solution offers as a licensed service partner against their li-
censor, which is a task that is especially demanding since the manufacturer mostly sets
the license conditions.
Solution Network Formation Capability Selecting enterprise boundaries to gain access
to external resources and capabilities is a specific seizing capability required to main-
tain evolutionary fitness of the firm (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Teece, 2007). In the context
of solutions, manufacturers rely on partners to extend their portfolio of products and
services to cost-efficiently extend their capabilities and footprint (Baines et al., 2007;
Gao et al., 2011; Gebauer et al., 2013). Thus, they make use of solution networks, in
which each actor contributes to the offering (Lusch et al., 2010), focusing on their core
competence and cooperation with other network actors (Basole & Rouse, 2008).
For manufacturers, integrating the competitor’s technology into the own solution has
been labeled the acid-test of if they are willing to become a real solution provider (Foote
et al., 2001; Davies et al., 2006). For service providers, integrating services from com-
petitors to benefit the customer may constitute just this acid test. For example, local
service providers or the customer’s organization may need to be integrated into the
solution offering, to ensure the continued employment of local staff and enable a price-
competitive offering. Alternatively, in cases in which manufacturers offer more com-
petitive repair services on their equipment, traditional service providers may need to
be forced to rely on these offerings on the expense of filling their own workshops.
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Service Firm-specific Dynamic Capability of Solution Reconfiguring
Dynamic capabilities are capabilities that reconfigure operational capabilities, enabling
a change in the product, the production process, the scale, or the customers served
(Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Winter, 2003). MRO firms need to develop a set of operational
capabilities (i.e., repair and engineering-, integration-, multi-vendor-, risk management-
, and data processing and interpretation) to sustain their business model and offer so-
lutions. The development of these operational capabilities requires the reconfiguring
dynamic capabilities described in this section.
Microfoundations Description Proof Quotas
Orchestrating the 
transformation of the 
solution network
Managing and reconfiguring the 
network of product- and service 
providers that are critical for the 
solution’s performance. 
„We have to decide in every moment: this unit, do we want to repair it, can 
we do that in-house or do we have a cheaper subcontracting possibility, or 
do we throw it away because we get it so cheap today on the surplus 
market. […] So we cannot let ourselves be driven by the fact that we have a 
lot of production capacity, workshops that we theoretically need to fill. 
Because, if we are driven by the decision to fill these workshops but we are 
not competitive anymore because there are cheap surplus units available or 
there are simply smart subcontracts that have everything 20% cheaper, than 
we are out of the market, immediately.“ – Vice President Sales MRO 1
Adopting an outcome-
oriented mental model
Changing the mental model 
towards the achievement of a 
result, assuming the responsibility 
for the outcome, independent of 
whether it can be directly 
influenced
“we had to learn that it’s not your or my problem, it’s our joint problem.” 
– Team Leader Aircraft Engineering MRO 1
“we have to dare to tackle the central topic that moves airlines: aircraft 
availability. […] In the end the customer doesn’t give a damn if I have to 
move heaven and earth. The customer needs a contact person that is 
always there, takes away all the problems, solves them in a short time and 
he needs aircraft availability.” – Manager Market Research MRO 1
Customer co-specialization Interorganizational, learning and 
reconfiguring routines that
continuously adapt the offering to 
changing customer needs
“[adapting the solution] is still very difficult, we are in a steady flow. […] Even 
in this partnership you are under a constant pressure to prove that you are 
the correct partner.” 
– Team Lead Aircraft Engineering Services MRO 1
Customer incentive
alignment
Routines to align interests and 
balance dependency between 
solution provider and customer, 
such as performance guarantees, 
long-term commitments and pain-
gain sharing models 
„I can measure whether my aircraft has a technical reliability of 90.2% or 
95%. And we are compensated for this value. That means, per percentage 
point […] we receive a bonus. [..] we do not only promise that but if we don’t 
deliver we have a real problem, also financially. That means all of our efforts 
are direct to make this happen. […] the advantage is that we have 
considerable more profit potential if we over-achieve this goal.” 
– Manager Product Management MRO 1
Installed base learning 
routines
Routines to codify, access and 
utilize knowledge from servicing 
the installed base aiming at forming 
knowledge capital and gaining a 
competitive advantage
“the question will be […] how to access the dispersed knowledge from these
minds? To apply it onto a new engine with a new design, new materials, and
architecture to build a new [product and service portfolio], that helps us to
compete against the OEM, who always has the material cost advantage.
[We have to create] a unique selling proposition to convince the customer. If
I only offer the same as the OEM, then I would rather choose the OEM as a
customer.” – Senior Manager Alliance Function MRO 1
Table 6.7: Service Firm-specific Dynamic Capability of Solution Reconfiguring
Orchestrating the Solution Network Solution providers should actively manage the
external actors that are central to the performance of the service system (Kindstro¨m
et al., 2013). To effectively do so, they need to develop a common language with sup-
pliers and customers (Gebauer et al., 2013). In the Aerospace industry, this is facilitated
by the fact that common terms are defined by the airworthiness regulations of the au-
thorities and English is generally accepted as the primary language. Nonetheless, both
manufacturers and pure service firms need to make some efforts to establish common
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terms, definitions, communication channels and to intertwine critical IT systems.
Orchestrating the service network also includes the reconfiguration of the resource base
and actors that belong to the solution network (Kindstro¨m et al., 2013). MROs as solu-
tion integrators possess no or few production facilities of their own, enabling them to
select the most competitive equipment from either OEM or alternative sources (Davies
et al., 2007). However, they may need to make compromises by integrating services
from third parties instead of internal service functions: In the Aircraft Case, for exam-
ple, one aircraft solution customer re-tenders individual service segments to the most
competitive MRO regularly. If the MRO loses one of the tenders, it might be forced
to integrate the services provided by the competitor to continue offering the solution.
Alternatively, in Component Solutions, repair services from competitors need to be in-
tegrated if they are more competitive than an in-house repair, even at the expense of
workshop utilization. As Manager Product Management MRO 1 sums up: “[As an air-
line] I don’t have one MRO that does everything and that needs to be the best in all areas. I
believe that I have to challenge my provider constantly. And I also believe that there is no single
best MRO in all areas.” Hence, just as integrating competitors’ products into the solution
shows the OEMs’ commitment to their customers’ solution (Foote et al., 2001; Davies
et al., 2006), integrating third-party services to benefit the customer is something that
the MRO may find challenging to do. It becomes evident however that achieving the ca-
pability to either swiftly improve the internal resource base or exchange it for resources
from external partners is vital for obtaining and maintaining a competitive solution in
the long term.
Adopting an Outcome-oriented Mental Model To successfully provide hybrid offer-
ings, OEMs need to undergo a cultural change away from a product towards a service
culture. Practices that facilitate establishing a service culture include creating service
champions, a long-term orientation, and even building a separate organizational unit
to escape the dominant product culture (Oliva & Kallenberg, 2003; Gebauer et al., 2010b;
Kindstro¨m & Kowalkowski, 2014; Story et al., 2017). Traditional service firms might not
be expected to require a cultural change to provide solutions since, after all, they come
from a base in services.
My research shows however that even traditional service providers need to change
their service culture from an input-based to an output-based logic. Instead of merely
performing a contracted service (deed), the service provider needs to assure an out-
come of the service that is satisfactory for the customer. While before, finger pointing at
other suppliers or internal business units may be a common practice, now the respon-
sibility for the seamless performance needs to be assumed by the solution provider,
independent of the cause of the error. Interviewees were in unison in the importance
of a Key Account Manager to achieve this goal. This finding is in line with (Hakanen,
2014) that notice that establishing a Key Account Managers as knowledge integrator
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that facilitates the solution process from design throughout the operation.
A second measure that facilitates the change towards and outcome-oriented mental
model is the internal alignment of incentive systems: to optimize the entire offering,
profit centers need to extend their focus away from a purely internal view on prof-
itability towards the profitability of the whole solution. In the process, dependencies
between the different service components need to be taken into account (e.g., Aircraft
Reliability in Line Maintenance depends on stock level of Aircraft Components). As a
result, the profitability of some business units may benefit (e.g., through increased re-
liability), while others may need to make sacrifices (e.g., through higher stock-levels).
Overall, however, the performance of the solution and hence customer satisfaction and
profitability can be increased.
Customer Co-specialization It could be assumed that after co-designing the solution
with the customer only minor adjustments need to be performed that do not require
distinct capabilities to reconfigure the resource base. This is however far from the
truth. Especially Aircraft Solutions are highly individual and intertwined with the cus-
tomer’s operation and thus require a constant adaption to the customer’s needs. These
reconfigurations are very challenging for solution providers, as the quote in Table 6.7
illustrates. Adaptations may be very extensive and include changes in the size of oper-
ations (in this case from four to 80 aircraft), the scope of operations (extension to new
countries), underlying technology (new aircraft types), areas of responsibility, and IT
systems (MRO software). The efforts required may, however, result in difficult to im-
itate co-specialized assets (i.e., low-cost and high-performance maintenance network)
and a sustainable competitive advantage for the airline (Bharadwaj et al., 1993).
Interviewees perceive inter-organizational learning and communication routines as es-
sential to support customer co-specialization and trigger changes at both organizations.
Again, the Key Account Manager was highlighted as the most important intermediary
and knowledge integrator that ensures that reconfigurations are conducted in the solu-
tion provider’s organization. In contrast to manufacturers, where this type of routines
are known as dynamic feedback loops that aim to improve current and future genera-
tions of equipment (Hobday et al., 2005), here the main aim is to improve the overall
performance of the solution offering. However, pure service firms can benefit from cus-
tomer co-specialization as well. The reason is that these routines pinpoint tacit weak-
nesses of the organization that less integrated buyer-supplier relationships are unable
to uncover. Hence, specific learning routines can be established to drive innovation and
improve business performance (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Lusch et al., 2010).
Customer Incentive Alignment The level of mutual interdependence between customer
and solution provider increases from pure product-, over use-based up to performance-
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based agreements due to co-specialization and the customer’s loss of internal capabil-
ities (Bharadwaj et al., 1993; Windahl & Lakemond, 2010). In Aircraft Solutions, for
example, it typically takes a project of several years to build the internal skills that are
required to replace the MRO provider entirely. While customers suffer from increased
dependence, the reciprocal level of dependence of the MRO provider on its customer
increases, as well. This increase is due to upfront investments and a potential loss of
reputation if the solution offer does not meet the expected performance.
To balance this increased, reciprocal interdependence typical for solution offers, MROs
and customers establish routines to align interests through performance guarantees,
long-term commitment, and pain-gain sharing models, which have been extensively
discussed in literature (Penttinen & Palmer, 2007; Windahl & Lakemond, 2010; Kowal-
kowski et al., 2015). As Team Lead Aircraft Engineering Services MRO 1 summarizes:
“the customer clearly wants us to feel the pain if things don’t go well” so that he can give up
responsibility with a peace of mind.
Installed Base Learning Routines Through learning routines, firms can create knowl-
edge capital, which enables competitive differentiation versus their peers. Just as other
routines underlying dynamic capabilities, learning routines are not free but costly to
establish and sustain (Malerba, 1992; Zollo & Winter, 2002; Winter, 2003).
Servitization literature stresses that most manufacturers possess an installed base of
capital goods in operation as a unique resource (Wise & Baumgartner, 1999), which
can be leveraged to build unique capabilities that pure service providers cannot attain
(Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). In the aerospace industry, large independent MRO providers
however typically possess a broad customer base, servicing large and diverse fleets
which allows them to perform extensive learning routines. For example, the world
largest independent MRO provider Lufthansa Technik services an ’installed base’ of
800 airline customers operating 3.700 aircraft (Lufthansa Technik AG, 2017). Hence,
the independent service provider possesses a by far larger installed base on which it
performs services than most manufacturers.
As occurrence and contents of maintenance, repair, and overhaul are less predictable
than the production of goods (Auramo & Ala-risku, 2005), it relies to a greater extent
on knowledge gained from learning routines. The importance of learning routines is
further increased by the manufacturers’ servitization tactics to withhold or thin-out re-
pair instructions, as MRO providers cannot anymore rely purely on manuals to receive
all information required to perform MRO services successfully. A central challenge in
this regard is the codification and storage of the tacit knowledge that is created through
learning-by-doing (Malerba, 1992). Accessing and utilizing the expertise possessed by
engineers and mechanics is regarded as vital for service innovation and differentiation
from the manufacturer as the proof quota in Table 6.7 shows.
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In consequence, installed base learning routines are more critical to pure service firms
as they represent a significant form of gaining knowledge about the manufacturers.
The importance of these learning routines is further amplified by the fact that manufac-
turers increasingly withhold vital repair information to inhibit other competitors from
servicing their equipment. For pure service firms, departing from stand-alone solu-
tions towards alliances with manufacturers represents an opportunity to deepen their
installed base learning routines by establishing two-sided dynamic feedback loops such
as engineering councils which can give them advantages over other providers that are
not able to build such an in-depth product knowledge.
6.4.2 Relational Dynamic Capabilities
While manufacturers require relational capabilities to build and make use of service
networks (Gebauer et al., 2013), traditional service providers require a distinct set of ca-
pabilities to capitalize on these networks. My research uncovers that traditional service
providers perform sensing routines to identify the opportunities presented by the ma-
nufacturers’ service networks, seizing routines connected with joining the networks,
and reconfiguring routines, required for providing and appropriating value from the
network. These service provider-specific dynamic capabilities are delineated in the next
sections.
Service Firm-specific Dynamic Capability of Relational Sensing
Microfoundations Description Proof Quotas
OEM competitor sensing Identifying (a) changes in the 
competitive position on the market 
level and (b) the competitive profile 
of the manufacturer
“I would say that … the OEMs are actually another type of competitor, 
when they enter [the market]. Some are more aggressive, others less. But 
they are an additional competitor. And of course, a good sales man needs 
to know his competitors and know their strengths and weaknesses to know 
what to highlight in my own offerings […].” – Vice President Sales MRO1
OEM partner sensing building a deep understanding of 
the OEM’s core logic and needs
“we have taken a long, long time to learn everything. So, we have had an 
initial phase with the OEM in which we took one and a half years to 
understand each other, I think now that has changed very much, now we 
have a good mutual understanding, and now it’s all about improving that 
even further.” – OEM Cooperation Manager at MRO1 
Customer partner sensing Increasing sensing routines with 
customers to mitigate threats of 
monopolization of service market
“I believe that it is the biggest risk for the MRO if everything runs via the 
airframer. Because monopolization increases even further and because of 
that less competition is taking place. And at the same time this is also the 
biggest risk for the airline. The awareness has already increased strongly 
due to [the development in the engine market]. Because everybody 
needed to sign with the OEM although they did not want to.” – CEO MRO1
Table 6.8: Service Firm-specific Dynamic Capability of Relational Sensing
OEM Competitor Sensing OEM Competitor sensing is a microfoundation at the very
basis of sensing dynamic capabilities that is required for all types of alliances. It is per-
formed on two levels: on the market level, it is geared at detecting the development
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of changes in the competitive landscape induced by the manufacturers’ hybrid offer-
ings, such as increased competition for tenders, manufacturers previously did not care
about (Schneider et al., 2013). On the level of the individual manufacturer, it aims at
identifying the OEMs’ competitive moves and positioning, strengths and weaknesses,
its service offers, and their commercial success. One aspect is the identification of new
technologies used in the latest generations of equipment and the manufacturers’ at-
tempts to erect barriers to service provisioning through this technology.
As a competitor, OEMs differ from competing traditional service providers, as they pos-
sess unique resources and capabilities that can be used to gain a competitive advantage
against conventional service firms (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). A related advantage of the
manufacturer is its unique position as both a competitor and a supplier of material and
intellectual property, which may be required to perform the service on the particular
asset. Hence, OEM competitor sensing is a servitization-specific capability and differs
from traditional competitor sensing on the same level of the supply chain.
Depending on the individual configuration, the competitor sensing capability becomes
salient on different levels. Whereas for the workbench setup it can be interpreted as a
prerequisite to enter the alliance, it is on top of that continuously required in a coopet-
itive alliance configuration to continually differentiate the own against the manufac-
turers’ service offerings.
OEM Partner Sensing OEM partner sensing aims to establish a profound understand-
ing of the OEM, its core logic and servitization strategy to develop opportunities for col-
laboration. As the OEM’s core logic differs considerably from the familiar logic of pure
service providers, OEM partner sensing can be a time-consuming and complicated task.
Besides possible areas of collaboration, OEM partner sensing also encompasses poten-
tial negotiation levers that can be applied to improve the bargaining power in negoti-
ations, such as usage of alternative materials, or the vendor selection in the course of
the customer’s aircraft purchasing campaigns. OEM partner sensing is a microfounda-
tion that is required to establish all kind of alliances with the manufacturers. However,
more advanced partner sensing capabilities allow service firms to understand the core
logic of the manufacturer’s business model, such as the importance of the spare parts
business and the involved repair versus replace tradeoff. This, in turn, permits service
firms to make more advanced Value Propositions to the manufacturer and thus enables
configurations from coopetitive alliances up to providing a two-sided solution offer.
OEM Partner sensing is somewhat reciprocal to manufacturers’ service system sens-
ing capabilities as described by Kindstro¨m et al. (2013), as it represents the relational
sensing capabilities from the service provider’s side.
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Customer Partner Sensing Customer partner sensing is a capability that aims to iden-
tify common grounds with the customers to jointly oppose the risk of monopolization
of the service market caused by the OEMs servitization practices. Here, the service pro-
vider’s and customer’s interests are aligned, as both prefer alternatives to the OEM’s
offering. However, interviewees reported a limited willingness of airlines to oppose
OEM monopolization of the service market (see Table 6.4). Financial sacrifices associ-
ated with establishing an independent service provider and attractive OEM pricing for
large customers with the respective bargaining power were named as the main reasons,
inhibiting this type of strategic market-shaping.
Apparently, many airlines lack the strategic insight, resources, or expertise to formulate
a market-shaping strategic sourcing strategy, which is why the maintenance decision
is often based on short-term standard criteria of price, quality, and turn-around-time,
instead of long-term strategic market considerations. Customer partner sensing is a
microfoundation of dynamic sensing capabilities that support the formation of coopet-
itive solution alliances, as it identifies the customer’s needs of having a choice in their
maintenance decision, which is to be considered an antecedent for this configuration.
Service Firm-specific Dynamic Capability of Relational Seizing
Microfoundations Description Proof Quotas
OEM tactics capability Routines to develop strategies to 
react to OEM competition
"We should be prepared to see where […] Boeing really has an advantage. 
And then we have to think: ‚where can we compete with our means? Do we 
believe that we can stand up to them or is it rather as with the engine 
manufacturers?' [...] And then you have to simply say: ‚if you can’t compete, 
you better cooperate‘ and then you have to look if there is a possibility to 
maybe cooperate with Boeing on certain fields.“  – Vice President Sales 
MRO 1
Alliance capability Routines to co-create joint 
business models with OEMs
“We engaged with Boeing from the onset. They needed a network of 
partners on which they can rely on for the 787 airframe maintenance, where 
and when the need arises. [MRO 3] was one of the first seven selected – the 
only one in Asia. They effectively closed the market to anyone who is not in 
the network.”
– Executive VP MRO 3
Cultural change capability Capacity to overcome antiquated 
beliefs and embrace new business 
logics and value constellations
„Clearly the MROs are being asked things that are out of their comfort 
zones. The OEMs are slowly moving in but the Airlines want speed and they 
want lower costs. So if they have to meet the Airline requirements, the 
MROs will need to partner with OEMs at both the airframe and systems 
level so they can cooperate and provide a service that is fast and nimble.“
– VP and General Manager MRO 5
“Every situation, the old as the new, is taken by itself not that difficult. […]
The problem is the change management between. How do I get an
organization to collaborate that has embraced a clear bogeyman for thirty
years […]? And that’s why almost all larger collaborations begin with the two
bosses that say: ‘let’s do something together.’ And then the whole
organization comes and tells you why it’s not possible and where the risks
lie.” – CEO MRO 1
Table 6.9: Service Firm-specific Dynamic Capability of Relational Seizing
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OEM Tactics Capability Traditional service providers such as MROs need to build the
capability for formulating tactics of “how to deal with” each OEM that has entered or
is about to enter the service market. This capability enables them to decide whether
to compete or cooperate with manufacturers and to delineate a plan to pursue desir-
able cooperative or competitive aftermarket configurations. Although many points are
to consider in this decision, the tactic development can be based on a simple rule: “If
you can’t compete you better cooperate.” (Vice President Sales MRO 1). However, tactics
development (i.e., identifying whether competing is a feasible option) takes time and
is costly since decision protocols are not limited to this simple rule, as the interviewee
points out: “This is not a process that ’bam!’ we look at once and [. . . ] then we do it exactly
like that. [. . . ] It is rather something that develops depending on the signals we receive from the
market.” Consequently, the MRO may define a strategic direction of increased cooper-
ation with OEMs; however, each alliance is idiosyncratic, and decisions are made on a
case-by-case basis.
The OEM tactics and the capability required for its formulation differ considerably
from competitive tactics against the traditional competitors on the same level of the
value chain. The two main reasons are that (a) manufacturers possess unique resources
and capabilities that they can leverage to achieve a competitive advantage (Ulaga &
Reinartz, 2011), and that (b) MROs generally experience a higher dependency on OEMs
than on their competitors, as they are often the sole source of parts and repair manu-
als. The OEM tactics capability allows service firms to decide whether to compete or
cooperate with the OEM and choose the configuration of the alliance. For example, this
capability was extensively used in the Aircraft Case to determine the strategic position-
ing of the MRO as a competitor of the OEM and only pursue punctual collaborations
on equal footing.
OEM Alliance Capability Once a cooperative OEM tactic has been set, MROs require
a specific OEM alliance capability to form an OEM alliance of the desired configura-
tion. The alliance capability builds on a profound understanding of the OEM’s needs
through OEM sensing activities.
Thriving OEM alliances are typically not built with an all-encompassing approach. In-
stead, it is crucial to identify single fields of cooperation in which to create a win-win
situation. Routines include a phase of workshops in which the parties get to know each
other, build trust, and start co-creating a joint business model: “at the beginning it’s like in
a dark room, you are palpating each other, you don’t know exactly, who it is, what he’s doing, and
how he’s behaving.” (Director Finance and Product Sales MRO 2). Not surprisingly, more
advanced alliance capabilities are required for more advanced configurations. One ex-
ample is the two-sided solution in which a complex pain-gain-sharing model was es-
tablished to overcome the repair versus replace tradeoff and align the interests of the
OEM and the MRO.
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Cultural Change Capability Strategic flexibility involves the firm’s responsiveness to
pressures (Young-Ybarra & Wiersema, 1999) and a proactive rather than reactive atti-
tude to change (Bock et al., 2012). The corporate culture refers to the values and beliefs
of employees, and it can work as a de facto governance system mediating the behavior
of individuals and the firm (Teece et al., 1997). Hence, the corporate culture may fos-
ter or inhibit the firm’s strategic flexibility to innovate its business model (Bock et al.,
2012).
MRO providers require strategic flexibility to reconfigure their business model to de-
velop solutions and proactively form alliances with OEMs. Interviewees perceive the
cultural change needed to collaborate with OEMs as especially critical. The reason is
that MROs have to discard the traditional beliefs held about the roles in the industry,
a change in the company’s mission, and adapting to new operating routines following
different business logic. For example, production and engineering staff has tradition-
ally developed alternative repair methods and parts to compete with expensive OEM
spare parts and deliver value for airlines. In OEM alliances, these developments are
increasingly restricted or follow a different business logic: in the new business model,
cost savings benefit first and foremost the OEM (the old bogeyman in the beliefs of
many employees) and only indirectly the airline (the valued customer).
Somewhat counter-intuitively fewer cultural change capabilities are required for more
advanced configurations with the OEM. This becomes apparent in the workbench setup
in which the MRO provides basic repair services to the OEM as the only customer and
according to the OEM’s engineering instructions. This posits a much stronger cultural
change, then, for example, coopetitive solutions in which the MRO continues servicing
airline customers, just as part of the manufacturer’s network. However, even in this
setup cultural change capabilities are required since the development of alternative
repairs is performed under supervision and control of the manufacturer and does not
aim to improve the competitive positioning against this player.
Service Firm-specific Dynamic Capability of Relational Reconfiguring
A key to successful and sustainable growth is the capability to reconfigure the resources
of the firm, adapting them to external changes such as dynamic markets or technologies
(Teece, 2007, 2012). In cases in which firms are confronted with significant levels of en-
vironmental dynamism, a mere fine-tuning of business models is not sufficient. Instead,
firms will require more substantial reconfigurations to remain competitive (Helfat et al.,
2007; Teece, 2007). In the aerospace industry, servitization represents such an increase
of environmental dynamism for MRO service firms that need to form alliances with ma-
nufacturers to remain competitive in an increasingly OEM-dominated industry (Schnei-
der et al., 2013).
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Microfoundations Description Proof Quotas
OEM co-specialization Idiosyncratic development of joint 
resources such as facilities and 
activities such as overhaul 
procedures between OEM and MRO
„we have already formed some partnerships […], but what kind of change 
does that mean for us? […] When we say: ’we are doing the Joint Venture’, 
then nothing stays as it was, but you have to change and adapt to the 
partner.“ 
– Manager Market Research and Competition MRO 1
"So, it is in fact an entry ticket that we have purchased and now we have to 
shape this thing, don’t we? So, keep on developing, always promise value 
and develop it over time” – Head of Corporate Strategy MRO 1
OEM incentive alignment Establishment of mechanisms such 
as outcome-based revenue models, 
equity-sharing and management 
meetings to ensure the alignment of 
interests between MRO and OEM
"it's always the crux when you bring together an OEM and an MRO is the 
topic of replace versus repair. The OEM always wants to sell material and 
we always want to lower costs. And what we have achieved in this model is 
to make the OEM participate from our repair development, on all our cost-
savings measures”
– Manager Alliance Function MRO 1
Value appropriation capability Increasing transparency about costs 
and value of services, making them 
more tangible and marketable to 
manufacturers
“We sell especially engineering as a mush of different services […], they are 
smeared via overhead, […] they are not transparent. For an airline this is 
OK, but for the OEM we need to develop and sell them. […] I think this is 
one of the capabilities that we have to gain as a company, it is something 
that we are not good at today.” – Senior Manager Alliance Function MRO 1
Coopetition management 
capability 
Establishment of coopetitive function 
and (learning) routines that enable 
steering both competitive and 
cooperative facets of the OEM-MRO 
relationship
This [multilateral relationship] is indeed a problem and one of the reasons 
why we have founded […] a small team, where this tension is concentrated 
in very few people. […] The cooperation management should be active for a 
very long timeframe and manage these very, very different streams of 
activity, we will continue purchasing a mad amount of material and repair 
services from them, […] but now we also have a multiplying sales stream, 
[…] and the third stream is this field of technological cooperation. Long story 
short, this cooperation management has to somehow manage these very 
different streams of activities. 
– Senior Manager Alliance Function MRO 1
Table 6.10: Service Firm-specific Dynamic Capability of Relational Reconfiguring
When a traditional service provider enters an alliance with a manufacturer, a multi-
lateral relationship between the two actors evolves, in which the manufacturer can
take multiple roles such as alliance partner, supplier, customer, and competitor. My
research uncovers a specific set of microfoundations of dynamic capabilities that ser-
vice providers require for creating for and appropriating value from these multilateral
relationships.
OEM Co-specialization Co-specialization — the idiosyncratic development and us-
age of resources and activities such as assets, R&D activities, or human resources be-
tween firms — is a microfoundation of dynamic capabilities, providing opportunities
for achieving a competitive advantage through both cost savings and unique offerings
such as integrated solutions (Teece, 2007).
While the exchange of simple services requires less co-specialization, the level increases
in cases in which joint resources or a joint venture are created. One example of a pro-
nounced type of co-specialization is present in the engine case, where the focal com-
pany and the OEM jointly create an engine overhaul facility. While the OEM contributes
with manufacturing-specific resources such as test-equipment, manuals required for
the overhaul process, and material, the MRO provider contributes by providing its
knowledge about efficient overhaul processes and the design requirements of the fa-
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cilities. As both parties co-create by providing their unique resources and capabilities,
this co-specialized asset may be difficult to imitate by single competitors alone.
However, co-specialization is not an easy task and requires effort and commitment to
create joint processes, a common language and working culture as Senior Manager
Alliance Function MRO 1: “currently we are still in the phase in which we have a lot of
friction and have to calibrate with one another. For now, we are nowhere near the phase in
which we start to raise synergies, as to say one plus one is more than two. Just the opposite is
true. Currently, it rather feels like one plus one is still less than two.”
OEM Incentive Alignment Incentive alignment in strategic alliances is a governance
issue that has received broad academic attention (e.g., Gulati & Singh, 1998; Zollo et al.,
2002). Alliance literature discusses an extensive set of methods to ensure incentive
alignment, including hierarchical control, equity sharing (e.g., the foundation of a joint
venture), incentive systems, standard operating procedures, dispute resolution proce-
dures, and non-market pricing systems (e.g., cost-plus models) (Gulati & Singh, 1998).
Establishing inter-organizational routines (stable patterns of two firms defined and re-
peated during recurrent collaborations, Zollo et al. (2002), p. 701) enable partnering
firms to achieve their strategic objectives. Thus, it is likely to be critical to business
performance, and a key microfoundation of dynamic capabilities (Teece, 2007).
In the context of coopetitive alliances and two-sided solutions between traditional ser-
vice providers and manufacturers, the previously mentioned “repair versus replace
tradeoff” becomes salient as a specific type of governance issue: balancing cost im-
provements through the reduction of material consumption versus the manufacturer’s
incentive to protect its spare part business. While the former is a primary way the MRO
can contribute value to the OEM, the latter is a crucial Revenue Stream for the OEM
and has even been associated with solution-specific dynamic capabilities of OEMs (Fis-
cher et al., 2010). Aligning these contrary incentives becomes possible by defining an
outcome-based pain-gain-sharing model between OEM and MRO provider. By estab-
lishing these profit-sharing routines, both parties are incentivized to minimize mainte-
nance costs and material consumption. In the workbench setup, the microfoundations
of incentive alignment are less relevant as here, the workscope is defined by the manu-
facturer, while the service firm is compensated on an input-based t&m logic.
Coopetition Management Capability It may be assumed that by establishing an al-
liance between an MRO and a manufacturer, a cooperative relationship across a broad
set of equipment, topics and organizational functions evolves. However, this is not the
case. Rather, the alliance is typically limited to one type of equipment, which results in
the forming of a multifaceted relationship, in both parties take multiple roles such as
alliance partners, suppliers, customers, and competitors. For this reason, interviewees
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highlighted the MRO’s need to develop the dynamic capability to manage this type of
multifaceted business relationships in all types OEM alliances, not only the coopetitive
solution configuration. The identified microfoundations supporting this capability en-
tail the establishment of learning and inter-organiza-tional routines that are bundled at
a central coopetition function in the enterprise.
Institutionalizing alliance management routines into a dedicated alliance function is
known to lead to a higher alliance success rate, greater abnormal stock-market gains,
and an improved capability to form more alliances and attract better partners. This
is achieved by different mechanisms such as knowledge management and learning,
granting external visibility and support, internal coordination and problem-solving and
interventions to fix problems (Dyer et al., 2001; Kale et al., 2002). In line with these pre-
vious findings, interviewees (1, 6, 8, 9, 15, 16, 19) perceived a central alliance function
as a crucial element for successfully establishing and managing the OEM alliances.
In this context, the central coopetitive function is better able to form alliances than de-
central managers for a variety of reasons: first, it can systematically and proactively
perform sensing and seizing routines. Hence, opportunities are actively created, in-
stead of only seized when they present themselves. Second, coopetition managers can
integrate needs and OEM-related activities across different business units into one bun-
dled negotiation. This profound understanding is a precondition for making valuable
propositions to the manufacturer and increases the possibility of establishing a config-
uration which allows a relationship on equal footing. Hence, a more advanced coope-
tition capability will enable MROs to develop more advanced alliance configurations.
Fourth, coopetition managers can establish relationships of mutual trust with OEM de-
cision makers that increases with the duration of the relationship.
In conclusion, MROs as pure service firms require a distinct set of dynamic capabilities to suc-
cessfully create solutions and ally with manufacturers. The differences compared to manufac-
turers’ dynamic capabilities in this context stem on one hand from the service background. On
the other hand, also the position in the supply chain, the high level of dependence, and changing
roles in the industry shape these dynamic capabilities and their microfoundations.
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7.1 Academic Contributions
By exploring strategic options for business model innovation of traditional mainte-
nance, repair, and overhaul firms in the aerospace industry, this study aims to make
three main contributions to servitization research and research on aerospace business
models. The first and main contribution is clarifying the role of pure service firms in
servitization research and the development of strategic options for MROs to cope with
servitization practices of manufacturers through business model innovation. Second,
this study takes a first step in unveiling the “dark side of servitization”, uncovering the
currently obscure less favorable aspects of this phenomenon. Third, I describe business
models of MRO firms that have been overlooked in the efforts of describing changing
airlines’ and manufacturers’ business models.
7.1.1 Strategic BMI Options for Pure Service Firms to Cope with Servitization
The main contribution of this study is the identification of viable strategic options for
pure service firms to cope with servitization through business model innovation. In
order to do so, I first conducted a systematic literature review to clarify the role of pure
service firms in servitization research. Then, I developed a portfolio of strategic options
(i.e., business model configurations) for MRO service firms including a contingency-
based decision model that allows pure service firms to select the most appropriate type
of their business model. This decision is undergirded by my examination of competi-
tive advantage between pure service firms and manufacturers in hybrid offerings. To
complete the examination of BMI, I explore the dynamic capabilities that are required
by pure service firms to actually transform their traditional business model into the
desired configuration. This represents a contribution to servitization literature that has
mostly focused on manufacturers that wish to add services to their business model,
competitive advantage (Lightfoot et al., 2013), and effects on firm performance (Kastalli
et al., 2013; Parida et al., 2014a). In contrast, business model innovation of service firms
and evolutions on an industry level in the context of servitization has received minimal
attention (Raddats et al., 2019).
Systematic Literature Review In a first step, this study enhances our understanding of
pure service firms in the context of servitization and the limitations of servitization re-
search. By performing a systematic literature review, I have consolidated the dispersed
knowledge stocks and anecdotal evidence towards a more systematic and granular un-
derstanding of traditional service firms in this context.
The results indicate that most servitization studies show a focus on manufacturers,
while the role of service firms remains under-explored (Martı´n-Pen˜a & Ziaee Bigdeli,
2016; Mountney et al., 2016). Studies that do take service firms into account do this
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mostly in the form of network partners (Paiola et al., 2013; Gebauer et al., 2013; Fork-
mann et al., 2017b), however neglecting the competitive aspects of these relationships.
Besides, very few efforts have been made to understand the possibly disruptive changes
caused by the entry of manufacturers onto pure service firms (Schneider et al., 2013) and
onto the service market and its customers.
This study reveals disparities in the presentation of traditional service firms in litera-
ture: on one hand, service firms can compete in the field of solutions by integrating the
equipment from various manufacturers and services into a seamless solution to fulfill
increasing customer needs (Brady et al., 2005; Davies et al., 2007). In doing so, tradi-
tional service firms, however, need to compete with manufacturers that possess unique
resources and capabilities that they can leverage into a cost and differentiation advan-
tage (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011).
On the other hand, traditional service firms have also been portrayed as network part-
ners in manufacturers’ solution networks (Paiola et al., 2013; Gebauer et al., 2013).
However, academia has focused on the cooperative aspects of these relationships, fail-
ing to observe the inherent competitive characteristics. Only recently, network actors
have received limited academic attention, e.g., Jaakkola & Hakanen (2013) identify ben-
efits and sacrifices that network partners experience when joining manufacturer-led so-
lution networks, and Story et al. (2017) investigate the capabilities that firms that aspire
to become network partners need to develop.
The literature review generates a stronger platform to explain the phenomenon of tra-
ditional service firms offering solutions and becoming part of the manufacturers’ net-
works. As a central element, Table 2.4 gathers empirical evidence of companies that
venture into solution provisioning from a base in services. These findings demonstrate
the disparity in high relevance of traditional service firms offering solutions and the
sporadic nature with which this phenomenon has been studied. In conclusion, the
academic contribution provided by the literature review is providing a systematic and
granular understanding of this phenomenon, the description of research gaps, and the
identification of future research directions.
The MRO Business Model Portfolio Second, by creating the MRO Business Model
Portfolio (Figure 6.3) — a two-dimensional framework containing five different con-
figurations of MRO business models — I outline the strategic options that these firms
can employ to cope with servitization. The portfolio represents an extension of current
literature from two anecdotally reported generic BMI paths towards strategic options
that that pure service firms can employ to cope with servitization. This represents a
contribution to servitization literature that has remained anecdotal in regards to how
traditional service firms need to transform their business model to become part of these
networks.
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The MRO Business Model Portfolio outlines the opportunities for developing stand-
alone solutions and different configurations of alliances between pure service firms
and manufacturers. These findings considerably expand our knowledge regarding the
types of different business models employed by pure service firms when faced with
servitization: First, service firms can develop stand-alone solutions without forming
alliances with manufacturers given the necessary access to manufacturing-specific re-
sources such as intellectual property rights. Second, alliancing with manufacturers is
not necessarily a time-limited approach with lacking added customer value (Schneider
et al., 2013); instead the different configurations of partnerships differ considerably in
their setup and effects for both MRO and the final customer.
Stand-alone Solutions of Traditional Service Firms The study finds that solution busi-
ness model employed by pure service firms differ from the common perception of ma-
nufacturers’ solution business models in various aspects. To design effective solutions,
companies require a comprehensive understanding of the aspired underlying business
model to resolve alignment issues between product, marketing, sales, and operations
management (Storbacka, 2011). Established servitization literature hence is of only lim-
ited help to pure service firms in developing effective solution business models.
Here, this study contributes by gathering and synthesizing existing empirical evidence
of pure service firms that offer solutions (see Table 2.4), and strengthening the current
anecdotal empirical base with three service firm solution cases. The systematic visual-
ization in the Business Model Canvas highlights differences between solution business
models employed by manufacturers and pure service firms and guides service firms in
their transformation path towards solutions (Adrodegari et al., 2016).
First, the common perception of established servitization literature should be adapted
from a notion that solutions are a type of “integrated product and service offering that
delivers value in use” (Baines et al., 2007, p. 3). Instead, traditional service firms pro-
vide pure service solutions, in which the underlying product does not always form part
of the bundle. For example, in Aircraft and Engine Solutions, ownership is transferred
to the airline or a lessor, whereas the solution consists in providing engineering, plan-
ning, and repair services for the airline for a fixed fee per flight hour, however not the
operation of the asset itself. This arrangement departs from much of the established
servitization literature, in which the common perception remains that asset ownership
remains with the supplier who often operates the asset (Baines & Lightfoot, 2014).
Second, traditional service firms can base their solution offers partly on different Value
Propositions that are difficult for manufacturers to imitate, namely (a) a unique cus-
tomer perspective based on their operator experience and neutral position between ma-
nufacturer and customer, and (b) providing services or solutions across different types
of manufacturer’s equipment, which is highly challenging for manufacturers. This
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unique differentiation advantage is especially valuable, as solutions are typically used
to achieve competitive differentiation in commoditized markets (Matthyssens et al.,
2009).
Another aspect uncovered by this study is the duality of roles of the final customer.
For pure service firms, the customer does not only play the role as co-creator of the
joint solution (Storbacka, 2011); instead, he is also Key Partner that ensures access to
the manufacturer’s materials, test equipment, and intellectual property such as repair
manuals. Hence, the customer’s role differs from manufacturers, where customers do
not play this Key Partner role. This is because manufacturers typically do not require
the end customer as a partner to manage dependencies across different levels of the
supply chain. This finding complements servitization literature on buyer-supplier rela-
tionships and linkages that has overlooked this service-firm specific aspect so far (Bastl
et al., 2012).
Third, traditional service firms need to employ the elements of their business model
in different ways to successfully deliver solutions and sustain competition. One exam-
ple is the positional advantage that manufacturers can gain by using their preferred
channel access to the final customer and pre-empt competition. In this context, tradi-
tional service firms need to rely on their long-term trustful customer relationships with
service content to offset this supposed advantage of the manufacturer.
MRO-OEM alliance configurations The identified alliance configurations range from
setups with high manufacturing dependence, low added customer value, and little
competition in the aftermarket (the OEM Workbench setup), via coopetitive solution
networks that provide space for rivalry and providing value-added services, up to
two-sided solutions that place pure service firms in a favorable competitive position
vis-a`-vis their peers. The two-sided solution underpins the recent interest in the phe-
nomenon of de-servitization (Valtakoski, 2017; Kowalkowski et al., 2017) that is likely
to be of rising importance in the future due to the increasing occurrence of servitiza-
tion and thus cases of servitization failure. Hence, alliancing with manufacturers is not
necessarily a time-limited approach with little customer value added, as previously as-
sumed. Instead, service networks are very likely to be of high importance in the future,
as manufacturers and OEMs can combine their resources and capabilities to create su-
perior offerings to their customers. The value added to the customer depends on the
configuration employed. However, all arrangements except the workbench setup re-
tain at least some, albeit a lower level of competition in the service markets. Overall,
however, the level of competition depends on the arrangements within the networks
and airlines’ efforts to restrain OEM hegemony.
This work contributes to this strand of literature by clarifying that not one but multiple
types of network partner business models exist that differ considerably in the perceived
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benefits and sacrifices for pure service firms (see Table 7.1). Also, this work identifies
previously unknown sacrifices of service firms that are rooted in the coopetitive aspects
of those networks.
Benefits OEM Workbench Coopetitive Solution Two-sided Solution
Growth
• Increase in revenue
• Access to new customer segments
• Access to most profitable customer segments
• Extension of the service offering
Y/N
N
N
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Cost/Effort Reduction
• Increased learning and economies of scale
• Reduced effort for sales activities
Y/N
Y
Y/N
N
Y
Y
Access to Knowledge Resources
• Input in R&D from other customer segments
• Increased product-knowledge
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Improvement of Company Image
• Credibility for being partner of a known OEM network
• Access to bigger customers that can be used as 
reference
Y/N
Y/N
Y
Y/N
Y
Y
Sacrifices OEM Workbench Coopetitive Solution Two-sided Solution
Investment and Sales
• High upfront investments
• Delay of profits
• Limited potential to affect solution contents, sales 
targets and -efforts
• Decrease of revenues
Y
Y
Y
Y/N
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
N
N
Access to Knowledge Resources
• Lack of information sharing by solution provider
• Lack of access to intellectual property
Y
N
N
N
N
N
Culture and Governance
• Professional’s reluctance to act as mere resource 
providers
• Lack of trust in each other’s competences
• Lack of incentive alignment between partners
Y
Y/N
Y
N
Y/N
Y/N
N
N
N
Coopetition
• Strengthening a competitor’s service offering N Y N
Table 7.1: Proposed Benefits and Sacrifices of OEM Network Partners per Configuration
In the OEM workbench setup, the MRO provider becomes a subcontractor of the OEM
for MRO services, which does not allow it to reap most of the associated benefits, while
it still has to bear most of the sacrifices that are potentially associated with an alliance.
The most prominent examples are the benefit of continuing to be able to provide ser-
vices on new technology and improved product knowledge, which comes however at
the sacrifice of increased dependency and loss of channel access to the end customer.
Coopetitive solutions allow pure service firms to experience more benefits such as the
opportunity of providing traditional, value-added and solution offers to both end cus-
tomers and the manufacturer. This configuration places traditional service firms in a
better long-term competitive position since they can retain market access which results
in a somewhat lower dependency on the manufacturer, given satisfactory license con-
ditions. One major drawback in common with the workbench setup is that pure service
firms are unlikely to capture value from the most profitable customers since these are
typically contracted by the manufacturer. However, coopetitive solutions entail fewer
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sacrifices compared to the workbench setup, as the provider can determine solution
contents to a greater extent and does not suffer from the staff’s reluctance to act as a
mere subcontractor to the OEM.
The two-sided solution configuration provides the most benefits and requires the fewest
sacrifices compared to the other two alliance configurations. In this setup, pure ser-
vice firms take over the service business of the manufacturer, hence providing simul-
taneously a solution to the manufacturer and the end customer alike. This arrange-
ment offers the most benefits for the service firm, as it enjoys preferential access to
manufacturing-specific resources that may create a competitive advantage against other
firms that have more limited access to these resources. The preferential access and the
lack of competition with the manufacturer provide a solid basis for capturing the most
profitable customers, robust opportunities for growth, and tapping into economies of
scale. Yet, one drawback of this configuration is that the MRO loses the capability to
perform a credible OEM-independent consulting approach that is in the best interest
of the airline. Instead, OEM and MRO interests become completely aligned through
risk-and-revenue-sharing-mechanisms. For customers, a drawback of this configura-
tion is the limited competition that results from such a setup. A common denominator
of all OEM alliances is that they require a substantial upfront investment for licenses
and possibly facilities and hence delay the earning of profits.
In conclusion, the benefits and sacrifices that pure service firms experience depend on
how they innovate their business model and the associated configuration of alliance
business models that they achieve. Some of the sacrifices that have previously been
associated with becoming a network partner such as the lack of information sharing
by the manufacturer or the professional’s reluctance to act as a pure resource provider
(Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013) can be mitigated by developing more advanced configura-
tions of network partner business models.
By employing the holistic business model lens to explore the different configurations
of the network partner business model of traditional service firms, a basis is created
on which future research can base its efforts. The findings indicate that developing a
network partner business model is less straight forward than might be assumed. The
reason is that service firms need to cope with both competitive and cooperative aspects
of the relationships and take a strategic decision of whether to ally with manufacturers
that enter the “own” service market. Besides, service firms need to develop specific
Value Propositions for servitizing manufacturers that deviate from those formerly pro-
vided to end customers.
Competitive Advantage between Pure Service Firms and Manufacturers Extending
the knowledge-base regarding competitive advantage between firms with a manufac-
turing and service background in hybrid offerings is the third backbone of my first
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contribution, aiming to answer the call for research by the in this regard seminal pa-
per by Ulaga & Reinartz (2011). Currently, research on competitive advantage between
both players has so far only taken the manufacturer’s perspective, is mostly based on
resources and capabilities, lacks empirical underpinnings on the service firm side, and
does not take the buyer-supplier relationships and positions in the supply chain into ac-
count. Hence, current servitization literature has limited explanatory power regarding
the competitive advantage between manufacturers and pure service firms.
Consequently, the proposed contribution is threefold. The first aspect is synthesizing
the academic and strengthening the empirical underpinnings of manufacturers’ unique
sources of competitive advantage against service firms that have received only little
and dispersed academic attention (e.g., Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011; Schneider et al., 2013).
The second aspect is exploring the service-provider side of competitive advantage and
comparing the results with manufacturers, hence improving our understanding of the
phenomenon from both sides. The final third aspect is extending the employed the-
oretical lenses from the RBV towards the holistic business model perspective that can
explain competitive advantage through the combination of business model elements,
not only resources and capabilities (Morris et al., 2005).
This study is the first one to identify sources of competitive advantage of pure service
firms and taking a first step in explaining competitive advantage from both sides (see
Table 6.1). By focusing on service firms in my sample, I was able to overcome the limita-
tion of Ulaga & Reinartz (2011) that have used a sample comprised of manufacturers.
The results have four essential implications regarding the competitive advantage be-
tween both parties. First, the service-based empirical evidence strengthened some of
the assumptions regarding the competitive advantage of the manufacturer’s business
model elements. However, some items that previously were assumed to be unique to
manufacturers are also present in the business model of pure service firms. Third, ad-
ditional mechanisms, by which manufacturers can leverage their business model into
a competitive advantage, were identified. However, also traditional service firms pos-
sess unique business model elements that they can employ to reach cost leadership or
differentiation advantage against manufacturers.
One example of manufacturers’ unique business model elements and their effect on
competitive advantage that were replicated is the manufacturers’ risk management ca-
pability. This capability allows manufacturers to assess, manage, and mitigate risks in-
herent in the maintenance of the equipment better than their pure service counterparts
(Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). Interviewees perceived this capability as especially relevant
on products with new technology in COPS industries, where risks are difficult to as-
sess and may result in significant financial losses due to the high value and technical
complexity of the assets. These findings shed light on the under-researched risk as-
pect of solution offerings, where the scope and magnitude of these risks still have to be
determined from a supplier and customer perspective (Raddats et al., 2019).
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The results also indicate that some resources and capabilities are — unlike previously
assumed — unique to manufacturer business models. Instead, these elements also form
part of the business model of pure service firms. One example is the manufacturers’
product sales force that requires additional knowledge and capabilities to successfully
market services (Gebauer et al., 2005), whereas a pure service firms’ sales force was
found to have more experience with the sales of services and hence better meet cus-
tomer needs. This finding is however limited by the fact that it is based on the percep-
tion of managers of a service organization and may thus underlie a certain bias.
Third, the results extend our current understanding by indicating additional mecha-
nisms by which manufacturers leverage their unique resources and capabilities: for
example, product development and manufacturing assets such as tools, patents, and
licenses are used primarily to construct entry barriers for service firms that wish to
service the manufacturers’ installed base. This practice hints at additional, previously
unknown isolation mechanisms (e.g., intellectual property rights cause certain causal
ambiguity of resource-based sustainable competitive advantage of manufacturers, Di-
erickx & Cool, 1989) that may depend on the perception of the party employing or being
hindered by these isolating mechanisms.
Fourth, the study identified business model elements that service firms can leverage to
gain a competitive advantage against manufacturers in service and solution offerings.
One example is the multi-vendor capability that allows traditional service firms to pro-
vide solutions across different types or the specific scope of the equipment of one manu-
facturer. This capability facilitates the reduction of costs and complexity at customers
that operate various types of equipment and is required for a credible manufacturer-
independent consultancy approach (Schneider et al., 2013; Raddats & Easingwood,
2010). In contrast, for manufacturers, developing this capability has been labeled the
acid-test (Foote et al., 2001; Davies et al., 2006) and is particularly challenging to cre-
ate, as the Aircraft and Components Cases demonstrate. These findings complement
established literature, challenging the general assumption that manufacturers can gain
a competitive advantage by venturing into the service space. This result constitutes an
impactful contribution, as I have refined our current understanding to discern between
inter-manufacturer and manufacturer-service provider competition and a have taken a
first stride to understand the latter.
In conclusion, an empirically founded two-sided approach to understanding compe-
tition between servitizing manufacturers and pure service firms was created that, by
taking the business model lens, generates a systematic and granular understanding of
the phenomenon (Amit & Zott, 2001; Zott et al., 2011). This approach departs from
the primary focus on resources, capabilities, and networks for creating competitive ad-
vantage in solution provisioning towards the more holistic business model perspective.
While some studies in hybrid value provisioning have taken a more rigorous view on
the business model (e.g., Forkmann et al., 2017b), these studies mostly focus on the
business model reconfiguration process and not competitive advantage. Findings of
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this thesis provide empirical evidence on the innovation of incumbent firms’ traditional
business models blurring or converging industry boundaries (Zott & Amit, 2010; Foss
& Saebi, 2017), with particular regards to service and manufacturing domains.
A Contingency Approach to Becoming a Network Partner While for manufacturers a
plethora of strategic approaches regarding the alliance decision has been developed
(Salonen & Jaakkola, 2015), this work is the first attempt to develop a contingency
approach for traditional service firms alliance options. For traditional service firms,
competing or collaborating with manufacturers is a critical decision, since on one hand
manufacturers can severely limit the service firm’s critical operational capabilities, e.g.,
by withholding mandatory repair manuals (Schneider et al., 2013) while on the other
hand, pure service firms may lose their privileged established market position when
forming an alliance (Turunen & Finne, 2014).
The contingency approach contributes to our understanding of antecedents of alliances
between OEMs and service firms from the currently under-developed service firm side.
This study sheds light on dependence-based mechanisms that lie behind the formation
of these networks that have formerly received little or no attention. The common per-
ception has been that service firms perceive a set of specific benefits and sacrifices when
joining manufacturer-led networks (Jaakkola & Hakanen, 2013), do however not base
their collaboration decision on dependence considerations. In contrast, I find that the
collaborative decision is not a question of weighing benefits and sacrifices but rather a
question of power, i.e., whether manufacturers can protect their equipment from third-
party services. This power perspective has received only little academic attention so
far in research on solution networks and has focused on tier one manufacturers, not
service firms (Finne et al., 2015).
Besides, my findings complement earlier studies that find that partners in solution net-
works strive for powerful positions. On one hand, network partners from a base in
manufacturing mainly aim to improve their power position through the development
of proprietary technology that forms part of the overall solution (Finne et al., 2015). On
the other hand, pure service firms that, unlike the capital goods sector, rely to a low
extent on proprietary R&D but instead use the technologies transmitted from manufac-
turers for service innovation (Barras, 1986). Hence, the identified approaches by service
firms to secure the power required for participating in and benefiting from solution net-
works differs considerably from the procedures developed by manufacturers. Instead
of relying on proprietary technology, pure service firms aim to establish a relationship
“on equal footing” by developing Value Propositions to the manufacturer building on
their service-based business model that are difficult for the manufacturer to develop
internally. Another identified approach is reaching a critical size in the service network
that increases the service firm’s bargaining power and hence ensures a beneficial rent
distribution. Finally, relying on the bargaining power of the end customer of the so-
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lution has repeatedly been labeled the “entry ticket” to join a manufacturer’s solution
network and enable sustainable commercial conditions to do so.
Dynamic Capabilities of Traditional Service Firms To successfully perform the trans-
formation of the business model as a reaction to the environmental change that serviti-
zation poses, traditional service firms need two specific, complementary sets of sensing,
seizing, and reconfiguring capabilities, i.e., solution-specific and relational dynamic
capabilities. Here, I aim to contribute by shedding the first light on how traditional
service firms can adapt to a changing environment induced by servitization to ensure
long-term competitive survival or even advantage by means of dynamic capabilities.
First, I demonstrate that the microfoundations of dynamic solution capabilities required
by traditional service firms differ considerably from manufacturers. As illustrated in
Table 7.2, only three similar microfoundations were identified in both types of firms,
while the remaining 15 where either different from manufacturers (six), only available
at manufacturers (four), or only available at pure service firms (five). This finding sup-
ports the initial claim that the sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring capabilities required
for delivering solutions depend on whether a firm comes from a base in products or
services.
Microfoundations of Traditional 
Service Firms … No. Example
… similar to manufacturers 3 Orchestrating the solution network: both types of firms reconfigure the solution network to adapt it 
to changing customer needs and operational requirements. 
… different from manufacturers 6
Adapting a service-oriented versus outcome-oriented mental model: pure service firms do not 
have to develop a service-oriented model, as they already possess this as part of their traditional 
business model. Instead, changing their mental model is rather focused on providing output-based 
service offers, which entails assuming risks from other business units or even across firm 
boundaries.
… only available at manufacturers 4
Protection of spare parts business: not required for pure service firms that do possess a 
manufacturing business. This differentiates pure service firms from manufacturers, as the latter are 
not incentivized to reduce their spare parts business, except in pure outcome-based offers. Also, 
pure service firms can make use of alternative, more cost-efficient parts which manufacturers are 
unlikely to do to not endanger their spare parts business.
… only available at pure service 
firms 5
Installed base learning routines: unique dynamic capability of pure service firm that allows it to 
employ learning routines across the equipment of various manufacturers (e.g., different types of 
engines), in service. However, pure service firms also require more learning routines as they 
possess less design knowledge compared to manufacturers. 
Total 18
Table 7.2: Comparison of Dynamic Solution Capabilities of Traditional Service Firms and
Manufacturers
Even though solution business models of manufacturers and pure service firms are sim-
ilar, the dynamic capabilities that are required to transform traditional business models
from either a base in services or manufacturing differ considerably. First, unlike manu-
facturers, pure service providers do not need to adopt a service-oriented mental model
(den Hertog et al., 2010; Kindstro¨m et al., 2013), as they come from a base in services.
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However, they need to shift their mindset from performing a deed towards achieving
an outcome, which constitutes one of their main barriers for solution provisioning.
Second, manufacturers require more dynamic capabilities to change the product-part
of the solution, e.g., technology sensing routines (Kindstro¨m et al., 2013) or the adap-
tion of the product to facilitate unique service offers (Fischer et al., 2010). In contrast,
pure service firms can rely on the equipment of multiple manufacturers or alternative
vendors (Hobday et al., 2005) to differentiate their solution offer.
Third, integrating competitors’ services, not products, into the solution offering consti-
tutes the acid test (Foote et al., 2001; Davies et al., 2006) for pure service providers. Pure
service providers should consider doing so, as it (a) shows their commitment to act in
the customers’ interest, (b) firmly establishes them as the customer’s solution integrator,
(c) allows them to provide a superior offering by balancing strengths and weaknesses
of their internal service functions (Kowalkowski et al., 2011b; Kindstro¨m et al., 2013),
and (d) provides them with the opportunity to improve the own operations by learning
from the competitor.
The findings also indicate that traditional service firms that wish to transform the busi-
ness model to become a network partner in the manufacturer’s solution network require
relational sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring capabilities that are undergirded by spe-
cific microfoundations. While for manufacturers, the dynamic capabilities to form and
orchestrate solution networks have been studied relatively well (Fischer et al., 2010; den
Hertog et al., 2010; Kindstro¨m et al., 2013; Gebauer et al., 2012), I have taken the first
step to identify the dynamic capabilities needed for joining these networks.
My findings suggest that network partners require specific relational dynamic capa-
bilities that allow them to form part of a solution integrator’s network. For example,
the relational dynamic capability is undergirded by microfoundations that enable the
service firm to understand the solution integrator’s business model and seize oppor-
tunities to either compete with or complement the solution network. Besides, service
firms with sufficient dynamic capabilities can form alliances in a way that appropriates
some of the created value and change its culture and beliefs about roles in the industry
along the way. Here, I contribute by identifying the required dynamic capabilities and
their microfoundations of network partners to survive and thrive in manufacturer-led
solution networks and thus contribute to successful solution provisioning. Develop-
ing coopetitive solutions and two-sided solutions are particularly demanding ways of
innovating the MRO business model, as this requires simultaneously building solution-
specific and relational dynamic capabilities.
In conclusion, this study explains BMI of service firms in the context of servitization in
the following dimensions: what needs to be transformed (i.e., the content of the busi-
ness model), how the business model can be reconfigured (i.e., by the means of which
dynamic capabilities), and when (i.e., in which case) which configuration of business
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model is the most appropriate.
7.1.2 Unveiling the “Dark Side” of Servitization
My second contribution is to increase the understanding of the effects of servitization
on pure service firms and service markets, which is an area where close to no research
has taken place. Instead, the few studies that research servitization on a market level,
examine the contingency factors on market level and their influence on manufacturers
and their servitization efforts (Turunen & Finne, 2014).
My approach is inverse to these studies, as it takes a first step in exploring the ef-
fects of servitization on incumbent service firms and customers on an industry level.
Here, I contribute to the servitization literature by employing a process perspective
(in line with Kowalkowski et al., 2015; Forkmann et al., 2017b), which complements
the dominant outcome perspective in current research (Baines et al., 2009; Eggert et al.,
2014). The phase model of servitization (see Figure 2.12) allows gaining further insights
into the dynamics of competition between manufacturers and pure service firms over
time.
In the pre-servitization phase, manufacturers often perceive services as a necessary
evil, which results in customers providing maintenance services themselves and the
growth of professional service organizations for maintenance, repair, and overhaul.
In the servitization phase, customers profit from increased high-value solution offers
and possibly price-based competition with traditional service firms. Simultaneously,
service firms need to innovate their business model due to (a) increasing competitive
pressure by manufacturers, (b) the emergence of high-value solution offerings, and (c)
the manufacturers’ needs of partners to provide solutions in service networks.
The competitive survival of pure service firms is not only an end in itself but has im-
portant implications for functioning service markets, as well. Current research portrays
servitization to be associated with positive effects, such as competitive differentiation,
reduced risk, increased customer value, and the customer being locked-on, not locked-
in (Wise & Baumgartner, 1999; Vandermerwe, 2000; Shankar et al., 2007; Ng et al., 2009).
However, the manufacturers’ downstream movement can have severe effects on cus-
tomers that are left with few or no service choices for the lifecycle of their equipment.
The resulting dependency is especially severe in industries such as aerospace that op-
erate complex product systems. These industries are characterized by long product
lifecycles, where services such as maintenance constitute a significant proportion of the
total cost of ownership for the customer (Davies & Hobday, 2005). For commercial air-
craft, MRO costs accrue to 1.5 to 2 times the costs for purchasing and financing; for
engines, even 70% of the lifecycle costs emerge from maintenance, not the initial pur-
chase (Berger, 2014). Besides, competitive MRO services play a crucial role for airlines
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in ensuring aircraft reliability and punctuality (Niehues et al., 2001).
By identifying the manufacturer’s tactics to erect insurmountable barriers for service
firms or bind them into their service networks, I shed light on the “dark side” of servi-
tization. Explicitly, I identify the specific mechanisms that manufacturers employ to
erect barriers to hinder pure service firms in providing services for their equipment.
These barriers differ considerably from the previously assumed mechanisms of how
manufacturers can gain a positional advantage versus service firms (i.e., by leverag-
ing distinctive capabilities based on their unique resources from their manufacturing
background).
Alas, all critics of the dark side of servitization must not forget that these practices
have evolved due to the enormous discounts that manufacturers grant airlines at the
point of sales of the aircraft. The initially low prices realized for the equipment create
the need to shift the profitability into the aftermarket. Hence, servitization is a two-
sided medal that involves lower prices on equipment and more encompassing service
offers. However, these gains are more likely than not offset by the resulting long-term
dependency.
Nevertheless, a rising resilience of customers towards accepting solution offers was
uncovered. This resilience is mostly caused by increased customer dependency, which
results in aftermarket monopolies, increased risks, and higher prices for end customers.
This dark side of servitization is a relatively new topic, as most literature has analyzed
benefits, challenges, and risks of servitization through the manufacturer’s perspective
(Turunen & Finne, 2014), while only little is known about the sacrifices and adverse
effects of solution provisioning (Gesing et al., 2014). The general assumption seems to
be that “customers are more likely to receive increased performance at decreased costs”
(Hypko et al., 2010, p. 460), and that suppliers benefit from solutions by concentrating
on the core competence (Gesing et al., 2014). Here, industry practice seems to proceed
before academia, as the European Commission has performed various example of legal
intervention to ensure fair competition between manufacturers and repair shops in the
automotive industry, limiting anti-competitive behavior that manufacturers exhibit in
their servitization strategies (European Commission, 2003, 2007). The ability of manu-
facturers to lock-in customers through solutions has, in contrast, only been mentioned
sporadically, not systematically in academia (e.g., Rabetino et al., 2015). By providing
empirical evidence regarding the tactics that manufacturers employ to increase cus-
tomer dependence and erect competitive barriers for pure service firms, I contribute to
this barely researched topic, adding a first understanding of this phenomenon.
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7.1.3 MRO Business Model Innovation
A third contribution is made to business model literature in the commercial aviation
industry. So far, research in this area has been limited to explaining innovative ap-
proaches to compete based on business model innovation of aerospace manufacturers
(e.g., Ng et al., 2013; Batista et al., 2015; Ferreira et al., 2016) and airlines (e.g., Bieger &
Agosti, 2005; Doganis, 2010; Daft & Albers, 2013).
To my knowledge, the present work is the first attempt to capture the core logic of
aerospace MRO service firms in a comprehensive business model framework. In gen-
eral, maintenance, repair, and overhaul is commonly not understood as a viable busi-
ness model but rather as an internal function that is part of operations management.
However, this is an insufficient understanding given the development of large, inde-
pendent aircraft maintenance firms and the increasing outsourcing practices of air-
lines. Literature remains very limited on the topic and focuses mostly on the optimiza-
tion of this internal function through effectiveness and efficiency gains, which can be
achieved by employing maintenance information systems, optimization models, and
performance management (Garg & Deshmukh, 2006). Most available MRO literature
has so far only focused on specific aspects of the MRO business, such as maintenance
management (Tsang, 1998, 2002). Aircraft MRO is analyzed mostly as a function that
airlines need to perform or outsource to external parties (Potter et al., 2015), and hence
has focused on outsourcing decision, its impact on performance (Al-kaabi et al., 2007b),
and the resulting configurations of airlines (Al-kaabi et al., 2007a).
In contrast, knowledge regarding the performance of (aircraft) maintenance, repair, and
overhaul as a business model, not an internal cost center remains very limited. This
study builds on earlier work such as Hinsch (2012) who details the organization and
operational requirements that aerospace MRO firms need to fulfill to comply with leg-
islation, or (Schneider et al., 2013) who introduce innovation and marketing aspects of
MRO business models, remain however superficial in the description of the core logic
of MROs. Here, this work contributes by carving out the properties of the business
model that occupies the central position in the supply chain with OEMs as suppliers
and airlines as customers. One critical aspect of the MRO business model is the tacit
knowledge in the form of operator experience that manufacturers do not possess. This
knowledge allows these specialized service firms to maintain and optimize the opera-
tion of the complex equipment present in this industry better than their manufactur-
ing counterparts. Operator experience is complemented by service-specific engineer-
ing and repair capabilities and underlying service-specific resources such as mainte-
nance facilities that enable MROs to offer a portfolio of diversified maintenance services
across the equipment of different manufacturers.
The current lack of MRO business model literature is especially critical as simultane-
ously much academic work has advanced our understanding of business models and
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their innovation of other firms operating in the aerospace industry such as airlines (e.g.,
Albers et al., 2005; Daft & Albers, 2015; Daft, 2015) and manufacturers (Esposito, 2004;
Baines et al., 2007, 2013; Ferreira et al., 2016). Here, I aim to contribute by taking the first
steps in filling the blind spot between airlines and manufacturers by defining an em-
pirically grounded business model of this highly intertwined $75.6bn industry (Cooper,
2017). The findings presented in this study complement earlier attempts by Scott et al.
(2005) to describe business models at each tier of the aerospace value chain and the links
that exist between the different levels. One example of links and interdependencies are
buyers, suppliers, and partners on different tiers of the industry that simultaneously
innovate their business model, which creates the need for MROs to do so as well. Then,
the resulting MRO-OEM partnerships reciprocally affect business models of manufac-
turers that choose to de-servitize, leaving the service arena to their traditional service
partners. These developments are empirical evidence of the earlier notion that solution-
focused business model innovation practices can shape markets and dramatically alter
the competitive arena (Ferreira et al., 2016).
MROs need to understand and adapt the core logic of how they conduct business, as
business models of both their suppliers and customers change dramatically. When do-
ing so, they can leverage unique elements of their business model to create a positional
advantage by achieving strategic fit in times of increased environmental dynamism.
One example is using the well-developed service-related engineering capabilities to
develop new digitally-enhanced service offers, which will be decisive for gaining a
competitive edge in the commercial aerospace industry within the next years.
7.2 Managerial Implications
This study claims to make a threefold of managerial contributions: First, managers of
maintenance, repair, and overhaul firms can make use of the findings to drive the inno-
vation of their business model and ensure long-term competitiveness when faced with
servitization. Second, the findings inform airline managers who are responsible for the
development of the technical operations function, the MRO make-or-buy decision, and
procurement of MRO services. Third, managers at aerospace manufacturers can benefit
from the insights developed in this thesis to either differentiate their service offers by
relying on MRO service partners or even relying on these firms to deservitize and focus
on their core manufacturing business.
Managers at MRO Firms Managers of aerospace Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul
firms need to understand that servitization has become an imperative for manufac-
turers. Servitization is a strategy for these players to cope with the increasing financial
burden for commercial aircraft, with simultaneously decreasing yields on the initial
sale of the product. In effect, aerospace manufacturers rely on the large and lucrative
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service market to bridge the decade that lies between initial development costs and
product revenues. For MROs, servitization is both a threat as well as an opportunity.
To cope with manufacturer’s servitization strategies, MROs cannot use a one-size-fits-
all approach. Instead, they need to decide case-by-case based on the contingency factors
identified in this study, whether it makes more sense to compete, cooperate or coopete.
I hope that the provided MRO Business Model Portfolio (Figure 6.3) can act as a guidance
for these managers in choosing the appropriate configuration based on the identified
contingency factors (Figure 6.5). Also, the proposed benefits and sacrifices that are inherent
in the different alliance configurations (Table 7.1) allow managers to predict the results
of the alliance decision better. These three contributions can facilitate the decision of
MRO managers of whether or not to ally with manufacturers and for which alliance
type to aim. This decision is deemed as especially critical, as on the one hand, it may
enable but on the other hand compromise sources of competitive advantage (e.g., the
ability to provide a credible OEM-independent consulting approach representing the
airline’s best interest against manufacturers).
In this context, the research uncovered that the MRO’s alliance decision shows a bias to-
wards contingencies resulting from dependence on the manufacturer. This again hints
at the necessity to unlearn antiquated beliefs about the roles of the different actors in
the industry and develop a more proactive approach that takes sensing and seizing
opportunities from these new exciting value constellations into account (e.g., based on
the identified benefits and sacrifices). Managers will have to find answers to the ques-
tion of how the business model can be transformed to leverage its inherent strengths
into new Value Proposition that simultaneously solve the manufacturers’ and airlines’
challenges using the MRO business model and its BMI paths.
To compete with manufacturers that enter the aftermarket, MROs should formulate at-
tractive Value Propositions based on their unique resources and capabilities grounded
in their core business that differentiate themselves clearly from the OEMs. When doing
so, MRO marketing managers can rely on the competitive advantage framework (Table 6.1)
that contains sources of competitive advantage of both manufacturers and MRO service
firms. The findings show that MROs can set a focus on their differentiation strategies
on customer-centricity, which makes life easier for the customer. Shorter, easier to un-
derstand service contracts, rapid troubleshooting, high service quality, and a service
mindset that centers around the customer, are properties of this differentiation oppor-
tunity against manufacturers that typically receive only mediocre scores in customer
satisfaction surveys regarding service quality (AeroDynamic Advisory, 2018).
For MROs, one attractive option is to develop more stand-alone solutions to cater to air-
lines that increasingly demand service bundles that solve their technical operation’s
problems. In this regard, many options exist to increase their responsibilities along the
value chain by making use- and value-based offers. One example would be to provide
integrated Cabin Solutions. In such an offer, the MRO could take responsibility for fi-
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nancing, procurement, integration, installation, and modifications of an aircraft cabin,
for which airlines would pay a flight hour-based fee. This offer would allow airlines to
fly attractive cabin interiors while smoothing the financial burden that is typically as-
sociated with cabin refurbishment. Besides, airlines could mitigate the workload peak
for their engineering team, while simultaneously relying on one responsible provider
for the entire campaign. Overall, Cabin Solutions may be an attractive offer especially
for smaller carriers that are reluctant to stem the one-time invest and engineering ef-
fort and prefer a risk- and hassle-free solution. In Cabin Solutions, MROs can differ-
entiate themselves from airframer competition, since MROs can rely on internal base
maintenance facilities to perform cabin installation and thus assume true end-to-end
responsibility.
Another option for stand-alone solutions would be the development of a Consumable
& Expandable solution offer. For all but the largest carriers, optimizing the supply
chain for the large quantity of these low-value commodities is undoubtedly not core
to their business. MROs can provide value to airlines by assuming responsibility for
the supply and optimization of C&E stock in hubs and outstations. By establishing
favorable purchasing contracts with a multitude of vendors and distributors as well as
organizing an efficient logistics supply system, MROs can optimize airlines’ costs while
simultaneously reducing the complexity of their operations.
MROs that choose to ally with manufacturers should avoid the Workbench setup, as it
leaves them in a confined, dependent position as a sub-tier supplier of the manufac-
turer. Hence, the workbench setup is indeed a short-term, time-limited approach that
may ensure competitive survival, however at the expense of sustainable profitability
and growth. Instead, MROs should aim to establish coopetitive solution networks with
manufacturers that guarantee a direct customer channel and a higher level of compe-
tition on the MRO market. Even though the level of dependency on the manufacturer
remains relatively high, MROs should use their opportunities to develop a relationship
on equal footing with the OEMs. This position can be achieved by becoming an indis-
pensable part of the network (e.g., by providing a considerable share of the overhaul
capacity), or by providing difficult to imitate value-added services to manufacturers
and airlines.
Two-sided solutions are an even better type of alliance that MROs should embrace if op-
portunities present themselves. This setup allows MROs to regain most of the service
business that they may have lost due to the manufacturer’s incursion and places them
at a favorable integrator position within the supply chain. Furthermore, this setup al-
lows them to gain a positional advantage vis-a`-vis their peers, at least for the proportion
of products that the alliance partner fabricates. Also for manufacturers, this setup is at-
tractive because it allows them to focus on their core business while participating from
service revenues at reduced risk. However, even in this setup, MROs are forced to give
up their independence from the manufacturers. Hence, MROs exchange their differen-
tiation for a cost advantage, which is a tradeoff they will have to perform in changing
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market conditions.
This study has several implications for managers of independent MRO firms, as well.
These firms lack the affiliated airline and hence sourcing campaign which can be used
to gain operator experience and enter OEM alliance discussions. Furthermore, inde-
pendent MROs are often excluded from the MRO sourcing decision, which airlines in-
creasingly take at the point of asset purchase. For these reasons, independents are most
likely to be forced to abandon Engine Maintenance on new aircraft types since they
will not be able to receive a license. However, independent MROs are not doomed. In-
stead, they can innovate their business model to ensure competitive survival, prosper
in individual MRO market segments, or even thrive in niche markets.
One opportunity to ensure competitive survival might be to become a workbench part-
ner for aircraft manufacturers. To capture additional revenues in Components or Base
Maintenance, this is a viable, however, neither very profitable nor advisable configu-
ration to ensure competitive survival. In these less material- and IP-intensive market
segments, independent MROs should instead pursue an OEM-independent approach to
thwart the airframers’ aspirations to dominate the aftermarket.
In Base Maintenance, remaining independent is a better choice than forming part of
the airframer’s solution networks for various reasons. First, this configuration does not
strengthen the airframer’s position and overall service offer but increases insecurity
since the airframer needs to find partners to allocate base maintenance slots. Second,
it does not endanger total revenues, considering the increasing shortage of base main-
tenance capacity worldwide. Third, this approach ensures direct customer contact —
and the airframers may well be one of these customers.
Prospects for continuing business independently are also in Component Maintenance. In
this segment, independent MROs can offer Components Solutions by integrating in-
ternal MRO capabilities with parts overhauled by the manufacturers. However, it will
be challenging to achieve the same cost-base as airframers with possibly better con-
tractual conditions and airline MROs that can leverage sourcing campaigns of their
airlines to achieve cost advantages against these independent players. In effect, inde-
pendent MROs need to employ other measures to reach an attractive cost-base. Using
PMAs and surplus material are two cost levers that tackle material costs. An excel-
lent logistics system can enable competitive differentiation by allowing quicker access
to components and simultaneously decrease capital costs. Ideally, MROs should aim
to establish partnerships with component manufacturers to improve their competitive
position vis-a`-vis their peers and the airframer.
A third type of BMI that independent MROs can employ is to ally with lessors. Such a
partnership would allow improved access to aircraft sourcing campaigns at the point
of aircraft sales, which is the second large disadvantage that independents face. Value
Propositions to lessors could be formulated based on the operator experience and service-
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specific engineering capabilities that lessors do not possess. MROs should aim to find
solutions to the lessors’ pain points such as residual asset value and a flawless aircraft
transition process. Independents that, in contrast, intent to leverage their completely
independent market position into a positional advantage may have trouble in doing so. In
practice, airlines have only few concerns when contracting the maintenance arm of a
competing airline. For example, Air France KLM has contracted more than 100 airlines
for their Components Solution offer (AFI KLM E&M, 2019), and Lufthansa relies on the
independent Base Maintenance specialist HAECO for layovers of their long-haul fleet
(HAECO Group, 2019), even though they possess an in-house maintenance arm.
In principle, alliancing with other MROs does not resolve the threats caused by servitiza-
tion. The reason is that MRO alliances will hardly improve access to the manufacturer-
owned IP or enable them to participate in tenders during the sourcing decision. How-
ever, in the face of consolidating manufacturing markets on all tiers of the supply chain,
forming alliances to increase the bargaining power, stem the required investments, and
reap economies of scale is an attractive option for MROs. These alliances will how-
ever instead take shape as acquisitions of the smaller players by the industry leaders
and not as an alliance between equal partners. For smaller independent MROs, inor-
ganic growth or a partnership with airline affiliated MROs may be a promising option
to avoid an acquisition. To achieve the latter, independents would need to formulate
attractive Value Propositions based on their unique resources and capabilities. One op-
tion would be to provide innovative services that could be included in the service port-
folio of other MROs. Opportunities may lie in performing additional services within
a B-, C-, or D-check performed by another provider. These services could be complex
cabin modifications such as the installation of an antenna, structural repairs (e.g., the
cracked wings of the A380 were repaired by a specialized task force), or mobile en-
gine services. At the time of writing, becoming a licensed provider for mobile engine
services seems a promising growth path, considering the enormous challenges that all
participants in the supply chain face coping with the increasing technical difficulties of
modern engine types.
Finally, we are only scratching the surface of understanding and realizing the possibili-
ties for cost and differentiation advantage that can be leveraged through by digitization.
Digitization will increasingly replace preventive through predictive and on-condition
maintenance, which will allow cost savings through reduced material consumption and
efficiency gains, as well as quicker troubleshooting in the daily Line Maintenance busi-
ness. Today, MROs may gain a first mover advantage by defining applications jointly
with airlines and possibly manufacturers. Simultaneously, airlines need to secure data
ownership and unlimited, unencrypted access to all available data. Only then can air-
lines mitigate the threat of even further monopolization of the MRO marked through
smart servitization.
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Airline Managers This study also has implications for airline managers in charge of
the technical operations function as well as the MRO supply chain. Technical fleet
management is a core function of airlines that enables safe, reliable, and cost-efficient
operations for passengers onboard the aircraft. Disruptions in the internal and external
technical supply chain lead to delays and cancellations, which directly impact customer
perception, loyalty, airline performance (Knotts, 1999). External MRO services pro-
vided by traditional MRO service firms and OEMs represent a significant proportion
of the technical operations value chain of the airline. Hence, managing performance
and lifecycle costs of these external parties is paramount to ensure smooth operations
and a competitive cost-base. MRO and OEM solution offers have become an attrac-
tive option for lowering the risks associated with the operation and maintenance of the
complex technical system aircraft. Especially Engine and Components Solutions allow
most airlines to focus on their core business, mitigate risks, and establish a predictable
cost base. Moreover, especially small and start-up airlines can outsource most of their
technical operation by relying on comprehensive Aircraft Solutions. This move can
provide them with the technical competence required to start their operations, as well
as more reliable and possibly even cost-efficient operations.
Is it time to sit back, relax, and let the solution supplier do the work? Well, not exactly.
First, Aircraft Solution offers come at hefty flight hour rates and strong dependence
on the supplier. Here, I hope that the provided information supports their decision-
making and the contractual design of these comprehensive contracts, limiting customer
dependence and supporting gain-sharing models. In all types of solution offers, suppli-
ers take increasing responsibility for the airline’s technical operations, which decreases
the airline’s control over its performance and costs. Hence, KPI and pain/gain shar-
ing models including enforceable long-term maintenance cost guarantees need to be
established to counter the resulting one-sided dependency.
Second, airline managers should closely monitor the manufacturers’ servitization strate-
gies, which include creating increasing market barriers for independent MRO firms and
aim at monopolizing the service market for their equipment. On one hand, airlines
should welcome OEMs and their offers on the aftermarket. The reason is that the dif-
ferent resources and capabilities and approaches to the aftermarket, based on the previ-
ously product-centered business model, allows OEMs to drive innovation in the MRO
industry. Improved levels of innovation and competition can reduce airlines’ costs and
increase the reliability and availability of the fleet. However, airlines simultaneously
need to ensure the continuous access of independent MROs in all market segments and
their capability to make service offers independent from the manufacturers. Otherwise,
the formation of coopetitive networks or even two-sided solution agreements will fur-
ther consolidate the supply chain leaving airlines with less bargaining power. While
two-sided solutions are the most promising setup for MROs, they bear the threat of
even further supply chain consolidation for airlines. Hence, airline managers should
be wary of these developments. In conclusion, it remains to be seen whether even
higher OEM dominance in the supply chain will occur, or if airlines and MROs will be
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able to hold a market equilibrium that includes a competitive aftermarket.
One critical battleground is the open access to aircraft data that is applied in the nascent
field of smart servitization and digitally supported solutions. In this field, competition
should not be determined via the ownership of data but instead based on who can
develop the most competitive service offers based on data made available to all par-
ties. This approach would ensure competition between OEMs, MROs, and indepen-
dent analysts to the benefit of the airlines. Hence, airlines should pursue joint action to
safeguard unlimited, unencrypted access and ownership of the data generated by their
aircraft.
In conclusion, airlines can benefit from servitization through more players with a dif-
ferent background and increased competition; however, they need to ensure that com-
petition prevails long-term and that the OEM’s attempts to shut-off third party access
to the installed base are unsuccessful. Here, airlines are in a unique position as the cus-
tomer of both the manufacturers’ products and services to make the required demands
and lead those tough negotiations. If airline managers fail to ensure the continued ex-
istence of third-party MRO firms, they will be confronted with monopolization, lock-in
situations, increased OEM-dependence, and exaggerated prices for MRO services.
Aerospace Manufacturers Ultimately, also managers in the manufacturing industry
can benefit from this work, as it provides unique insights into competitive positioning
and alliance approaches of MROs in their unique role of competitors and potential part-
ners for the manufacturer’s servitization efforts. In contrast to most of the servitiza-
tion literature, this work sheds light on the strengths of partners in service networks
and the dynamic capabilities that these firms first need to develop to become partners
in manufacturer-led service networks. I hope that managers responsible for the de-
velopment of the manufacturer’s service business find the results helpful for forming
effective service networks, e.g. by actively extending their supplier’s capabilities.
Manufacturers that struggle to implement a profitable service business are encouraged
to deservitize, by relying on a two-sided solution offer by a single MRO. Here, the ser-
vice firm takes over the responsibility for the manufacturer’s service business while
gain-sharing models ensure participation of both parties in the profit potential of the
service market. The main advantages of this model are that both firms can concentrate
on their core business, participate in the aftermarket, and create a joint superior offer-
ing vis-a`-vis their competitors by combining their respective strengths. I hope that this
example may encourage manufacturers to depart from the mainstream paths of solu-
tion provisioning into new, potentially more promising ways to go downstream while
simultaneously concentrate on their core business.
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7.3 Limitations and Further Research
Like any other academic work, this study is not free of limitations. First, the empirical
setting of all three cases in the aerospace industry may limit the generalization of the
findings. The aerospace industry possesses characteristics such as complex technology,
long product lifecycles, a high installed base ratio, and manufacturers with intellec-
tual property rights. Consequently, the findings are likely to be generalizable for other
COPS industries, where servitization is a typical phenomenon (Oliva & Kallenberg,
2003; Hobday et al., 2005), but be more limited for industries with less complex goods.
In the latter type of sectors, dependency on the manufacturer and competitive advan-
tage of pure service firms may differ from the findings presented in this study.
One example is the automotive industry, where independent car repair shops were
repeatedly protected by the legal intervention from the manufacturers’ servitization
efforts to benefit consumer welfare and mitigate monopolization of the aftermarket.
However, also other markets such as energy production, building operations, and farm
or medical equipment exist, where servitization may be a relevant phenomenon to
which traditional service firms need to find competitive responses. Future studies
could replicate this study in other empirical settings to improve the generalizability
of the findings and possibly identify other alliance configurations.
Second, the case studies are based on interviews with MROs and airlines only. In-
cluding manufacturers in the sample would allow triangulating whether the sources
of competitive advantage and the proposed mechanisms are equally perceived by ma-
nufacturers. This reciprocal approach is especially intriguing, as the proposed mech-
anisms by which manufacturers achieve competitive advantage against pure service
firms (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011) were only partly confirmed by this study. Another limi-
tation of the competitive advantage framework is that it has little explanatory power in
explaining differences in competitive advantage in traditional (input-based) versus so-
lution (output-based) offerings. Refining the provided framework would enable schol-
ars and practitioners to gain a more fine-grained understanding of competition between
manufacturers and traditional service providers.
Third, other prospects outside of the realm of business model innovation may be promis-
ing to ensure the competitive survival of pure service firms. For example, MROs might
aim to merge with or acquire a manufacturer to integrate upwards and thus reduce
dependency. Another option would be to pursue lateral growth opportunities in other
industries.
Fourth, the identified contingency factors have some limitations. The first limitation
is the interviewees’ focus on dependency when taking the alliance decision. Future
studies could determine further contingency factors that shape the alliance decision,
which could be based on the identified benefits and sacrifices attached to such a deci-
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sion. Besides, the contingency factors have limited power in explaining the resulting
type of alliance configuration. Other factors that could not be identified in this study
might be of high importance in this regard. For example, solutions with a high value
derived from tangible characteristics might foster workbench and coopetitive setups,
while solutions, where value is created mainly through interaction between provider
and client, might foster the creation of two-sided solutions (Kuijken et al., 2017). More-
over, other antecedents to deservitization and the related two-sided solution such as
the realization of cost-savings by relying on lower-cost producers (Kowalkowski et al.,
2017) may be identified by future studies. Further research could aim to clarify which
contingency factors determine the appropriate configuration of alliances between ma-
nufacturers and pure service firms.
Another limitation is the list of dynamic capabilities and their microfoundations that
is, consistent with Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) and Teece (2007), neither extensive nor
exhaustive. For example, microfoundations to sense and seize opportunities resulting
from digitization emerged as a highly relevant topic that could be explored further.
Besides, the microfoundations of dynamic capabilities have been identified along the
two dimensions “developing solutions” and “alliancing with manufacturers”, remain
however unspecific to the different configurations. It is likely that reaching the more
advanced types of the MRO business model requires more advanced dynamic capabil-
ities. For example, providing a two-sided solution requires extensive co-specialization
between manufacturer and service provider, while the workbench is a comparatively
simple cooperative setup. A future opportunity would be to develop a maturity model
of microfoundations of dynamic capabilities required to reach each of the configura-
tions.
The limited coverage of the emerging field of predictive aircraft maintenance enabled
by the increasing use of sensor technology, data transmission, and data analysis repre-
sents another limitation. The improved transparency during operation of the aircraft,
the quicker identification of errors, and the usage of predictors to remove components
before failure are promising approaches to reduce MRO costs and further increase air-
craft reliability. While this technological advancements allow firms to achieve both cost
and differentiation advantages, increasing data availability is unlikely to be disruptive.
The reason is that newer generations of aircraft already have a high reliability (except
for considerable teething trouble) and that data-based aircraft reliability management is
already common practice. However, this new technology may shift large parts of main-
tenance from preventive to predictive maintenance logics based on live transparency
of the aircraft status. MROs need to master this change by innovating their business
model, no matter whether they, airlines, or manufacturers derive the predictions.
While airlines are per default the owners of the data generated by their fleet, manu-
facturers are aggressively pursuing strategies to protect this very data generated by
their proprietary equipment. Digital servitization, defined as the provision of digitally
supported services embedded in a physical product (Vendrell-Herrero & Wilson, 2017)
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allows manufacturers on one hand to provide better product and service offers to their
customers. On the other hand, manufacturers can make use of the data to erect barriers
that impede MROs from competing and use the information advantage to increase their
bargaining power towards airlines. A solution to this dilemma may be to make data
available to all parties, which would allow competition in digitally supported MRO ser-
vices without the downside of even further monopolization and positional advantage.
In conclusion, digitization, digital servitization, and predictive maintenance methods
are important trends that require the attention of all industry players alike. As we
are just starting to understand the possibilities, limitations, and implications of these
trends, researchers should engage in this exciting emerging research field.
Another avenue for further research would be linking service infusion and research
on coopetitive business models more systematically. Studies could investigate the an-
tecedents, management methods and results of coopetition in solution networks, tak-
ing, for example, Dorn et al. (2016) and the developed configurational approach as
points of departure.
Finally, my study has only taken the first steps in exploring the dark side of serviti-
zation. The findings indicate that servitization is less favorable than previously as-
sumed but instead may lead to increased buyer dependency up to lock-in situations,
and consequently adverse effects on buyers’ firm performance. In the aerospace indus-
try, first signs of resilience against manufacturers’ service offerings and market strate-
gies to dominate the aftermarket have become clearly visible not only in the interviews
but also in the complaint that the IATA has filed against engine manufacturer CFM (a
joint venture between GE and Safran). By prematurely agreeing to CFM’s proposal,
airlines have lost the opportunity to ensure sustainable competition in the engine mar-
ket. Even though CFM waives license fees to third-party providers and allows limited
usage of PMAs, the vast majority of MROs will not risk the investment to build engine
service capabilities. This will enable CFM to pursue its monopolization aftermarket
tactics even more aggressively backed by the carte blanche issued by airlines and the
European Commission. This case represents a perfect example of the lack of strategic
sourcing capabilities and long-term thinking of many airlines that lack the in-depth
understanding of the servitization in the aerospace industry. Hence, the aerospace in-
dustry is a suitable point of departure for future studies in the field of servitization in
analogous or digitally supported form. In regards to the adverse effects of servitization,
studies could employ quantitative methods to measure these effects over time either on
a buyer-supplier dyad or on a market level.
As servitization in the aerospace industry remains a complex, dynamic, and highly
exciting research field, I strongly encourage further empirical investigations amongst
manufacturers, MROs, and airlines.
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1 Costs of Aircraft Non-availability
The costs of non-availability (CNA) are calculated using an average contribution mar-
gin (ACM), which is defined as the selling price per ticket minus the variable costs per
ticket. The ACM ranges for most passenger airlines between 40% and 45%.
CNA = ∆days not available × Revenue per pax per leg× Earning Capacity
×Seat Load Factor× Legs per Day×ACM
The exemplary calculation using the values of Table 1 of costs of non-availability for an
A320 operated on a short haul flight, shows that approximately $30,000 lack of contri-
bution margin occur.
Factors Values
Average revenue per PAX per leg $70,00
Seat capacity A320 180
Average seat load factor 85%
Average legs per day 6,5
ACM margin 45%
D days not available 1
Costs of non-availability $31,326.75
Table 1: Exemplary Calculation of Costs of Non-availability (Based on Internal Sources)
This calculation is simplified, since it does not take other factors, such as cargo, the
availability of replacement aircraft, and the airline’s staff, supervising the base mainte-
nance event, into account.
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2 Costs for Aircraft Ferry Flights
Total costs of ownership (TCO) for ferry flights can be approximated through the fol-
lowing formula:
TCOferry flight = BH×(Aircraft Ownership Costs˙per BH + Maintenance Costs˙per BH)+
Navigation Fees + Landing Fees + Crew Costs + Fuel Consumption ×Fuel Price
The exemplary calculation using the Values in Table 2 of ferry costs results in approxi-
mately $14,000 total cost of ownership incurred for an intra-European ferry flight. It is
simplified, since it does not take other factors, such as cargo into account.
Factors Values
Block hours (BH) needed 3
Aircraft ownership cost / BH $670
Maintenance cost / BH $800
Landing fees $500
Navigation fees $1,800
Fuel consumption in gal 2,800
Fuel price/ gal (03/13/17) $1.5
Crew Cost $3,300
Sum inner-European Ferry Flight $14,210
Table 2: Exemplary Calculation of Ferry Flight Costs (Based on Internal Sources)
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3 Additional Case Material
Category Initial Questions Follow up Questions
Introduction, Servitization, 
Business Model
Innovation 
• what touchpoints have you had with 
OEMs' service offers?
• what has changed with the OEMs' entry in 
the aftermarket?
• What changes have you made to your 
business model?
• how does offering solutions differ from traditional offerings/pure 
service offerings?
• how do customer requirements change and what will be the 
requirements of the future?
• how do requirement between the different customer groups differ 
(e.g., airlines and lessors)
BMI 1: Developing Solutions
• Describe the solution business model [of 
the specific case]?
Categories of business model canvas:
• Value Proposition
• Key Resources
• Key Activities
• Key Partners
• Cost Structure
• Channels
• Relationships
• Customer Segments
• Revenue Structure
• What are the factors that determine in 
[interviewee's case] that you can [/ 
cannot] provide solutions?
• are these factors generalizable?
• how important are these factors?
To provide solutions:
• which resources and capabilities did you 
need to develop?
• which resources and capabilities did you 
acquire from external partners? 
• how and why are these resourced developed 
internally/externally?
• how did you develop solutions? 
which [dynamic] capabilities did you 
require to develop solutions?
• which sensing capabilities?
• which seizing capabilities?
• which reconfiguring capabilities?
Competitive Advantage
Strengths and weaknesses:
• What are strengths and weaknesses of 
MROs?
• What are strengths and weaknesses of 
OEMs?
• how can the strengths of MROs be leveraged into a cost- or 
differentiation leadership?
• how can the strengths of OEMs be leveraged into a cost- or 
differentiation leadership?
BMI 2: Alliancing with 
Manufacturers
• how does your business model differ 
being an OEM network partner compared 
to your traditional business model?
Categories of business model canvas:
• Value Proposition
• Key Resources
• Key Activities
• Key Partners
• Cost Structure
• Channels
• Relationships
• Customer Segments
• Revenue Structure
• What are the factors that determined that 
you became a network partner of the 
OEM?
• why did you chose to collaborate?
• in what case would you chose to compete?
• how did you become an OEM Network 
Partner?
• which [dynamic] capabilities did/do you 
require to become OEM network partner?
• which sensing capabilities?
• which seizing capabilities?
• which reconfiguring capabilities?
Table 3: Interview Protocol
For analytical purposes, a Business Model Canvas that describes the focal company’s
business model in each Case has been developed. The individual Business Model Can-
vases are configuration-agnostic, meaning that all elements of the business model are
summarized, irrespective of in which configuration they are utilized.
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Key Activities
• Engine Disassembly, 
Assembly, Test
• Engine Parts Repair
• Workscoping
• Mobile services
• Dynamic Feedback 
Loops
Key Resources
• Discounted Material, 
Repair Manuals, 
Mechanics, Engineers, 
Plants & equipment
• Mobile maintenance 
network
Key Capabilities
• Engine Repair Capability
• Engineering Capability
Value Proposition
• Sharing risk and 
investment
• Decrease of engine 
repair costs
• Delivering local support
• Improving OEM’s 
engineering capabilities
Customer Segments
• Engine OEMs
• Airlines
Channels
Network Configurations: 
• Open: direct channel 
with airline
• Closed: channel only 
with OEM, no direct 
customer channels
Customer Relationship
OEM: 
• Long-term cooperation 
on equal footing
Airline: 
• Relationship restricted in 
closed network 
configuration
Revenue Streams
• Fixed-price for performing work packages
• Gain-sharing models for cost reductions
Cost Structure
• One-off investment in license 
• Material at varying discount rates
• Labor
• Plants and equipment
Key Partners
• Affiliated Airline with 
sourcing campaign
• Engine OEMs
Figure 1: Engine Network Partner Business Model
Key Capabilities
• Integration and multi-
vendor capability 
• Operational capabilities 
(asset management, 
engineering, repair)
Key Resources
• (Joint) worldwide asset 
supply system
• Serviced fleet
• Workshops and 
mechanics
• Material 
• Worldwide sales force
• Workshops and 
mechanics
Key Activities
• Dynamic Feedback 
Loops: Engineering 
Council
• Alliance Management
Value Proposition
VP developed for OES:
• Focus on core business 
manufacturing
• reduction of 
investments, costs, 
assets and risks 
associated with 
aftermarket support 
• Participation in 
aftermarket revenues 
• Engineering and 
customer feedback to 
benefit new product 
development
Customer Segments
• All types of Airlines 
operating the A350 
aircraft
• Access to customers 
preferring service by 
OES
Channels
• Direct Channel to airline 
remains
• Dynamic Feedback 
Loops and Alliance 
Management with OES
Customer Relationship
• OES-Alliance: incentive-
alignment and high 
mutual dependency
• Multifaceted relationship: 
supplier and competitor 
on other aircraft types
• Unchanged relationship 
with airline
Revenue Streams
• Revenues incurred from maintenance contracts with airlines and third-
party MRO
• Risk and Revenue-sharing mechanism: sharing of revenues via license 
fee
Cost Structure
• Risk and Revenue-sharing mechanism: Material discounts offset by 
revenue-dependent license fee
Key Partners
• Alliance with OES on the 
A350 aircraft program
Figure 2: Components Network Partner Business Model
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Figure 3: Aircraft Solutions Business Model
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